Remmer v. United States
347 U.S. 227
(1954) .
Conviction for federal tax
evasion was vacated and remanded to the district court because an
unnamed person offered juror bribe to bring in verdict favorable to
defendant. The trial judge and the prosecutors had the matter
investigated by the FBI and concluded that the remark had been made as a
joke. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[i]n a criminal case,
any private communication, contact or tampering, directly or indirectly
with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is,
for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial." Id. at 229.
United States v. Rutherford
371 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2004) .
In tax evasion case, the court remands for an evidentiary hearing on defendants' claim that jurors were intimidated by numerous government agents who were in the courtroom during the trial glaring at the jurors. The appropriate inquiry is whether unauthorized conduct "raises a risk of influencing the verdict," or "had an adverse effect on the deliberations." It is not required that any intimidation have been intentional. In denying the defendants' motion for a new trial, the district court erred in limiting juror testimony to "the existence of such conduct at the time it occurred."
Caliendo v. Warden
365 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004) .
Habeas relief granted where three deliberating jurors chatted amiably
and at length with the critical prosecution witness, a police officer,
in an uncontrolled setting. The state appellate court decision was
contrary to the Mattox rule which required court to apply
rebuttable presumption of prejudice as result of 20- minute conversation
between the jurors and
the key witness.
United States v. Schwarz
283
F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 2002).
Jurors' midtrial
exposure to extraneous information about a codefendant' mid-trial guilty
plea in this police brutality trial provided clear and convincing
evidence of potential prejudice requiring an evidentiary hearing by the
trial court. The Court noted that the proper remedy for the trial
court's error would either be a remand for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue or the outright grant of a new trial. However, the Court did not
decide which would be appropriate because it granted a new trail another
issue.
Fullwood v. Lee
290 F.3d 663
(4th Cir. 2002).
Remanded for
hearing on allegations that juror's spouse constantly, throughout the
capital murder trial, encouraged the juror to vote to convict and for
death sentence. Additionally, evidentiary hearing on when and how jurors
became aware of information that defendant had previously been sentenced
to death and that sentence was overturned on a "technicality."
Fields v. Woodford
281 F.3d
963 (9th Cir. 2002).
Remanded for evidentiary hearing
on issue of whether juror, whose wife was victim of an unsolved rape,
robbery and kidnaping, was biased, in this capital murder trial
involving charges of rape, robbery, murder and kidnaping, because the
wife and her juror husband had many, many conversations about the case
during the trial about the wife's attack and her fear that the defendant
may have been her attacker. Although juror had revealed on voir
dire that his wife was
victim of a robbery, he did not reveal that she had also been raped in
the same crime. District court to determine whether juror intentionally
withheld that information and whether his conversations with his wife,
which were shared with other jurors, during the trial rendered him or
any other juror biased.
United States v. Sandilis
14 Fed.Appx. 287,
2001 WL 867389 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).
Fourth Circuit held that
"Remmer
hearing"to determine whether a juror was biased was required where
information came to light that member of jury failed to reveal repeated
negative business dealings with the defendant business owners. The
business owners, who had never seen the juror before but only spoken
with her on the phone, were informed of the juror's identify by some of
their employees who attended the last day of the trial and pointed out
the juror to the defendants. (After hearing, the district court denied
motion for new trial and that decision was affirmed.)
United States v. Henley
238
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001)
.
Remanded for hearing in light of
Dutkel, infra, in federal prosecution where
co-defendant attempted to bribe juror. Court found that attempted
bribery of the juror was, prima facie, jury tampering, therefore,
invoking a strong presumption of prejudice, manifest in juror's
resulting intense anxiety. Court found error in trial court's rejecting
without hearing "African-American defendants' claim that juror who
allegedly used the word "nigger" was racially biased, without making any
findings concerning whether juror actually made a racist statement, and
if so, its specific content."
United States v. Corrado
227
F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000).
Allegations of jury
tampering and news reporting about the arrest of a suspect for jury
tampering in a trial on Rico charges required remand to the lower court
for a "Remmer Hearing," because the lower court failed to conduct an
adequate hearing to determine whether jury tampering occurred and
whether jurors learned of and were biased by media reports that a
suspect accused of jury tampering in the case was arrested. (Petition
for Certiorari filed July, 2002).
