NON-CAPITAL RELATED CASES

 

Armstrong v. State,
862 So.2d 705 (Fla. 2003)

Death sentence doubt.

United States v. Walker,
198 F.3d 811 (11th Cir. 1999)

District court properly reduced petitioner’s federal sentence that had enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act where petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging the sentence after one of his three predicate state court convictions has been vacated in a state habeas action due to a violation of Boykin v. Alabama. In affirming, the appeals court observed that "[s]ince Custis was decided in 1994, seven other circuits, all that have considered the issue, have also held, or indicated without expressly deciding, that pursuant to federal habeas corpus, a district court may reopen and reduce a federal sentence, once a federal defendant has, in state court, successfully attacked a prior state conviction, previously used in enhancing the federal sentence." See United States v. Pettiford, 101 F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.1997); Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72 (3d Cir.1996); United States v. Bacon, 94 F.3d 158, 162 n. 3 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Nichols, 30 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Rogers, 45 F.3d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir.1995); Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806, 807 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 339 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581 (10th Cir.1994)

United States v. Pettiford,
101 F.3d 199 (1st Cir. 1996)

District court correctly reduced petitioner’s sentence where he successfully raised Boykin v Alabama challenges in state court to eight of nine prior state convictions that had been the basis for sentencing petitioner pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act.

United States v. Cox,
83 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1996)

District court erred in refusing to reopen defendant's sentence after his prior state convictions, which were considered in determining sentence, were dismissed or expunged.

McGee v. Estelle,
732 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1984)

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of theft of property, a third degree felony. This 1977 sentence was enhanced by two prior felony convictions obtained in 1960 and 1969. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in accordance with sentencing guidelines set forth in the Texas Penal Code. Petitioner contended that the 1960 theft conviction was constitutionally infirm and therefore could not be relied upon to enhance his sentence. The court concluded that use of the 1960 conviction was not harmless, and remanded to the district court for determination as to the constitutionality of the 1960 conviction.

Note: this case preceded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 121 S.Ct. 1567 (2001).

Mateo v. United States,
276 F.3d 186 (D. Mass. 2003)

Where petitioner’s federal sentence for drug trafficking had been enhanced because he had been on state-court probation at the time of the offense, he was entitled to resentencing after obtaining a state court order terminating his state probation nunc pro tunc to a time prior to the federal offenses.

Candelaria v. United States,
247 F.Supp.2d 125 (D. R.I. 2003)

Where petitioner received an enhanced sentence as a Career Offender due in part to a prior Massachusetts conviction which was subsequently vacated in habeas proceedings because of a deficient plea colloquy, he was entitled to resentencing by the federal court

U.S. v. Payne,
894 F.Supp. 534 (D. Mass. 1995)

Payne was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on his prior convictions for armed robbery and larceny from the person. Payne returned to the state court that issued his prior larceny conviction and successfully acted its validity on the ground that the judge had engaged in an inadequate colloquy in violation of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Because the prior larceny conviction was invalidated, Payne’s sentence under the ACCA was constitutionally infirm and he was entitled to resentencing.

U.S. v. Gray,
773 F.Supp. 86 (N.D.Ill. 1990)

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government sought enhancement of defendant's sentence based on four prior convictions. Gray argued that no enhancement should be permitted because two of the four prior convictions were based on guilty pleas that were not knowing or voluntary. The state offered certified documents containing evidence of defendant's convictions. The court considered the documents offered by the state to contain certain inconsistencies, factual inaccuracies, and missing pieces. The documents, therefore, did not constitute a prima facie case of the constitutionality of the defendant's convictions. The defendant also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel in neither trial could remember the defendant or the case as the events in both occurred in 1966 and 1967 respectively. The court heard live testimony by the defendant as to the events that transpired at both of those trials, found him to be quite credible and denied the state's request for sentence enhancement.

State v. Probst,
85 P.3d 313 (Or. App. 2004)

Defendant was entitled to have her felony DUI conviction reduced to a misdemeanor where the trial court erred in finding that a prior conviction used to elevate the charge was valid. The record of the prior proceedings was not sufficient to support inference that the defendant understood risks of self-representation and that she therefore validly waived her right to counsel

Thompson v. State,
583 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 2003)

The court of appeals erred when it upheld the trial court's consideration of Thompson's three prior habitual violator convictions in aggravation of his sentence where the prosecutor conceded that they prior convictions had been uncounseled.

State v. Payne,
69 P.3d 889 (Wash. App. 2003)

Trial court properly refused to consider prior Canadian conviction in sentencing defendant because the conviction was unconstitutional in that Canada did not provide a right to a jury trial.

State v. Shimabukuro,
60 P.3d 274 (Hawaii 2002)

Trial court erred by denying motion to dismiss habitual DUI charge where one of the predicate prior convictions had been vacated because it was unconstitutionally obtained.

People v. Cabassa,
717 N.Y.S.2d 487, 496-497 (2000)

After jury trial, defendant was convicted of sale of a controlled substance. His sentence was enhanced based on a prior federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. That conviction, however, was later vacated on Fourth Amendment grounds. On defendant's motion for new trial and/or sentencing, the court remanded for a new sentencing because "it cannot be said that defendant's sentence was not directly enhanced, at least in part, based upon the fact of the conviction."

