Incompetency To Stand Trial
Summaries of
Successful Cases
Updated October 2004
SUCCESSFUL
CASES
UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348 (1996)
Oklahoma's statute requiring criminal defendants to prove
their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence imposes a significant risk
that defendants who have already demonstrated that they are more-likely-than-not
incompetent will be erroneously found competent and thus violates due process.
Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975)
The trial court violated Drope's due process rights when
it failed to suspend his trial for a competency hearing in the face of
accumulating evidence of incompetency, including an attack on his wife and a
suicide attempt. A nunc pro tunc, or retrospective, determination of
competence, which is difficult under the best of circumstances, would not be
adequate in this case inasmuch as Drope was absent during a critical stage of
his trial and thus was not observed by the court or counsel.
Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966)
The trial court's failure to grant a competency hearing
deprived Robinson of his right to a fair trial, where there was uncontradicted
testimony of his history of irrational behavior, defense experts testified that
he was insane and the only evidence supporting his competency was Robinson's
demeanor at trial and the stipulated testimony of a state expert who did not
make a determination as to Robinson's sanity. A retrospective determination of
competency would be too difficult because (1) the jury would not be able to
observe the subject of their inquiry, (2) the testimony of experts would have to
be based solely on information in the printed record and (3) six years had
passed since the trial.
Westbrook v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam)
Although defendant received hearing on the issue of his
competence to stand trial, he was entitled to hearing or inquiry into issue of
his competence to waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel and to
proceed to conduct his own defense. Remand to Arizona Supreme Court to determine
if the trial court fulfilled its "protecting duty" to the defendant. But
see Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993), which denies that
there are separate standards of competency to stand trial and to waive counsel,
and interprets Westbrook as holding that the trial court failed to
determine if defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.
Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960)
The information on the record was insufficient to support
a finding of competency. The District Court erred in limiting its inquiry to
whether the defendant is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of
events. The proper "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding --
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." A retrospective hearing would have been difficult
because of the "doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance of
the psychiatric testimony."
UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
United States v. Howard
381 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2004)
Where it was undisputed that at the time of his guilty plea
petitioner was taking powerful narcotic drugs that could have dulled his
mental faculties, and petitioner had alleged specific, credible facts in
support of claim that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing him
while incompetent to acquiesce in a plea agreement he had seen for the
first time just before he agreed to plead guilty, petitioner was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim.
Lounsbury v. Thompson
374 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2004)
Petitioner’s substantive incompetency claim was properly exhausted
even though his petition for review to the Oregon Supreme Court raised a
procedural argument that the lower court applied an incorrect burden of
proof. "Lounsbury worded his petition for review as a procedural
challenge, but the clear implication of his claim was that by following
a constitutionally defective procedure, the state court erred in finding
him competent. Where the substantive and procedural claims are as
intertwined as they are here, we hold that Lounsbury made a fair
presentation to the state courts of his claim that he was not competent
to stand trial." The case is remanded to the district court for merits
consideration of the substantive incompetency claim.
United States v. Jones
336 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003)
In case involving unlawful weapons possession and witness tampering
charges, the case is remanded to determine whether defendant was
competent at the time of sentencing. At the initial sentencing hearing
defendant became upset, struck his counsel, and requested to withdraw
his plea. The court appointed substitute counsel and denied the motion
to withdraw the plea. At a subsequent hearing on pro se pleadings the
Government informed the court that defendant was being administered
psychiatric medications and requested a competency hearing prior to
sentencing. The court requested an evaluation of defendant which was
referenced during sentencing, but there was never a competency hearing.
In remanding for further proceedings, the appeals court references
several indicators of incompetency, including defendant’s violent
courtroom behavior and noncompliance with medication.
Brown v. Sternes
304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002)
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate non-capital defendant's mental illness and in permitting the court appointed experts to evaluate defendant with inadequate data. Prejudice is shown, in part, because the medical records counsel neglected to obtain showed defendant suffered from chronic schizophrenia and raised a "bona fide doubt" regarding his competence.
Matheny v. Anderson
253 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2001)
Indiana death row inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on (1) whether he was competent to stand trial, (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an initial request for a competency hearing, and (3) whether the state court was obligated to hold a competency hearing sua sponte; since the failure to develop the facts in state court was not attributable to petitioner, the court evaluated the request for an evidentiary hearing under pre-AEDPA standards.
Appel v. Horn
250 F.3d 203 (3rd
Cir. 2001)
Capital defendant was constructively denied counsel where appointed counsel failed to take any steps to investigate their client's competency prior to the competency hearing ordered by the trial court at which time defendant's waiver of counsel was accepted.
Johnson v. Norton,
249 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2001)
In a non-capital case, the court analyzed a Pate
claim under AEDPA standards; the trial judge should have held a competency
hearing sua sponte where Petitioner was hit on the head shortly before
trial and became unconscious a few hours after trial began, raising a question
of his competency during jury selection.
McGregor v. Gibson,
248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
In capital 2254 proceeding, the court addressed the
question "when may a defendant found competent to stand trial under an
unconstitutional 'clear and convincing evidence' burden of proof and then
convicted succeed in habeas on a procedural competency claim?"; since
Petitioner's competency at trial was assessed under the standard found
unconstitutional in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), the court
reviews the trial as if no competency hearing was held at all; a procedural
competency claim such as that raised by Petitioner is held to a lower burden of
proof than a substantive competency claim; the court holds that in order to
succeed on a procedural competency claim after a trial in which a petitioner was
found competent under an unconstitutional burden of proof, the petitioner must
establish that a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his
competence at the time of trial; a petitioner establishes a bona fide doubt by
showing a reasonable judge should have doubted whether the petitioner met the Dusky
standard; the claim is assessed under a totality of the circumstances approach;
in this case, the trial court should have had such a doubt; the court also
concluded that a retrospective competency determination could not be made and
therefore ordered Petitioner's conviction vacated.
Odle v. Woodford,
238 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2001)
In capital 2254 proceeding, court held that state trial
court should have conducted a competency hearing because the information before
the judge about Petitioner's extensive mental impairments, including the fact
that he was missing a piece of his brain the size of a grapefruit, raised a bona
fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; the court also found the record
sufficient for the state court to conduct a retrospective competency
determination; case remanded to district court with directions to grant the writ
unless the state trial court conducts a hearing within 60 days to determine
Petitioner's competency at the time of trial.
United States v. Giron-Reyes,
234 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000)
In non-capital case, court found district court's failure
to hold competency hearing violated due process as well as the competency
procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241; district court initially found
Appellant incompetent and ordered him hospitalized; the hospital later certified
his competency; with no motion for a second competency hearing, Appellant pled
guilty; the court held that section 4241 required a second competency hearing
when there had been an initial finding of incompetence, even when Appellant had
not requested the hearing; the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a
determination of Appellant's competency to plead guilty; if retrospective
determination cannot be made, district court should assess Appellant's present
competency and if it finds him competent, allow him to replead.
Torres v. Prunty,
223 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000)
In non-capital 2254 proceeding, the state appealed the
district court's finding of a Pate violation; the court analyzed the
claim under AEDPA standards, finding the state courts' rejection of the claim
was an "unreasonable determination of the facts" under 2254(d)(2); the
court equated the "unreasonable determination" provision to the
"clearly erroneous" standard; the information before the trial court
raised a bona fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; writ granted.
Barnett v. Hargett,
174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999)
Pro se federal habeas petitioner's claim that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on rehearing a claim that the
record was insufficient to support a finding that a competency hearing had
occurred prior to sentencing, was construed by the federal courts as a claim
that the state had violated petitioner's right to procedural due process by not
conducting a competency hearing in accordance with the proper, post-Cooper
v. Oklahoma, legal standard. Federal courts would not afford presumption of
correctness to state-court determinations of competency where the state court
applied the wrong, pre-Cooper, legal standard. The court treated
petitioner's Cooper claim as analogous to a case where no competency
hearing had occurred at all. Thus, petitioner was entitled to relief because his
history of psychiatric problems, including being found incompetent to stand
trial twice in this case, raised a bona fide doubt about his competency.
United States v. Klat,
156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998)
Once the district court had found reasonable cause to
believe defendant was incompetent to stand trial, it could not allow defendant
to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se at a hearing to determine her
competency. Relying on Pate, court held that a defendant whose
competency was reasonably in question could not have knowingly and voluntarily
waived right to counsel. Remedy was remand for hearing to determine whether
competency hearing "could have come out differently" if defendant had
been represented by counsel. If so, reversal was required because error would
have contaminated the entire criminal proceeding.
Trotter v. Bunnell,
163 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 1998)(unreported opinion)
Federal habeas corpus petitioner was arguably entitled to
evidentiary hearing on claim that he was incompetent at time of guilty plea.
Petitioner presented report of mental health expert indicating he had low IQ and
an inability to apply information, and that his use of language could lead
someone to erroneous impression that petitioner has greater understanding than
he actually possessed. District court was correct that the latter finding by
petitioner's expert defeated petitioner's procedural due process claim because
it indicated the trial court would not have had grounds for doubting
petitioner's competency at time of the plea. But district court erred in
concluding that the expert's evidence was not relevant to petitioner's
substantive due process claim that petitioner was in fact incompetent to enter
plea.
United States v. Heywood,
155 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1998)
Defendant's procedural due process rights were violated
when district court failed to conduct a hearing on defendant's competency after
receiving report that defendant, who had been found incompetent, had been
rendered competent through "substantial doses of antipsychotic
medication" that had to be continued. Due process requires a
"record-based judicial determination of competence in every case in which
there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to stand trial."
Remanded for hearing to determine whether a (disfavored) retrospective
competency determination was possible. If no such determination was possible, or
a retrospective determination indicated defendant was not competent, defendant
would be entitled to a new trial.
United States v. Loyola-Dominguez,
125 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997)
Defendant's due process rights violated by failure of
district court to grant a competency hearing following defendant's attempted
suicide in a jail cell on the eve of trial. The timing of the suicide attempt,
and defendant's desire to "get out of here" as his sole objective,
raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competence that required a hearing.
