Dishonesty on Voir Dire

Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Court remanded for evidentiary hearing for inquiry into allegations that juror who served on capital murder trial concealed information on voir dire and that prosecutor was aware of the concealment but stood mute.

On remand from USSCT, District court held that juror withheld information on voir dire intentionally to mislead the trial court, despite the juror's denial to the contrary, and ordered a new trial. Fourth Circuit affirmed. District Court's opinion published at: Williams v. Netherland, 181 F.Supp.2d 604 (E.D.Va. 2002).

The state trial court committed constitutional error when it dismissed the lone holdout juror in response to the prosecution’s assertion that it would have exercised a peremptory challenge against the juror had it been aware of information that was revealed by the juror at an in camera hearing conducted during jury deliberations. The record showed that any failure by the prosecution to discover this information was due to its own lack of diligence and not any concealment or deliberate withholding of information by the juror. Further, the information did not support a finding of implied bias.

Hearing on implied bias required in capital case involving kidnapping/rape where juror stated on voir dire that his wife had been victim of robbery but neglected to mention that she had been kidnapped and raped and the perpetrator never found.

Remand for more comprehensive evidentiary hearing to determine whether juror who concealed information on voir dire was biased. The trial court's prior hearing on the matter was woefully insufficient because: the defendant was not allowed to participate or be present during the F.B.I.'s questioning of the juror about his criminal record; the trial court was not present during the questioning and failed to question the juror itself; the ex parte examination of the juror by the government may have added another layer of juror misconduct in this trial of multiple defendants on charges including jury tampering.

United States v. Sandalis ,
14 Fed. Appx. 287, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17273 (4^th Cir. Aug. 1, 2001 ) .

Juror's lies concerning his background, both on juror questionnaire and during voir dire, and juror's attempts to cover up behavior in posttrial proceedings-where juror attempted to distance himself from statements in his declaration-supplied basis for presumption of actual bias and required habeas corpus relief.

Dyer v. Calderon,
151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir 1998) (en banc), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1033, 119 S.Ct. 575, 142 L.Ed.2d 479 (1998) .

Habeas relief required where juror in capital trial failed to disclose that brother was murder victim despite on point questions before and during voir dire. Even though juror claimed to be unbiased, the court vacated the conviction and sentence, holding a finding of actual bias was not required and that bias should be presumed where a juror's actions created "destructive uncertainties" about the indifference of the juror.

Murder conviction in which battering and abuse issues prominent reversed on habeas where juror did not acknowledge own sexual abuse during voir dire; defendant had asked for and been denied individually sequestered voir dire on issue (lying juror also discussed own experiences with other jurors). Habeas court refused to accord presumption of correctness to state court findings.

Conviction overturned where juror deliberately failed to reveal on voir dire that brother-in-law was an attorney for the government.

Convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana and other crimes were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother was a deputy sheriff who performed work in an office that was involved in the defendants' case.

FELA negligence action was reversed and remanded. The court held that the lower court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing when juror affidavits and voir dire testimony indicated possibility of dishonesty. The court also remanded the case for a hearing because of one juror's statements concerning the railroad's settling practices, which constituted the introduction of an extraneous influence.

Conviction for obstruction of justice was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court found that the defendant had suffered actual prejudice as a result of juror's failure to disclose prior associations with the defendant as well as prior involvement in criminal cases.

Remand for hearing to determine whether juror's intentional failure to disclose fact that son was in training to become parole officer despite being asked questions on point during voir dire rendered civil rights plaintiff's trial, grounded in police misconduct, unfair based on either a resulting prejudicial impairment of right to exercise peremptory challenges or finding that correct answer would have provided basis for challenge for cause.

Venireperson's concealment of fact that brother had been convicted of crime, in face of voir dire question on point, required new trials where the venireperson was seated as a juror on the trial of two separate cases involving three defendants (two of whom were convicted by the juror of making false statements to the government).

Juror's failure to reveal that his two children where serving sentences for convictions arising from drug transactions in response to questions on point in juror questionnaire and on voir dire required new trial for drug defendant.

Hearing required regarding possible juror concealment of bias on voir dire where evidence shows that juror commented that the defendants wouldn't have been arrested if they weren't guilty, belying the juror's claim that he would afford the defendant the presumption of innocence. Hearing order at which juror was to appear to give testimony and both the government and the defendant were barred from any contact with the juror whatsoever prior to the hearing.

