Use of Religious Source Material

 

Romine v. Head , 
253 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2001 )

Death sentence reversed on habeas where religion permeated sentencing; court relies primarily on prosecutor’s improper arguments but also cites to jurors’ use of Bible during deliberations in finding sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair.

Jones v. Kemp, 
706 F.Supp. 1534 (N.D.Ga. 1989)

Capital case. Writ of habeas corpus was conditionally granted because trial court erred in allowing Christian Bible into jury deliberation room. The court noted that it is well established that religion may not play a role in sentencing.

State v. Williams, 
777 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio App. 2002)

Interest of justices required that Ohio death row inmate receive a hearing where evidence indicated that jurors undertook group prayer along with court personnel.

Glossip v. State, 
29 P.3d 597 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001)

While reversing capital case on ineffectiveness ground, court notes impropriety of jurors’ use of bible at both stages of trial.

Ex Parte Troha, 
462 So.2d 953 (Ala. 1984)

State supreme court granted writ of certiorari and reversed petitioner's rape conviction because juror consulted a minister, who was also his brother, for guidance and scripture references to enable him to make decision in accordance with Christian principles.

State v. Harrington, 
627 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1110 (1982)

Capital case. New sentencing proceeding was required because jury foreman read biblical passages to other jurors during their sentencing deliberations.

 

 

  Separation of Jurors

 

 

State v. Fields, 
1998 WL 430536 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. 1998)

Convictions for breaking and entering reversed because jury foreman and another juror took cigarette break together for a few minutes and discussed the case apart from the other jurors. Error could not be remedied by further instructions.

Kimoktoak v. State, 
578 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1978)

It was reversible error to permit a sequestered jury to separate after the commencement of jury deliberations.

 

 

  Alternate Jurors in Jury Room

 

 

Manning v. Huffman , 
269 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2001 )

Involvement of alternate jurors in deliberations (in addition to, not replacing, jurors on panel) constitutes prejudice per se to defendant.

United States v. Ottersburg, 
76 F.3d 137 (7th Cir. 1996)

Conviction reversed on appeal where two alternates participated in jury deliberations; court holds plain error holding of Olano permissive, not mandatory and finds harm under facts of case.

United States v. Beasley, 
464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972)

Mistrial required where alternate is present in jury room and included in any proceeding commenced by the jury, albeit only selection of the foreperson, after deliberations begin.

 

United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 
335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964)

Presence of alternate in jury room was plain error even though counsel (but not the defendants) consented to the alternate's presence as a precaution because one of the regular juror's was feeling ill and even though the alternate was instructed not to participate in the deliberations.

Archie v. State , 
844 So.2d 1173 (Miss. App. 2003 )

Alternate juror’s improper participation in deliberations required reversal of conviction where post-verdict inquiry revealed that the alternate juror may have influenced the verdict.

State v. Gross , 
776 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio 2002 )

Death sentence reversed due to trial court's error in permitting alternate jurors to sit in on sentencing deliberations. Prejudice was presumed given evidence that at least one alternate inserted himself into actual deliberations through intrusive verbal participation, and more than one alternate participated through nonverbal acts.

State v. Washington , 
632 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. App. 2001 )

Misdemeanor convictions reversed where court allowed alternates to participate in deliberations.

Koch v. Rist, 
730 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2000)

Affirming grant of new trial in medical malpractice case where dismissed alternate entered jury room and remained there throughout jury's deliberation as within the discretion of the trial judge, without trial judge specifically finding prejudice.

Hayes v. State, 
735 A.2d 1109 (Md. Ct. App. 1999)

Substitution of alternate juror, who had been excused but had not left courthouse, after jury left courtroom to begin deliberations was impermissible; basis for trial court's conclusion that no deliberations had occurred prior to substitution was not clear, record did not reveal how much time had passed, or what jury was doing, during critical period, alternate was allowed to leave courtroom for some period of time, and alternate was not interviewed to determine whether she had been exposed to any outside influences.

State v. Edgarnelson , 
587 N.W.2d 439 (S. Dak. 1998 )

Conviction for inhumane treatment of animals reversed despite lack of objection where alternate juror deliberated with the twelve impaneled.

State v. Cleveland, 
959 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1997)

A missing juror during a trial for aggravated assault was replaced by an alternate. When the missing juror returned during closing arguments, the court removed the alternate and returned the missing juror. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the juror's absence during closing argument was a fundamental error under its constitution and therefore not subject to harmless error analysis.

