Recent Decisions

Dye v. Hofbauer
___S.Ct.___, 2005 WL 2494290 (Oct. 11, 2005) (per curiam)

In this non-capital Michigan murder case, the Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the Sixth Circuit panel’s denial of habeas relief. The Court found “two errors . . . meriting reversal of the judgment.” [page numbers not yet available]. First, it rejected the Sixth Circuit’s apparent assumption that, because the state court’s opinion did not mention the federal component of petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, petitioner failed to present the federal claim to the state court. The Court explained that “[f]ailure of a state appellate court to mention a federal claim does not mean the claim was not presented to it,” and that, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s statement that petitioner’s direct appeal brief was not in the federal record, “the District Court record contains the brief petitioner filed in state court, and the brief sets out the federal claim.” Second, the Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s alternative determination that petitioner’s claim did not warrant review because it was presented “in too vague and general a form.” “The habeas petition,” the Court explained, “made clear and repeated references to an appended supporting brief, which presented Dye’s federal claim with more than sufficient particularity.” (citing Fed Rules Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2), 10(c)). “As the prosecutorial misconduct claim was presented properly,” the Court concluded, “it, and any other federal claims properly presented, should be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand.”

Kane v. Espitia
___S.Ct.___, 2005 WL 2838601 (Oct. 31, 2005) (per curiam)

The Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of relief in this California carjacking case, holding that petitioner had no “clearly established” federal right to access to a law library while incarcerated for purposes of preparing to defend himself at trial. The Court explained:

A necessary condition for federal habeas relief here is that the state court’s decision be “contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Neither the opinion below, nor any of the appellate cases it relies on, identifies a source in our case law for the law library access right other than Faretta [v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)]. The federal appellate courts have split on whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, implies a right of the pro se defendant to have access to a law library. That question cannot be resolved here, however, as it is clear that Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant. The [Ninth Circuit] therefore erred in holding [in this case and a previous case], based on Faretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief.

2005 WL 2838601 at *

Bradshaw v. Richey
126 S.Ct. 602 (2005) (per curiam)

In this Ohio capital case, the Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for certiorari, vacated the Sixth Circuit grant of relief, and remanded for further proceedings. The court of appeals had granted relief on two grounds: (1) that Ohio state law did not permit the use of transferred intent in a prosecutions for aggravated felony murder, and that reading state law to permit that theory for petitioner’s case would violate the due process guarantee of fair notice, and (2) that trial counsel had been ineffective in challenging the state’s evidence that the fire which led to the death of the decedent in this case had resulted from arson.

On the first ground, the Court found that the Sixth Circuit erred in disregarding the Ohio Supreme Court’s “perfectly clear and unambiguous” determination that transferred intent did apply to petitioner’s case. [page numbers not yet available]. As to the Sixth Circuit’s fair notice concerns, the Court began by observing that “[i]t is doubtful whether this principle of fair notice has any application to a case of transferred intent, where the defendant’s contemplated conduct was exactly what the relevant statute forbade.” (emphasis by the Court). The Court went on to conclude that, in any event, the Sixth Circuit was wrong to rely upon a state law provision requiring a showing of specific intent to kill the person actually killed, since that provision applied only where the prosecution sought to prove intent through the inherent dangerousness of the underlying felony, whereas in this case, “intent to kill was proved directly. It was not inferred from the dangerousness of the arson. It was shown to be the purpose of the arson.” (emphasis by the Court).

As to the ineffective assistance of counsel ground, the Court agreed with the state that “the Sixth Circuit erred in its adjudication of this claim by relying on evidence that was not properly presented to the state habeas courts without first determining (1) whether respondent was at fault for failing to develop the factual bases for his claims in state court, or (2) whether respondent satisfied the criteria established by 28 U. S. C. §2254(e)(2),” and that “the Sixth Circuit erred by disregarding the state habeas courts’ conclusion that the forensic expert whom respondent’s trial counsel hired was a ‘properly qualified expert,’ without analyzing whether the state court’s factual finding had been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” (internal citations omitted). The Court further noted that the Sixth Circuit overlooked a state court finding that “certain grounds” included in petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim were defaulted, but also acknowledged petitioner’s contention that “the State failed to preserve its objection to the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on evidence not presented in state court by failing to raise this argument properly before the Sixth Circuit.” Observing that, “[b]ecause the relevant errors had not yet occurred, the Sixth Circuit has had no opportunity to address the argument that the State failed to preserve its Holland [v. Jackson, 452 U.S. 649 (2004) (per curiam)] argument[,]” the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit “is better situated to address this argument in the first instance.”

Day v. McDonough
126 S.Ct.1675 (2006)

In this non-capital murder case, the Court (5 to 4; Ginsburg, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, Souter, Alito, JJ.) held that “district courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition.” Id. at 1683. The Court added that, “before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions. Further, the court must assure itself that the petitioner is not significantly prejudiced by the delayed focus on the limitation issue, and ‘determine whether the interests of justice would be better served’ by addressing the merits or by dismissing the petition as time barred.” Id. at 1684 (citations omitted).

