CAPITAL CASES

 

Armstrong v. State,
862 So.2d 705 (Fla. 2003)

Death sentence reversed where prior felony conviction that jury considered as an aggravating circumstance was vacated after petitioner was sentenced to death. "Given the nature of the crime underlying the vacated conviction--a sexual offense upon a child--and the detailed testimony given by the young victim of that crime at Armstrong's penalty phase, we cannot say that the consideration of Armstrong's prior felony conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child of the age of fourteen constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt."

People v. Horton,
47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 (Cal. 1995)

There were two aggravating circumstances in this case: armed robbery and a previous conviction for murder. At the end of the guilt phase of defendant's trial, counsel moved to strike the prior conviction special circumstance on the grounds that defendant's constitutional rights had been violated in numerous ways during the pendency of the previous murder trial. The trial court acknowledged several irregularities in the proceeding in question but denied the motion to strike. Notably, the defendant's earlier trial occurred when he was a juvenile. The defendant's lawyer asked to be absent when the jury returned its verdict. The jury came back deadlocked and the court was on the verge of granting a mistrial when the prosecution convinced the judge to send the jury back for further deliberations. The lawyer for Horton's co-defendant was present and also objected to the granting of a mistrial. The jury acquitted the co-defendant but found the defendant guilty. The court relied heavily on Johnson v. Mississippi in finding that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the prior conviction special circumstance on the grounds that the prior conviction had been obtained in an unconstitutional manner (denial of assistance of counsel). Because the prosecution relied entirely on the prior conviction for aggravation at the penalty phase, the court set aside the death sentence notwithstanding the validity of the other special circumstance (armed robbery).

State v. Shepherd, 
902 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1995)

There were three aggravating circumstances presented in this case: a previous conviction of a felony involving violence to the person, the murder was especially heinous, atrocious etc., and the murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The felony conviction involving violence to another person was reversed. Relying on Johnson v. Mississippi, the court found that it had no alternative but to remand the case for resentencing. In so finding, the court noted that one of the other aggravators (that the murder was committed during the commission of a felony) was not supported by the evidence though the jury found it to be true. The cumulative effect of finding two invalid aggravators in the face of potentially substantial mitigating proof eliminated the possibility the error was harmless.

Harris v. Blodgett,
853 F.Supp. 1239 (D. Wash. 1994)

At the penalty phase of his capital trial, Harris' prior convictions for manslaughter and assault were admitted into evidence in the form of a judgment and sentence for each conviction. At the time of his murder trial, the manslaughter conviction had already been dismissed. Nonetheless, the conviction was admitted into evidence without objection from defense counsel. Moreover, there was no pre-trial hearing to consider the validity of this guilty plea prior conviction. Referring to Johnson, the court held that the legal effect of the dismissal should have been determined. At the very least, the dismissal should have been presented to the jury along with the judgment and sentence to comply with due process. Moreover, there was no definition of manslaughter presented to the jury. This omission exacerbated the injurious nature of the prosecutor's statements to the jury that the defendant had killed before leaving them to believe that the manslaughter conviction was tantamount to a murder conviction. There was serious constitutional error and influence on the jury's verdict which required that the habeas writ be granted.

Greene v. State,
878 S.W.2d 384 (Ark. 1994)

During the sentencing phase of appellant's trial, the state introduced evidence that appellant had been convicted in North Carolina of the murder of his brother. That conviction was later reversed. The state conceded there was Johnson error but maintained the error was harmless. The state court concluded it could perform a harmless error test only if the jury found no mitigating circumstances. Because the jury unanimously found four mitigating circumstances, the court vacated the death sentence.

Duest v. Singletary,
967 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1992); 997 F.2d 1336 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1107 (1994) and cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 1126 (1994)

 Duest was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. At the sentencing phase of appellant's trial, the state introduced evidence that Duest had two prior convictions; one for armed robbery and the other for armed assault with intent to murder. Subsequently, one of these convictions was vacated and one was nolle prossed. On appeal, the state did not dispute that error occurred in this case but, instead contended that the error was harmless. The court found error based on the evidence that the jury had seriously considered the two convictions. During deliberations, the jury asked to see the vacated convictions. The court also emphasized the likelihood that the assault conviction which involved murderous intent would have likely had a particularly adverse impact on a jury deciding to recommend life or death. Duest v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court later vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, (1993), which adopted a relaxed harmless error standard. Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336 (11th Cir. 1993). Under Brecht, actual prejudice to the defendant occurs when constitutional error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Habeas relief is thus justified if just one juror who voted for the death sentence was likely substantially influenced by the evidence of Duest's prior conviction. The court found that such a likelihood existed in Duest's case based on several factors: the jury requested to see the vacated convictions, the sentencing hearing only took one day, there was a close jury vote (7-5), and the evidence improperly considered was materially inaccurate.