United States v. Williams,
113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997)
Williams' courtroom behavior and other evidence created a bona
fide doubt about Williams' competency to stand trial and should have moved
the trial court to order a competency hearing. Williams often interrupted the
proceedings, speaking rapidly and "hysterically," urged one of her
several attorneys (having fired or caused many to withdraw) to behave improperly
(such as to ask cross-examination questions while the prosecutor was still
conducting direct examination), testified nonresponsively, cried in front of the
jury and informed the court on the second day of trial that she had not taken
the medication she required for depression. The trial court's error was not
cured when he ordered a post-verdict psychological evaluation at the urging of
Williams' fourth attorney. The evaluator's finding that she was competent to
participate in sentencing does not inspire confidence that she was actually
competent during her trial. The Circuit Court vacates the conviction and directs
the District Court to conduct a hearing into Williams' competency to stand
trial.
Sena v. New Mexico State Prison,
109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997)
Applying pre-AEDPA standards, the Circuit Court concludes
that the District Court improperly afforded the state court's competency finding
a presumption of correctness. The state court's initial judgment that Sena was
incompetent gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetence.
That presumption was not overcome when the state court later ruled Sena
competent without a hearing, relying solely on a hospital report claiming he had
improved but also warning that he required continued treatment. The District
Court also erred in holding that Sena's claim was procedurally barred when he
failed to appeal the trial court's competency determination to the state's
highest court. Procedural bars apply to competency claims that implicate
procedural due process, as when an defendant complains that he did not receive a
competency hearing to which he is entitled. Such bars do not apply to the type
of substantive due process claim raised by Sena, who complains that he was
allowed to enter a guilty plea while incompetent in fact. Remanded for a
competency hearing by the District Court.
Webb v. Evans,
1997 WL 207514 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished)
Webb's
failure to raise on direct appeal the claim that he was incompetent at the time
he entered his guilty plea does not bar him from raising the issue in federal
habeas since he is claiming a violation of substantive due process. Since the
state court's docket does not clearly indicate what proceedings took place, the
federal district court's first order of business on remand will be to determine
if the state court ever made a formal finding of incompetency, as claimed by the
state, giving rise to a presumption of continued incompetency. If so, then
Webb's guilty plea should not have been accepted without a full-blown competency
hearing.
Williamson v. Ward,
110 F.3d 1508
(10th Cir. 1997)
The
evidence of which Williamson's counsel was aware triggered a duty to investigate
Williamson's competency to stand trial and to move for a competency hearing.
Counsel knew that Williamson had a long history of mental problems (including
diagnoses of severe bipolar disorder and paranoid and borderline personality
disorders), that Williamson was being medicated, and perhaps overmedicated, for
mental disorders, that Williamson behaved bizarrely in jail and in the courtroom
(such as by tipping over counsel table), that Williamson had been found
incompetent in connection with an earlier criminal charge, and that he was
awarded disability benefits on the basis of his mental condition. Had counsel
conducted an investigation he would have uncovered a wealth of additional
information casting doubt on Williamson's competence. For instance, he would
have learned that the psychiatrist who opined that Williamson was competent was
himself severely mentally disordered. There is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's ineffectiveness, Williamson would have been found incompetent.
Miles v. Stainer,
108 F.3d 1109
(8th Cir. 1997)
Miles was
found incompetent to stand trial shortly after his arrest. The trial court
eventually ruled him competent after a year-and-a-half of conflicting
psychiatric findings. After entering a not guilty plea, Miles was again examined
by three psychiatrists who eventually found him competent after initial doubt,
but who warned that Miles' competency fluctuated since he did not consistently
take his antipsychotic medication. Before allowing Miles to change his plea to
guilty, the trial court held a second hearing. This hearing was not adequate
because the trial court failed to inquire whether Miles was still taking his
medication (in fact, he had stopped taking it some two weeks before). The
Circuit Court instructs the District Court to grant the writ unless the state
trial court conducts a retrospective competency hearing within 60 days.
Reynolds v. Norris,
86 F.3d 796
(8th Cir. 1996)
Although
defendant had been found competent during two pretrial hearings, the trial court
should have conducted a third hearing, knowing that: (1) expert opinion had been
closely divided at the second hearing, (2) defendant's trial testimony was
meandering and irrational, (3) defendant had not been taking his medication, (4)
defense expert testified that defendant was significantly impaired and (5)
expert who testified at trial that defendant was competent had not examined
defendant in some time. It was premature of the federal district court, however,
to grant the writ of habeas corpus without first conducting a nunc pro tunc hearing.
United States v. Mason,
52 F.3d
1286 (4th Cir. 1995)
The
District Court should have granted a retrospective competency hearing after the
defendant attempted to commit suicide following his conviction on federal drug
charges. It was an error under federal law to require Mason to show more than
"reasonable cause" for a competency hearing.
United States v. Soldevila-Lopez,
17 F.3d 480 (1st Cir. 1994)
District
Court abused its discretion by denying motion for continuance of competency
hearing to allow defendant to prepare response to new and unexpected diagnosis
of malingering. Remanded for a full competency hearing.
Blazak v. Ricketts,
1 F.3d 891 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1866 (1994)
Due process
was violated when the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing where
the defendant was found incompetent on three separate occasions in unrelated
matters and engaged in bizarre conduct in pretrial hearings. (The grant of
relief by the District Court was allowed to stand because two members of the
panel disagreed on the merits and the third declined to reach the merits.)
Spitzweiser-Wittgenstein v. Newton,
978 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1992)
The
District Court erred in giving the state court finding of competency a
presumption of correctness because the state court failed to adequately develop
the facts. The trial court failed to address the defendant's pro se motion to withdraw her plea, to which was
attached an expert's affidavit reinstating his earlier opinion that the
defendant was incompetent.
James v. Singletary,
957 F.2d 1562
(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 262 (1993)
Defendant
who presented clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial and
legitimate doubt as to his competence at the time of his trial was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. No state court had ever made a determination of
competency, and defendant presented the conclusion of an expert that defendant
would have been found lacking in several areas of competency. A defendant
alleging a substantive due process violation (incompetence in fact), rather than
a procedural due process violation (failure of the state court to hold a
required competency hearing) is not barred by his failure to raise his claim at
trial or on direct appeal.
Nicks v. United States,
955 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1992)
Determination that the trial court improperly denied a
competency hearing must be based solely on the evidence available to the trial
court at the time of the denial. Remand for clarification whether the District
Court's grant of relief relied on evidence not available to the trial court.
United States v. Hoskie,
950 F.2d
1388 (9th Cir. 1991)
Government
did not meet burden of demonstrating competence by a preponderance of the
evidence where defendant had verbal IQ of approximately 62, where defense expert
testified that defendant was incompetent, where government's expert focused too
narrowly on competency in basic skills of daily life, and where the court itself
expressed frequent doubts about defendant's competence and appeared motivated to
find competency out of a fear that the defendant would be a danger to the
community if released.
United States v. Day,
949 F.2d 973
(8th Cir. 1991)
District
Court erred in holding that defendant could not preclude the use of prior guilty
pleas as sentence enhancers unless he could prove that he was incompetent when
he made the pleas; defendant need only show that the courts that accepted the
pleas were aware of evidence warranting competency hearings but failed to
conduct them.
Lafferty v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992)
State trial
court erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial; although defendant
had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him, there was
substantial testimony that he lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings
because of his paranoid delusional system. The passage of six years made a
retrospective hearing impractical.
Griffin v. Lockhart,
935 F.2d 926
(8th Cir. 1991)
The state
trial court did not conduct a full, fair and adequate hearing as to defendant's
competency when there were no witnesses, questioning of the defendant was
limited and the only evidence was a one-paragraph letter from a state mental
health facility stating that further evaluation was needed. The passage of three
years made a meaningful retrospective hearing impossible.
Hull v. Freeman,
932 F.2d 159 (3d
Cir. 1991)
State trial
counsel exhibited deficient performance at a competency hearing when he failed
to bring to the factfinder's attention the fact that two colleagues of the
state's expert disagreed with his conclusion that the defendant was fit to stand
trial. Remand for clarification of the District Court's findings as to
prejudice.
Cowley v. Stricklin,
929 F.2d 640
(11th Cir. 1991)
Where trial
court was aware of defendant's extensive history of psychiatric commitments and
where the state's expert made only a cursory examination before declaring
defendant competent, it was a due process violation for the trial court to
refuse to appoint a defense mental health expert to assist in establishing
defendant's incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense.
Tiller v. Esposito,
911 F.2d 575
(11th Cir. 1990)
Trial court
violated due process when it accepted defendant's guilty plea without conducting
a competency hearing, where trial court was aware of the history of mental
illness of defendant and his family, uncontroverted psychiatric reports
indicated that defendant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was
incompetent, defendant inquired whether he would receive psychiatric treatment
if he pled guilty, and judge wrote letter to Department of Corrections
expressing concern regarding defendant's competency. Remand for a determination
whether a meaningful nunc pro tunc hearing could
be held.
Card v. Dugger,
911 F.2d 1494 (11th
Cir. 1990)
Petitioner
claimed that both his procedural due process right to a competency hearing and
his substantive due process right not to be tried while incompetent in fact were
violated. In ruling on these claims, the district court alluded only to the
facts regarding defendant's competency that were available to the state trial
court. While this is appropriate for a procedural due process claim, disposition
of the substantive due process claim requires examination of all the evidence
regarding competence, whether it was available to the state trial court or not.
In order to ensure that the district did in fact consider this additional
evidence, the reviewing court remanded to allow the district court to set forth
its reasons for failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Bouchillon v. Collins,
907 F.2d 589
(5th Cir. 1990)
It was not
clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that petitioner met his
burden of proving his incompetence in fact by a preponderance of the evidence,
where petitioner was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, his periods
of diminished capacity would not necessarily be obvious to the layman, and
psychiatrist testified in habeas proceedings that petitioner was probably
incompetent at the time of his guilty plea.
