2000 Term
Zadvydas v. Davis
121 S.Ct. 4291 (2001)In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that habeas
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241 are available to aliens being held
in post-removal detention beyond the 90-day removal period. Zadvydas was
held beyond the 90-day period because other countries refused to accept
him; the Fifth Circuit held that his detention did not violate the
Constitution because his eventual removal was not impossible. Kim Ho Ma
was also held beyond the 90-day period because Cambodia had no
repatriation treaty with the United States; the Ninth Circuit held that
his detention violated the Constitution because there was no realistic
chance he would be removed.
The Court held that section 2241 habeas proceedings were available
for statutory and constitutional challenges to detention extending
beyond the 90-day period. Statutory changes to immigration law had not
affected the availability of this remedy. The statute governing
detention beyond the 90-day period implicitly limits such detention to a
reasonable period, and application of the reasonable time limitation is
subject to review by federal courts. The Court set forth guidelines for
applying the reasonable time limitation.
Tyler v. Cain
121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001)In a second habeas corpus proceeding, the Court
addressed a question regarding the AEDPA: whether the rule of Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), was "made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court" under 28 U.S.C. sec.
2244(b)(2)(A). In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court determined that the Cage
rule had not been "made" retroactive by the Supreme Court because "made"
means "held" and the Court had not held Cage retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review. The Court rejected Tyler’s argument that
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), made clear that retroactive
application of Cage is warranted under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989).
The Court refused to decide whether Cage is retroactive to cases on
collateral review. In order for Tyler to satisfy the requirements of
section 2244(b)(2)(A) for proceeding on a second petition, the rule he
relied upon had to have already been made retroactive when he filed the
petition. Therefore, a decision on whether Cage is retroactive would not
help Tyler and would be dictum.
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion to explain that a single
decision holding a rule retroactive is not the only way to satisfy
section 2244(b)(2)(A). A rule may be "made" retroactive by the Supreme
Court through multiple decisions which "logically dictate" the rule’s
retroactivity. However, "the holdings must dictate the conclusion and
not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule
applies retroactively."
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr
121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001)In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court addressed the
impact of amendments to immigration law in the AEDPA and the IIRIRA
(Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act).
Specifically, the Court addressed the effect of these amendments on the
availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241, on
conduct that occurred before the amendments’ enactment and on the
availability of discretionary relief from deportation. Before the AEDPA
and IIRIRA, the Attorney General had discretion to waive deportation in
certain cases. The AEDPA identified a broad set of offenses for which
conviction would preclude such discretionary relief, and the IIRIRA
precludes such relief for anyone previously "convicted of any aggravated
felony."
In a habeas petition, St. Cyr raised a pure question of law,
contesting the Attorney General’s conclusion that he was not eligible
for discretionary relief as a matter of statutory interpretation. The
district court and Second Circuit held they had jurisdiction to consider
this question under section 2241, but the I.N.S. argued the AEDPA and
IIRIRA stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to decide this
question of law. Finding no "clear statement" of congressional intent to
repeal habeas jurisdiction and concluding that accepting the I.N.S.
argument would present "a serious Suspension Clause issue," the Court
held that habeas proceedings under section 2241 were available to
persons like St. Cyr. The Court also held the repeal of the availability
of discretionary relief to persons who pled guilty to certain offenses
could not be applied retroactively to aliens who would have been
eligible for such relief under the law in effect at the time of their
plea.
Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S.
121 S. Ct. 2268In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court addressed whether
resident aliens subject to removal may seek relief in the federal
courts. Petitioners sought to challenge the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ decision that they were ineligible as a matter of law for a
discretionary waiver of deportation. Petitioners filed petitions for
review under 8 U.S.C. sec. 1252(a)(1) in the Court of Appeals and also
filed habeas petitions in the district court under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions filed there, but held that
petitioners could pursue their habeas actions.
The Court held that in the IIRIRA, Congress removed the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to hear a petition challenging a final order of
removal for an alien who is removable because of conviction for certain
criminal offenses. However, the Court held that leaving aliens with no
forum for adjudicating claims such as those raised in this case "would
raise serious constitutional questions" which can be alleviated by
construing the IIRIRA not to preclude aliens such as the petitioners
from pursuing habeas relief under section 2241.
Duncan v. Walker
121 S. Ct. 2120 (2001)In a case involving the AEDPA’s tolling
provisions, the Court addressed whether a federal habeas corpus petition
is an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review"
under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2244(d)(2). Walker’s state conviction became final
in April 1996, and he filed a federal habeas corpus petition on April
10, 1996, before the effective date of the AEDPA. In July 1996, the
district court dismissed the petition without prejudice because it was
not apparent Walker had exhausted his state remedies. On May 20, 1997,
Walker filed another federal petition, but had not returned to state
court since his first petition was dismissed. The district court
dismissed the new petition as time barred because it had not been filed
within a reasonable time from the AEDPA’s effective date. The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that Walker’s first petition tolled the
limitations period because it was an application for "other collateral
review" under 2244(d)(2).
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that a federal
habeas corpus petition is not an "application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review" and therefore does not toll the limitations
period. The Court based this conclusion on the language of the statute
and the purposes of the AEDPA. The Court noted that its "sole task" in
this case was statutory construction and that when Walker’s first
petition was dismissed, he had nine months remaining in the limitations
period, but he neither returned to state court nor filed a nondefective
petition before his time elapsed. Thus, the court declined to address
alternative scenarios or the availability of equitable tolling.
Justices Stevens and Souter concurred, pointing out that a district
court may retain jurisdiction over a federal petition pending exhaustion
of state remedies and that equitable tolling could be available on facts
different from those in this case.
Penry v. Johnson
121 S. Ct. 1910 (2001)In a habeas case governed by the AEDPA, the
Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the admission into evidence
of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled
interview with Penry violated the Fifth Amendment; (2) whether the
penalty phase jury instructions complied with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) (Penry I). The Court analyzed these questions under the AEDPA
provision which prohibits a federal court from granting habeas relief
with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless
that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
As to the Fifth Amendment claim, which relied upon Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court factually distinguished this case from
Estelle. Without deciding whether these differences affected the merits
of the claim, the Court pointed out that Estelle suggested it was
limited to its "distinct circumstances." The Court thus decided it could
not say that the Texas court’s decision was objectively
unreasonable.
As to the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court determined that the
penalty phase jury instructions did not provide the jury a mechanism to
give effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence, as required by Penry I. The
jury was instructed to answer three special issues: whether Penry acted
deliberately when he killed the victim; whether there was a probability
Penry would be dangerous in the future; and whether Penry acted
unreasonably in response to provocation. The trial court also gave the
jury a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The verdict form
provided to the jury listed only the three special issues and allowed a
yes or no answer to each issue.
In Penry I, the Court had held that the same three special issues
were not broad enough to provide a vehicle for giving effect to
mitigating evidence. Here, the Texas court had held that providing the
jury with the supplemental instruction satisfied Penry I. The Texas
court could have rejected Penry’s claim based on a belief that Penry I
was satisfied merely by giving the supplemental instruction. If so, the
Supreme Court said, the Texas court had misapprehended Penry I, which
did not hold that simply mentioning mitigating circumstances to a jury
or informing a jury it may "consider" mitigating circumstances satisfied
the Eighth Amendment. "Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury be
able to ‘consider and give effect to [a defendant’s mitigating] evidence
in imposing sentence."
The Texas court could have rejected Penry’s claim based on a belief
that Penry I was satisfied by the substance of the supplemental
instruction. If so, the Supreme Court held that the confusing
supplemental instruction on mitigation did not allow the jurors to give
effect to the mitigation. If jurors interpreted the supplemental
instruction as telling them to take mitigation into account in deciding
the special issues, those issues were not broad enough to give effect to
the mitigation, as Penry I had previously held. If jurors interpreted
the supplemental instruction as telling them they could answer no to a
special issue if the mitigation warranted a life sentence, the
instructions as a whole were rendered internally contradictory and
required the jurors to give an untruthful answer to one or more special
issues.
In determining that the Texas court’s decision
was objectively unreasonable, the Court also pointed out that Penry I
had provided guidance on drafting the jury instructions and that Texas’
current capital sentencing scheme (which was revised after Penry’s
second penalty phase) also provided a helpful frame of reference. The
Court concluded that the Texas court’s rejection of Penry’s claim was
objectively unreasonable because "[a]ny realistic assessment of the
manner in which the supplemental instruction operated" would have led to
the same conclusion as that in Penry I.
Florida v. Thomas
121 S. Ct. 1905 (2001)The Court dismissed a
certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction. The state trial court
granted a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, and the
district court of appeal reversed. The Florida Supreme Court then
reversed the district court of appeal and remanded for further trial
court proceedings on the issue. The Supreme Court granted the state’s
certiorari petition on the Fourth Amendment issue, but then dismissed
the petition because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was not
"final" under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1257(a) and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Daniels v. U.S.