United States v. Jackson
209
F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
Evidentiary
hearing required where juror received threatening phone call during
trial. The issue was not defaulted, even though the juror was questioned
at trial about the phone call and it's impact on her and she was allowed
to remain on the jury without objection by the bribery defendant,
because the juror denied any negative impact or associating the call
with the trial. Years later and contrary to her statements to the trial
court, the juror told the defendant's investigator that she thought the
call was from one of the defendant's associates and was related to the
trial. An evidentiary hearing was required only because the juror
refused to sign the statement drafted by the investigator. If the juror
affirmed the information proffered through the investigator, the
defendant would be entitled to a new trial in accordance with
United States v. Angulo
4
F.3d 843 (9th Cir.
1993).
United States v. Dutkel
192
F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 1999)
.
Case remanded for
determination whether jury's deliberations were materially affected by
co-defendant's bribery and coercion of juror, which resulted in hung
jury for co-defendant, while appellant was found guilty. A finding on
remand of material affect on deliberations would require that appellant
be afforded a new trial.
United States v. Sylvester
143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998)
.
Remanded for
evidentiary hearing, where trial court's ex parte inquiry into multiple
occasions of third party contact with multiple jurors was deemed
insufficient, so that parties could participate in inquiry to determine
whether intrusion affected jury's deliberations and
verdict.
United States v. Gaston-Brito
64 F.3d 11 (1st
Cir. 1996)
.
Conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine reversed because case agent
sitting at prosecutor's table gestured and implicated defendant as
unnamed person discussed in witness' testimony. Court construed this as
an unauthorized communication which was presumptively prejudicial.
United States v. Cheek
94
F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996)
.
Habeas petitioner entitled to new
trial where juror was approached by person associated with co-defendant
for purpose of bribing juror to vote to acquit, scaring juror such that
juror did not inform trial court. Lower court's determination that
presumption of prejudice required by Remmer, supra,
had not attached was error, as was lower court's delving into
impermissible 606(b) testimony from juror in allowing inquiry concerning
whether juror had listened to and considered all the evidence, and then
relying on the impermissible testimony in reaching
conclusions.
United States v. Smith
26
F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1994)
.
Juror's statement
to other jurors that she had a visitor on night before she was excused
from jury, together with another juror's expression of concern for her
safety, required further inquiry by trial judge beyond merely
interrogating excused juror; remanded.
United States v. Angulo
4
F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1993)
.
In cocaine/heroin
distribution case, juror received anonymous threatening phone call;
trial court dismissed juror, but failed to conduct evidentiary hearing
to determine possible bias of other jurors; remanded for hearing: if
government fails to show that phone call was harmless beyond reasonable
doubt, new trial should be ordered.
Hunley v. Godinez
975 F.2d
316 (7th Cir. 1992)
.
In trial for murder
and burglary, new trial was required where four jurors suffered burglary
of hotel room and theft of belongings during deliberation gave rise to
presumption of bias. Jurors' claims that the burglary would not affect
their verdict was not dispositive where previously divided jury quickly
voted to convict after burglary.
United States v. Strickland
935 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991)
.
Juror acted improperly when he asked question of government witness outside courtroom.
United States v.
Maree
&United States v. Brooks
934
F.2d 196 (9th
Cir. 1991)
.
Brooks' conspiracy
to distribute cocaine conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered
because juror discussed the case with her friends during her jury duty
and her friends said that people like the defendant should be
incarcerated.
Church v. Sullivan
942 F.2d
1501 (10th Cir. 1991)
.
Habeas corpus
petition for relief from conviction for accessory to armed robbery was
granted and the cause remanded for a hearing because defendant's friends
signed affidavits alleging that they witnessed head jailer's wife speak
to jurors and ask how defendants could tie up and rob an elderly
couple.
Stockton v. Virginia
852 F.2d
740 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071
(1989)
.
Capital case. Death
sentence reversed because jurors were approached, during the
deliberation stage, at a diner by the proprietor who said, among other
things, that they ought to "fry that son of a bitch."