The question addressed in this case arose as a result of the state’s miscalculation of the limitations period in petitioner’s case, which led the state to erroneously concede the timeliness of the petition before the district court. Noting a distinction between the sort of mistake committed by counsel for the state in this case, and an “intelligent waiver” of the limitations period by the state – which a “district court would not be at liberty to disregard,” id. – the Court chose to treat the question of the district court’s authority to raise the limitations period sua sponte not as one governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but instead as analogous to other “nonjurisdictional” “threshold barriers” to federal habeas review, such as exhaustion, procedural default and nonretroactivity, each of which may be raised sua sponte. Id. at 1681. The Court further expressed its agreement with the state that “the petition should not be deemed timely simply because a government attorney calculated the days in between petitions incorrectly,” and emphasized that it would have been permissible under the rules for the district court to have alerted the state to the possibility of a timeliness problem and invited an amended answer, which “might have obviated this controversy . . .” Id. at 1683.

Having concluded that the Eleventh Circuit was correct in holding that a district court retains authority to raise the limitations period sua sponte even after the respondent has answered a petition, the Court affirmed its judgment. However, the Court made clear that its opinion decided only that question, and “not the correctness of [district court’s] decision that the limitation period had run,” since the answer to that question is likely to turn on the outcome of Lawrence v. Florida, No. 05-8820 (cert. granted Mar. 27, 2006). Id. at 1680 n. 2.

Justice Stevens agreed with the Court’s resolution of the question presented, but dissented (joined by Breyer, J.) “from the entry of the Court’s judgment at this time,” rather than awaiting the decision in Lawrence v. Florida. “It seems improvident,” Justice Stevens explained, “to affirm a possibly erroneous Court of Appeals judgment . . . when we have already granted certiorari to address the issue on which the Court of Appeals may have erred.” Id. at 1685.

Justice Scalia (joined by Thomas and Breyer, JJ.) dissented, contending that the Court erred in failing to apply the ordinary rules of forfeiture for limitations and other affirmative defenses prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

House v. Bell
126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006)

In this Tennessee capital case, the Court (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) determined that "new revelations" about the forensic evidence relied upon by the prosecution to convict petitioner at trial, and about an alternate suspect, were sufficient to make the "stringent showing required by" Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), such that petitioner should be permitted to proceed on his otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims in the district court.

Before discussing petitioner’s new evidence, the Court rejected the state’s contention that the AEDPA "has replaced the Schlup standard with a stricter test based on Sawyer [v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992)], which permits consideration of successive, abusive, or defaulted sentencing-related claims only if the petitioner ‘show[s] by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law[.]" After noting that both §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and §2254(e)(2) "establish[] a similar standard" for certain circumstances, the Court explained that "[n]either provision addresses the type of petition at issue here – a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence." "Thus," the Court concluded, "the standard of review in these provisions is inapplicable."

After reviewing the requirements of the Schlup standard, the Court rejected the state’s contention that "the District Court’s findings in this case tie our hands, precluding a ruling in House’s favor absent a showing of clear error as to the District Court’s specific determinations." The Court explained:

This view overstates the effect of the District Court’s ruling. Deference is given to a trial court’s assessment of evidence presented to it in the first instance. Yet the Schlup inquiry, we repeat, requires a holistic judgment about "‘all the evidence,’" and its likely effect on reasonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt standard. As a general rule, the inquiry does not turn on discrete findings regarding disputed points of fact, and "[i]t is not the district court’s independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses." Here, although the District Court attentively managed complex proceedings, carefully reviewed the extensive record, and drew certain conclusions about the evidence, the court did not clearly apply Schlup’s predictive standard regarding whether reasonable jurors would have reasonable doubt. As we shall explain, moreover, we are uncertain about the basis for some of the District Court’s conclusions – a consideration that weakens our reliance on its determinations.

(citations omitted).

Having established these limits on the impact of the district court’s findings, the Court proceeded to a detailed, fact-intensive examination of the evidence offered by petitioner in support of his actual innocence argument. That evidence fell into three broad categories: (1) DNA test results showing that semen found on the victim’s clothing, and described ast trial as possibly having come from petitioner, had been contributed by the victim’s husband; (2) expert testimony and circumstantial evidence indicating that small bloodstains on pants seized from petitioner may have resulted from law enforcement’s improper handling of the physical evidence; and (3) testimony from approximately five lay witnesses indicating that the victim’s husband had physically abused her in the past, attempted to arrange a false alibi for himself, and actually confessed to committing the murder himself. On the basis of this evidence, the Court concluded that "although the issue is close, . . . this is the rare case where – had the jury heard all the conflicting testimony – it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt."

Finally, the Court declined petitioner’s invitation to "answer the question left open in Herrera [v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993),] and hold not only that freestanding innocence claims are possible but also that he has established one." The Court explained: "The sequence of the Court’s decisions in Herrera and Schlup – first leaving unresolved the status of freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway standard – implies at the least that Herrera requires more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It follows, given the closeness of the Schlup question here, that House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera."

Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) concurred in the Court’s rejection of petitioner’s Herrera claim, but dissented from the determination that he should be permitted to pass through the Schlup gateway, contending, inter alia, that the Court had improperly substituted its own judgments about the evidence for those of the district judge who presided over the evidentiary hearing.