121 S. Ct. 1578 (2001)Daniels was convicted of a
federal crime, and his sentence was enhanced based on prior state
convictions. He filed a 2255 motion contending his federal sentence was
unconstitutional because it was based in part upon prior state
convictions which were unconstitutional. In a 5 to 4 decision relying
largely upon Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), the Court
held that 2255 could not be used to challenge a federal sentence on the
ground that prior convictions were unconstitutional. The only exception
to this rule is when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), but this challenge may
generally only be raised in 2255 if it was raised at the federal
sentencing proceeding. Prior convictions must be challenged in the
jurisdictions where they were obtained and through the remedies
available in those jurisdictions. If such challenges are not pursued or
are unsuccessful, the defendant is "without recourse," the prior
convictions are presumed valid at a federal sentencing, and the prior
convictions may not be challenged under 2255. Five members of the Court
joined in these conclusions.
The Court notes that the text of section 2255 "is
broad enough to cover a claim that an enhanced federal sentence violates
due process" and that there may be "rare cases" in which the defendant
had no mechanism to challenge the prior through no fault of his own.
Only four members of the majority joined this portion of the opinion.
Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v.
Coss
121 S. Ct. 1567 (2001)Coss was convicted and
sentenced in state court. He filed a 2254 petition challenging his
current sentence, contending it was based upon an unconstitutional prior
state court conviction. The Third Circuit ordered habeas relief.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 decision,
holding that a state prisoner may not collaterally attack a prior
conviction in a 2254 petition. Once a prior state conviction is no
longer open to direct or collateral attack on its own, the conviction is
regarded as conclusively valid. The only exception to this rule is for
prior convictions obtained in violation of Gideon, provided the 2254
petitioner has satisfied the procedural prerequisites for relief
including exhaustion of remedies.
A portion of the opinion joined by only three
members of the Court explained that another exception to the rule might
be available if the failure to obtain timely review of the prior
conviction is not the petitioner’s fault. This might occur if a state
court refuses to rule on a properly presented constitutional claim or if
the petitioner obtains previously unavailable evidence that he is
actually innocent of the prior offense. In such situations, the
petitioner must also show that the prior conviction adversely affected
his present sentence. Four members of the Court joined the part of the
opinion explaining that Coss did not meet this exception. Coss had filed
a state post-conviction motion challenging his prior conviction, and
that motion sat in state court for 14 years with no ruling. However,
Coss did not show that his prior conviction actually affected his
present sentence.
Texas v. Cobb
121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001)In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court addressed the question "whether the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel extends to crimes that are ‘factually related’ to those that
have actually been charged." Based upon McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.
171 (1991), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
"offense specific." The Court rejected the view of some state courts and
federal Courts of Appeals that there was an exception to McNeil for
crimes which were "factually related" to the charged offense.
The definition of "offense" is that contained in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Thus, "when the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that,
even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under
the Blockburger test." Cobb was charged with burglary and was appointed
counsel on that charge. When police later questioned him in the absence
of counsel about the disappearance of two people from the burglarized
house, he confessed to murdering them. As defined by Texas law, burglary
and murder are not the same offense under Blockburger. Therefore, the
Sixth Amendment did not bar the police interrogation about the
murders.
Shafer v. South Carolina
121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001)In Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994), the Supreme Court held that it did
not comport with due process for the state to "secure a death sentence
on the ground, at least in part, of [defendant’s] future dangerousness,
while at the same time concealing from the sentencing jury the true
meaning of its only noncapital sentencing alternative, namely, that life
imprisonment meant life without parole." In Shafer v. South Carolina,
121 S.Ct. 1263 (2001), the Supreme Court reviewed the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s holding that Simmons did not control under the current
sentencing scheme in South Carolina. Under this scheme, at the time the
case is submitted to the jury at sentencing, the jurors could return
with a finding that no statutory aggravating circumstance was proven.
Thereupon, the jurors would not sentence; the judge would sentence the
defendant to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment for thirty years. South Carolina argued that because at the
time the sentencers deliberated there was the possibility of a sentence
that included the possibility of parole, a Simmons instruction was not
required.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Once
the jurors find an aggravating circumstance, then there are only two
possible sentences – life without parole or execution – and the jurors
are then required to make "the moral judgment whether to impose the
death penalty." Id., 121 S.Ct. At 1273. "[W]henever future dangerousness
is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under South Carolina’s
new scheme, due process requires that the jury be informed that a life
sentence carries no possibility of parole." Id. The Court reversed and
remanded for the South Carolina Supreme Court to address whether future
dangerousness had been placed in issue by the State’s argument or
evidence.
Fiore v. White
121 S. Ct. 712 (2001)The Due Process Clause
forbids a State to convict a person of a crime without proving the
elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In a per curiam
opinion, the Court vacated the conviction of habeas corpus petitioner
who had been convicted of illegally dumping hazardous waste. After Fiore
was convicted and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to hear his
appeal, the state court held, in the case of Fiore's co-defendant, that
failure to possess a permit was an essential element of the offense.
Although Fiore had possessed a permit, the state courts denied him
relief under the co-defendant's case. After remanding to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether its decision in the
co-defendant's case represented new law or a clarification of existing
law, and being advised that no new law was created, the Supreme Court
held that Fiore's conviction violated due process because the state had
conceded the absence of an essential element of the offense.
Glover v. United States
121 S. Ct. 696 (2001)Any increase in a prison
term which is attributable to counsel's unreasonable errors is
sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). In this case, the government conceded that cases from
the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit which required
that an increase in the sentencing outcome be "significant" in order to
establish Strickland prejudice were inconsistent with Supreme Court law
and unworkable. Glover had been convicted of racketeering, money
laundering, and tax evasion. Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, if Glover's convictions had been grouped together he would
have been eligible for a sentence 6 to 21 months shorter than the one he
received. His attorneys did not raise the grouping issue on appeal after
the government persuaded the district court not to group the offenses.
Glover claimed in a post-conviction motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
that his counsel's failure to raise the grouping issue constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Relying on Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364 (1993), the Seventh Circuit held that the mere difference in
Glover's sentence would not be "substantial" enough to establish
prejudice. The Seventh Circuit's substantial difference requirement was
contrary to (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000), which
held that Fretwell did not "justify a departure from a straightforward
application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of counsel does
deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the
law entitles him." A requirement that a defendant establish a
substantial change in the outcome was contrary to Strickland's
requirement that the outcome simply be "different," and would prove
unworkable in practice, the Court held.
Artuz v. Bennett
121 S. Ct. 361 (2000)The question was whether an
application for state postconviction relief containing claims that were
procedurally barred was "properly filed" within the meaning of §
2244(d)(2), so that the state petition would toll AEDPA's one-year
statute of limitations. The Court held that a state petition is properly
filed "when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the
applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe,
for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its
delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the
requisite filing fee." 121 S. Ct. at 364. In a unanimous decision
written by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the warden's argument that
an application for state postconviction relief is not properly filed
unless the claims presented therein meet all state procedural
requirements. As it had in prior decisions interpreting AEDPA, the Court
relied upon its pre-AEDPA habeas rules in rejecting the warden's
argument because it "elides the difference between an 'application' and
a 'claim.' Only individual claims, and not the application containing
those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law pursuant to
our holdings in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which establish the sort of procedural bar
on which petitioner relies." 121 S. Ct. at 364.
1999
Term
Apprendi v. New Jersey
120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)The Court addressed
"whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum
prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on
the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi’s sentence was
enhanced under a hate crime law when the trial court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted with a purpose to intimidate
because of race.
The Court explained that due process and the
right to jury trial entitle a criminal defendant to "a jury
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court distinguished
between "sentencing factors" and "elements" of offenses. "[T]he
important consideration is the effect of the factor rather than whether
the legislature placed the factor in the definition of the crime or
within sentencing provisions." "[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect--does the required finding expose the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?"
If so, the factor is an "element." Thus, the Court held, "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." The only exception to this rule is the fact of a prior
conviction.
The majority opinion stated that this decision
does not invalidate state capital sentencing schemes in which a judge
finds aggravating factors before imposing a death sentence. The majority
decision is distinguishable from Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990),
because before a judge imposes sentence, a jury has found the defendant
guilty of all the elements of an offense whose maximum penalty is
death.
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority opinion,
but wrote separately to explain that "the Constitution requires a
broader rule than the Court adopts." This broader rule is that "a
‘crime’ includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or
increasing punishment." As to whether this rule affects capital
sentencing schemes is "a question for another day." According to Justice
Thomas, capital sentencing schemes might not be affected because the
Court has placed "special constraints" on states’ abilities to define
capital crimes.
Justice O’Connor dissented, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer. Justice O’Connor wrote that perhaps the
most important decision refuting the majority’s rule is Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). According to Justice O’Connor, the
majority’s distinction of Walton is "baffling" because an Arizona
defendant cannot receive death unless the judge finds an aggravating
factor. Without that finding, the maximum sentence could only be life.
Thus, Justice O’Connor wrote, "If the Court does not intend to overrule
Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it issues
today."
Dickerson v. United States
120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)After the decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. sec.
