Intoxication

 

People v. Hedgecock
795 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1990).

The appellate court granted a remand for an evidentiary hearing as to improper bailiff comments with jurors and an alternative writ to explore possibility of jurors' excessive drinking, finding that allegations of jury misconduct were serious enough to sustain the trial court's decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to violate disclosure laws and perjury. Bailiff allegedly commented about how well jurors were treated, about hold out jurors and about a fight that once erupted when there was a hold out and told a story about a "green hat" designed to illuminate the concept of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the bailiff provided alcohol to jurors, one of whom drank so much that she had to leave her jury seat every 15 minutes to vomit.

People v. Lee Chuck
20 P. 719 (Cal. 1889).

Capital case reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that where the proof of drinking during deliberations is clear and undisputed in a capital case, a verdict of conviction should not be allowed to stand.

Juror Misstatements of Law

McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (9^th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103 (1998). Death sentence reversed where jury misunderstood instructions regarding what may be considered as mitigating evidence. But see Coleman v. Calderon, 525 U.S. 141 (1998), overruling McDowell to the extent Boyde analysis relied upon inconsistently from Brecht harmless error analysis requirements.

Rasbury v. State, 832 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Capital case. First degree murder convict entitled to a new hearing on his motion for a new trial because first hearing excluded relevant evidence relating to one juror's misstatement of the law of self-defense as a fact, rather than an opinion and the juror indicated that he had been a magistrate, thus implying he knew the law. The court ruled that it appeared that jurors could testify to statements made by other jurors "if the statement is relevant to the validity of the verdict." Id. at 399.

Young v. Brunicardi, 232 Cal. Rptr. 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Negligence judgment reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror erroneously stated the law of negligence in that he said defendant could not be negligent if he had not been ticketed for his actions.

Flores v. Dosher, 622 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1981). Negligence judgment reversed and plaintiff's granted a new trial when juror erroneously told other jurors that it did not matter how they answered the special issues because plaintiffs would recover anyway.

Reese v. Britain, 570 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). Will contest judgment was reversed when one juror gave other jurors erroneous instructions on the law of undue influence. In determining whether this was an "overt" act, the court listed the following factors as significant: nature of the conduct, significance of the conduct, presence or absence of a rebuff, whether the statements were asserted as matter of opinion or fact, the timing of the misconduct, duration of deliberations and any other matters occurring during trial that might have a bearing. Id. at 533.

 

Discussions of Parole

Musgrove v. State, 986 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Trial court must hold hearing where affidavit provides probable cause to believe jury misconduct occurred; issue here was jury’s improper consideration of Texas parole law at sentencing in burglary case; remand ordered; relief denied after remand.

Buentello v. State, 826 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Voluntary manslaughter conviction was reversed and remanded back to the trial court because two jurors were found to have misstated the application of the parole law, leading to at least two jurors voting for a harsher punishment that they would have if the misstatement had not occurred.

McIntire v. State, 698 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Conviction for aggravated sexual assault and indecent liberties with a child was remanded for a hearing because of several possible acts of jury misconduct, including an implied quotient verdict, third party communication with a juror and discussion of parole. The jurors apparently agreed to average the amount of time they thought the appellant should get and thus a hearing should have been granted on this ground. Moreover, one of the appellant's own character witnesses remarked "What do you do with a guy like that?" which was sufficient to raise a rebuttable presumption of injury to the defendant. Finally, a juror admitted to discussing parole and this alone was sufficient to sustain appellant's motion for a hearing on a new trial.

Johnson v. State, 652 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). Aggravated robbery conviction was reversed and remanded because jurors misstated application of the parole law which resulted in one juror agreeing to a 75 year sentence because she believed that the defendant would only serve 20 to 30 years. The juror indicated that she would not have voted for such a harsh punishment if the discussions of parole had not occurred.

Collins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Conviction for burglary with intent to commit theft was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because the jurors extensively discussed the impact of parole on defendant's sentence.

Grismore v. State, 641 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Aggravated robbery conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror's discussions about parole caused one juror to change his opinion on sentencing.

Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Petitioner pled guilty and opted for a jury sentencing. The sentencing was reversed and his case remanded for a new trial because the jury discussed the possibility of parole and some jurors changed their sentencing verdict as a result of such discussions.

Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Aggravated assault conviction was reversed and remanded because the jurors' discussions about parole law were extensive and caused two jurors to change their vote from probation to confinement.