Court Officer Improper Influence

 

Parker v. Gladden
385 U.S. 363 (1966).

Second degree murder conviction was reversed because bailiff commented to jurors "[o]h that wicked fellow [petitioner] he is guilty." The bailiff also remarked that if anything was wrong with the jurors' verdict, the Supreme Court would correct it. While only one juror acknowledged hearing the bailiff's comments and admitting that they prejudiced her, the court reversed, focusing on the official nature of the misconduct and the fact that the defendant was entitled to 12 impartial jurors, not less than 12.

Turner v. Louisiana
379 U.S. 466 (1964).

Capital case. Conviction and sentence of death reversed and remanded because two deputy sheriffs who gave crucial testimony were put in charge of jury, ate with them, conversed with them and did errands for them. The court noted that the testimony given by the deputies was in direct conflict with that of the defendant and it "must inevitably have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his death." Id. at 473.

Mattox v. United States
146 U.S. 140 (1892).

Murder conviction reversed because bailiff remarked to jury that this was third person defendant had killed and because newspaper article about case was read to jury. Jurors permitted to testify about extraneous influences in jury room.

Moore v. Knight,
368 F.3d 936 (7^th Cir. 2004)

State post-conviction court’s denial of relief in rape case where the trial judge had ex parte communications with the jury was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The jury had asked questions that went to the heart of petitioner’s alibi defense and some jurors recalled being told, erroneously, that no evidence was in the record as to one of the questions. Evidence at the post-conviction hearing was too sparse and ambiguous to support a finding of harmless error, especially in light of the applicable presumption of prejudice.

United States v. Brande ,
329 F.3d 1173 (9^th Cir. 2003)

Evidentiary hearing required in wire fraud case where court officer questioned juror’s ability to convict defendant based on religious belief; hearing ordered despite fact that defense waited five months after learning of ex parte contact before raising issue.(But note, on remand the claim was denied. See 296 F.Supp.2d 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2003).)

Fisher v . Roe ,
263 F.3d 906 (9^th Cir. 2001)

Murder conviction reversed in AEDPA case where, following request, court reporter entered jury room and read back testimony; defendant and attorneys were not informed of readback and were denied right of presence.

Agnew v. Leibach ,
250 F.3d 1123 (7^th Cir. 2001)

Habeas corpus relief granted in armed robbery case where bailiff who provided substantial testimony as prosecution witness had also been charged with continuous care of jurors; prejudice inherent under Turner.

Sanders v. Easley ,
230 F.3d 679 (4^th Cir. 2000)

Capital defendant challenged mistrial from previous sentencing hearing; mistrial found proper where juror had claimed that court officers told her life in prison meant at least 20 years, then said she had lied under pressure to change vote; mistrial decision not unreasonable or contrary to law under AEDPA.

United States. v. Scisum
32 F.3d 1479 (10^th Cir. 1994).

Federal conviction for trafficking in prostitution reversed where juror asked marshal if had to be present for reading of verdict; marshal sent her to judge, without parties present, who told visibly upset juror that she had to be present, and informed counsel only after jury polled and verdict recorded; court holds that counsel could not then cross-examine judge and government did not meet heavy burden of showing harmless error, even though jury had agreed on verdict before juror met with judge.

Keller v. Petsock
853 F.2d 1122 (3^rd Cir. 1988).

Hearing granted where bailiff denied jury's request to see judge without explaining that jury could communicate with the court in writing.

United States v. DeHernandez
745 F.2d 1305 (10^th Cir. 1984).

Prejudice found where trial court responded to jury's question concerning unanimity requirement without first advising parties and attorneys.

Jimenez v. Heyliger
792 F.Supp. 910 (D. Puerto Rico 1992).

Medical malpractice verdict was reversed and remanded for a new trial because security guard, placed in charge of the jury, stayed inside the deliberation room, brought jurors requested items related to the defendant's claim he had not committed negligence. An additional ground of misconduct consisted of remarks an alternate juror made to a bailiff concerning the plaintiff's national origin which indicated that other jurors had discussed her ethnicity and national origin.