3501, which stated that admissibility of a custodial statement depended
only on its voluntariness. In this case, the district court suppressed
Dickerson’s custodial statement because he had not been given Miranda
warnings. Although agreeing Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the suppression order, holding that section
3501 was satisfied, that Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and
that therefore Congress could have the final say on admissibility.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress." The Court also declined to
overrule Miranda based on the doctrine of stare decisis.The
constitutional bases of Miranda are the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimnation and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress may modify judicial rules of evidence and procedure
that are not required by the Constitution, but may not legislatively
supersede decisions applying the Constitution. The major indication that
Miranda is a constitutional decision is that it applied its rule to
state court proceedings, and the Supreme Court’s authority with respect
to state court proceedings is limited to enforcing the Constitution.
Further, the text of Miranda repeatedly refers to protecting
constitutional privileges.
Ramdass v. Angelone
120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000)In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court addressed a claim premised on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
154 (1994), under the AEDPA. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment in a
plurality opinion. Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Ramdass was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in Virginia. At the time of the jury sentencing, he had been
charged with and investigated for numerous other violent felonies. Two
of these other charges had already gone to trial. Ramdass had been
convicted of a Pizza Hut robbery, and judgment had been entered. He had
also been convicted of a Domino’s robbery, but judgment had not been
entered at the time of the jury sentencing. At sentencing, the state
argued future dangerousness, and Ramdass argued he would be in prison
the rest of his life. On direct appeal, Ramdass argued the jury should
have been told he was parole ineligible based on Virginia’s three
strikes law. The three strikes were the Pizza Hut robbery, the Domino’s
robbery and the murder conviction. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected
this claim, concluding that Simmons applied only if Ramdass was
ineligible for parole when the jury was considering his sentence. The
court said he was not parole ineligible at that time because judgment
had not been entered on the Domino’s robbery conviction. Ramdass sought
federal habeas corpus relief.
The plurality opinion explained that under 28
U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1), Ramdass could not obtain relief in federal
habeas proceedings unless the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision on the
Simmons claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States." The plurality relied upon the definitions of
"contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" set out in Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
The Simmons parole ineligibility instruction is
required "only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the
defendant is ineligible for parole under state law." This instruction is
required because it is "legally accurate." However, in Ramdass’s case,
the instruction would not have been legally accurate, because the
Virginia Supreme Court had authoritatively determined Ramdass was not
parole ineligible at the time the jury considered his sentence. Because
of the material factual differences between Simmons and this case, the
Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was not "contrary to" the rule in
Simmons. The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision also did not result in an
"unreasonable application" of Simmons when that court refused to extend
Simmons to require a court to determine if a defendant might become
parole ineligible. The court rejected Ramdass’s contention that entry of
judgment on the Domino’s robbery conviction was a ministerial act which
would inevitably occur, because before entry of judgment Ramdass could
have filed post-trial motions attacking the verdict, and the trial court
could have set aside the verdict.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the
judgment agreed that the standard for reviewing Ramdass’s claim was that
set forth in 2254(d)(1), and emphasized that this standard was narrower
than that applicable on direct review. Justice O’Connor agreed with the
plurality that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was not "contrary
to" nor an "unreasonable application of" Simmons. While the question
whether a defendant may inform a jury he is parole ineligible is a
question of federal law, the question of the defendant’s parole status
is a question of state law. Under Virginia law, Ramdass was not parole
ineligible at the time of capital sentencing because judgment had not
been entered on the Domino’s robbery conviction. However, were entry of
that judgment a purely ministerial act which was foreordained, Justice
O’Connor would find the facts in Ramdass’s case "materially
indistinguishable" from those in Simmons and would therefore find the
Virginia Supreme Court’s decision "contrary to" Simmons. "Where all that
stands between a defendant and parole ineligibility under state law is a
purely ministerial act, Simmons entitles the defendant to inform the
jury of that ineligibility . . . even if he is not technically ‘parole
ineligible’ at the moment of sentencing." Here, however, entry of
judgment was not a purely ministerial act, and Ramdass was not parole
ineligible under state law at the time of sentencing.
Portuondo v. Agard
120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000)The Court addressed
"whether it was constitutional for a prosecutor, in her summation, to
call the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant had the
opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and to tailor his
testimony accordingly." Agard contended the prosecutor’s comments
violated his rights to be present, to confront witnesses, to testify on
his own behalf and to due process.
The Court interpreted Agard’s position as a
request to extend the rationale of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), to the prosecutor’s comments in his case. Griffin involved
comments on a defendant’s refusal to testify. First, the Court found no
historical foundation for Agard’s position. The Court also distinguished
Griffin because it prohibited a prosecutor from urging a jury to do
something a jury is not permitted to do anyway (i.e., use the failure to
testify as evidence of guilt) and because the comments here involved
Agard’s credibility. The Court also rejected the Second Circuit’s
conclusions that the comments were impermissible because they occurred
during summation, leaving Agard no opportunity to rebut them, and that
the comments violated due process because state law required Agard’s
presence at trial. The Court concluded that allowing such comments is
"appropriate" and "sometimes essential" to the truth-seeking function of
a trial.
Slack v. McDaniel
120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000)The Court was presented
with the question whether: If a person's petition for habeas corpus
under 28 USC §2254 is dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies
and he subsequently exhausts his state remedies and re-files the §2254
petition, are claims included within the petition that were not included
within the initial §2254 filing "second or successive" habeas
applications?
The Court entered the following order on October
18, 1999:
This case is restored to the calendar for
re-argument. The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs not to
exceed 25 pages addressing the following questions:
(1) Do the provisions of the AEDPA, specifically
including 28 U.S.C. 2253(c) and 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), control the
proceedings on appeal?
(2) If AEDPA does control the proceedings on
appeal, may a certificate of appealability issue under 28 U.S.C.
2253(c)?
Thereafter, the Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner and decided three questions. First, The Certificate of
Appealability (COA) provision of the AEDPA (§2253(c)) applies to all
appeals initiated after April 24, 1996. Second, a COA may issue when a
district court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds so long as
jurists of reason would find it debatable a.) whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and b.)
whether the district court correctly resolved the procedural issue.
Third, a petition that is filed after a previous one has been dismissed
without any claim being ruled upon and without prejudice to allow for
exhaustion of state remedies is not a second or successive petition.
Edwards v. Carpenter
120 S. Ct. 1587 (2000)The Court was presented
with the question of whether a federal habeas court is barred from
considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as "cause" for
the procedural default of another habeas claim when the
ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally defaulted. The Court
decided that a defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot
be used in federal habeas proceedings to show "cause" to excuse a
default on other claims.
(Terry) Williams v. Taylor
120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)The Court addressed
"Whether Mr. Williams’ constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel ...was violated and whether the judgment of the Virginia
Supreme Court refusing to set aside his death sentence ‘was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.’"
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that trial
counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of
Williams’’ severe childhood neglect and abuse was unreasonable and
prejudicial. Trial counsel began to prepare for the sentencing hearing
only a week before trial and failed to uncover Williams' nightmarish
childhood, borderline mental retardation, inability to proceed beyond
the 6th grade, favorable prison record, and evidence that he would
likely not be dangerous in a prison setting. The Virginia Supreme court
erred in (1) applying a prejudice test purportedly based upon Lockhart
v. Fretwell, rather than Strickland, and in (2) failing to give adequate
weight to the mitigation evidence trial counsel had failed to develop.
Habeas relief is available on claims adjudicated
on their merits in state court if the state decision is either contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
law. Relief is available under the "contrary to" clause if the state
decision employs an incorrect rule of law in deciding the claim or
applies a Supreme Court decision with similar facts incorrectly. Relief
is available under the "unreasonable application" clause even where the
state court has applied the correct Supreme Court rule but has done so
in a manner that is objectively unreasonable and leaves the federal
court with the firm conviction that the state court's resolution is
unsatisfactory. Relief is not available if the state court decision is
merely incorrect. Rules set forth in Supreme Court decisions announced
prior to finality are "clearly established Supreme Court law" under
§2254(d).
In this case, the state supreme court's rejection
of Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim violated both
clauses of 2254(d). Strickland v. Washington announced the rule that
governs the claim. The state court's utilization of the rule announced
in Lockhart v. Fretwell in conjunction with the Strickland rule is
contrary to clearly established law, and the state court’s failure to
consider much of the mitigating evidence Williams presented in state
post-conviction proceedings to establish the merit of his claim
demonstrates an unreasonable application of the law to the facts.
(Michael) Williams v.
Taylor
120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000)The Court was presented
with the following question: Whether 28 U.S.C. §§2254(e)(2), which
prohibits a federal habeas corpus evidentiary hearing only if the
applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state
court proceedings, governs petitioner's claim where, throughout state
proceedings, the state suppressed the relevant facts, denied
petitioner's discovery requests, and denied all investigative and expert
resources to investigate, develop, and discover claims, and denied an
evidentiary hearing?