State v. Babbington , 
676 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. App. 1997 )

Murder conviction reversed where 13 jurors answered questions upon being polled; court held that whether or not alternate actually deliberated, defendant was entitled to know composition of his jury.

State v. Grovenstein , 
493 S.E.2d 865 (S.C. 1997 )

Trial court erred in failing to grant mistrial when it was discovered that alternate was not dismissed before jury began deliberations; prejudice presumed under South Carolina law.

Turk v. Silberstein, 
1996 WL 580960 (Conn. Super. Sept. 30, 1996), aff'd, 48 Conn.App. 223, 709 A.2d 578 (Conn.App. 1998)

Granting motion in civil case to set aside verdict because alternate juror participated in jury deliberations.

Commonwealth v. Sheehy, 
588 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1992)

In first-degree murder case, trial court committed reversible error by allowing alternates to sit in jury room with deliberating jurors; alternates, whose views may be influenced by lack of responsibility for verdict, may improperly influence deliberating jurors.

People v. Litwa , 
646 N.Y.S. 2d 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996 )

Harm presumed where alternate jurors communicated with deliberating jurors in arson trial.

Bullock v. State, 
258 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. 1979)

Voluntary manslaughter conviction reversed when an alternate juror was allowed to retire to the jury room with the serving jurors after defense counsel had objected to the alternate's presence.

People v. Adame, 
111 Cal. Rptr. 462 (Cal. 1973)

Grant of new trial affirmed in case involving a second degree murder conviction because an alternate juror was allowed to sit with the deliberating serving jurors.

State v. Bindyke, 
220 S.E.2d 521 (NC 1972)

The presence of an alternate in the jury room during deliberations, even if for only a minute or two, is reversible error per se.

 

 

Sleeping Jurors

 

Kelley v. State
805 So.2d 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Remand for hearing on issue of sleeping juror and impact thereof after post-conviction applicant made facially valid showing that juror slept through significant portions of the trial.

State v. Burns
800 So.2d 106 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2001).

Post-conviction applicant entitled to new trial for conviction of unlawful entry of business where trial court sua sponte removed a juror who the court had been sleeping and replaced that juror with an alternate, where neither the state nor the defendant requested the substitution. Trial counsel objected to the substitution.

Spunaugle v. State, 
946 P.2d 246 (Okla. 1997)

The trial court committed reversible error by failing to grant defendant's timely motion to replace a sleeping juror. In this case, the record clearly reflected that the juror had in fact been asleep.

People v. South, 
526 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1991)

New trial required where trial court failed to investigate timely allegation the juror slept through portions of the trial and even portion of the jury charge (but not that much of it). Juror who has not heard all of the evidence and the court's instructions "is grossly unqualified to render a verdict."

People v. Evans, 
710 P.2d 1167 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)

Conspiracy to distribute marijuana conviction was reversed and remanded when juror slept through defense counsel's argument. After the trial was over, Sleepy was charged with contempt.

 

 

Incompetence

 

 

Sullivan v. Fogg,
613 F.2d 465 (2nd Cir. 1980)

Murder conviction reversed and remanded because juror was delusional and heard voices during the trial. The juror believed that the voices belonged to defense spies.

 

 

Missing Jurors

 

 

State v. Poindexter , 
545 S. E 2d 414 (N.C. 2001 )

Reversal in capital case where juror was removed after guilt phase following remarks to other jurors about alleged threats by defendant’s family; removal violated defendant’s right to trial by jury of twelve.

State v. Cleveland , 
959 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1997 )

Missing juror during trial for aggravated assault was replaced by alternate, but when absent juror returned during closing arguments, court removed alternate and returned missing juror; Tennessee Supreme Court held that the juror’s absence during closing argument was fundamental error under its constitution and therefore not subject to harmless error analysis.

State v. Thompson, 
955 S.W.2d 828 (Mo.App. 1997)

Trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing to determine if two jurors were absent during deliberations where two correctional officers informed defense counsel that they had seen two jurors had left the floor.

 

 

  Juror Subject to Prosecution

Reese v. State, 
739 So.2d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

Prejudice was presumed and a mistrial required where state law enforcement officer appeared in court during deliberations to arrest juror; juror knew arrest was imminent, and juror's prosecution was being handled by same prosecutor trying case against defendant.