In Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that
Johnson's death sentence, which was based in part on a prior conviction vacated after his
Mississippi capital trial, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Mr. Johnson was sentenced to death after a jury found three aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. One of the aggravators (that Johnson had been
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person) was
supported solely by a 1963 New York conviction of second degree assault with intent to commit
first degree rape, the only evidence of which was an authenticated copy of Johnson's commitment
to Elmira Reception Center.
After his Mississippi conviction, Johnson successfully challenged the 1963 assault conviction.
Prior to the assault trial in New York, the police obtained an incriminating statement from
Johnson. Despite his objection that it had been coerced, the confession was admitted into
evidence without an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, after he was convicted, he was not informed
of his right to appeal though he attempted to do so three times without the benefit of counsel.
Each attempt was rejected as untimely. Johnson's attorneys were able to convince the Monroe
County Court in New York that Johnson had been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to
appeal. The county court entered a new sentencing order from which Johnson was able to take a
direct appeal. In that proceeding, the New York Court of Appeals reversed his conviction.
People v. Johnson, 506 N.E.2d 1177 (1987).
Johnson then sought post conviction relief from the Mississippi Supreme Court which was
denied. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the reversal of the 1963 conviction affected the validity of the death sentence. The Supreme
Court's holding was grounded in its concern for heightened reliability in capital cases. Because
the 1963 conviction was ultimately reversed, evidence regarding it was entirely irrelevant to the
Mississippi jury's sentencing decision. Therefore, the jury "was allowed to consider evidence that
has been revealed to be materially inaccurate." 486 U.S. at 590. Johnson's death sentence was
vacated.
Since Johnson, the Supreme Court has decided three other cases, all noncapital, concerning
how and when challenges to the unconstitutionality of prior convictions used to enhance a
sentence can be brought.
In the first case, United States v. Custis, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), the defendant attacked the
validity of two prior state convictions the government sought to use to enhance his federal
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), a federal recidivist statute. Custis
argued that the prior convictions were unconstitutional as a result of ineffective assistance of
counsel and an involuntary guilty plea. 511 U.S. at 480. Relying on the wording of the ACCA
which did not expressly provide for a collateral attack of priors on constitutional grounds at the
time of sentencing, and the interest in ease of administration and promoting finality, the Supreme
Court concluded that, except where a defendant was claiming a violation of the right to appointed
counsel, a defendant cannot collaterally attack a state conviction at the time of his federal
sentencing. 511 U.S. at 496-97. The defendant could, however, seek to have his prior convictions
voided in state court or by a federal habeas corpus proceeding, and if successful, could apply to
reopen his federal enhanced sentence. 511 U.S. at 497.
In Daniels v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 1578 (2001), and Lackawanna County District Attorney
v. Coss, 121 S.Ct. 1567 (2001), the Supreme Court answered the question left unanswered by
Custis: whether the constitutionality of prior convictions used to enhance a federal or state
sentence may be challenged through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the post-conviction
remedy for federal prisoners), or a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (the
federal post-conviction remedy for state prisoners). In both cases, the answer was no, with
several important exceptions.
In Daniels v. United States, the defendant filed a §2255 motion challenging the
constitutionality of his state convictions used to enhance his federal sentence under the ACCA.
He argued that his prior state convictions were unconstitutional because they were based on
involuntary guilty pleas and resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. 121 S.Ct. at 1581.
Extending Custis (and its reliance on the interests of "finality" and "ease of administration") to
prohibit such challenges in §2255 motions except where the defendant was denied his right to
counsel, the Supreme Court noted that a defendant "generally has ample opportunity to obtain
constitutional review of a state conviction." If the defendant did not pursue those avenues, or the
pursuit was unsuccessful, §2255 cannot be used to collaterally attack those convictions. 121 S.Ct.
at 1584-85. The Court recognized, however, that in "rare cases" where "no channel of review was
actually available" to challenge the prior conviction "due to no fault of his own,"a §2255 motion
may be appropriate. Id. The examples the Court cited for such circumstances included newly
discovered evidence of innocence and the impediment to timely challenging the prior conviction
was the fault of governmental actors. Id.
In Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, the Court reached the same result when the
habeas petitioner sought to challenge the constitutionality of prior state convictions used to
enhance his state sentence. Unlike Daniels, Coss had challenged the constitutionality of his prior
convictions in a state postconviction petition that was still pending some 14 years later. 121 S.Ct.
at 1571. After extending Daniels and its rationale to §2254 habeas petitions, the Court concluded
that "even assuming the existence of a limited exception to the general rule" barring review of
expired convictions, Coss was not harmed because "it is clear" that any consideration the state
judge gave to the unconstitutional prior convictions "did not actually affect that sentence." 121
S.Ct. at 1575. The Court reiterated the exceptions described in Daniels, adding that a state court's
"refus[al' to rule on a constitutional claim properly that has been properly presented to
it"constitutes such an exception.
Although neither Daniels nor Coss address the separate concerns of the Eighth Amendment's
"special `need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment'" in a
capital case, Johnson, 486 U.S. at 584, counsel should timely challenge the constitutionality of
any prior conviction used to support a death sentence in the forum where the prior conviction
occurred, in addition to challenging those convictions under Johnson at the capital sentencing
and post-conviction proceedings.
SUCCESSFUL JOHNSON V. MISSISSIPPI CASES (updated May 2011)
If you are aware of other successful Johnson v. Mississippi cases that are not contained in this
summary, please notify Wendy Peoples at wendypeoples@earthlink.net.