United States v. Hemsi,
901 F.2d
293 (2d Cir. 1990)
Trial court
properly found defendant incompetent (over defendant's objection), based on
expert testimony that while defendant had an intellectual understanding of the
proceedings, his mental illness prevented him from rationally acting on that
understanding and based on defendant's courtroom behavior, including frequent
outbursts and the blowing of kisses at the prosecuting attorney. Note: strictly
speaking this is not a successful case, since the defendant sought to have the
finding of incompetency overturned.
United States v. Auen,
846 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1988)
District Court erred in not making findings as to
defendant's competency to stand trial, were defendant exhibited bizarre
behavior and beliefs, including claim that compliance with tax laws was
voluntary and claim that his detention was an outlaw act. On remand,
District Court is to determine if a meaningful nunc pro tunc competency hearing is possible
and to hold such a hearing, if possible.
Estock v. Lane,
842
F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
The
state habeas court's finding of competency, although ordinarily entitled
to a presumption of correctness, was not fairly supported by the record,
where petitioner's pleadings created a bona
fide doubt as to competency and where the state habeas court (1)
failed to conduct a hearing, (2) was not the same judge that accepted
petitioner's plea and thus had no opportunity to observe petitioner, and
(3) falsely assumed that petitioner's trial attorney was aware of all
evidence relevant to competency. At a retrospective hearing, the federal
district court properly concluded that petitioner had not been competent
at his plea hearing, in that petitioner had been diagnosed as "paranoid
personality, borderline on psychotic," petitioner's answers during his
plea colloquy did not indicate understanding, and petitioner had
attempted suicide six days prior to his guilty plea.
Agan v. Dugger,
835
F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987)
State
trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to hold
a competency hearing, where a bona fide
doubt as to competency was raised by the facts presented to the trail
court, including petitioner's long history of mental illness and
commitments and his bizarre and self-defeating testimony before the
grand jury and during the sentencing hearing. Remand for retrospective
competency hearing.
United States v. Renfroe,
825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987)
District Court erred in not granting hearing on
question of defendant's competency to stand trial and to be sentenced
when, during the course of the sentencing hearing, evidence was
presented that defendant suffered a 16-year addiction to cocaine that,
in the opinion of experts, interfered with his ability to cooperate with
his attorney and defendant's attorney testified that defendant forbade
him from using drug abuse as a defense during trial. Remanded for
District Court to determine if a meaningful nunc
pro tunc hearing was still possible. (For disposition on remand,
see United States v. Renfroe, 745 F.Supp.
203 (D.Del. 1990)).
United States v. Hutson,
821 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1987)
Second competency hearing should have been held
after treating psychiatrist reported that defendant, who was earlier
adjudged incompetent and committed for evaluation, was competent to
stand trial, but failure to do so only required remand for determination
as to whether meaningful retrospective competency hearing could be held,
rather than reversal; defendant's substantive rights were affected only
if she was actually incompetent at time of trial. A retrospective
determination is meaningful if the quantity and quality of available
evidence is such that a competency hearing can be labeled as more than
mere speculation.
Bundy v. Dugger,
816
F.2d 564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870
(1987)
District Court's finding that petitioner was not
entitled to an competency hearing was clearly erroneous where the
District Court (1) relied on a finding of competency in a separate state
proceeding without reviewing the record of that proceeding for adequacy,
(2) placed undue emphasis on trial counsel's failure to request a
competency hearing, (3) erred in finding that petitioner had waived his
claim by failing to present it earlier, and (4) ignored strong indicia
of incompetence, including petitioner's rejection of a plea agreement,
the uncontroverted testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner
lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings, and petitioner's
decision to perform a mock wedding ceremony in lieu of presenting
mitigating evidence. Remanded for a competency hearing by the District
Court. (For disposition on remand, see 675 F.Supp. 622 (M.D. Fla.
1987)).
United States v. Cole,
813 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1987)
It
was error for the District Court not to inquire into defendant's
competency when it learned during the course of a plea colloquy that
defendant had taken illegal drugs the night before. The District Court's
failure to develop the record made a retrospective hearing
impossible.
Sturgis v. Goldsmith,
796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1986)
Petitioner had a constitutional right to be present
at his competency hearing, a critical stage of his trial. Remanded to
federal district court for harmless error analysis.
Felde v. Blackburn,
795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986)
After
the jury rejected his insanity defense, petitioner instructed his
attorney to seek the death penalty. The state habeas court and the
federal district court rejected petitioner's claim that his attorney was
ineffective for carrying out his wishes. The circuit court recast the
issue as one of whether petitioner was competent to instruct his
attorney in this manner, effectively waiving his right to counsel.
Remanded to district court for determination whether the trial court's
finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial was adequately
supported by the record and whether petitioner was still competent at
the time he waived counsel.
United States ex rel. SEC v. Billingsley,
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985)
District Court improperly placed the burden on the
defendant to prove his incompetence. Since lay and expert testimony on
defendant's competence was closely divided, there is a reasonable
possibility that defendant would have been found unfit under a proper
allocation of the burden of proof. Remanded for the District Court to
determine if a meaningful retrospective hearing is possible and, if so,
to hold such a hearing. Note: the Court appears to base its holding on
the view, later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992),
that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the
defendant.
Silverstein v. Henderson,
706 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1983)
In
view of undisputed facts that petitioner had IQ of 74 and mental age of
seven-year-old, had long institutional history and that two
court-appointed psychiatrists found petitioner incompetent, failure to
order competency hearing sua sponte
violated right to fair trial, even though third psychiatrist found
petitioner competent based on a brief evaluation. When a trial court
neglects its duty to conduct a hearing on competence, the defendant's
failure to object or take appeal on the issue will not bar collateral
attack. A retrospective hearing would be inadequate given the passage of
almost six years.
Speedy v. Wyrick,
702
F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1983)
The
federal district court erred in rejecting, without a hearing,
petitioner's claim that he was incompetent during trial. Before trial,
two experts opined that petitioner was competent, but a third expert
gave trial testimony indicating he had some doubt about defendant's
competency. Nonetheless the trial court failed to conduct a competency
hearing. The rejection of petitioner's claim by state courts was not
entitled to a presumption of correctness, inasmuch as the state courts
did not conduct a complete review of the record on direct appeal and did
not supplement the record with relevant evidence in post-conviction
proceedings. Remanded to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing.
United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen,
686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 873 (1986)
State
statute placing the burden on the defendant to prove incompetence is
unconstitutional. The misallocation of the burden was not harmless error
since competency was a close question: two experts found defendant unfit
to stand trial, one found defendant fit but would present "difficulties
for defense lawyer," and another found him fit. Remand for determination
whether a retrospective hearing would be meaningful. Note: In Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional to place the
burden of proof on the defendant in a competency proceeding.
Acosta v. Turner,
666
F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1980)
State
trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to make
a competency determination, where petitioner had history of serious
mental illness, where there is no evidence that petitioner received
necessary treatment during the four months between his hospital
discharge and trial, where trial court entertained doubts about
competency, and where psychiatrists appointed after trial found
petitioner incompetent to be sentenced. In the alternative, where trial
court agreed that he would vacate the guilty plea if a specified expert
made a finding that petitioner was incompetent, petitioner was entitled
to have this bargain enforced. Remanded for a determination of whether
the specified expert ever made a finding. If petitioner is not entitled
to relief based on his bargain with the court, then District Court is to
determine whether a retrospective competency hearing is possible.
Pride v. Estelle,
649
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1981)
Petitioner was entitled to a federal hearing on his
claim that he was incompetent during his trial, where (1) one expert
testified at his competency hearing that he was mentally retarded,
paranoid schizophrenic and incompetent, (2) a second expert's finding of
competency was based on a brief examination done for another purpose
some three years previous to trial, (3) petitioner was transferred from
prison to a mental hospital following his trial, and (4) petitioner's
claim was rejected without a hearing or a written opinion by the state
courts. Remanded to district court.
Pate v. Smith,
637
F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1981)
Petitioner was entitled to a competency hearing once
the state trial court entertained doubts about his competency. In
resolving his doubts by consulting a report that was not part of the
record and by reflecting on his own experience with petitioner in
previous proceedings, the trial judge deprived petitioner of the
opportunity to introduce evidence, conduct cross-examination, and create
a record. Remanded to state court for a determination whether a
retrospective hearing would be feasible.
Lokos v. Capps,
625
F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980)
Petitioner's procedural due process rights were
violated when the state trial court failed to inquire into his
competency, where the only evidence of competency was the testimony of
peace officers and a medical doctor who considered petitioner sane and
where the trial court improperly refused to consider (as hearsay) the
substantial evidence of incompetency contained in the records of one of
petitioner's hospitalizations. Petitioner's substantive due process
rights were violated when the federal habeas court ruled that petitioner
was in fact competent at the time of his trial, where the expert with
the greatest knowledge of petitioner was confident he had been
incompetent, a second expert opined that petitioner was in a state of
severe psychosis during his trial, and a third expert stated that he
lacked sufficient evidence to make a determination.
Osborne v. Thompson,
610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1979)
State
trial court should have granted a competency hearing or allowed
defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas, where an expert found defendant
to be only marginally competent prior to the plea colloquy and where the
trial court found defendant to be incompetent to be sentenced a few
months later.
Van Poyck v. Wainwright,
595 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1979)
District Court erred in holding that petitioner had
failed to exhaust his substantive due process claim that he was
convicted while incompetent in fact. Petitioner presented sufficient
facts to raise a real, legitimate and substantial issue as to his mental
capacity, inasmuch as during the period of his guilty pleas he tried to
hang himself and set fire to his mattress and psychiatric tests showed
him to be incompetent. (Petitioner's procedural due process claim that
he was improperly denied a competency hearing was rejected because the
trial court was not aware of these facts.) Remanded for a competency
hearing.
Zapata v. Estelle,
588
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1979)
Petitioner presented sufficient facts to create a
real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to her competency in fact,
where her personal physician testified at trial that she suffered from
severe emotional problems and a mental health expert who examined her a
few days after trial found her to be legally insane. Remanded for
competency hearing.