The Court unanimously rejected Virginia's
argument that 2254(e) imposes strict liability on petitioners such that
no hearing is allowed in federal court regardless of the reason the
facts were not developed in state court. Instead, the Court construed
§§2254(e) consistent with it prior decision in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
112 S.Ct. 1715 (1992). So long as the Petitioner exercises reasonable
diligence in attempting to develop and present facts in support of
claims in the state courts, he will not be denied a federal hearing if
he was unable to uncover and present the facts prior to the conclusion
of state proceedings. Of three claims presented in the case, the Court
concluded that Williams showed sufficient diligence with regard to a
jury misconduct and prosecution misconduct claim, but that his efforts
to identify facts in support of a Brady v. Maryland claim, which
consisted chiefly of requesting disclosure from the attorney general of
a mental health report that was likely reasonably available via other
means, failed to show a requisite degree of diligence.
Roe v. Flores-Ortega
120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000)The Court addressed the
following question presented: Whether trial counsel has a Sixth
Amendment duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea in the
absence of such a request by the defendant, particularly where the
defendant has been advised of his appeal rights?
The Court held that counsel for a convicted
defendant who has not clearly instructed counsel to, or not to, file an
appeal provides ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington by
failing to consult with the defendant about taking an appeal if there is
reason to think that a rational defendant would wish to appeal or if the
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel an interest in appealing,
and the defendant shows a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
lack of consultation with the defendant, the defendant would have timely
appealed.
Bryan v. Moore
120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000)This case presented the
following questions: (1) Did the Florida Supreme Court's appraisal of
the likelihood that Mr. Bryan will suffer needless agony and degradation
when he is put to death by Florida's electrocution machinery violate the
Eighth Amendment by disregarding a constitutionally unacceptable risk of
physical violence, disfigurement and torment? (2) Did the Florida
Supreme Court err in concluding that the record as a whole
insufficiently sustains Mr. Bryan's contention that his execution by
Florida's electrocution machinery unnecessarily exposes him to physical
suffering and degradation in violation of the Eighth Amendment? (3)
Following the notorious, repeated malfunctioning of Florida's
electrocution machinery, resulting in ghastly spectacles of violent
disfigurement, did the Florida Supreme Court err in rejecting Mr.
Bryan's contention that his subjection to execution b that machinery
constitutes psychological and moral cruelty that violated the Eighth
Amendment?
On January 24, 2000, the Court dismissed the writ
in the following order: "In light of the representations by the State of
Florida, through its Attorney General, that petitioner's death sentence
will be carried out by lethal injection, unless petitioner affirmatively
elects death by electrocution' pursuant to the recent amendments to
Section 922.10 of the Florida Statutes, the writ of certiorari is
dismissed as improvidently granted."
Smith v. Robbins
120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)The Court addressed the
following questions presented: (1) Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding
that California's no-merit brief procedure, in which appellate counsel
who has found no non-frivolous issues remains available to brief any
issues appellate court might identify, violates the Sixth Amendment
Anders right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal? (2) Did the
Ninth Circuit err when it ruled that asserted Anders violation required
new appeal, without testing claimed Sixth Amendment error under
Strickland v. Washington? (3) Did the Ninth Circuit violate the rule
announced in Teague v. Lane, which prohibits retroactive application of
new rule on collateral review, when it invalidated California's
well-settled, good-faith interpretation of federal law?
The Court decided that California's Anders
procedure, as outlined in People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal. Rptr.
839, 600 P.2d 1071 (1979), satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment, which is
primarily concerned with assuring that state appellate review procedures
reasonably assure that an indigent's appeal is resolved in a way that is
related to the merits of the appeal. Anders' proposed procedure was
prophylactic rule only and non-binding upon the states. The Court
remanded the case to provide Robbins with an opportunity to demonstrate
that appellate counsel's representation was deficient pursuant to
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington.
Weeks v. Angelone
120 S. Ct. 727 (2000)The Court addressed the
following question: When a capital sentencing jury informs the judge
that it does not understand the sentencing instructions held facially
constitutional in Buchanan v. Angelone and specifically asks whether or
not it is free to consider a sentence less than death if it finds one or
more aggravating factors, is the judge constitutionally required to
clarify that a death sentence is not mandatory upon the finding of an
aggravating factor but that the jury should consider mitigating evidence
as well in making its sentencing decision?
In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's denial of habeas relief. The Constitution is not violated when
a trial judge directs the sentencer to a constitutionally sufficient
instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration
of mitigating circumstances. The law presumes not only that juries
follow instructions but also that they understand them. At best, the
record shows only a possibility that the jury might have misunderstood
its role; no reasonable probability is shown.
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
CA
120 S. Ct. 684 (2000)The Court addressed the
following question presented: Does a criminal defendant have a
constitutional right to elect self-representation on direct appeal from
a judgment of conviction?
The Court unanimously concluded that the Sixth
Amendment Faretta right to self-representation does not lead to the
conclusion that the Due Process clause requires a similar rule for
appeal. Unlike at trial as addressed in Faretta, there is little
historical evidence suggesting the right to self-representation on
appeal. The right to appeal did not exist until early in the 20th
century. To assure the integrity and efficiency of appellate system,
states are free to bar self-representation on appeal.
1998
Term
Jones v. United States
119 S. Ct. 2090 (1999)In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court considered three questions regarding a death sentence imposed
under the Federal Death Penalty Act. First, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment does not require that the jury be instructed regarding
the consequences of the jury’s failure to reach a unanimous decision as
to sentence. The Eighth Amendment requires a capital sentencing scheme
to narrow the class of persons eligible for a death sentence
("eligibility stage") and must insure an individualized inquiry
("selection stage"). To assure an individualized inquiry, the scheme
must allow "broad inquiry" into all "constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence." Petitioner’s requested instruction regarding the
effect of jury deadlock had no bearing on eligibility, and the failure
to give it did not prevent the jury from considering mitigating
evidence. Further, although the Court has held that a capital sentencing
jury may not be affirmatively misled regarding its role in the
sentencing process, the requested instruction had no bearing on the
jury’s role, and the Court has never held that the Eighth Amendment
requires the jury be instructed on the consequences of a breakdown in
the deliberative process. The Court also declined to exercise its
supervisory authority over the federal courts to require such an
instruction.
Second, the Court considered Petitioner’s
argument that references in the trial court’s instructions to "some
lesser sentence" (other than death or life without release) led to jury
confusion. Since no objection on this basis was raised at trial, the
Court reviewed Petitioner’s claim for plain error. Relief under this
standard requires that there has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and
(3) affects substantial rights. There was no error that is plain because
there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged
instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Even assuming
error, Petitioner cannot show it affected his substantial rights because
the trial court told the jury not to be concerned with the effect of a
lesser sentence recommendation and because petitioner cannot show that
any confusion necessarily worked to his detriment.
Third, the Court considered whether two
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances regarding the victim’s
vulnerability and the victim’s personal characteristics were
duplicative, vague or overbroad. Four members of the Court concluded the
factors were not. Five members of the Court concluded that even if the
factors were duplicative, vague or overbroad, any error was harmless
because had the factors been more precisely defined, the jury would
still have recommended death.
Four members of the Court dissented, concluding
that the jury instructions regarding the possible sentences could have
led the jurors to believe that without unanimity, the court might impose
a "lesser sentence." Three of the dissenters also believed the
nonstatutory aggravating factors were duplicative and vague.
Strickler v. Greene
119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999)In a habeas proceeding
arising from a state capital conviction, the Court addressed (1) whether
the state violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), (2) whether
Petitioner had shown "cause" for failing to raise his Brady claim in
state court, and (3) whether Petitioner suffered sufficient prejudice to
excuse his procedural default. Strickler was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death for the murder of a woman who was kidnapped from
a mall parking lot and later killed. State witness Stoltzfus provided a
detailed eye-witness account of the kidnapping. After Strickler filed
his federal habeas petition, a district court discovery order led to the
production of previously undisclosed police reports and other documents
which cast doubt on Stoltzfus’s confident and detailed trial testimony.
Strickler then raised a Brady claim which had not been raised in state
court.
The Court first examined whether the state had
violated Brady. A Brady violation consists of three components: (1) the
evidence must be favorable to the accused, because it is either
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by
the state, either willfully or inadvertently; (3) the defendant must
have been prejudiced. In Strickler’s case, the Court found the first two
components established, but did not find prejudice.
Before addressing Brady’s prejudice prong, the
Court addressed whether Strickler had shown cause and prejudice to
excuse his procedural default of his claim. Cause and prejudice parallel
two components of the Brady claim--the state’s suppression of the
documents and the prejudice or materiality inquiry. The Court found
cause established because the prosecution had withheld exculpatory
evidence and Strickler’s trial and post-conviction counsel had
reasonably relied on the prosecution’s open file policy as fufilling the
prosecution’s duty to disclose. The nondisclosure and the open file
policy impeded trial counsel’s access to the factual basis of the claim.
Since it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on the open file
policy as the prosecution’s implicit representation that all materials
had been disclosed, such reliance by post-conviction counsel was also
reasonable. Counsel do not have a duty to raise a claim for which there
is no evidentiary support.