In capital case involving an anonymous jury where evidence existed indicating that one of the jurors may have failed to reveal that he lived near the petitioner’s mother and had a troubled relationship with the petitioner’s family, petitioner presented a compelling need to interview the juror in order to determine: (1) whether the juror willfully concealed information during voir dire; (2) whether he was biased against petitioner based on his history with petitioner’s family; and (3) whether the juror conveyed this information to other jurors.

Where juror did not disclose that he knew defendant or any members of his family, and defendant learned from his brother after trial that the juror did in fact know him, the lower court erred in denying the request for a post-trial interview with the juror. The appellate court reverses the order denying the motion for a new trial and remands for an evidentiary hearing, including an interview of the juror.

In medical malpractice case, trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial after finding that a juror intentionally failed to disclose in response to a voir dire question information concerning a products liability action against the manufacturer of the product that injured her husband.

Affirming grant of postconviction relief where juror failed to disclose on voir dire that she had a brother who had been sentenced to death, which she believed he deserved; failed to disclose that she had two other brothers who had been arrested; and failed to disclose that she herself had been raped while very young.

New trial ordered where juror concealed on voir dire that he had formed an opinion about the plaintiff as an "opportunist" (plaintiff was seeking a money judgment after her child died in foster care).

Conference America, Inc. v. Telecommunications Cooperative Network, Inc.,
___ So.2d ___, 2003 WL 22753446 (Ala. Nov. 12, 2003)

In civil contract dispute case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial that was based on a juror’s failure to reveal that he had been involved in at least three contract disputes and that he had been a defendant in legal actions involving those contract disputes. The juror also failed to disclose that he had been arrested, jailed and convicted of a criminal offense, and that he had been charged with being in arrears in his child support and was a party to a paternity action. There was no evidence that the matters inquired about were temporally remote, that the questions posed to the juror were ambiguous, or that the juror’s misrepresentations were inadvertent.

After conviction in larceny case but before sentencing, defendant told lawyer that he recognized juror who had once solicited him to commit unrelated crime; trial court’s failure to conduct any hearing based on alleged "facial incredibility" of defendant’s statements held erroneous and case remanded for inquiry.

Affirming grant of new trial where juror failed to disclose on voir dire that he had been a defendant in a personal injury case two years earlier.

In shoplifting case, a new trial is ordered where juror failed to disclose that she had been convicted of shoplifting and the circumstances indicated that this was not a case of juror dishonesty because of mistake or embarrassment, but rather there was an inference that the juror deliberately lied with the motivation of being placed on the jury.

Reversing conviction where juror failed to disclose that her mother had been murdered or that the police officer who investigated the case was also listed as a witness at the defendant’s trial.

Kelly v. Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, Inc.,
818 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2002).

New trial required for plaintiff doctors in fraudulent inducement case against hospital, where several jurors failed to reveal litigation histories, where the information was relevant to issues at trial, the jurors concealed the information, and the moving party was diligent in seeking the information. Accord Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2002) (juror's failure to disclose prior litigation history in med-mal action warranted new trial and counsel were not required to scour public records for information on jurors as part of diligence requirement).

New sentencing phase trial required where, among other things, trial court removed juror during penalty phase after juror recognized capital murder defendant's aunt as an old neighbor and "scant" acquaintance of the juror's. The juror indicated that she did not recognize the aunt's name during jury selection when asked, didn't intentionally withhold information about their relationship, and would not be biased by the relationship.

New trial required in personal injury action where juror concealed felony conviction during voir dire when asked a specific question about criminal history and where information was not discoverable using ordinary diligence. Court reversed long line of cases in stating that party no longer has to show wrong or injustice.

Remand for evidentiary hearing required where jury foreperson failed to reveal on voir dire she had been the victim on violent crime. The state's attempt to argue that the juror did not answer falsely because no one was ever prosecuted for the crime -a rape- against the juror was not persuasive.

Burglary case remanded for evidentiary hearing where juror did not disclose on voir dire that he had had altercation with defendant prior to trial

Reversing on other grounds, court notes that trial court also erred in refusing to investigate allegations that juror had answered falsely on voir dire and had communicated with witness during trial.

New trial required where juror concealed information that she was a volunteer victim's advocate for three years with the prosecutor's office. The Court rejected the juror's fluctuating responses and reasons about why she didn't respond correctly when asked about the matters on voir dire, as well as her claim that she wasn't biased and did not intentionally withhold the information. The Court announced it will use the inferred bias standard when a juror is found to have intentionally withheld information during voir dire.

Remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine whether juror deliberately failed to inform the trial court he was a retired police officer in order to be seated as a juror. The trial court is to grant a new trial for defendant convicted of criminal assistance if it finds that question in the affirmative.

Juror's failure to reveal on voir dire that she had known defendant since childhood, had current friendship with victim, and had prior knowledge of underlying offense amounted to misconduct requiring new trial on charge of attempted murder.

New trial granted in murder case where juror intentionally failed, in the face of specific voir dire, to reveal that her son had been murdered, that prosecution witnesses were the same officers who assisted in prosecuting her son's killer and that juror regarded the area where the defendant's crime occurred as a "drug area."

Doyle v. Kennedy Heating and Service, Inc.,
33 S.W.3d 199 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), review denied.

New trial required in this personal injury action because juror failed to disclose she had filed for bankruptcy five years earlier. Jurors were voir dired about bankruptcy filings. The offending juror heard the question but didn't answer because she didn't think it was important. The Court held that once the intentional concealment of information by a juror on voir dire is proven, bias and prejudice must be presumed.

New Hampshire Supreme Court barred on double jeopardy grounds retrial of petitioner whose first trial for aggravated sexual assault ended in a mistrial because one juror concealed information that she was a victim of sexual assault but revealed it to other jurors during deliberation. The trial court declared a mistrial without any inquiry of any of the jurors because the law did not permit the judge to make inquiry of jurors at that stage.

Civil judgment against Los Angeles reversed where jurors concealed bias on voir dire and in questionnaires, including strong negative opinions about conduct and veracity of Los Angeles police; jurors shared views based on own experiences that LAPD regularly "screws over" people and hides evidence; case remanded for new trial.

On showing of lying on voir dire, defendant was entitled to juror questionnaires which were not otherwise discoverable.

Affidavits by defendant's family and witnesses--that juror knew defendant's family and juror had relatives who had been convicted of criminal offenses despite negative responses during voir dire--established prima facie case of juror misconduct and entitled defendant to evidentiary hearing. After remand, convictions affirmed.

Rejecting harmlessness finding, court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded for new trial where jury foreperson failed to disclose during voir dire his suspicion that defendant had murdered his friend in previous homicide.

Court reversed trial court's denial of defendant's motion for new trial and remanded to determine whether juror withheld information at voir dire, where juror had not disclosed that she had been sexually abused and where the defendant was charged with lewd act on a minor.

Juror's intentional failure to disclose felony and misdemeanor convictions on voir dire required new trial.

New trial on punishment required when it emerged during opening of punishment phase that juror was stepmother of victim of another of defendant's alleged rapes. Not strictly a dishonesty case because stepmother was unaware of connection until that stage, but court said was "contrary to human nature" to expect her to ignore feelings about rape of stepdaughter.

Convictions for murder, first-degree robbery, and attempted first-degree assault remanded for a hearing to determine existence of actual bias where a juror neglected to inform the court during voir dire that he had been the victim of an assault. After remand, conviction was reversed and new trial granted: State v. Myers, 244 Conn. 683, 711 A.2d 704 (Conn. 1998).

Venireperson's failure to disclose during voir dire that he received an unfavorable verdict in a wrongful death action arising out of the death of his wife required new trial.

Court's failure to voir dire remaining jurors after juror was dismissed for not revealing her knowledge of the defendant and the crime during voir dire constituted plain error.

When asked during voir dire if any member of his family had been the victim of a crime, juror answered no. However, it came to light at the conclusion of the trial that the juror's father had been murdered and that he himself had been the victim of organized crime. Trial court erred in failing to grant mistrial.

New trial required when juror failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been victim of crime, had read new articles about case, had visited courthouse and seen defendant surrounded by reporters, had criminal record, had father with criminal record, and had friend in law enforcement.

Civil judgment on conversion and slander reversed; juror answered on voir dire that he had been previously party to one lawsuit; information later surfaced that he had been party 21 times, and that losing party's attorney in this case had secured judgment against him; court holds that litigant's right to fair exercise of peremptory challenges hampered and orders new trial.

Criminal case reversed and remanded for new trial because juror failed to disclose that she volunteered at the county jail where the defendant was being detained and that she had contact with the defendant and one of his key witnesses in the course of her duties as a volunteer after being chosen as a juror. The juror escorted the defendant's witness to see him the night before his trial was to begin. She had already been chosen to sit on the jury. The combination of these elements was prejudicial to the defendant.

State v. Adams,
880 P.2d 226 (Haw. Ct. App.) cert. denied, State v. Adams, 77 Hawaii 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994) .