Martin v. Estelle,
583
F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978)
District Court's finding, following a retrospective
hearing, that it could not make a determination of petitioner's
competency at the time of his trial could not be relied upon inasmuch as
the District Court failed to make an initial determination as to whether
a retrospective hearing would be meaningful and improperly placed the
burden of proof on the state. The test of meaningfulness is whether the
evidence is adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labeled as
more than mere speculation; contemporaneous expert and lay testimony, as
well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, can provide sound
material for a reconstruction of mental state. Remanded for a finding as
to meaningfulness and, if warranted, a competency hearing at which the
burden of proof is put upon the petitioner.
United States v. Ives,
574 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978)
Petitioner's due process rights were violated when
trial court refused to consider evidence proffered by the defense (the
testimony of two psychiatrists and a U.S. Marshall) indicating a change
in petitioner's competence, where previously there had been four
alternating determinations of competency and incompetency within the
space of a year, petitioner's first trial had ended in a mistrial upon a
finding of incompetency, and five months had elapsed since he was last
found competent by government experts. A retrospective hearing would not
be possible because of the passage of six years, because the judges in
both previous trials were dead, and because there were no psychiatric
reports on petitioner's competence at the time of his second trial.
Suggs v. LaVallee,
570
F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)
A
state trial judge ordered a competency evaluation when petitioner made
unusual remarks immediately following the court's acceptance of his
guilty plea. After petitioner had been restored to competency, a second
trial judge sentenced petitioner without considering whether he had been
competent to enter a guilty plea, even though petitioner told the court
that he had not understood the earlier
proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court properly concluded
that petitioner had been incompetent at the time of his guilty plea,
based on the finding of incompetency immediately after the plea,
evidence of bizarre behavior on petitioner's part around the time of the
plea, and the exhaustive investigation by an expert who testified that
petitioner was probably psychotic. The district court was justified in
rejecting the finding of a state postconviction court because several
facts were not adequately developed at the state hearing.
United States v. Hollis,
569 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1977)
The
federal habeas court's error in placing the burden on petitioner to
prove his incompetence at the time of his trial was not harmless in that
the evidence as to competency was closely divided. The fundamental
nature of the right not to be tried while incompetent makes it
inappropriate to place the burden on the petitioner, even in
post-conviction proceedings. Remanded for a competency hearing at which
the burden will be properly allocated. Note: this holding might not
survive the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medina v. California 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992) that
it is not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant
in a competency proceeding.
United States v. Nichelson,
550 F.2d 502 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 998 (1977)
District Court must grant an 18 U.S.C. § 4244
motion for a psychiatric examination unless the motion is frivolous or
made in bad faith. Defense counsel satisfied that standard by citing his
own observations of defendant's difficulties in discussing the facts of
the case, the history of mental disturbance in defendant's family, and
the head injury that defendant had sustained some six years before.
Remanded for competency hearing.
Martin v. Estelle,
546 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1977)
Petitioner was not given a full and fair competency
hearing (before a jury), where the prosecutor continually introduced
highly inflammatory material relevant only to guilt and warned that
petitioner would go free if found incompetent and where the distinction
between incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense was not
observed during the competency hearing.
United States v. Masthers,
539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
District court erred in failing to hold a hearing
on federal defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where the
prosecutor agreed with defense counsel that defendant may not have given
his confession knowingly and intelligently and where the presentence
report stressed defendant's extremely low intelligence and lack of any
concept of time. Remanded for a
hearing.
Bruce v. Estelle,
536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976)
It
was clearly erroneous for the federal district court, at a nunc pro tunc hearing, to credit the testimony
of a psychiatrist (Dr. Grigson) who diagnosed petitioner as a sociopath
and a malingerer, where the diagnosis made by the other psychiatrist at
the hearing -- chronic schizophrenia so severe as to have rendered
petitioner incompetent -- was supported by the great weight of the
evidence, including petitioner's medical discharge from the Marines and
his commitments to psychiatric facilities for treatment of
schizophrenia.
Saddler v. United States,
531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam)
When evidence of defendant's extensive history of
mental illness, including a hospitalization following a suicide attempt,
became known to the trial court prior to sentencing, it was error for
the trial court not to have ordered an evaluation of defendant's
competency to be sentenced and a retrospective evaluation of his
competence to have pled guilty.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS
United States v. Mooney,
123 F.Supp.2d 442 (N.D. Ill.
2000)
In
a non-capital case, the court found the defendant incompetent; the
defendant's personality disorder, which was a systemic, enduring and
severe condition, qualified as "a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241(a).
United States v. Sanchez,
38 F.Supp.2d 355 (D. N.J. 1999)
Court held that same standard for determining
competency during trial (Dusky) must be
applied in case of defendant whose competency came into doubt after the
conviction but before sentencing.
United States v. Rudisill,
43 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)
While in pretrial detention defendant received a
beating from other inmates. The resulting brain damage left him with
severe cognitive impairments, dementia, speech and motor impairments,
and "absolutely no recollection of the facts underlying the charges
against him." Relying on its own observations of defendant and his
testimony at a competency hearing, the court rejected the testimony of a
government psychiatrist that defendant was malingering his amnesia
symptoms. The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and,
based on expert testimony that he would never fully recover, refused to
commit him to the custody of the attorney general, and instead returned
defendant to his mother's custody and care.
Johnson v. Keane,
974 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
The
state trial court erred in failing to order a second competency hearing
where the experts who declared Johnson competent at the first hearing
also warned that he had a history of mental illness and could
deteriorate at any time, where defense counsel notified the court
several times that Johnson had in fact deteriorated, where the court
refused to hear evidence that counsel was prepared to present, where the
court dismissed a psychiatrist's finding that Johnson was delusional by
remarking that "[w]e are all delusional," where the court ignored
Johnson's irrational behavior, such as his insistence on wearing to
court the clothes that his victims had described to police, and where
the court conceded that Johnson should receive psychiatric treatment
while incarcerated.
Short v. United States,
1997 WL 276229 (W.D.N.Y. May 1997)
(unpublished)
Short, filing a habeas petition before the same
district judge who presided over his plea proceeding, succeeded in
getting an evidentiary hearing not strictly on a competency claim, but
rather on the claim that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to
plead guilty without investigating his competency and for failing to
move for withdrawal of the plea when evidence of Short's mental illness
came to light. Trial counsel should have known early on that Short
suffered from a severe mental illness that merited further investigation
(for example, Short told the court during the plea colloquy that he was
taking medication for schizophrenia). A
probation officer's report prepared after the plea colloquy
should have alerted counsel that Short suffered from chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia, behaved irrationally during his
interview with the probation officer
and was receiving federal assistance on account of mental
disability. The district judge appears to be sympathetic to Short's
claim that the judge was in error for failing to convene a competency
hearing before accepting his plea, but finds that Short procedurally
defaulted the claim by not raising it on direct appeal and by failing to
plead cause and prejudice.
Nicks v. United States,
874 F.Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Trial court denied petitioner's due process rights
in failing to conduct a hearing into petitioner's competency to enter a
guilty plea, where, prior to sentencing, petitioner's probation officer
requested a psychiatric evaluation, mental health experts who examined
him for purposes of sentencing found him to be paranoid schizophrenic,
mentally retarded and delusional, and trial counsel expressed his
misgivings about petitioner's competence to the trial judge in private
and made a motion for withdrawal of the plea on the record. Conviction
vacated.
United States v. Veatch,
842 F.Supp. 480 (W.D. Okl.
1993)
The
government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant is fit to stand trial or waive his right to counsel, where
appointed counsel stated, over defendant's objections, that he did not
believe defendant is competent, where defense expert gave credible
testimony that defendant's unconditional belief in conspiracy theory
rendered him incapable of participating in the proceedings in a rational
manner, and where the testimony of the government expert that
defendant's actions are calculated was inconsistent and less
credible.
Lagway v. Dallman,
806 F.Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ohio
1992)
Competency hearing before state trial court did not
comport with due process, where trial court relied on his own
impressions based on a lengthy colloquy, discounted the uncontroverted
testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner was incompetent, and
failed to request additional evidence or argument from counsel.
Furthermore, even if the hearing had comported with due process, the
trial court's finding of competency is not entitled to a presumption of
correctness in that the court placed undue emphasis on petitioner's
factual understanding of the functions of judge, jury and prosecution
and did not give adequate consideration to petitioner's ability to
consult with counsel and to participate in the proceedings in a rational
manner.
United States v. Perez Diaz,
797 F.Supp. 81 (D. Puerto Rico
1992)
Government failed to prove defendant's competence
by a preponderance of the evidence, where there was uncontroverted
expert testimony that defendant is incompetent, defendant exhibited
nervous tremors throughout the competency hearing, and defendant's
self-inflicted wounds were visible to the court.
United States v. Renfroe,
745 F.Supp. 203 (D. Del. 1990)
In
retrospective competency hearing where evidence for and against a
finding of competency was equally balanced, government failed to meet
the burden of proving competence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Government and defense experts agreed that defendant was using cocaine
during trial, but disagreed as to his level of impairment. Trial counsel
testified that defendant was able to focus on his case for only a few
minutes at a time and that he exhibited bizarre behavior.
United States v. Nichols,
661 F.Supp. 507 (W.D. Mich.
1987)
Defendant established reasonable cause to believe
that he may not be able to understand the proceedings against him and
assist in his defense, where trial counsel attested that defendant
failed to respond normally to discussions of the charges, defendant has
been under treatment for severe depression, and government agreed that
defendant's attitude is bizarre and that he may be incompetent. Under
federal law, a showing of reasonable cause mandates a competency hearing
and strongly counsels in favor of a psychiatric evaluation, although the
latter remains in the District Court's discretion.
United States v. Blohm,
579 F.Supp. 495 (S.D. N.Y.
1983)
Defendant was incompetent to stand trial, though he
had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him and though
mental health experts deemed him competent, because the requirement that
defendant have a rational understanding of the proceedings was not
satisfied by the mental health experts' testimony that defendant was
rational in the sense that his reasoning was logically consistent with
his underlying delusions. Defendant could not be said to have a rational
understanding (in the lay sense of that phrase) in that he believed that
the charges against him grew out of a conspiracy among a judge, Richard
Nixon, and Arnold Palmer.