The Court decided, however, that Strickler had
not shown sufficient prejudice to satisfy either the cause/prejudice
standard or Brady’s materiality standard. The Court reiterated the
discussion of Brady’s materiality standard in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419 (1995), concluding that the record contained "strong support for the
conclusion that petitioner would have been convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death," even if the withheld documents had been
disclosed.
Lilly v. Virginia
119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)The Court addressed
"whether the accused’s Sixth Amendment right ‘to be confronted with the
witnesses against him’ was violated by admitting into evidence at his
trial a nontestifying accomplice’s entire confession that contained some
statements against the accomplice’s penal interest and others that
inculpated the accused." Lilly, his brother and a third man were charged
with a series of robberies and a murder. The brother gave statements to
police implicating himself in some of the crimes, but indicating that
Lilly committed the murder. When the state called the brother to testify
at Lilly’s trial, the brother invoked the Fifth Amendment. Over Lilly’s
Sixth Amendment objection, the trial court then admitted the brother’s
entire statements. The state supreme court held admission of the
statements constitutional because they were against the brother’s penal
interest and because a statement against interest of an unavailable
witness was a firmly rooted exception to the state’s hearsay rule.
The Court concluded that admission of the
brother’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause and remanded the
case for the state supreme court to consider whether the error was
harmless. The plurality opinion reviewed the history of the "firmly
rooted" doctrine and the "against penal interest" exception and
concluded, "accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant
are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that
concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence." The
plurality also considered the state’s argument that the brother’s
statements bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
sufficient to allow their admission. The plurality concluded it was not
required to defer to the state supreme court’s determinations on this
issue, but should conduct an independent review. The question was
whether the guarantees of trustworthiness convinced the plurality that
the statements were "so inherently reliable that cross-examination would
have been superfluous." The plurality found the facts that other
evidence corroborated portions of the statements, that the brother was
given Miranda warnings and that the brother knew he was exposing himself
to criminal liability insufficient to establish this level of
reliability.
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined only the
conclusion of the plurality opinion holding that admission of the
statements violated the Confrontation Clause and remanding for the state
supreme court to conduct a harmless error analysis.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the
plurality’s conclusion that all accomplice confessions inculpating a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule and with the plurality’s conclusion that appellate courts
should independently review the government’s proffered guarantees of
trustworthiness.
Neder v. United States
119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999)The harmless error rule of
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), applies to a jury instruction
which omits an element of an offense.
O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel
119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999)In a federal habeas
proceeding, the Court addressed "whether a state prisoner must present
his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary
review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement" of 28 U.S.C. sec.
2254(b)(1), (c). After his conviction in Illinois state court, Boerckel
appealed his convictions to the appellate court, which affirmed.
Boerckel then filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, but did not include three of the claims presented to the
appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In
his federal habeas petition, Boerckel raised six claims, including the
three he did not present in the petition to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The district court found these three claims procedurally defaulted, but
the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding Boerckel was not required to
present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to the
Illinois Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
The Supreme Court reversed. Under section
2254(c), a habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented." The Court has not interpreted the exhaustion
doctrine to require prisoners to file repetitive petitions or to invoke
extraordinary remedies. However, because the exhaustion doctrine is
intended to give states a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal
constitutional claims, state prisoners must give the state courts "one
full opportunity" to resolve constitutional issues. Since the normal and
established system of appellate review in Illinois is a two-tiered
system, comity requires Boerckel to use that system before turning to
federal court.
Jones v. United States
119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999)The Court addressed whether
the federal carjacking statute "defined three distinct offenses or a
single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them
dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge
and jury verdict." The federal carjacking statute in effect at the time
of Jones’ trial allowed three different sentences depending on certain
circumstances. If "serious bodily injury results" during the offense,
the defendant may be imprisoned for not more than 25 years. Jones was
indicted under the statute, but the indictment did not charge "serious
bodily injury." After Jones’ conviction by a jury, the court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that serious bodily injury had occurred
and imposed a 25-year sentence, despite Jones’ objection that serious
bodily injury was a an element of the offense which had not been pled in
the indictment or proved to the jury.
The Court concluded that the fairest reading of
the statute treats serious bodily harm as an element, not simply a
sentence enhancement factor. Elements of an offense must be charged in
the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Interpreting the statute otherwise would put the statute in
constitutional doubt in light of cases dealing with due process and jury
trial guarantees.
Calderon v. Coleman
119 S. Ct. 500 (1998)In a per curiam opinion to
which four justices dissented, the Court reversed and remanded this
Ninth Circuit case for application of the Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993), harmless-error standard to Coleman’s claim that an
inaccurate jury instruction on the governor’s power to commute a life
sentence violated his constitutional right to due process.
1997
Term
Hohn v. United States
118 S. Ct. 1969 (1998)The Court held (5-4
(Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer; Souter concurring))
that a request for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2253(c) is a "case" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1254, which
provides the Court with jurisdiction to review "Cases in the court of
appeals . . .." In reaching this conclusion, the Court characterized a
request for a COA as "a proceeding seeking relief for an immediate and
redressable injury, i.e., wrongful detention in violation of the
Constitution." 118 S.Ct. at 1972. The Court also determined that when
action is taken on a COA request, it is the action of the court, not
that of a single judge acting individually. In this regard, the Court
"reject[ed] the suggestion contained in the Advisory Committee Notes on
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) that ‘28 U. S. C. §2253 does
not authorize the court of appeals as a court to grant a certificate of
probable cause.' 28 U. S. C. App., p. 609." 118 S.Ct. at 1974. Rather,
the Court explained, "It is more consistent with the Federal Rules and
the uniform practice of the courts of appeals to construe §2253(c)(1) as
conferring the jurisdiction to issue certificates of appealability upon
the court of appeals rather than by a judge acting under his own seal."
118 S.Ct. at 1974. Additionally, the Court relied in part on a negative
inference arising from § 2244(b)(3)(E)’s prohibition on review of the
denial of an application to file a second or successive petition, a
prohibition with no counterpart in the COA section. Thus, the Court held
that it "has jurisdiction under §1254(1) to review denials of
applications for certificates of appealability by a circuit judge or a
panel of a court of appeals," and that the "portion of House v. Mayo,
[324 U.S. 42 (1945)] holding this Court lacks statutory certiorari
jurisdiction over denials of certificates of probable cause is
overruled." 118 S.Ct. at 1978.
Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor and
Thomas, dissented asserting that the "notion that a request pertaining
to a case constitutes its own ‘case’ for purposes of §1254 is a
jaw-dropper." 118 S.Ct. at 1979. Justice Scalia summed up as
follows:
The purpose of AEDPA is not obscure. It was to
eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of state and federal
criminal sentences, and the shameful overloading of our federal criminal
justice system, produced by various aspects of this Court's habeas
corpus jurisprudence. And the purpose of the specific provision of AEDPA
at issue here is also not obscure: It was designed, in intelligent
reliance upon a holding of this Court, to end §2255 litigation in the
district court unless a court of appeals judge or the circuit justice
finds reasonable basis to appeal. By giving literally unprecedented
meaning to the words in two relevant statutes, and overruling the
premise of Congress's enactment, the Court adds new, Byzantine detail to
a habeas corpus scheme Congress meant to streamline and simplify. I
respectfully dissent. (118 S.Ct. at 1984.)
It is also noteworthy that, although petitioner
argued fairly extensively both in his petition for certiorari and in his
brief that Lindh should preclude application of the COA requirement to
his §2255 motion, which was filed before passage of the Act, the Court
granted certiorari limited to the question "In light of the fact that
the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's request for a Certificate
of Appealability, does this Court have jurisdiction to grant certiorari,
vacate, and remand this case per the suggestion of the Solicitor
General?," and nowhere mentioned the retroactivity issue in its
opinion.
Hopkins v. Reeves
118 S. Ct. 1895 (1998)In this Nebraska capital
case, the Supreme Court (8-1) held that the Eighth Circuit erred in
granting relief on petitioner’s claim that Beck v. Alabama entitled him
to a charge on a lesser included offense even though Nebraska law does
not provide for lesser included offenses to felony murder, the crime for
which petitioner was convicted and sentenced. Writing for the majority,
Justice Thomas found Beck "distinguishable from this case in two
critical respects." 118 S.Ct. at 1900. First, Alabama law at issue in
Beck prohibited instruction on lesser included offenses that existed
under state law, while Nebraska law simply does not provide any lesser
included offenses for the crime charged in this case. Second, Alabama
law created an "artificial barrier" to jury consideration of lesser
included offenses in capital cases, thereby treating capital cases
differently than noncapital cases, while Nebraska law treats all
felony-murder cases the same, capital or noncapital. Relying on these
distinctions, the Court criticized the Eighth Circuit’s approach, which
it characterized as "requir[ing] in effect that States create lesser
included offenses to all capital crimes . . . a requirement [that] is
not only unprecedented, but also unworkable." 118 S.Ct. at 1901.