State v. White , 
138 S.W.3d 783 (Miss. App. 2004)  

The State failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice that arose from the presence of the judge’s law clerk/bailiff during jury deliberations. Although the clerk testified that she did not verbally participate in the deliberations, "that evidence alone was insufficient to prove that her presence in the jury room had a benign effect on the deliberative process."

State v. Brown , 
2003 N.J. Super. LEXIS 261 (N.J. Superior Court App. July 21, 2003 )

Reversing conviction where jury was read back victim’s testimony by court reporter in jury deliberation room, outside presence of the judge or defendant; judge had previously had ex parte contact with jury to explain this procedure.

State v. Hall , 
65 P.3d 90 (Ariz. 2003 )

Capital conviction and death sentence reversed where bailiff improperly told several jurors that the defendant had a bracelet-like tattoo on his wrists. Crucial to the prosecution’s case was a surveillance video which the prosecution contended showed the defendant. During trial, the jurors had scrutinized the tape looking for a bracelet tattoo. Although ten jurors testified at the hearing on the new trial motion that they had not been able to see a tattoo, the trial court found that a bracelet tattoo was in fact visible on the videotape. A new trial was required since it was impossible to know the effect of the extrinsic information on the two jurors who did not testify.

People v. Mello
97 Cal.App.4th 511, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 (2002).

In a stunning case, the trial court repeatedly encouraged jurors to lie about racial biases in response to voir dire questions by counsel. The African-American defendant, on trial for aiding and abetting and false imprisonment, was surrounded by a courtroom full of "Caucasians," who might not feel comfortable expressing any bias against the defendant because of his race. Therefore, the judge told the veniremen to deny racial bias but if they felt biased to come up to bench and express any other reason for dismissal and he would excuse them.

Ex parte Pierce
851 So.2d 619 (Ala. 2002 ).

In capital case, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to fact that sheriff witness was also escorting jury to and from courtroom in violation of Turner v. Louisiana .

State v. Merricks,
831 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2002)

Affirming reversal of conviction for sexual battery where jurors asked bailiff for readback of testimony and he told them to rely on their memories; court notes impossibility of determining what effect bailiff’s comments might have had on verdict.

Orenski v. Zoremba Mgmt. Co.,
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3323 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. June 20, 2002)

Reversing civil judgment where judge instructed jurors regarding disputed elements without knowledge or consent of parties.

Hodge v. Commonwealth,
68 S.W.3d 338 (Ky. 2001)

Remand for full evidentiary hearing where defendant in robbery/murder case alleged that prosecutor visited jurors daily; jurors were provided with newspapers and alcohol; jurors decided on guilt before deliberations began; and other jury tampering occurred.

People v. Flores,
282 A.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

Kidnaping conviction reversed where court officer usurped trial court’s function by responding to jury’s question about translating letter from English into Spanish and where one juror provided Spanish translation never offered in court.

Terrell v. State,
745 N. E. 2d 219 (Ind. 2001)

Motion to set aside verdict based on juror’s contact with trial judge regarding her alleged involvement with Mafia preserved error in criminal battery case; hearing required.

Carter v. State,
541 S. E.2d 366 (Ga. 2001)

Felony murder conviction reversed where trial court told jurors, outside presence of parties, that defendant would not be tried again on specific count of indictment if jury did not reach verdict.

Garcia v. People
997 P.2d 1 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).

Trial court impermissibly invaded deliberations by interviewing foreperson after deliberations began after receiving note indicating one juror was not complying with oath; defendant was further prejudiced by court's recall of discharged alternate juror to replace juror dismissed during deliberations.

Pennie v. State
520 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. 1999).

Murder conviction reversed where judge questioned juror about alleged communication with third party outside the presence of the defendant, without valid waiver of right to be present of defendant, and prejudice was presumed.

Turpin v. Todd
519 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1999).

Death sentenced reversed where bailiff responded personally to jury's question about parole eligibility, telling it to refer to court's earlier instructions; prejudice found because earlier charge did not bar consideration of parole and jury returned death verdict soon after communication with bailiff.

State v. Erickson
597 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1999).

Remanded for hearing to determine prejudice where bailiff, upon request, brought jury an exhibit not introduced into evidence, and then upon retrieving it suggested that the panel "should review the video," trial court erred both in failing to question all jurors and in holding hearing outside defendant's presence. After remand, convictions were affirmed:State v. Erickson, 610 N.W.2d 335 (Minn.2000).