Evans v. Raines,
534
F.Supp. 791 (D.Ariz. 1982)
Trial court violated petitioner's due process
rights in failing to hold hearing on petitioner's competence to waive
counsel. Although petitioner was able to understand the nature of the
proceedings and to participate in them meaningfully, and thus was
competent to stand trial, he was not competent to waive counsel in that
he was unable to make reasoned choices among the alternatives presented
to him. Trial court knew that petitioner had been diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenic and that petitioner believed the public defender was part
of a conspiracy against him. The Circuit Court endorsed the above
findings of the district judge, but held that the state court might be
able to cure the error through a retrospective competency hearing. Evans v. Raines, 705 F.2d 1479 (1983). Note:
in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680
(1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is one standard for both
competency to stand trial and competency to waive counsel.
Meeks v. Smith,
512
F.Supp. 335 (W.D. N.C. 1981)
Petitioner's due process rights were violated when
state trial court failed to hold competency hearing, where petitioner
had recently been found incompetent in another proceeding, one mental
health expert consistently found petitioner incompetent and another
mental health expert, who diagnosed petitioner as paranoid
schizophrenic, alternated between findings of competency and
incompetency.
Osborne v. Thompson,
481 F.Supp. 162 (M.D. Tenn.
1979)
Trial
court should have inquired further into petitioner's competency to enter
guilty pleas, where pre-trial evaluator deemed petitioner only
marginally competent, where petitioner gave unclear or nonresponsive
answers to open-ended questions during the plea colloquy, and where
trial court had petitioner committed for treatment of mental illness
prior to sentencing. Passage of four years made retrospective hearing
unfeasible.
Military Cases
United States v. Collins
60 M.J. 261 (U.S. Armed Forces
2004)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
finds that a military judge abused his discretion by not inquiring
further into Appellant's mental responsibility when the sole member of
the sanity board appeared to change his testimony and conclusion about
the central issue.
STATE COURTS
State v. Leonard
855
A.2d 531 (N.H. 2004)
The trial court found that defendant was not competent to stand
trial, but his competence could probably be restored "with appropriate
services of legal counsel." Pursuant to court order, counsel attempted
to educate defendant before the next competency hearing. On
interlocutory appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a
psychiatrist must be appointed to supervise a defendant’s treatment, and
that "tutelage in the law" by his attorneys is not appropriate
treatment. Case is reversed and remanded.
Commonwealth v. Santiago
855 A.2d 682 (Pa. 2004)
The issue of competence to stand trial is not waived where it was not
raised at trial or on appeal and it may be raised initially in a PCRA
(Post Conviction Relief Act) petition. Under certain circumstances,
however, a PCRA court may hold a retrospective competency hearing in
lieu of granting a new trial. Here, the findings of the PCRA court that
petitioner was competent to stand trial are affirmed.
In Re Erick B.
777
N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 2004)
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the court
commits the defendant to the custody of the Commissioner for the Office
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for a period of 90
days. The court found that the defendant presented evidence that
rebutted the application of the presumption of fitness and competence,
after which the prosecution failed to prove he was not an incapacitated
person.
Jackson v. State
880
So.2d 1241 (Fla.App. 2004)
The trial court erred in failing to hold a
competency hearing where the defendant had been adjudicated incompetent
on four separate occasions. A defendant cannot be adjudicated from
incompetent to competent without a competency hearing that includes an
opportunity to call witnesses, so the court's oral declaration that
defendant was competent was invalid. Thus, the defendant remained
incompetent when brought to trial and his right to due process was
violated. Harmless error review is
inappropriate with such fundamental error, so the case is reversed and
remanded.
People v. Johnwell
18
Cal.Rptr.3d 826 (Cal.App. 2004)
Erroneous circumstantial evidence instructions at
defendant’s competency trial placed a higher standard of proof on
defendant and violated due process. The error was not harmless and the
case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
People v. Ary
13
Cal.Rptr.3d 482 (Cal.App. 2004)
Defendant was denied due process when the trial
court failed to hold a competency hearing despite substantial evidence
that defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings against
him because of his mental retardation. On remand, the State has the
burden of establishing that a retrospective competency hearing can be
held.
State v. Kent
584
S.E.2d 169 (W.Va. 2003)
Defendant was found incompetent after his arrest
and was treated for 9 months until he regained competency and was tried
and convicted of murder. Because of his behavior during trial, counsel
immediately requested an examination of defendant. It was subsequently
determined that correctional authorities had failed to advise the court
and the parties that defendant was no longer taking his medication. At a
competency hearing, the treating physician testified that defendant had
been incompetent, while another State doctor who examined defendant 23
days after resumption of medication opined that he had been competent at
trial. The trial court agreed and sentenced defendant to life in prison.
The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred and
reversed and remanded for a new trial because the defendant had lacked
the mental capacity to meaningfully participate in his defense.
Wilson v. State
875
So.2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)
A hearing was required on whether defendant was
competent at time he pleaded guilty to theft and burglary, where the
trial judge had ordered a mental evaluation of defendant, the forensic
examiner expressed doubts as to defendant's intellectual functioning and
knowledge comprehension, the examiner referred defendant for screening
by the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and nothing
in record indicated any action was taken on the examiner's
recommendations, and no reference was made at guilty plea proceedings to
defendant's mental evaluation.
Tate v. State
864
So.2d 44 (Fla.App. 2003)
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to mandatory life in prison for an offense committed when
he was 12 years old. Post-trial his appellate counsel sought a
competency evaluation, as well as an evidentiary hearing on the adequacy
of explanations to the defendant regarding pre-trial plea negotiations.
The trial court denied the competency evaluation, explaining that
defendant’s competency to stand trial had never before been questioned.
The appellate court held that defendant's due process rights were
violated by the trial court's failure to order, sua sponte, pretrial and
post-trial competency evaluations. In light of defendant’s age, his lack
of previous exposure to the criminal justice system, and further
developmental evidence presented at trial, a competency evaluation was
constitutionally mandated.
Baqleh v. Superior Court
100 Cal.App.4th 478, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 (Cal.App. 1
Dist. 2002)
The
provisions of the Civil Discovery Act apply to competency hearings; the
order directing defendant to submit to an examination by a prosecution
expert is vacated because it fails to adequately specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as
required by the Civil Discovery Act, and improperly allows unidentified
examiners to videotape the examination; an accused person cannot on the
basis of the Fifth Amendment refuse to submit to a mental examination by
a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a
competency hearing because a judicially declared rule of immunity
provides the necessary assurance that an accused will not be convicted
of a crime by use of any information obtained at a court-compelled
mental examination or the use of information obtained from that
examination, or that his sentencing may be affected by such information
or the fruits thereof; there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a
court-ordered mental examination because the judicially declared rule of
immunity provides adequate protections; if a proper order is entered
requiring defendant to submit to a competency examination by a
prosecution expert, and defendant refuses to cooperate, the trial court
may disclosure to the jury the fact of the defendant's refusal to comply
with the order.
State v. Morales
2002
WL 1331757 (Conn. Super. April 5, 2002) (unpublished)
Connecticut statute governing procedures for when
the court determines that there is not a substantial probability that
the defendant will obtain competency within the period of treatment
allowed by the law was unconstitutionally vague. Although the statute
clearly provided the available options -- release or civil commitment --
it provided no standards for the trial judge to use in selecting the
choice or implementing the choice of remedy.
State v. Bevins
2002
WL 440753 (Ohio App. March 22, 2002) (unpublished)
Because the trial court raised the issue of
defendant's competency, even though it may have been inadvertent, it was
reversible error under state law for the trial court to fail to conduct
a competency hearing. (The trial court ordered a sanity evaluation in
response to defendant's NGRI plea but utilized a form that included a
competency examination.)
In re Grimes
769
N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 2002)
The
right not to be tried while incompetent applies to juvenile proceedings
just as it does in criminal trials of adults. Report in prior case
finding that juvenile defendant was not competent to stand trial, of
which the judge in the present case was familiar, raised "sufficient
indicia of incompetence" that defendant should have been afforded a
competency hearing.
Anderson v. State
2002
WL 432674 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio March 20, 2002) (unpublished)
While
an informal dialogue may constitute a competency inquiry in some
instances, it is insufficient when, as in this case, the competency
issue is specifically raised by the defendant; trial court erred in
failing to conduct a competency inquiry given the well-supported
incompetency finding of an appointed expert; the appointed expert's
later unexplained opinion that defendant was competent did not
extinguish the bona fide doubt that had been raised about defendant's
competence; the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether
there is "some evidence" of incompetence, and, if there is, to determine
whether a retrospective competency determination by a jury is
practicable.
State v. Were
761
N.E.2d 591 (Ohio 2002)
In
case involving the murder of a prison guard, the capital conviction and
death sentence are reversed due to the trial court's failure to conduct
an evidentiary hearing after trial counsel repeatedly raised the issue
of defendant's competency. The trial court's finding of competence based
upon its review of the competency evaluation report violated the
competency statute then in effect, as well as the United States
Constitution. "[A]n evidentiary competency hearing is constitutionally
required whenever there are sufficient indicia of incompetency to call
into doubt defendant's competency to stand trial." Here, defense counsel
documented defendant's paranoia and bizarre beliefs that interfered with
his ability to cooperate with his attorneys. Defendant's pro se filings
corroborated defense counsel's assertions. That defendant had refused to
speak with the appointed mental health experts did not prevent the trial
court from conducting the required hearing. Further, the record did not
support the lower court's conclusion that defendant was engaged in a
"calculated effort to avoid prosecution by delaying the progress of the
trial."
In re Kerch
2002 WL
86831 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)
After
state supreme court directed appellate court to vacate its summary
denial of petitioner's habeas petition and remanded for further
proceedings, the appellate court grants relief on claims that petitioner
was incompetent at the time of trial and incompetent at the time she
waived her right to counsel. Post-trial affidavits established that
petitioner suffered from bipolar disorder and that she was delusional at
the relevant times.
People v. Green
2002
WL 86987 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)
Trial
court abused its discretion by denying motion to continue sentencing to
allow defendant to present a formal competency motion based on newly
discovered information about defendant's narcolepsy.