Second degree assault conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial when juror relayed her previous experiences as a sexual assault victim, in essence explaining why the alleged victim in the case did not defend herself and presenting extra-record evidence. The juror in this case also lied to the court in that, when questioned, she failed to reveal that she had been a victim of sexual assaults in the past.

First degree burglary conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror failed to reveal that he had been charged with a criminal offense and was asked to reveal any such prior charges on voir dire.

New trial ordered where juror did not disclose on voir dire extent of pretrial knowledge about case and discussed case in middle of trial with nonjuror in violation of oath.

Capital case. Death sentence overturned and new trial granted when jury foreman failed to disclose that he had been a police officer after defense counsel specifically asked all venire members with a law enforcement background to identify themselves.

Venireperson who was selected as juror expressed view as to defendant's guilt before jury was empaneled and before giving false response concern fairness during voir dire; trial court's failure to inquire whether these remarks had in fact been made, and if so, whether the juror could set her previous opinion aside, required reversal.

Grant of new trial affirmed and conviction for two counts of rape, sodomy and sexual abuse were reversed and remanded because juror failed to reveal that she knew someone who had been sexually abused.

Conviction for possession of a pistol, after conviction of a violent crime, was reversed and the case remanded because juror failed to answer truthfully on voir dire the question whether she had an interest in convicting the defendant. The juror was the mother a woman whom the defendant had previously raped.

Court issued the writ of error coram nobis and his drug conviction reversed because juror failed to reveal his prior jury service on a drug case in which the defendant was convicted.

Medical malpractice action was reversed and remanded and a new trial granted because juror failed to disclose that she was a patient of the respondent doctor.

Law enforcement officer's manslaughter conviction was reversed because two jurors failed to answer questions regarding (1) conflicts/problems they had with law enforcement officers in the past and (2) any relation to law enforcement officers. One juror failed to reveal her prior legal problems and another failed to reveal that her ex-husband was a police officer.

First degree manslaughter conviction was reversed and remanded because juror failed to disclose his knowledge of facts about the homicide and having worked with the victim's brother-in-law.

Conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was reversed because juror failed to reveal that he had been the victim of the same crime for which defendant stood accused. Prejudice was presumed.

Voluntary manslaughter conviction with 20 year sentence was reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror failed to reveal that she had previously been the complainant in an assault case.

Conviction for robbery was reversed and remanded or a new trial on certiorari to the state supreme court because when questioned as to whether he had been the victim of a violent crime, a juror failed to disclose that he had been the victim of a shooting incident.

Conviction for rape, assault and battery and robbery was reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror failed to reveal his law enforcement background which included temporary work as a security guard and his then current employment as a juvenile counselor. The court presumed prejudice.

Tort action verdict was reversed and remanded for a new trial because juror failed to reveal his experiences as a seasoned truck driver and then later admitted to the panel that he had operated almost every kind of truck. The court held that prejudice was presumed for a dishonest juror response to voir dire questioning and that it was irrelevant whether the dishonest answer was intentional or the defendant was actually harmed by the misconduct. Moreover, the court held that the entire jury panel was tainted when even one juror lies on voir dire.

Capital case. Reversing capital conviction and death sentence where litigant examined a juror on her qualification and juror does not "answer truly, it is manifest that [litigant] was deprived of his right to challenge for cause."

New trial required because trial court erred in refusing defendant's motion to strike a Jewish juror for cause after the juror repeatedly expressed bias and doubt that he could be impartial in a trial of three defendants accused of a hate crime against Jewish persons and property. The juror was placed on the jury when the district court had to replace one sick juror with an alternate. However, the district court, not liking the race and religious composition of the jury substituted in some alternates, including the biased juror, in an attempt to have a jury with diverse religious and racial backgrounds. The Court of Appeals also found the district court erred in that regard, as well.

Third Circuit upheld grant of petition for writ of habeas corpus for death-sentenced inmate seeking relief because the trial court erred by striking a death-scrupled juror for cause without determining whether the juror could be impartial; death sentence vacated and remanded for new sentencing trial.

Gall v. Parker,
231 F.3d 265 (6^th Cir. 2001) cert. denied, Parker v. Gall, 533 U.S. 941 (2001).

Capital murder defendant conviction and sentenced overturned and that the trial court enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity based on numerous errors, specifically including trial court's error in striking a venireman for cause because he was unsure about his feelings on the death penalty, where he did not say he could not or would not impose a death sentence.