Next, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s
conclusion that, because Tison v. Arizona and Enmund v. Florida "require
proof of a culpable mental state with respect to the killing before the
death penalty may be imposed for felony murder, Nebraska could not
refuse lesser included offense instructions on the ground that the only
intent required for a felony murder conviction is the intent to commit
the underlying felony." 118 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court interpreted the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion as "requiring States to alter their definitions
of felony murder to include a mens rea requirement with respect to the
killing," something it had already rejected in Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376 (1986). 118 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court thus concluded that "Tison
and Enmund do not affect the showing that a State must make at a
defendant’s trial for felony murder, so long as their requirement is
satisfied at some point thereafter." 118 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court did
not, however, discuss when that showing might have been made in this
case.
Additionally, in footnote 3, the Court refused to
consider the state’s Teague defense because it was raised for the first
time in the petition for certiorari.
Justice Stevens dissented arguing that, "[t]o be
faithful to the teaching of Beck," Nebraska’s usual rule that felony
murder has no lesser included offenses simply should not apply where the
state seeks the death penalty in light of the Court’s decisions in
Enmund and Tison. 118 S.Ct. at 1903.
Calderon v. Ashmus
118 S. Ct. 1694 (1998)The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in this declaratory judgment action
concerning California’s threats to invoke the advantages of Chapter 154,
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the respondent’s complaint.
The Court based this disposition on its conclusion that respondent’s
class action did not present a justiciable case or controversy as
required by Article III. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained,
The underlying "controversy" between petitioners
and respondent is whether respondent is entitled to federal habeas
relief setting aside his sentence or conviction obtained in the
California courts. But no such final or conclusive determination was
sought in this action. Instead, respondent carved out of that claim only
the question of whether, when he sought habeas relief, California would
be governed by Chapter 153 or by Chapter 154 in defending the action.
Had he brought a habeas action itself, he undoubtedly would have
obtained such a determination, but he seeks to have that question
determined in anticipation of seeking habeas so that he will be better
able to know, for example, the time limits which govern the habeas
action.
We think previous decisions of this Court bar the
use of the Declaratory Judgment Act for this purpose.
118 S.Ct. at 1698.
The Court further characterized this action as
one that "attempts to gain a litigation advantage by obtaining an
advance ruling on an affirmative defense." 118 S.Ct. at 1698. [Editor’s
note: This language may be useful in challenging the few existing
rulings that § 2244's statute of limitations is jurisdictional, as
opposed to being an affirmative defense.] Finally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist advised that, "[i]f the class members file habeas petitions,
and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate
California’s compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk
associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a
pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices
commonly faced by litigants." 118 S.Ct. at 1699.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter,
concurred to point out that "it should prove possible for at least some
habeas petitioners to obtain a relatively expeditious judicial answer to
the Chapter 154 compliance question and thereby provide legal guidance
for others." 118 S.Ct. at 1700.
Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal
118 S. Ct. 1618 (1998)In this Arizona capital
case, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, which held §
2244(b)’s bar to second or successive applications for habeas relief
inapplicable to petitioner’s Ford claim, which had been raised in his
first petition but dismissed by the district court as unripe. Writing
for the 7-2 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "[t]his may
have been the second time that respondent had asked the federal courts
to provide relief on his Ford claim, but this does not mean that there
were two separate applications . . . There was only one application for
habeas relief, and the District Court ruled (or should have ruled) on
each claim at the time it became ripe." 118 S.Ct. at 1621. Rejecting the
state’s contention that the Ford claim is subject to § 2244(b), the
Court pointed out that "none of our cases . . . have ever suggested that
a prisoner whose habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust
state remedies, and who then did exhaust those remedies and returned to
federal court, was by such action filing a successive petition." 118
S.Ct. at 1622. Following this reasoning, the Court held that
"respondent’s Ford claim . . . should be treated in the same manner as
the claim of a petitioner who returns to a federal habeas court after
exhausting state remedies." 118 S.Ct. at 1622. In footnote 1, the Court
expressly reserved decision on the proper handling of a Ford claim
raised for the first time only after a petitioner has already completed
one round of federal habeas review.
Justices Scalia, joined by Thomas, dissented,
accusing the majority of "flout[ing] the unmistakable language of the
statute to avoid what it calls a ‘perverse’ result," and asserting that,
"[a]s hard as it may be for this Court to swallow, in yesterday’s
enactment of AEDPA Congress curbed our prodigality with the Great Writ .
. . ‘The mutilated [AEDPA] bears ample testimony to the "day before
yesterday" that judges insist is today.’" 118 S.Ct. at 1623. (internal
citations omitted).
Justice Thomas, joined by Scalia, also dissented,
arguing that the dictionary definitions of "application" and "present"
-- the words of § 2244(b) -- compel the conclusion that respondent’s
Ford claim should be subjected to the AEDPA’s bar to successive requests
for relief. See 118 S.Ct. at 1624.
Bousley v. United States
118 S. Ct. 1604 (1998)The Court held that its
decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), does not prevent
petitioner from relying on Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)
to support his claim that his guilty plea to using a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) was involuntary because he was
misinformed by the trial court and his counsel as to the true nature of
the charge against him. The Court explained that "because Teague by its
terms applies only to procedural rules, we think it is inapplicable to
the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal
statute enacted by Congress." 118 S.Ct. at 1610.
The Court did, however, determine that
petitioner’s Bailey claim was procedurally defaulted as a result of his
failure to challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal, and that
petitioner is unable to demonstrate cause for the default. Reasoning
that petitioner may be able to meet the actual innocence standard
necessary to overcome his default, however, the Court remanded for
further inquiry. With regard to the scope of that inquiry, the Court
explained:
the Government is not limited to the existing
record to rebut any showing that petitioner might make. Rather, on
remand, the Government should be permitted to present any evidence of
petitioner’s guilt even if that evidence was not presented during
petitioner’s plea colloquy and would not normally have been offered
before our decision in Bailey. In cases where the Government has
foregone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining,
petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also extend to those
charges.
118 S.Ct. at 1611-12.
Finally, the Court clarified that, because
petitioner’s indictment charged him only with "using" a firearm -- as
opposed to "carrying" – "petitioner need demonstrate no more than that
he did not ‘use’ a firearm as that term is defined in Bailey" in order
to overcome his default. 118 S.Ct. at 1612.
Calderon v. Thompson
118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998)The Court held (5-4) that
the en banc Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in sua sponte recalling
the mandate in this California capital case. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy (joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas) first
determined that, "[i]n a § 2254 case, a prisoner’s motion to recall the
mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be
regarded as a second or successive application for purposes of §
2244(b)," and that, therefore, "[i]f the court grants such a motion, its
action is subject to AEDPA irrespective of whether the motion is based
on old claims (. . .) or new ones (. . .)." 118 S.Ct. at 1500. Here,
however, because the Ninth Circuit acted sua sponte and recalled the
mandate based only upon the contents of Thompson’s first habeas
petition, the Ninth Circuit’s action "did not contravene the letter of
AEDPA." 118 S.Ct. at 1500.
However, Justice Kennedy explained that
"[a]lthough the terms of AEDPA do not govern this case, a court of
appeals must exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the
objects of the statute." 118 S.Ct. at 1500. He then proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of the importance of finality, stating that "[w]hen
lengthy federal proceedings have run their course and a mandate denying
relief has issued, finality acquires an added moral dimension. Only with
an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment
in a case." 118 S.Ct. at 1501.
On the basis of this overriding concern, the
Court held "the general rule to be that, where a federal court of
appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an
earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the
court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of
justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence." 118 S.Ct. at
1502. This new standard, while "somewhat more lenient than the standard
in § 2244(b)(2)(B)," "comports with the values and purposes underlying
AEDPA" which, although not governing in this case, "’certainly inform
[the Court’s] consideration.’" 118 S.Ct. at 1502.
Turning to the merits of petitioner’s actual
innocence showing as made in his first habeas petition, the Court
quickly determined that petitioner had not satisfied either the Schlup
or Sawyer standards. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit and remanded with instructions to reinstate the panel’s
earlier mandate denying habeas relief.
Justice Souter (joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer) dissented from the majority’s adoption of the miscarriage of
justice standard as the rule to be applied when deciding whether to
recall a mandate. Souter said that, while the "majority . . . adhere to
the terminology of abuse of discretion . . . it is abuse of discretion
‘informed by’ the 1996 amendments to the habeas corpus statute enacted
by certain provisions of AEDPA . . ., and so informed the abuse of
discretion standard is beyond recognition." 118 S.Ct. at 1508. He
explained further that, "[n]othing in AEDPA speaks to the courts of
appeals’ inherent power to recall a mandate, as such, and so long as the
power over mandates is not abused to enable prisoners to litigate
otherwise forbidden ‘second or successive’ habeas petitions, . . . AEDPA
is not violated." 118 S.Ct. at 1509. Thus, "[w]hatever policy the Court
is pursuing, it is not the policy of AEDPA." 118 S.Ct. at 1509.