United States v. Heller
785
F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986)
.
Tax evasion
conviction was reversed because of numerous acts of juror misconduct,
including one instance involving a juror who spoke with a friend, who
was an accountant, on matters relating to the case. This case is best
known because of the anti-Semitism that was displayed by the jurors, see
section on anti-Semitism.
Budoff v. Holiday Inns, Inc.
732 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1984) .
Wrongful death
verdict was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the
plaintiff's counsel's employee's child contacted a juror's child and
discussed the case. Court held that the "administration of justice"
required finding misconduct when a person under the supervision of
counsel initiates a private contact with those close to
jurors.
Owen v. Duckworth
727 F.2d
643 (7th Cir. 1984)
.
Habeas relief
granted based on government's inability to overcome presumption of bias,
notwithstanding district court's finding that none of the jurors was
biased, where juror received threatening phone call and, despite being
told not to do so, conveyed the threat to other jurors, who thought the
defendant was the source of the threat.
Krause v. Rhodes
570 F.2d 563
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1488
(1978)
.
Plaintiffs were
entitled to new trial because verdict was returned by a jury at least
one of whose members had been threatened and assaulted during trial by
person interested in its outcome.
Anderson v. Miller
2001 WL 1182832 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2001) (not reported in F.Supp)
.
Remand for evidentiary hearing in habeas case where trial court conducted insufficient inquiry into complaints by two jurors of intimidation by others; habeas court holds that petitioner did not fail to develop facts under § 2254(e) where state trial judge abruptly terminated inquiry into allegations.
United States v. Gaffney
676 F.Supp. 1544
(M.D. Fla. 1987) .
Mail extortion
convictions reversed and motion for a new trial granted because of
several sources of potential jury misconduct including one juror's
discussion of the case with her attorney friend, a third-party's
negative comment about the case and jurors' discussions of the case with
their relatives. Jurors gave conflicting accounts about the case;
however, the court believed that at least one juror may have been
prejudiced by the extraneous contacts.
Neal v. John
110 F.R.D. 187 (D. Virgin
Islands 1986) .
Malicious
prosecution conviction reversed and a new trial ordered because one
juror heard witness allege he was paid for his testimony.
Jenkins v. State
825 A. 2d 1008 (Md. App. 2003)
"[D]enial of petitioner's motion for a new trial was a clear abuse of
discretion under the specific egregious circumstances in the case sub
judice, where, during a recess in a criminal trial, both the juror
and the State's detective witness clearly ignored the trial court's
orders prohibiting interaction between jurors and witnesses, where the
juror not only intentionally sought out interaction with the detective
during a weekend religious retreat, but, after such retreat, went to
lunch with the detective while the trial was still pending and where
they discussed personal details of their lives, (footnote omitted) and
the State's detective witness drove the juror to his car in her own
personal vehicle. Regardless of whether details of the ongoing trial
were discussed, personal and prolonged contact as occurred in this case
not only interjects an inherent prejudice to petitioner in the form of
possible bias in favor of the State's case, but also creates an
appearance of serious impropriety and
causes subsequent serious harm to the perception of the integrity of
the jury process itself."
State v. Roman
817 A.2d 100 (Conn. 2003).
In murder case, the trial court erred in failing to conduct any
inquiry into a facially credible claim of juror misconduct, namely that
a juror had spoken with a member
of the victim’s family.
Buisker v. Thuringer
648 S.W.2d 817 (S.D. 2002)
In wrongful death suit, state trooper married to bailiff commented to
juror that defendant had liability insurance, thus forming basis of
jury’s belief that parties were in
cahoots; new trial ordered.
Evans v. Commonwealth
572 S.E.2d 481 (Va. App. 2002)
In sexual assault case, the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to investigate a juror misconduct allegation that suggested that
a juror had contact with the defendant's uncle during trial, and that
the defendant's uncle stated that defendant was always in trouble and
that he hoped the defendant would be sentenced to forty years. The trial
court erred in resolving the allegation against the defendant without
further inquiry where two partially conflicting sworn written statements
by the juror were submitted, one of which supported the misconduct
allegation.
People v. Washington
2002 WL 1161094 (Mich.
App. May 31, 2002) .