New trial required where juror who stated he would could not be impartial because he was related to or friends with several law enforcement officers was seated as juror on defendant's trial for theft of government property, to wit: a U.S. Marshal's service weapon, among other things. Both the trial court and defense counsel failed in their duties. Trial court should have sua sponte removed the juror. Defense counsel was found ineffective for failing to more to strike the juror for cause. See also Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499 (6^th Cir. 2000) (granting habeas relief to state inmate convicted of murder where several jurors who expressed bias against the defendant during voir dire were allowed to sit in on the jury after the defendant exhausted peremptory strikes, even though the jurors were never rehabilitated).

New trial required where juror who could not firmly state that she could be a fair and impartial juror should have been struck for cause on the defendant's motion. Juror's ex-husband was a drug user and dealer and their divorce was quite painful because of his activities. Ninth Circuit held the juror should have been removed under either the expressed or implied bias theories because the defendant was being tried for distribution of cocaine, among other things, which created a link between the juror's prejudice-inducing experiences and the essence of an issue at trial.

Habeas relief granted for petitioner convicted of murder in state court, where juror who expressed bias on voir dire and trial court refused to remove the juror for cause. New trial was required because trial court failed to remove jurors who had somewhat intimate knowledge of facts of case, who were ambivalent about ability to render fair and impartial verdict and who were only able to assert they would "try" to be fair, because a juror's promise to try to be fair was insufficient.

New trial required where trial court refused party's motion to strike to potential jurors who expressed bias against tort plaintiffs for cause, where one of the two sat on the jury because the party exhausted peremptory strikes earlier. The Court rejected those jurors claims that they would be fair as belied by the depth of their expressions of bias. Trial court also erred in restricting scope of voir dire.

Rejecting the "magic question" rehabilitation myth, the Kentucky Supreme Court granted a new trial and held that potential juror's ultimate statement that he could be fair and follow the law could not and should not be afforded credibility in light of the racial bias expressed by the potential juror, who did not serve as a juror on the African-American defendant's trial for murder and armed robbery. Prior to agreeing that he could be fair and follow the law, the potential juror expressed that he "was racially biased, that he left neighborhood because young black men were hanging around in area, that when he walked into courtroom he assumed that defendant was accused because of color of skin, that he was offended by inter-racial relationships, that people who were involved in such relationships were low class, and that low class people were more likely to commit crimes."

New trial required where potential jurors indicated they would be unlikely to consider fact that victims of statutory rape lied to the defendant about their ages and that the defendant then reasonably believed the victims. Although the jurors ultimately but begrudgingly agreed they would follow the law, the Montana Supreme Court found the risk they were actually biased outweighed the jurors claims that they would follow the law.

Reversal required where a prospective juror repeatedly evidences a predisposition towards the prosecution- cause exists for a challenge; fairness can not be measured by asking whether the venire person would do what no decent person would do, that is, convict an innocent person, since this question improperly posits the juror function as determining innocence. The opinion did not indicate whether the juror actually sat on the trial or whether the juror was removed by peremptory strike by defendant, in this 2^nd degree robbery prosecution.

Conviction for aggravated sexual assault reversed and voided on double jeopardy grounds after retrial, where judge improperly removed defendant's relative (cousin) for statutory exemption at first trial, after jury had been sworn but before opening statements. Texas statute bars relatives within third degree of sanguinity, which does not include cousins.

New trial required in aggravated battery case where a potential juror expressed doubt he could presume the defendant innocent and he would tend to believe a police officer more than anyone else, where the only evidence against the defendant was the police officer's assertion that the defendant confessed. Juror rendered a verdict in the case. Note that the defense failed to use peremptory to strike to remove the juror but counsel's failure did not impact the court's decision.

Trial court's failure to strike for cause juror who admitted that mere fact that grand jury indicted defendant, on trial for attempted burglary, made it more likely to potential juror that defendant was guilty required reversal. Potential juror who admits bias must be struck for cause even if potential juror subsequently states that she will and can follow the law. Accord State v. Schermerholn, WL 1307311 (W.Va. June 13, 2002).

New trial required for DUI defendant where trial court refused to strike juror who unequivocally stated he was biased against people who drink alcohol. Once a prospective juror in a criminal case has made a clear statement during voir dire reflecting or indicating the presence of a disqualifying prejudice or bias, the prospective juror is disqualified as a matter of law and cannot be rehabilitated by subsequent questioning, later retractions, or promises to be fair.