In re Staten
2001 WL
1647286 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Dec. 21, 2001) (unpublished)
Trial
court was required to conduct a competency hearing before accepting
minor's plea of guilty, which resulted in an adjudication of
delinquency, where the CAST-MR indicated that the minor was not
competent to stand trial.
State ex rel. Reed v. Frawley
59 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. 2001)
Juvenile was entitled to hearing to determine
whether he was competent to understand extradition proceeding and to
assist counsel in defending against extradition.
State v. Marshall,
27
P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001)
In a
capital case, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea without holding a competency hearing mandated
by state statute where there was ample evidence calling defendant's
competency into question at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Thompson v. Com.,
56
S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001)
In a
capital case where the defendant pled guilty, the trial court erred in
not holding a competency hearing mandated by state statute; the statute
protects the due process right not to be tried while incompetent; a
retrospective competency hearing is permissible depending on the facts
of the case; remanded for trial court to determine if a retrospective
hearing is possible and if so, to conduct it.
State v. Sanders,
549
S.E.2d 40 (W.Va. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, the defendant was found incompetent and committed;
later, court found defendant competent; during trial, defense moved for
mistrial, saying the defendant was psychotic; conviction reversed
because the information before the trial court raised sufficient doubt
about the defendant's mental fitness to warrant an additional inquiry
regarding his competency; the trial court has a duty to employ adequate
procedures for determining competency, whether or not a formal motion is
made; where there has been a competency hearing and the defendant has
been found competent, the trial court need not suspend proceedings for
another hearing unless it is presented with new evidence casting serious
doubt on the validity of the earlier competency finding or with an
intervening change of circumstances that renders prior determination
unreliable; on remand, the trial court may attempt a nunc pro tunc
determination of the defendant's competency at the time of trial.
Kelly v. State
797
So.2d 1278 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2001)
In
non-capital case, trial court abused its discretion in not sua sponte
holding a competency hearing before proceeding with trial. The court
found on the record that Kelly was only borderline competent, a finding
that was supported by defendant's disruptive behavior during trial,
nonsensical ramblings about leaving the country, and rantings about
Jesus. "Because all the parties involved, including defense counsel,
worried about Kelly's ‘reduced capacity,' it was incumbent upon the
court to speak up and order a hearing when no one else asked for it."
In re J.M.,
769 A.2d
656 (Vt. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, an expert testified at the competency hearing that the
mentally retarded juvenile defendant was "marginally competent," but
would need special held before he could meet the competency standard;
teachers and others from defendant's
school testified about his limited abilities; the court's sole
finding in ruling defendant competent was that the expert "should be
believed"; although the evidence was sufficient to find defendant
competent, the court's findings were inadequate to explain its reasoning
and did not address defendant's need for special help; reversed.
State v. Haycock,
766
A.2d 720 (N.H. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, the only witness at the competency hearing was
defendant's expert, who testified defendant did not have rational
understanding and lacked ability to consult with attorney; trial court
found defendant competent, focusing on factual understanding; under
state law, the state must prove competency by a preponderance of the
evidence; the trial court erred in finding defendant had a rational
understanding when no evidence supported that finding; on remand, court
should consider if a retrospective determination of competency could be
made.
In re Fleming,
16 P.3d
610 (Wash. 2001)
Guilty plea vacated because trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to apprise court that defendant's competence was
in doubt.
State v. Sullivan,
739 N.E.2d
788 (Ohio 2001)
In a
non-capital case, experts testified that defendant was incompetent and
that no form of treatment would be effective in restoring his competency
in foreseeable future; trial court found defendant incompetent and
committed him; relying upon Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), court found statute under which
defendant was committed unconstitutional because it requires all
defendants found incompetent to be committed for a fixed time up to one
year regardless of whether treatment will be effective in restoring
competency.
Roberts v. State,
761
S.2d 885 (Md. 2000)
In a
non-capital case, court found under state law that trial court erred in
denying, without a hearing, a motion for examination of defendant for
competency, when attorney's motion was sufficient to overcome the
presumption of competency.
Head v. Taylor,
538
S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 2000)
In
capital state post-conviction case, court affirmed lower court's order
finding trial counsel ineffective in failing to assure defendant was
medicated before trial so he could assist in his defense and in failing
to obtain jail records which would have contradicted testimony of jail
doctor and jailers about defendant's mental condition.
Permenter v. State,
796 So.2d 1147 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000)
In
non-capital case, court found that although defendant was initially
found competent, court erred in denying second competency hearing where
the defense presented evidence that defendant's mental condition had
deteriorated since first competency hearing; remanded for trial court to
conduct compentency hearing, at which state has burden of proving
competency.
State v. Paul,
2000 WL
1239728 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished)
In
non-capital state post-conviction proceeding, court found that trial
court violated defendant's procedural due process rights in not holding
competency hearing where there was reason to doubt defendant's
competency.
State v. McRae,
533
S.E.2d 557 (N.C. App. 2000)
In
non-capital case, trial court's failure to conduct competency hearing
violated federal due process; evidence before the court raised bona fide
doubt sufficient to require court to conduct hearing sua sponte;
remanded for retrospective competency determination, if that is
possible; if retrospective determination is not possible, conviction
must be reversed.
People v. Castro
78
Cal.App.4th 1402 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 2000)
In
non-capital case, trial court committed reversible error in denying
defense counsel's request to appoint the director of the regional center
for the developmentally disabled to evaluate defendant pursuant to Cal.
Pen. Code, § 1369 (trial of issue of mental competence) in light of
substantial evidence that raised a suspicion that defendant was
developmentally disabled.
Woods v. State,
994 S.W.2d 32
(Mo. App. W.D. 1999)
Defendant's due process rights were violated when
trial court failed to order a competency evaluation and hearing after
defendant, who had a history of psychiatric problems, attempted suicide
the day before the sentencing hearing.
State v. Snyder,
750
So.2d 832 (La. 1999)
Trial
court's refusal to grant a "continuance to allow [defendant's]
antidepressant medication time to remedy his unfocused, tangential and
circumstantial ideation [which] rendered him unable to effectively
communicate with his attorney"violated due process because the trial
court failed to conduct adequate inquiry into defendant's competency.
Defendant had been diagnosed with severe depression while in jail
awaiting trial. Experts testified that the anti-depressant medication
defendant received further clouded his thinking, and trial counsel
informed the court that defendant was unable effectively to communicate
with her. Remanded for retrospective competency determination, and if
necessary a new trial, due to trial court's failure adequately to
investigate defendant's competency further before denying
continuance.
State v. Tilden,
1999
WL 136944 (Mo. App. March 16, 1999)(unpublished slip
opinion)
The
failure of the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor (who all
shared in the responsibility) to raise the issue of defendant's
competency despite their knowledge of his brain damage, "partial
lobotomy, self-mutilating behavior, alcohol abuse, extensive criminal
activity, extensive mental health treatment and observation dating back
to childhood" violated due process. After being found guilty but before
sentencing, defendant was sent to state hospital. At the sentencing
hearing the court asked defendant and the prosecutor if defendant had
been evaluated and found competent to stand trial. Both answered yes,
although no competency evaluation had been performed. Trial court had an
obligation to order competency evaluation and a post-examination hearing
once he was "presented with sufficient facts to form reasonable cause to
believe the accused lack[ed] the mental fitness to proceed," and the
failure to do so will require a new trial, if defendant is competent to
stand trial. Neither the erroneous belief that defendant had been found
competent, the fact that the evidence supported the conviction, nor the
fact that defendant exhibited no bizarre behavior during the trial could
change this result.
Garcia
Estrada v. State,
1999 WL 12749 (Tex. App. Jan.
14, 1999)(unpublished opinion)
Defendant's bizarre behavior raised a bona fide
doubt about his competency, which required the trial court to conduct a
competency hearing although not requested by either the defense or
prosecution. Defendant had filed "numerous incomprehensible pro se
motions," could not explain his objection that "something was 'missing
from his defense,'" fired three lawyers, and made several ranting
outbursts during the trial.
Commonwealth v. Simpson,
704 N.E.2d 1131 (Mass. 1999)
Defendant had been allowed to represent himself.
Although he was coherent and rational in early stages of proceedings,
his opening statement asserting that he was victim of conspiracies and
scams by the police, and his subsequent trial conduct raised
sufficient doubt about his
competency to require a hearing. Court would not address the issue on
appeal, but held that defendant's new counsel would be required to raise
issue in a motion for new trial. Addressing defendant's earlier
resistance to efforts by previous defense counsel to challenge his
competency, the court held that if defendant were first found competent,
the trial court could permit him to withdraw the motion for new trial
"on a finding an appropriate waiver, equivalent in quality to a plea of
guilty."
People v. Hill,
697
N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1st Dist. App. June 17,
1998).
Court
held, per statute, that defendant was entitled to a retrospective
fitness hearing due to defendant's use of psychotropic medication. If at
the hearing the trial court determines that the case is one of those
"exceptional cases" in which the defendant's sanity at the time of trial
may fairly and accurately be determined despite the time intervening,
his conviction may be affirmed. If the evidence is inconclusive or
suggests that defendant was impaired, his conviction and sentence must
be vacated and he must be granted a new trial.
People v. Kinkead,
695
N.E.2d 1255 (Ill. 1998)
Defendant was entitled to a new trial having
established that there was a bona fide doubt as to fitness at time of
plea and sentencing due to his use of psychotropic medication during
trial, and, where five years had passed since the original proceeding, a
retrospective competency hearing was inappropriate.
Hatten v. State,
978
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. March 12, 1998)
Case
remanded to trial court to determine whether defendant's competency at
the time of trial can be ascertained after the passage of two years and,
if so, to hold a hearing on the issue of defendant's competency to stand
trial where the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing and
"some evidence (at least more than a scintilla)" of the defendant's
incompetence had been brought to the attention of the trial court.
Ex Parte Janezic,
723
So.2d 725 (Ala. Nov. 14, 1997)
During trial expert changed his opinion from "the
defendant is competent" to "the defendant is not competent." Although
the evidence in the record does not conclusively prove that the
defendant had become incompetent during the course of the trial, the shift in opinion when
considered in the context of other evidence related to the defendant's
mental health created a reasonable and bona fide doubt as to the
defendant's competency during the guilt-determination phase of the
trial.