New trial required where armed
robbery and assault defendant brought to court's attention mid-trial
that a juror was seen riding with and lunching with a police officer who
had been at trial for the first two days and who was associated with the
victims and where the trial court refused to allow the defendant to
conduct mid-trial voir dire of the juror or to present a witness concerning the juror's
contact with the police officer, even though the trial court did
question the juror about the contact.
Commonwealth v. Guisti
434 Mass. 245, 747
N.E.2d 673 (Ma. 2001).
Post-verdict hearing required
where juror posted messages on a listserv about her juror service
including, "[let's] just say he's guilty and let's just get on with our
lives. I am missing good gym time." during the trial. The trial judge
refused to voir dire the
juror on the emails and her statements contained therein and whether she
shared any of the information with other jurors.
Hodge v. Commonwealth
68 S.W.3d 338 (Ky. 2001)
Remand for full evidentiary hearing where defendant in robbery/murder case alleged that prosecutor visited jurors daily; jurors were provided with newspapers and alcohol; jurors decided on guilt before deliberations began; and other jury tampering occurred.
State v. Albert
639 N.W.2d 224 (Wisc. App. 2001)
Where juror discussed case with bystander in courtroom and told him that he thought defendant was guilty, then lied about incident in court, trial court's failure to hold adequate inquiry required reversal of drunk driving conviction.
Buckholts v. State
545 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. App. 2001)
Where defense counsel in drug possession case informed court that two jurors had been seen talking with state's chief investigative officer, trial court's failure to inquire into nature of communications required reversal.
Quinine v. Commonwealth
547 S. E.2d 524 (Va. App. 2001)
Reversing on other grounds, court notes that trial court also erred in refusing to investigate allegations that juror had answered falsely on voir dire and had communicated with witness during trial.
State v. Rideout
725 A.2d 8 (N.H. 1999)
New trial ordered where juror in need of insulin shot was aided by police officer who testified for prosecution; appellate court finds that trial court erred in not holding state to burden of establishing that no prejudice occurred and not interviewing jurors.
Mullins v. States
525 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999) .
Drug possession
conviction reversed due to improper communication between two jurors and
acquaintance; acquaintance told jurors defendant would not "be here" if
he were not guilty, and testimony was in conflict as to whether juror
had predetermined defendant's guilt.
May v. State
716 N.E.2d 419 (Ind.
1999) .
Trial court abused
its discretion in denying defendant's request to replace juror with an
alternate where juror encountered an officer testifying for the state in
a restaurant, exchanged pleasantries with the officer, then invited the
officer to his house to watch a fight the following weekend; this
contact "no doubt affected" the juror's ability to assess the officer's
credibility.
State v. Coburn
724 A.2d 1239 (Me. 1999) .
In case of
operating under influence of alcohol, conviction overturned where one
juror asked police officer husband about purpose of intoxilyzer test and
another tried contested maneuver in own vehicle; prosecution did not
rebut presumption of prejudice.
State v. Bisaccia
319 N.J. Super. 1, 724
A.2d 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
.
Case remanded for hearing where judge had failed
to inquire into outside influences on jurors, including their being
followed by strangers and receipt of implied threats; defendants must
have new trial if full hearing not possible due to passage of time.
After remand, new trial granted because state was not able to rebut
presumption of taint of jury by contacts:State v.
De Stefano, 339
N.J.Super. 153, 771 A.2d 592 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2001) (changed lead
defendant, same case).
State v. Faucher
596 N.W.2d 770 (Wisc.
1999) .
Reversing
conviction based on newly enunciated standard on objective bias where
juror discovered that long-time neighbor was an important state's
witness and where juror felt that neighbor would never lie, even though
juror declared he could be fair and impartial. Wisconsin Supreme Court
delineates three new standards, superceding all prior bias standards,
concerning bias determinations: statutory bias, subjective bias, and
objective bias.
State v. Bailey
713 So.2d 588 (La. App. 5
1998) .
Remanded for
evidentiary hearing to determine whether jury impartiality was affected
by juror's telling story that his wife received call from woman with
defendant's last name who asked for juror's daughter's telephone
number.
State v. Spencer
694 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.
1997)