Reversible error by trial court in failing to remove a potential juror for cause who indicated his friendship with arresting officer would cause him to believe and favor the officer's testimony. New trial was required even though defendant, who's guilt on the murder charge was only contested as to issue of premeditation, used a peremptory strike against the potential juror and without regard to whether defendant exhausted all his peremptory strikes.

In med-mal case, juror, who had been a longtime patient of the defendant doctor and who was represented by the attorneys for the defendant, should have been struck for cause regardless of juror's claim he would be fair and unbiased on theory that jurors could not and should not be arbiters of their own biases in such situations. Rehabilitation is not a remedy and, in fact, should not be engaged in by trial courts. The point of voir dire is to understand and explore potential juror biases not to smooth them over and obtain a jury at the cost of a fair and impartial trial.

Post-conviction relief granted where potential juror indicated his past experience with victim of sexual assault would make him bias where defendant tried for sexual assault. Juror sat and rendered verdict. Counsel was also found ineffective for failing to conduct further voir dire, failing to move to strike for cause and for failing to use a peremptory to remove the juror.

New trial required for defendant charged with sexual assault where trial judge refused to strike two jurors who were biased in favor of police testimony for cause, where the defendant exhausted all peremptory strikes. The trial court has a duty to assure that the jury is as impartial as possible and must excuse any juror if the court has a reasonable doubt about the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict.

New trial required where juror who had been victim of aggravated robbery indicated bias resulting from that crime in defendant's trial on aggravated robbery charges. Even though trial counsel failed to preserve the error, the court held that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury imposed on the trial judge a duty to explore sua sponte the juror's bias and attempt rehabilitate her.

Post-conviction relief required where trial counsel failed to move to strike for cause jurors who expressed bias against defendant who was on trial for charges including rape and kidnaping, where those jurors had life experiences or relationships that rendered them impliedly biased. (Although technically an IAC case, but underlying substantive facts make it relevant.)

New trial required where trial court failed to obtain unconditional, clear commitment from juror that biases against guns would not and did not interfere with ability to give manslaughter defendant a fair trial. Juror's answers to rehabilitation questions that he would try to be fair and hoped he could follow the law were insufficient.

New trial required for defendant convicted of second degree murder, where trial court failed to remove three jurors who expressed bias in favor of police officer testimony after defense requested they be removed for cause, where defense exhausted peremptory strikes before the end of jury selection.

Capital murder defendant's conviction and sentence reversed where trial court refused defendant's request to strike two juror's for cause, one of whom served as a juror and the other of whom the defendant was forced to exhaust his final peremptory strike to remove. One of the jurors, a veteran police officer, was strongly biased in favor of the prosecution, and the other juror, was absolutely biased in favor of the death penalty.

New trial required because trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion to strike juror for cause after the juror repeatedly stated that he would be biased in favor of law enforcement due to his familial associations with law enforcement. Although the juror waffled, he was never rehabilitated.

In re the Detention of Leroy Jones,
2001 WL 1155775 (Wash.App. Div. 1) (Unpublished).

New commitment hearing required on issue of whether subject was a sexually violent predator when trial court erred in refusing to grant motion to strike juror who was a recent rape victim and who's relative was rape victim for cause, even though juror expressed doubts about her ability to be fair.

State v. McCoy,
248 Wis.2d 984, 638 N.W.2d 394, 2001 WL 1183285 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (Unpublished).

New trial required for post-conviction applicant convicted on drug charges, where trial judge during voir dire actually enhanced jurors biases and helped to define them better rather than rehabilitating the jurors, then refused to remove any of them for cause.

New trial required for defendant prosecuted for improper exhibition of fire arm, carrying concealed weapon, and resisting arrest without violence when juror who stated she was biased in favor of police officer testimony because juror was not rehabilitated and trial court failed to grant defendant's request to strike the juror for cause. Defendant had to use last peremptory to strike juror. Trial court then denied defendant's request for an additional peremptory strike for another juror, who ultimately sat on the jury. All these factors required a new trial.

New trial required for burglary defendant where police officer juror indicated he would believe police officer testimony over anyone else's was not rehabilitated by trial judge, who bore the duty of rehabilitation (not the defendant as the government argued). The Court required new trial because the defendant was forced to use a peremptory strike to remove the potential juror and exhausted remainder of peremptory strikes before the end of jury selection. See also People v. White, 275 A.D.2d 913, 714 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).

New trial required where juror concealed fact that his car had been repossessed in this injury action against a repossession service. Defendant investigated juror post verdict and submitted credit report and juror affidavit admitting truth. Thorough discussion of why a juror lie on voir dire requires grant of a new trial.