State v. Herret,
965 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998)

Defendant's sentences for first-degree robbery and armed criminal action were vacated due to the trial court's reliance on a previously vacated conviction for first-degree robbery in finding that defendant was a prior and persistent offender and sentencing him on the basis of that determination.

Commonwealth v. Palmer,
700 A.2d 988 (Penn. 1997)

Defendant was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and corrupting the morals of a minor. He was sentenced as a repeat felony offender, a classification which required a prior record score of 6. Defendant's prior record score was only 5, thus the sentence was vacated and remanded.

People v. Howie,
41 Cal.App.4th 729 (Cal. App. 1995)

In 1993, defendant was convicted of robbery, commercial burglary, assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, and assault. The jury found three prior serious felony convictions which enhanced the defendant's sentence by a total of fifteen years (five years for each offense). One of these three felonies consisted of a 1973 robbery conviction which was later declared unconstitutional in 1979. The 1973 prior conviction was struck because of the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of his Boykin-Tahl rights before he pled guilty to robbery. Prior to the trial for the 1993 robbery, defendant filed a pre-trial motion to strike the 1973 prior on grounds of collateral estoppel. This motion and subsequent motions to exclude and strike the prior were denied. The jury then found the 1973 conviction to be true and defendant's sentence was thus enhanced by five years (in addition to the other enhancements). California case law and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevent the trial court from using the constitutionally invalid 1973 robbery conviction to enhance defendant's sentence.

McNaulty v. State,
826 P.2d 567 (Nev. 1992)

Defendant was sentenced as a habitual criminal pursuant to his stipulation with the state as to two prior felony convictions. Defendant plea bargained with the state to one count of grand larceny. He also agreed to stipulate to the two felony convictions as a part of the plea agreement. The court held that for enhancement purposes, it is essential that convictions be constitutionally valid. The defendant cannot stipulate to their constitutional validity. Thus the inquiry may not end with a stipulation. No matter what the plea bargain, it is up to the district court to determine the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.

State v. Melancon,
596 So.2d 331 (La. 1992)

Defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine and sentenced as a second-felony offender. After a careful reading of the record, the court could not find any evidence that the defendant had been convicted of a prior felony. The second offender status was thus vacated.

Wisconsin v. Baker,
485 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. 1992)

The defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after revocation of his license. The court was presented with four issues: May a defendant collaterally attack a prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle after revocation (hereafter OAR) in a subsequent OAR proceeding? If he may, is he limited asserting a violation of right to counsel? If he is not so limited, may he collaterally attack the prior conviction on the grounds that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea? The court concluded that a defendant may collaterally attack a prior OAR conviction allegedly obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Specifically, a defendant may, for sentencing purposes, collaterally attack a prior conviction obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel if the prior conviction is used to enhance punishment or support guilt for another offense. A defendant is not restricted to asserting a violation of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that one of defendant's prior OAR convictions was constitutionally infirm because the plea entered into was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. A guilty plea accepted in violation of constitutional requirements raises doubts about the reliability of the conviction

State v. McJunkin,
815 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1991)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of DUI. The jury was asked to decide whether the defendant was a second time offender based on proof offered by the state. The only proof offered was a certified copy of a January 1984 judgment from another court which had not been signed by the judge. The appeals court held that an unsigned judgment is void and may not be used as proof of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes.

State v. Prince,
781 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1989)

This case involved two defendants who were convicted of felonies triggering the habitual criminal statute and found to be habitual criminals. There were three issues in the case: 1) Did the defendants waive the right to challenge their prior guilty pleas by having failed to challenge them in a prior post-conviction petition attacking a sentence enhanced by those guilty plea convictions? As to this issue, the court held that because a defendant cannot make a collateral attack on prior guilty pleas in a post conviction petition attacking a sentence enhanced by those prior guilty plea convictions, there was no waiver. 2) If there is no waiver for that reason, must the enhanced sentence be vacated if the guilty plea convictions are found to be void? The answer to this question is yes and the sentence is void. 3) Finally, does a defendant waive his right to vacate the enhanced sentence by having failed to establish any invalidity in the guilty pleas before filing his first petition attacking an enhanced punishment sentence? The court found that there was no waiver. The court remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the merit's of Prince's 1976 guilty pleas. The trial court held the hearing and dismissed the petition.

Prince appealed the dismissal of the petition. The court of appeals set aside his prior convictions because the trial court did not advise Prince of his constitutional rights. The court held that the burden was consequently on the state to prove that despite the failure of the trial court, Prince knew that he had the right to avoid self incrimination. The state did not carry its burden and the court vacated his prior convictions. Thus, Prince could no longer be considered a habitual offender.

Lacy v. People,
775 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1989), cert. denied, Colorado v. Lacy, 493 U.S. 944 (1989)

This is not a case which actually cites Johnson but it is relevant to the use of previous convictions as sentence enhancers. Defendant was convicted on three habitual counts. On appeal, he asserted that his guilty pleas to those three counts were constitutionally infirm and therefore could not be used as predicates for habitual criminality charges. The court agreed with him as to two of the habitual criminal counts, finding that a prior conviction obtained in a constitutionally invalid manner could not be used against a defendant in a subsequent proceeding to support guilt or to increase punishment.