Recent Decisions
Knowles v. Mirzayance
, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411 (Mar. 25, 2009)
In this non-capital California murder case, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision granting relief on petitioner’s claim that trial counsel had been ineffective for
abandoning a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) defense. Pursuant to state law, cases
involving NGI defenses proceed in two phases: at the first phase, the jury determines the
defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged offense; if the defendant is found guilty at the first
phase, the trial moves to a second phase at which the NGI defense is considered. In this case, the
jury at the first phase rejected Mirzayance’s request for a second degree murder conviction, and
instead convicted him of first degree, premeditated and deliberate murder. Although trial counsel
had a well developed NGI defense prepared to present at the second phase, he decided to
abandon it because the jury’s first degree murder verdict indicated it had rejected expert
testimony similar to that which would have been presented at the second phase, and because
Mirzayance’s parents expressed reluctance to provide the emotional testimony counsel believed
was necessary to create a possibility of success on the NGI defense.
Mirzayance’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the NGI defense was denied
without explanation by the state habeas courts. After an initial denial of federal habeas relief was
reversed by the Ninth Circuit and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing, the federal
magistrate judge recommended that relief be granted, and the district court adopted that
recommendation. The recommendation was based on the magistrate judge’s interpretation of the
Ninth Circuit’s remand order as requiring a finding of deficient performance if withdrawal of the
NGI defense achieved "no tactical advantage." 129 S.Ct. at 1417. Because the evidence indicated
that Mirzayance had "nothing to lose" by going forward with the defense, and because the Ninth
Circuit’s remand order had characterized the NGI defense as "viable and strong," the magistrate
concluded, and the district court accepted, that relief was required. Id. After the Ninth Circuit’s
initial decision affirming the grant of relief was vacated and remanded for further consideration
in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), the Ninth Circuit adhered to its determination
that "the California [state] court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law because
defense counsel’s failure to pursue the insanity defense constituted deficient performance as it
‘secured ... [n]o actual tactical advantage.’" 129 S.Ct. at 1418.
In a portion of the opinion not joined by Scalia, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, examined the state court’s unexplained denial of relief under §2254(d). In
footnote 2, the Court noted that although Mirzayance had challenged the applicability of
§2254(d) before the court of appeals, his brief to the Supreme Court contended that "the Court of
Appeals correctly applied §2254(d) to his claim," while "question[ing] whether the [state court’s]
denial of his claim should receive as much deference as the ‘prototypical’ state-court
adjudication ‘involv[ing] both a reasoned, written opinion and an adequate development of the
factual record ...’" 129 S.Ct. at 1418, n.2 (third modification by the Court). The Court went on to
add that, "because Mirzayance has not argued that §2254(d) is entirely inapplicable to his claim
or that the state court failed to reach an adjudication on the merits, we initially evaluate his claim
through the deferential lens of §2254(d)." Id.
Proceeding under §2254(d), the Court held that "the state court’s decision to deny Mirzayance’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim did not violate clearly established federal law." The Court
explained:
The Court of Appeals reached a contrary result based, in large measure, on its
application of an improper standard of review-it blamed counsel for abandoning
the NGI claim because there was nothing to lose by pursuing it. But this Court has
held on numerous occasions that it is not "‘an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal law’" for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule
that has not been squarely established by this Court. This Court has never
established anything akin to the Court of Appeals’ "nothing to lose" standard for
evaluating Strickland claims. Indeed, Mirzayance himself acknowledges that a
"nothing to lose" rule is "unrecognized by this Court." And the Court of Appeals
did not cite any Supreme Court decision establishing a "nothing to lose" standard
in any of its three opinions in this case.
129 S.Ct. at 1419 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to explain that this case was
governed by the rule of Strickland, adding that the Court has "repeatedly applied that [Strickland]
standard to evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims where there is no other Supreme
Court precedent directly on point." After emphasizing that the question under §2254(d) is
whether the state court’s decision was "unreasonable," and that "because the Strickland standard
is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a
defendant has not satisfied that standard," the Court concluded as follows:
Under the doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim
evaluated under the §2254(d)(1) standard, ... Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance
claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that his defense
counsel’s performance was not deficient when he counseled Mirzayance to
abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of success.
129 S.Ct. at 1420.
Finally, in a portion of the opinion joined by the entire Court, Justice Thomas added that, "[e]ven
if Mirzayance’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim were eligible for de novo review, it
would still fail," because he had shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 129 S.Ct. at
1420. The Court explained that "counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he
reasonably believed was a claim doomed to fail," that the experts upon whom the defense would
have had to rely were vulnerable to impeachment, and that trial counsel had been under no
obligation to coerce Mirzayance’s reluctant parents to testify. Id. The Court further observed that
the reasonableness of counsel’s performance was supported by the magistrate judge’s factual
findings, and that the Ninth Circuit had ignored those findings without regard to the "clearly
erroneous" standard prescribed by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). 129 S.Ct. at 1421. The Court
concluded its analysis with the observation that "[i]t was highly improbable that a jury, which
had just rejected testimony about Mirzayance’s mental condition when the State bore the burden
of proof, would have reached a different result when Mirzayance presented similar evidence at
the NGI phase." 129 S.Ct. at 1422.
Jimenez v. Quarterman
___S.Ct.___, 2009 WL 63833 (Jan. 13, 2009)
The Supreme Court (Thomas, J.) unanimously reversed the dismissal as untimely of petitioner’s §2254 petition
challenging his Texas robbery conviction. Several years after petitioner’s original state court direct appeal
was dismissed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted him leave to pursue an out-of-time direct appeal, and
later affirmed his conviction. Petitioner later filed a federal habeas petition, contending that the petition was
timely under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed within one year (excluding time tolled pursuant to
§2244(d)(2)) of the date on which the second direct appeal was concluded. The district court disagreed, holding
that the federal limitations period began to run at the conclusion of the first direct appeal, and that the state
court’s decision to permit a second, out-of-time appeal did not restart the clock. The Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court’s decision by denying a certificate of appealability.
Beginning, “as with any question of statutory interpretation, ... with the plain language of the statute,” the
Supreme Court found that “the latter date controls.” 2009 WL 63833 at *4. After summarizing its prior
determinations concerning the time at which a conviction becomes “final,” and finding “no reason to depart from
this settled understanding, which comports with the most natural reading of the statutory text,” the Court found
that “direct review cannot conclude for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) until the ‘availability of direct appeal to the
state courts,’ and to this Court, has been exhausted.” 2009 WL 63833 at *4 (citations omitted). “Under the
statutory definition,” the Court continued, “once the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of
petitioner’s conviction ..., petitioner’s conviction was no longer final for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A).” 2009 WL
63833 at *4. The Court concluded by stating its holding as follows:
Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold that, where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file
an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the defendant has first sought federal
habeas relief, his judgment is not yet “final” for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A). In such a case, “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”
must reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking review of
that appeal.
2009 WL 63833 at *5.