People v. Smith,
694
N.E. 2d 681 (Ill.App. 4th Dist.
1998)
Failure of defense counsel to request, and trial
court to order, hearing as to the fitness of defendant required remand
for fitness hearing where the defendant's presentence investigation
report contained information from medical doctors, a clinical
psychologist, and defendant concerning use of the drugs Effexor and
Xanax and treatment for symptoms of depression and anxiety and where the
state did not contest the possibility that defendant might have taken
these psychotropic medications prior to, around the time of, and
subsequent to trial.
Commonwealth v. Simpson,
689 N.E.2d 824 (Mass.App. 1998)
Failure of trial judge to raise the issue of
competency and to hold a competency hearing required reversal of
judgment where the defendant, proceeding pro se, though initially
determined competent to conduct own defense in prosecution for mayhem
and assault with a deadly weapon, manifested paranoid delusions and an
underlying defense position that he was entitled to hammer a sleeping
woman in the head, as well as knife her, because of a pervasive
conspiracy against him. Though the defendant, at a certain level,
understood the offenses for which he was charged and the punishment the
court might impose, the defense position was irrational.
People v. Abraham,
689
N.E.2d 278 (Ill.App. 2nd Dist.
1998)
Defendant's conviction vacated where the State
failed to show within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
psychotropic medication that the defendant had been taking did not
impair his ability to participate in and understand his defense prior to
pleading guilty and sentencing. Though the defendant was afforded the
type of supplemental hearing required on his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, the only medical expert to testify in the case testified
that he could not give an opinion as to the defendant's fitness at the
time of the guilty plea and the trial court made no specific ruling with
respect to the effect of the psychotropic drugs on the defendant.
People v. Carlson,
691
N.E.2d 1156 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
1997)
Limited remand to determine whether the defendant
was entitled to a fitness hearing where both the trial court and defense
counsel knew that defendant was taking psychotropic drugs (lithium) and
was diagnosed manic depressive. The court and defense counsel were made
aware that drugs were taken proximate to the pretrial continuance,
defendant's appeal bond hearing, in defendant's physician's letter
attached to the pre-sentencing investigation report, and in defendant's
statement during the sentencing hearing, all of which put the court on
notice of the issue of defendant's mental incapacity to stand trial. An
Illinois statute entitles a defendant who is receiving psychotropic
drugs to a fitness hearing while under medication.
People v. Johns,
687
N.E.2d 138 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
1997)
Limited remand to determine whether defendant was
taking psychotropic drugs at any critical stage of the proceeding where
the presentence investigative report indicated that he was prescribed
the drugs Thorozine and Haldol while incarcerated awaiting trial, but
which report did not specify the dates the drugs were taken.
People v. Nitz,
670
N.E.2d 672 (Ill. 1996)
The
order of dismissal of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is
reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the
conviction and to grant a new trial for failure of trial court to grant
a fitness hearing. The State withheld information that it was
administering psychotropic medication (Tranxene) to defendant throughout
trial and sentencing. Had the trial court known, it would have been
required, pursuant to Illinois statute, to hold a fitness hearing. Prior
Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the statute to mean that the
administration of psychotropic drugs during trial raises a bona fide
doubt as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial, thus a fitness
determination, through a fitness hearing, is constitutionally
required.
Williams v. State,
685
N.E. 2d 730 (Ind.App. 1997)
The
trial court abused its discretion by allowing previously recorded
deposition testimony into evidence where defendant was present at the
time the testimony was recorded, but
was incompetent. Because defendant was deemed incompetent,
defendant did not have "the opportunity" to cross exam the witness.
Nunez v. State,
942 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.App.
1997)
Jury
verdict that defendant was competent to stand trial for murder was held
to have been against the great weight and preponderance of evidence as
to be manifestly unjust where the defense called two doctors at the
competency hearing who testified that defendant was not fit to stand
trial, where defendant's mother and sister testified to defendant's
strange behavior for years prior to the crime, and where the state
presented little evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the
defense.
Artiles v. State,
691
So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997)
An
indigent defendant has the right to be examined by a confidential expert
even if two other experts appointed by the court agree that defendant is
competent to proceed. The trial court's refusal to continue the
competency hearing to allow examination by the confidential expert was
an abuse of discretion, depriving the defendant a reasonable opportunity
to prepare for the competency hearing in terms of presenting evidence
and challenging the opinions of the other experts.
State v. Levy,
700
So.2d 1283 (La.App. 1st Cir.
1997)
The
State of Louisiana appealed the trial court's finding that defendant
lacked necessary mental capacity by a "clear preponderance of the
evidence" as opposed to "by clear and convincing evidence," which was
required by statute. The Court held that the lower standard was not
erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
Oklahoma.
Howard v. State,
701
So.2d 274 (Miss. 1997)
The
trial court's failure to order a competency hearing before allowing the
defendant to represent himself constituted reversible error in a murder
prosecution where the trial judge did not have a complete evaluation of
defendant's mental capacity, defendant's court-appointed attorney
repeatedly expressed concerns about defendant's competency to assist or
conduct his own defense, and where defendant exhibited paranoid behavior
at trial, asked irrational questions of witnesses, and engaged in
rambling commentary. Where facts appear on the record which, when
objectively considered, reasonably raise questions of defendant's
competence to stand trial or to represent himself, the trial court is
obliged to order a competency hearing.
Howard v. State,
697
So.2d 415, withdrawn, republished as corrected at, 701 So.2d 274 (Miss.
1997)
The
court reverses Howard's capital conviction and death sentence on the
grounds that the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing
before allowing Howard to proceed to trial and certainly before allowing
him to represent himself. The court should not have relied on a state
psychiatrist's written finding of competency since the same psychiatrist
said that he could not venture even a provisional diagnosis in light of
Howard's refusal to cooperate. The court was warned by all four of
Howard's attorneys that he was unable to assist them, let alone to
represent himself. Finally, the trial court should have been alerted to
the need for a hearing by Howard's irrational behavior, such as
insisting on the seating of jurors likely to be biased against, asking
witnesses questions that were irrational or relevant only to his
elaborate conspiracy theories, and accusing one of the jurors of having
committed the murder.
In re Williams,
687
N.E.2d 507 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1997)
The
magistrate's finding of competency is not reliable since both experts
who gave written reports and testified at the competency hearing appear
to have based their opinions on inappropriate considerations, the
state's expert focusing on Williams' moral culpability and dangerousness
if released and the defense expert focusing on the excessiveness of
charging a mentally impaired juvenile with rape. After subtracting these
inappropriate considerations, the evidence of incompetency predominates.
According to the defense expert, Williams has an I.Q. of 40 and the mind
of a six-year-old. Even the state's expert admitted that Williams would
have difficulty understanding the roles of judge and jury and would be
afraid to confide in his attorney. The court remands Williams' case for
a new competency hearing. A concurring judge takes the magistrate to
task for allowing himself to be swayed by the cost of the treatment that
would be required if Williams were found incompetent.
In re Hinnant,
678
N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. 1997)
The
evidence raised a substantial doubt about Hinnant's competence to
understand the extradition proceedings against him, where a court in the
state seeking his extradition had earlier found him unfit to stand trial
because of a head injury, where Hinnant's attorney stated that Hinnant
was unable to communicate with him and where Hinnant had been found
incompetent by a physician. The court remands the case to the lower
court for a formal competency determination and the issuance of a stay
for the duration of Hinnant's incompetency.
State v. Garfoot,
558
N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1997)
The
intermediate appellate court incorrectly subjected the trial court's
finding of incompetence to de novo review.
Under the proper "clearly erroneous" standard, the trial court's finding
was entitled to stand, since a defense expert testified at the
competency hearing that Garfoot would never be able to meaningfully
participate in a criminal trial because of a developmental disability
and where the state's expert testified that he had an IQ of 64 and was
only marginally competent.
State v. Gowan,
666
So.2d 1325 (La.App. 1996)
Once
defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of a sanity
commission, the trial court erred in accepting petitioner's guilty plea
before resolving the issue of his mental capacity. The reviewing court
declined to bar the habeas petition as untimely, because petitioner had
unsuccessfully raised the same issue in earlier proceedings and because
it would be unfair to enforce the deadline against someone who may not
have understood the proceedings against him.
State v. Johnson,
551
N.W. 2d 741 (Neb.App. 1996)
Trial
court committed plain error for failing to hold a full, fair, and
adequate hearing on the issue of defendant's competency when the court
was faced with a reasonable doubt regarding defendant's competency
twice: at the plea hearing and at sentencing. The trial court had
conducted a competency hearing of sorts: the court admitted into
evidence a psychiatrists report (offered by defense counsel), questioned
the defendant, allowed questioning of counsel, and observed defendant in
the context of a hearing to enter a plea. This "hearing" was not
sufficient to provide adequate procedural due process to protect
defendant's substantive due process right not to be tried while
incompetent. The issue of competency was determined principally on the
basis of the trial court's colloquy with Petitioner at the plea hearing;
the colloquy, however went only to defendant's ability to understand the
procedures, not his capability for rational decision making, which is
what the psychiatrist's report said was lacking.
Casey v. State,
924
S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)
Trial
court incorrectly concluded that defendant need not be competent during
the course of a probation revocation hearing. Trial court should have
held a competency hearing after a psychiatrist testified that defendant
was experiencing psychogenic amnesia.
State v. Soares,
916
P.2d 1233 (Haw. 1996)
Trial
court should have suspended trial for a competency hearing where (1)
several experts who had earlier found defendant competent warned that he
required medication to remain competent, (2) the court was aware that
defendant had missed his weekly dose of medication, and (3) trial counsel notified the court that
defendant's demeanor had changed, that defendant wanted to change trial
strategy and that defendant refused to cooperate with him.
Brogdon v. State,
467
S.E.2d 598 (Ga.App. 1996)
Trial
court should have interrupted trial for a competency hearing, where (1)
an evaluator who had earlier found defendant competent also noted that
he suffered from paranoid delusions, needed medications, and was
severely mentally ill, (2) defendant's trial testimony was confused and
not grounded in reality, and (3) defendant had to be restrained after an
outburst. It was not sufficient to inquire of the defendant whether he
was competent.