State v. Rideout
725 A.2d 8 (N.H. 1999).

New trial ordered where juror in need of insulin shot was aided by police officer who testified for prosecution; appellate court finds that trial court erred in not holding state to burden of establishing that no prejudice occurred and not interviewing jurors.

 

State v. Bisaccia  
724 A.2d 836 (N.J. Superior Court App. 1999)  

Trial court erred by refusing to grant mistrial or order inquiry in racketeering trial despite numerous allegations of misconduct, including jury’s exposure to newspapers in deliberation room; judge’s ex parte communication with juror who indicated he could not be fair; and jurors’ expressed concerns about being followed by man from courtroom. Hearing is ordered, if possible. If a hearing is not possible due to the six years that passed since trial, a retrial was required.

State v. Sanders
496 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1998).

Trial court's declaration of mistrial at state's behest affirmed where, at capital sentencing proceeding, juror allegedly inquired of a judge and police officers about meaning of "life imprisonment" and stated that she was threatened by other jurors.

 

Goff v. Arkansas
953 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 1997).

Trial court committed reversible error by entering the jury room to answer questions he received from the jury in a note. Despite having informed attorneys for the state and defendant of the questions and his intended answers, the court violated Arkansas law by not having his colloquy put on the record. As the right to be present at any stage of a criminal proceeding which is critical to the outcome is a fundamental right, prejudice is presumed.

Anderson v. State
695 A.2d 1135 (Del. 1997).

Trial court erred in responding to a note from a juror during deliberations without informing defendant's counsel of the question and his proposed answer beforehand.

State v. Rodriguez
703 So.2d 803 (La. 1997).

Case remanded for an evidentiary hearing after the trial court refused to consider juror testimony concerning communications with a bailiff. The juror testimony that had been proffered during a hearing on a Motion for a New Trial indicated that when the foreman requested to see an item of evidence, the bailiff informed him that the jury was not permitted to view evidence after beginning deliberations.

People v. Khalek
689 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1997).

Conviction for sexual abuse in the first degree reversed where court officer sent to tell jury to stop deliberations for the day was informed that the jury had reached a verdict but neglected to pass that information to the court. It was subsequently discovered that the jury had voted to acquit, yet returned with a guilty verdict the next day.

 

State v. Parchman
973 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

Where jurors had question about effect of 11 to 1 vote, and questioned bailiff who told them that judge would send them back for further deliberations, case reversed; court relies on rebuttable presumption of prejudice; prejudice found due to jurors' likely impression that answer was supplied to them by court officer.

 

Wilding v. State
674 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1996).

State failed to prove harmlessness beyond reasonable doubt where jurors contacted court employee expressing fear about defendant's access to personal information about them. (Holding was receded from somewhat in Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1998)).

Alexander v. State
919 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Presumption of harm not rebutted where juror passed question to district attorney via bailiff, and prosecutor recalled witness to testify in answer to question raised in juror note.

Ites v. State
923 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Jurors' ex parte contact with state witness (victim) grounds for reversal in sexual assault case where witness was defendant's son, and jurors heard son say he would rather die than visit his father; rebuttable presumption of prejudice.

 

State v. Watkins
526 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1995).

Where court bailiff referred to defense attorney as "that darky" and where jurors repeatedly referred to the defendant as "darky" or "that darky" during deliberations, a new trial was required when state failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice arising from the racist remarks.

State v. Brown
688 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995).

Criminal conviction was overturned and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on jury misconduct. Prior to sentencing, an anonymous note informed the trial judge that some of the jurors had overheard bailiffs betting that the defendant would be convicted because he was black and from New York. The court held that a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry, on the record, whenever it is presented with any allegations of jury misconduct.

Wright v. CTL Dist., Inc.
650 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Civil verdict was reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing because jurors allegedly made racist remarks about the plaintiff and bailiff answered jurors' legal questions, rather than getting the judge to respond to the jurors' questions.

State v. Kelley
517 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1994).