Ward v. State,
 827 S.W.2d 110 (Ark. 1992)

The defendant alleged error in the trial court's admission of a collection of documents relating to his prior manslaughter conviction in Pennsylvania. Even though Ward was convicted only of manslaughter, and there was no proof that he had raped or robbed the victim, the documents introduced into evidence contained a felony information charging appellant with murder, and an affidavit alleging that appellant raped and robbed the Pennsylvania victim. The state offered no collateral proof appellant committed the offenses of murder, rape, or robbery, thus the court the court held that mere allegations do not constitute proof. Therefore the documents were improperly admitted and Ward was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

Sanders v. State, 
824 S.W.2d 353 (Ark. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1126 (1995)

The jury found two aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the defendant previously committed a felony for which he received a death sentence. The capital murder conviction supporting the aggravator was later overturned. The court concluded there was reversible error under Johnson, stating it could not surmise how much the jury relied upon the felony conviction. The fact that the jury foreman came out and asked if the jury could consider the prior conviction was persuasive evidence that the error was in fact prejudicial.

State v. Burr, 
576 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1991)

Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. During the guilt phase of the proceedings, evidence of collateral crimes was introduced to establish the identity of the perpetrator. This evidence was presented in the form of live testimony from the victims of the three crimes; no evidence offered in the form of a certified judgment. The three victims' statements suggested that a similar modus operandi had been used in those crimes as that used in the crime for which Burr was now being tried. Later, in imposing the sentence, the trial court relied expressly on the collateral crimes evidence as supporting the existence of several aggravating factors. Subsequently, Burr was acquitted of one of the collateral crimes and the other was dismissed by nolle prosequi. The court determined that the admission of the collateral crimes at the guilt phase was harmless. However, because the trial judge, in rejecting the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, relied upon the collateral crimes evidence, the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

Preston v. State,
564 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 1619 (1993)

The trial court found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was the conviction of a prior felony involving the use of or threat of violence to another. This conviction was later vacated because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Preston filed a petition for habeas corpus based upon Johnson. The court noted that the Supreme Court had not precluded a harmless error analysis in cases where the conviction for a prior felony that formed the basis for an aggravating circumstance is set aside, but reasoned that such an error is likely to be harmful because evidence has been admitted which has been found to be materially inaccurate. The court noted the fact that the prosecutor placed special emphasis on the importance of the prior felony at issue, and reversed the death sentence.

Commonwealth v. Karabin, 
559 A.2d. 19, 521 Pa. 543 (1989)

At the defendant's murder trial, the jury found the aggravating circumstance of "a history of felonies". The sole evidence for the history of felonies circumstance consisted of the introduction of a conviction for aggravated assault in 1979. The evidence was offered in the form of testimony by the clerk of court reading a docket entry that the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to the charge on the specified dates. What really happened is a different story. On the day that defendant was sentenced, he filed a petition to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the petition and defendant appealed. While that appeal was pending, defendant's capital trial took place and he was sentenced to detah, in part, based on the aggravating circumstance of history of felonies. The capital conviction was later found invalid on appeal and his death sentence was vacated. The court held that no prior conviction had actually occurred that could support the aggravating circumstance of a history of felonies. Subsequently, defendant's aggravated assault appeal did become a conviction. The state then sought to have the death sentence reinstated. The court declined to reinstate the death sentence because technically the conviction occurred after the sentencing in the capital case. Therefore, there was no conviction to support the finding of an aggravting circumstance.

Teague v. State, 
772 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1988) cert. denied 493 U.S. 874 (1989)

At the sentencing hearing, the jury found the aggravating circumstance that Teague had been convicted of the prior felony of accessory before the fact to second degree murder. That conviction was found to be void by this court. The court addressed the issue of whether petitioner's death sentence should be vacated where the other aggravating circumstance was unaffected and still valid. Referring at length to Johnson, the court determined that Johnson left it unclear as to whether or not harmless error was applicable pointing out that in Johnson, the Court held that it was "plainly justified" in not applying the harmless error test in view of the fact that the prosecutor argued, as the prosecutor did in the this case, that the jury should return a death sentence on the basis of the infirm aggravating circumstance. Nonetheless, the court conducted harmless error and concluded that error had occurred.