Campbell v. Louisiana
118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998)A white criminal defendant
has standing to object to discrimination against black persons in the
selection of grand jurors. Regarding a white defendant’s standing to
raise the equal protection rights of excluded black grand jurors, the
Court applied the reasoning of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991),
which involved a white defendant’s standing to challenge racial
discrimination against black persons in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. Whether a defendant may assert the equal protection rights
of others requires satisfying three preconditions: (1) the defendant
suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) the defendant had a "close
relationship" to the excluded jurors; and (3) there was some hindrance
to the excluded jurors asserting their own rights. Campbell satisfied
these conditions. A criminal defendant also has standing to litigate
whether his conviction was procured by procedures which violate due
process.
Spencer v. Kemna
118 S. Ct. 978 (1998)The Court (Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer) first
determined that the district court’s "conclusion that Spencer’s release
from prison caused his petition to be moot because it no longer
satisfied the ‘in custody’ requirement of the habeas statute was in
error" because petitioner was in custody "at the time the petition was
filed, which is all the ‘in custody’ provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
requires." 118 S.Ct. at 983. The Court considered the Amore substantial
question" to be "whether petitioner’s subsequent release caused the
petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy
under Article III . . ." Id. As to this question, the Court acknowledged
that it has been "willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction
has continuing collateral consequences . . .," but pointed out that
here, petitioner was not challenging the validity of his conviction, but
rather the "wrongful termination of his parole status." Id. After
reviewing the origins of, and justifications for, the presumption of
collateral consequences for criminal convictions, the Court "decline[d]
to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III’s
injury-in-fact requirement resulted from petitioner’s parole
revocation." 118 S.Ct. at 986. Finally, the Court also rejected the four
injuries-in-fact alleged by petitioner in support of the continuing
vitality of his petition, and concluded by affirming the Eighth’s
Circuit’s dismissal of the petition as moot.
Buchanan v. Angelone
118 S. Ct. 757 (1998)In this Virginia capital
case, the Court addressed "whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a
capital jury be instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence
generally, or on particular statutory mitigating factors." 118 S.Ct. at
758-59. Answering this question in the negative and affirming the
judgment of the Fourth Circuit, the majority (6-3) held that "[t]he
absence of an instruction on the concept of mitigation and of
instructions on particular statutorily defined mitigating factors did
not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." 118 S.Ct at 763.
The penalty phase jury instruction in
petitioner’s case made no reference to the concept of mitigation, or to
the specific statutory mitigating circumstances at issue. Rather, the
only arguable reference to the jury’s ability to consider such
information came in the following paragraph:
'If you find from the evidence that the
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of
the preceding paragraph, then you may fix the punishment of the
Defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the
death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the
Defendant at life imprisonment.
118 S.Ct. at 760 n.1.
In approving the instruction in this case, the
majority, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, began by recognizing that the
Court’s cases "have distinguished between two different aspects of the
capital sentencing process, the eligibility phase and the selection
phase," and establishing that "it is only the selection phase that is at
stake in [t]his case." 118 S.Ct. at 761. Petitioner argued that the
Court’s decisions "indicate that the jury at the selection phase must
both have discretion to make an individualized determination and have
that discretion limited and channeled," and that the "Eighth Amendment
therefore requires the court to instruct the jury on its obligation and
authority to consider mitigating evidence, and on particular mitigating
factors deemed relevant by the State." Id.
Rejecting these contentions, the majority
explained that "petitioner . . . fails to distinguish the differing
constitutional treatment we have accorded [the eligibility and
selection] aspects of capital sentencing. It is in regard to the
eligibility phase that we have stressed the need for channeling and
limiting the jury's discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a
proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or capricious in
its imposition. In contrast, in the selection phase, we have emphasized
the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to
allow an individualized determination." Id. Accordingly, the "State may
shape and structure the jury’s consideration of mitigation so long as it
does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating
evidence." Id. Thus, while Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990),
established that the standard for assessing whether these principles
have been violated is "’whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents
the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence,’" the Court has
"never gone further and held that the state must affirmatively structure
in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating
evidence." Id. Rather, according to the majority, the Court’s "decisions
suggest that complete jury discretion [during the selection process] is
constitutionally permissible." 118 S.Ct. at 761-62.
Applying these principles, the majority quickly
concluded that the instruction in this case was constitutional because
it "did not foreclose the jury’s consideration of any mitigating
evidence." 118 S.Ct. at 762. Rather, "[b]y directing the jury to base
its decision on ‘all the evidence,’ the instruction afforded jurors an
opportunity to consider mitigating evidence." Additionally, the majority
concluded that "the entire context in which the instructions were given
expressly informed the jury that it could consider mitigating evidence."
Id. The context the majority refers to consists of two days of trial
testimony concerning "petitioner’s family background and mental and
emotional problems," and the "extensive arguments of both defense
counsel and the prosecutor on the mitigating evidence . . .." Id.
Essentially, the majority found it "unlikely that reasonable jurors
would believe that the court’s instructions" would foreclose
consideration of evidence and argument that was so important to the
parties at trial. Id.
Justice Scalia concurred to reiterate his
continuing adherence to the "view that the Eighth Amendment does not, in
any event, require that sentencing juries be given discretion to
consider mitigating evidence." 118 S.Ct. at 763. He also pointed out the
"incompatibility between the Lockett-Eddings requirement and the holding
of Furman . . . that the sentencer’s discretion must be constrained to
avoid arbitrary or freakish imposition of the death penalty," and argued
that "[t]he Court's ongoing attempt to resolve that contradiction by
drawing an arbitrary line in the sand between the 'eligibility and
selection phases' of the sentencing decision is . . . incoherent and
ultimately doomed to failure." Id.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, dissented concluding that, "taking the instructions and the
context together, the judge’s instructions created a ‘reasonable
likelihood’ that the jury ‘applied the challenged instruction in a way
that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.’"
118 S.Ct. at 766.
Trest v. Cain
118 S. Ct. 478 (1997)In a brief opinion by
Justice Breyer, the unanimous Court held that "[a] court of appeals is
not ‘required’ to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte." 118
S.Ct. at 480. The Court reiterated that "procedural default is normally
a ‘defense’ that the State is ‘obligated to raise’ and ‘preserv[e]’ if
it is not to ‘lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.’" Id.
(internal citations omitted) Before remanding for further proceedings,
the Court remarked that, "[w]e do not say that a court must always ask
for further briefing when it disposes of a case on a basis not
previously argued. But often, as here, that somewhat longer (and often
fairer) way ‘round is the shortest way home." 118 S.Ct. at 481.
1996
Term
Lindh v. Murphy
117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997)Justice Souter, writing for
a 5-4 majority (joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg and
Breyer), concluded that the Chapter 153 Amendments [the amendments
applicable to all habeas corpus cases] to the habeas corpus statutes,
contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
did not apply to "applications that were already pending when the Act
was passed." Applying the Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244
(1994), analysis for determining the retroactivity of new congressional
statutes, the Court, applying "normal rules of [statutory] construction"
held that "the statute reveals Congress’s intent to apply the amendments
to Chapter 153 only to such cases as were filed after the statutes’s
enactment." 117 S.Ct. at 2063. The Court embraced the negative inference
which arises from the fact that section 107(c) of the act expressly
stated that "’Chapter 154 [which contains the "opt-in" provisions for
capital cases in qualifying jurisdictions] . . . shall apply to cases
pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act." Id. Thus the
majority concluded: "We read this provision of section 107(c), expressly
applying Chapter 154 to all cases pending at enactment, as indicating
implicitly that the amendments to Chapter 153 were assumed and meant to
apply to the general run of habeas cases only when those cases had been
filed after the date of the Act." Id. The Court noted that the negative
inference was supported by the fact that the two chapters were part of a
single bill and did not "evolve[] separately." 117 S.Ct. at 2064. The
negative inference, the Court stated, is strongest when "the portions of
the statute treated differently had already been joined together and
were being considered when the language raising the implication was
inserted." 117 S.Ct. at 2065. The Court also believed that the negative
inference was supported by section 2264(b) of Chapter 154, which
provides that "following review subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e)
of section 2254, the court should rule on the claims." This section
indicated that "when a pending case is also an expedited capital case
subject to chapter 154, the new provisions of section 2254(d) and (e)
will apply to that case." 117 S.Ct. at 2067. This, in the Court’s view,
"confirms that Congress assumed that in the absence of such a provision,
sections 2254(d) and (e) (as new parts of Chapter 153) would not apply
to pending cases." Id. The Court noted that while there were some
conflicting possible inferences arising from various provisions of the
AEDPA "in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk
purse of the art of statutory drafting" and "our analysis accords more
coherence to sections 107(c) and 2264(b) than any rival we have
examined." 117 S.Ct. at 2068.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas, dissented acknowledging that while "Congress might
have intended that omission [in 107(c)] to signal its intent that
Chapter 153 not apply to pending cases. . . .there are other, equally
plausible alternatives." Id. Not finding the negative inference strong
enough, Justice Rehnquist would have gone on and applied ordinary
retroactivity principles and doing so would have found the Chapter 153
amendments applicable because (1) the modifications are procedural; (2)
habeas corpus is a prospective remedy; (3) the changes are
jurisdictional. 117 S.Ct. at 2068-2072.