First degree criminal sexual conduct conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial because of ex parte communications between the trial judge and deadlocked jurors. The judge told them to keep deliberating and reach a verdict and declined to grant a mistrial even after he learned that two jurors almost had a physical fight over their deliberations, when one juror told the other to step out in the hall. Defense counsel was never made aware of the situation. The appellate court found that the trial judge's admonition to keep deliberating until a verdict was reached was coercive in that implied that the jurors had to deliberate until they were unanimous.

State v. Cameron
428 S.E.2d 10 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).

Conviction for entering bank with intent to steal and life sentence were reversed and remanded and a new trial was granted because bailiff improperly remarked to jury foreperson not to worry if verdict was guilty with no recommendation of mercy because the judge was fair. This improperly lessened the jury's burden to decide on recommendation of mercy and implied that judge had sentencing discretion.

People v. Hedgecock
795 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1990).

The appellate court granted a remand for an evidentiary hearing as to improper bailiff comments with jurors and an alternative writ to explore possibility of jurors' excessive drinking, finding that allegations of jury misconduct were serious enough to sustain the trial court's decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to violate disclosure laws and perjury. Bailiff allegedly commented about how well jurors were treated, about hold out jurors and about a fight that once erupted when there was a hold out and told a story about a "green hat" designed to illuminate the concept of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the bailiff provided alcohol to jurors, one of whom drank so much that she had to leave her jury seat every 15 minutes to vomit.

Ravin v. Gambrell
788 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1990).

Medical malpractice verdict was reversed and a new trial granted when bailiff gave erroneous statement of law to a sick juror. The bailiff told her that a unanimous verdict had to be reached and that the judge could make the jurors stay and deliberate for two weeks.

Lockridge v. State
397 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 1990).

Voluntary manslaughter conviction was reversed and a new trial granted because, prior to sequestration, a bailiff told one juror that the defendant was guilty and that he "murdered that man."

Morris v. State
364 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. 1988).

Murder conviction reversed. Bailiff had numerous contacts with jury foreperson regarding viewing evidence. In one instance, foreperson requested a bloody towel, which the bailiff responded was not in evidence. Additionally, the foreperson requested a transcript of medical testimony which the judge denied, but the bailiff informed had not yet been transcribed.

State v. Weiler
512 A.2d 531 (N.J. 1986), cert. denied, 526 A.2d 130 (N.J. 1986).

Conviction for murder, conspiracy and two counts of attempted murder and a life sentence were reversed and remanded due to court officer's remarks before and during the jury's deliberations. A court officer befriended one juror and remarked to the juror that she knew defendant was guilty and, moreover, that she had been privy to proceedings that the jury had not seen. Other jurors heard the bailiff make derogatory remarks about defense counsel, including that the defense counsel was "lying" as well as remarks that defendant was guilty. While some jurors also made unauthorized visits to the crime scene and informed other jurors about their independent investigations, the Court relied on the bailiff's actions as grounds for overturning this sentence and conviction.

State v. Elmore
308 S.E.2d 781 (SC 1983).

Absolute reversal required where judge entered the jury room during guilt phase deliberations, even though accompanied by counsel from both the state and defense, to answer a question of the jury concerning reaching decision, based on improper communication with jury because defendant not present.

People v. Pierce
595 P.2d 91 (Cal. 1979).

Second degree murder conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial because, during the trial, the jury foreman discussed the case with a police witness. The court dismissed the foreman's contention that he had not been influenced.

State v. Robin
543 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1975) (en banc).

Error for trial court to communicate with jury during deliberations unless defendant and counsel have opportunity to be present

King v. State
89 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).

Conviction for voluntary manslaughter was reversed and remanded for a new trial because bailiff told a deadlocked jury that the judge said he would keep them a week or they would make a verdict. Shortly thereafter three jurors changed their vote from acquittal to guilty. Statement from bailiff was deemed presumptively prejudicial even though it had not been authorized by the trial judge.

McCoy v. State
42 So.2d 195 (Miss. 1949).

Murder conviction and life sentence reversed and remanded for a new trial because bailiff told jury that judge said he had nothing to do until the next term of court except wait for the jury to reach a verdict and "that as far as he was concerned they could stay there until they rotted." Shortly after the statement was made, the jury rendered a verdict. Just prior to the bailiff's comment the jury was 11 to 1 for conviction after twenty three hours of deliberating. The court stated that it was immaterial whether the trial judge had actually made the statement or not.