O’Dell v. Netherland
117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997)The Supreme Court held
(5-4) that its decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994), which "requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform
his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution
argues that he presents a future danger," announced a new rule under
Teague, and therefore could not "be used to disturb petitioner’s death
sentence," which became final in 1988. 117 S.Ct. at 1971. Writing for
the majority, Justice Thomas (joined by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy) explained that Teague forbids disturbing a final
state court judgment "unless it can be said that a state court, at the
time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted
objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in
federal court." 117 S.Ct. at 1973. Justice Thomas began by labeling the
rule in Simmons as "an unlikely candidate for ‘old-rule’ status" because
[t]he array of views expressed [by the Justices] in Simmons itself
suggests that the rule announced there was, in light of this Court’s
precedent, ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.’" 117 S.Ct. at
1974.
Petitioner contended that a reasonable jurist
would have felt compelled to grant the relief he sought by the Court’s
decisions in Skipper and Gardner, both of which predated petitioner’s
conviction and were relied upon in the Simmons decision. Rejecting this
assertion, Justice Thomas drew a distinction between Skipper and Gardner
on the one hand -- cases concerning the ability to present the jury with
"information about a defendant" -- and Simmons on the other -- a case
concerning the capital defendant’s ability "to describe the extant legal
regime." 117 S.Ct. at 1976. He also pointed to the existence in 1988 of
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) and Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985), both cases dealing with providing the jury with
post-sentencing information, for the proposition that reasonable jurists
in 1988 "could have drawn a distinction between information about a
defendant and information concerning the extant legal regime," with the
former group being controlled by Skipper and Gardner, and the latter
not. 117 S.Ct. at 1977. Against this legal backdrop, Justice Thomas
concluded that "a reasonable jurist in 1988 would not have felt
compelled to adopt the rule later set out in Simmons." Id. Finally,
petitioner’s contention that the rule in Simmons fits within the second
exception to the Teague new rule bar, allowing retroactive application
of "watershed rules of criminal procedure," was also rejected. 117 S.Ct.
at 1978.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented arguing both that Simmons did not
announce a new rule and that, even if it did, the rule in Simmons fits
within the second Teague exception because "it is of such importance to
the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding that it
should be applied consistently to all prisoners whose death sentences
were imposed in violation of the rule . . .." 117 S.Ct. at 1981.
Bracy v. Gramley
117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997)In a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that "petitioner has made
a sufficient factual showing to establish ‘good cause,’ as required by
Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial
bias." 117 S.Ct. at 1795. Petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced
to death before then Illinois state court judge Thomas Maloney. Maloney
was later convicted of taking bribes from criminal defendants to fix
criminal cases as part of "Operation Greylord." Petitioner alleged in
his federal petition that he was denied a fair trial because "in order
to cover up the fact that [Maloney] was taking bribes from defendants in
some cases, [he] was prosecution oriented in other cases." 117 S.Ct. at
1796. The district court denied relief and denied petitioner’s motion
for discovery -- which requested the sealed transcript of Maloney’s
trial, reasonable access to the prosecution’s materials in Maloney’s
case and the opportunity to depose persons associated with Maloney--on
the basis that the allegations contained "insufficient specificity or
good cause." Id. The court of appeals affirmed "because petitioner
failed to uncover any evidence of actual bias without discovery," thus,
in the court of appeals’ view, "the probability is slight that a program
of depositions aimed at crooks and their accomplices . . .will yield
such evidence." Id.
The Court first identified the essential elements
of petitioner’s judicial-bias claim, which were a "fair trial in a fair
tribunal," and concluded that if petitioner could demonstrate that
Maloney engaged in "compensatory, camouflaging bias in petitioner’s own
case" to hide his "taking of bribes from some criminal defendants" then
the Due Process Clause would be violated. 117 S.Ct. at 1797. Thus, while
the Court noted that the court of appeals may have correctly predicted
that "petitioner will be unable to obtain evidence to support a finding
of actual bias," he nevertheless had established "good cause for
discovery." 117 S.Ct. at 1799. Since petitioner’s allegations provided
"reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief,"
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse any
discovery. Id. The Court left it to the district court to determine the
"scope and extent" of discovery. Id.
Lambrix v. Singletary
117 S. Ct. 1517 (1997)The Court (5-4) held that
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), which held that where a
sentencing judge in a weighing state is required to give deference to a
jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation, neither the judge nor the
jury may constitutionally weigh invalid aggravating circumstances,
established a new rule of procedure inapplicable to cases which were
final on direct review at the time Espinosa was decided.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia
(and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas) first
discussed the state’s contention that petitioner’s Espinosa claim was
procedurally barred, an issue which was not addressed by the court of
appeals. The Court stated that "the procedural-bar issue should
[ordinarily] be considered first. 117 S.Ct. at 1523. The court explained
that its previous announcements that the Teague retroactivity question
was a "threshold matter" only meant that "the Teague issue should be
addressed before considering the merits of the claim." Id. Because it
"undermines the criminal justice system. . . when a federal court
permits [a State’s procedural rules] to be readily evaded" and because
"[c]onstitututional issues are generally to be avoided," and because the
"Teague inquiry requires a detailed analysis of federal constitutional
law," the procedural bar issue should ordinarily be considered first.
However, the Court declined to remand the case so as not to "prolong
this litigation." Id.
On the new rule issue, the majority, surveying
the "legal landscape" at the time Lambrix’ conviction became final,
concluded that Espinosa was not dictated by precedent. First, Justice
Scalia noted that Espinosa "did not purport to rely upon any controlling
precedent," 117 S.Ct. at 1525, but "cited only a single case, Baldwin v.
Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985)," and even "that lone citation [was
introduced] with a ‘cf.’ - an introductory signal which shows authority
that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that ‘controls’
or ‘dictates’ the result." Id. Then, analyzing the cases "relied upon
most heavily by petitioner"-- Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); and, Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738 (1990)--the majority concluded that these cases suggested
that "as late as 1990, if a Florida trial court determined that the
defendant’s conduct fell within the narrowed HAC aggravator, the
sentence would satisfy the Eighth Amendment." 117 S.Ct. at 1526. Thus
Espinosa, which held to the contrary, was a new rule. The majority also
rejected petitioner’s contention that Espinosa was not a new rule
because it was a per curiam decision. The Court stated that "[w]hatever
inference of established law a summary, per curiam disposition might
normally carry is precluded by the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the summary per curiam in Espinosa," because "just three weeks prior to
our issuance of Espinosa, we had decided a case [Sochor v. Florida, 504
U.S. 527 (1992)] that raised the identical issue, but the issue was not
decided because "the defendant had failed to preserve his objection in
the state courts." 117 S.Ct. at 1530. Thus, in the Court’s view,
Espinosa was "only in the most technical sense an ‘unargued’ case." Id.
The majority then noted that "[m]ost of the
dissent is devoted to making a forceful case that Espinosa was a
reasonable interpretation of prior law--perhaps even the most reasonable
one. But the Teague inquiry--which is applied to Supreme Court decisions
that are, one most hope, usually the most reasonable interpretation of
prior law--requires more than that. It asks whether Espinosa was
dictated by precedent--i.e., whether no other interpretation was
reasonable." Id.
After finding that neither of Teague’s two
exceptions applied, the Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus
relief.
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice O’Connor also dissented on the basis that
the case should be remanded to the court of appeals to determine the
procedural default issue and that it was "premature to address the
State’s contention that petitioner’s Espinosa claim is barred on Teague
grounds." However, she noted that "since the Court reaches the question,
I wish to express my agreement with Justice Stevens’ resolution of the
Teague issue." 117 S.Ct. at 1534.
California v. Roy
117 S. Ct. 337 (1996)The Court reversed and
remanded the decision of the en banc Ninth Circuit, which had granted
habeas relief on the ground that the trial court’s erroneous
instruction, which failed to include the essential element of intent in
a first degree murder charge, was not harmless. The Court found that the
Ninth Circuit’s harmless error analysis, which drew primarily from the
concurrence in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989), and allowed a
finding of harmlessness "only if review of the facts found by the jury
establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted element," 81
F.3d 863, 867 (1996), was not sufficiently deferential in light of the
Court’s decisions in Brecht and O’Neal. Because the error at issue was
clearly trial error and "[t]he state courts . . . applied harmless-error
analysis of the strict [Chapman] variety," the Court determined that the
standard set forth in Brecht and O’Neal, rather than the analysis
suggested in Carella, was to be employed in assessing its harmlessness
vel non.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the remand, cited
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) and suggested that, because a
defendant is entitled to a verdict that "he is guilty of each necessary
element of the crime," the error at issue here "can be harmless only if
the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces this one or if it
is impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did
find without finding this point as well." This analysis, however, must
still be conducted within the framework of Brecht and O’Neal.
[See also Seiler
v. Thacker, 101 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 1447 (1997) (Court of appeals explicitly held that Brecht
prejudice analysis is not appropriate unless the state courts have
conducted Chapman v. California harmless error
analysis)]