State v. Carney,
663
So.2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
Where
trial counsel filed pre-trial motion for sanity commission, pointing to
defendant's hallucinations and inability to understand the proceedings
or assist counsel, it was error for the trial court to proceed to trial
without a competency ruling merely because trial counsel withdrew his
motion at a hearing at which defendant was not present.
Calloway v. State,
651
So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
Trial
court should have ordered psychiatric evaluation and hearing on
competency to be sentenced, where defense counsel notified the court
that defendant was so heavily medicated that he could not discuss the
presentence report, where defendant's allocution was rambling and
incoherent, where those who testified to defendant's competency were
neither experts nor able to describe his medications, and where the
record indicated that defendant had brain damage, memory problems, and a
history of seizure disorders. Remanded for competency hearing and
resentencing.
People v. Kinkead,
660
N.E.2d 852 (Ill. 1995)
Trial
court should have ordered competency hearing sua
sponte upon learning that the jail administered thorazine to
defendant. Trail counsel's failure to make a motion did not waive
defendant's state-law right to a competency hearing upon a showing that
he was receiving psychotropic medication. Remanded for clarification
whether defendant's doses of thorazine coincided with his entry of a
guilty plea.
People v. Johnson,
659
N.E.2d 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
Under
state law, defendant is entitled to competency hearing if receiving
psychotropic drugs under medical supervision during the pendency of her
prosecution or sentencing. Remand for determination whether defendant
was in fact on psychotropic medication and whether it may have had an
effect on her competency.
People v. Gevas,
655
N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1995)
Under
state law, defendant who is taking psychotropic medications during the
course of his trial is entitled to a competency hearing. It was error
for trial court to deny motion for competency hearing, where defense
counsel presented evidence that defendant was administered
antipsychotics and antidepressants during the month prior to his entry
of a guilty plea. Passage of two years made a meaningful retrospective
hearing impossible.
People v. Guttierez,
648 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995)
Under
state law, trial court should have sua
sponte ordered a competency hearing upon learning that defendant
was administered psychotropic medication. Furthermore, trial counsel,
who was aware that defendant was receiving antidepressants, was
ineffective for failing to request such a hearing.
Aragon v. State,
910
S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
Jury's finding of competency is against the weight
and preponderance of the evidence, where the defense presented several
witnesses to defendant's bizarre thoughts and behavior, where the only
mental health expert to testify found defendant incompetent, and where
the prosecutor presented no evidence and, indeed, initially conceded
defendant's incompetence, only changing his mind during
cross-examination of defendant.
State v. Bartlett,
898
P.2d 98 (Mont. 1995)
Under
state law, trial court must order psychiatric evaluation upon written
motion by stand-by counsel, even if defendant had previously been ruled
competent to represent himself and opposed the motion.
State v. Pollard,
657
A.2d 185 (Vt. 1995)
Trial
court's finding of competency was erroneous, where examining physician
appeared to believe that competency required only a factual
understanding of the proceedings and did not assess defendant's ability
to consult rationally with his attorneys, where defendant's garbled
speech was nearly impossible to understand, where defendant was in a
hurry to plead guilty to avoid commitment to the state hospital, refused
to take the advice of his attorneys and took the stand during the
competency hearing for no apparent reason.
State v. Cooks,
642
So.2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
Trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant unfit to stand
trial, where one expert testified that defendant was competent, but
another expert stated that a gunshot wound to defendant's head
interfered with his memory and cognitive functions and rendered him
incompetent.
Holland
v. State,
634 So.2d 813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994)
Where
defendant had been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial on three
occasions in connection with the instant offense, it was error for the
trial court to proceed to trial without a hearing and formal
determination of competency. The trial court's delayed finding of
competency was of no effect because defendant's notice of appeal
deprived the court of jurisdiction. A retroactive hearing would not be
adequate since defendant had been adjudicated incompetent, not merely
suspected of incompetency.
State v. Green,
632
So.2d 1187 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
Defendant's due process rights were violated when
the trial court that ordered a competency evaluation erroneously ruled
that the evaluator's finding of competency obviated the need for a
hearing or a formal finding as to competency. The reviewing court
appears to hold that defendant waived this objection, but grants relief
on the ground that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make
an objection.
People v. Brandon,
643
N.E.2d 712 (Ill. 1994)
Under
state law, trial court must order a competency hearing sua sponte upon learning that defendant is
receiving psychotropic medication. Defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to notify the court
that defendant was receiving psychotropic medication.
Gabbard v. Commonwealth,
887 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1994)
Trial
court should have sua sponte held a
competency hearing immediately after the mental health expert appointed
by the court found defendant incompetent. Furthermore, when the trial
court later ruled that defendant was competent based on subsequent
report by the same expert, it was error for the trial court not to give
the defense the opportunity to cross-examine the expert.
State v. P.E.,
664
A.2d 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)
Although the usual rule is that a defendant who is
not facing consequences of magnitude (e.g., jail time) need not be
appointed an attorney, an exception must be made when the court has a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence to proceed pro se. Such a doubt was raised in this case,
where court was aware that defendant had been hospitalized and was
supposed to be taking psychotropic medication, was once a client of the
Mental Health Law Project, behaved so bizarrely during the offense that
police had her evaluated, and behaved in the courtroom in a manner that
indicated distorted thinking.
State v. Lambert,
645
A.2d 1189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
Trial
court should have suspended the trial and ordered a psychiatric
evaluation after notified by defense counsel that defendant had been
diagnosed as paranoid and schizophrenic, was receiving psychotropic
medication at the jail where he was put on suicide watch, and that
defendant formulated his ill-advised trial strategy on the basis of
conversations with God. This error was not cured by the presentence
psychiatric evaluation ordered by the court, inasmuch as the examining
psychiatrist did not assess whether defendant might have had a valid
defense of diminished capacity and appeared to hedge his finding of
competency by suggesting that defendant obtain an independent
evaluation.
Brown v.
State,
871 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994)
Trial
court erred in not ordering competency hearing sua sponte, where mental health expert
appointed by a previous judge never filed a competency report with the
court and testified only as to sanity at the time of the offense and
where trial testimony indicated that defendant had suffered a severe
head injury that changed his behavior, had been recently hospitalized
for a nervous breakdown, had written a letter accusing the alleged
victims of initiating the conduct for which he was charged, and had
threatened to castrate himself. Remanded for retrospective hearing if
feasible.
Ex Parte Potter,
2000
WL 827074 (Tex. CCA, June 28, 2000)
Hearing required on incompetency to proceed at
extradition hearing; defendant must be able to consult with counsel
regarding his "identity and presence"
Bright v. State,
865
S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
Trial
court should have impaneled a competency jury when, following
defendant's conviction, trial counsel filed a motion for such a hearing,
offering in support his own testimony and the testimony of defendant
that defendant, against counsel's advice, failed to cooperate in the
preparation of the presentence report and that defendant failed to
understand that a reduction in sentence was the best that he could hope
for. Remanded for retrospective competency hearing if feasible.
State v. Debra A.E.,
523 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1994)
Under
state law, when a trial court has reasonable doubt whether defendant is
competent to assist counsel in post-conviction proceedings (e.g., direct
appeal or post-trial motions), the court must make a determination as to
competency. Although post-conviction proceedings may continue even if
defendant is incompetent, a contemporaneous determination is necessary
since a defendant who regains his competency must not be prevented from
raising claims that he defaulted because of his earlier incompetency.
Remanded for determination whether there was reasonable doubt of
competency.
State v. Nomey,
613
So.2d 157 (La. 1993)
Once
defendant petitioned for a sanity commission, the trial court violated
his due process rights in accepting his guilty plea without first
conducting a hearing on defendant's mental capacity to proceed to trial.
This violation of state procedure was not, and could not be, cured by
the trial court's nunc pro tunc hearing.
Conviction reversed.
State v. Corethers,
629 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993)
It
was not harmless error for trial court to fail to conduct a competency
hearing, where initial psychiatric evaluation indicated that defendant
suffered from organic mental disorder with manic and delusional features
and was incompetent, where trial counsel alerted court that defendant
remained delusional and uncooperative after having been reported as
restored to competency, where the report of restoration appeared to be
based on incomplete information, and where defendant's courtroom
behavior gave signs of paranoid and grandiose thinking.
Addkison v. State,
608
So.2d 304 (Miss. 1992)
Trial
court improperly denied a competency hearing solely on the basis of an
expert's written report of competency; the only non-hearsay evidence
before the court was the testimony of counsel that defendant could not
assist in his defense and the testimony of defendant's sister that
defendant was mentally retarded and suffered blackouts and strange
spells.
People v. Smart,
184
A.D.2d 341, 585 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
Trial
court violated defendant's state-law rights when the court received
conflicting psychiatric reports as to defendant's competency and yet
failed to hold a hearing.
People v. Meurer,
184
A.D.2d 1067, 584 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
Having received conflicting psychiatric reports as
to defendant's competency, the trial court violated state law in failing
to hold a competency hearing.
Martin v. State,
588
N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
Trial
court should have inquired into defendant's competency to make decisions
regarding his defense, where defendant was initially found to be
psychotic and incompetent by court-appointed experts, where defendant
was receiving Social Security disability payments, where defendant
continued to express paranoid and delusional ideas to the court even
after experts reported the restoration of his competency, and where
defendant dismissed his retained counsel and refused to answer questions
necessary to the appointment of pauper counsel. Remanded for
retrospective hearing.
State v. Berger,
828
P.2d 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
Where
trial court had previously committed defendant for restoration of
competency, it was error to proceed to trail without a competency
hearing or formal finding after hospital reported that defendant's
competency had been restored. Trial court also erred in failing to make
an express finding that defendant was competent to waive a jury trial on
the issue of whether he had a prior conviction that could be used for
sentence enhancement, where defendant had 20-year history of
schizophrenia and hospitalizations, where defendant did not testify at
trial, and where defendant sometimes gave nonresponsive answers to the
court's questions. Remanded for determination whether a retrospective
hearing is feasible.
White v. State,
414
S.E.2d 328 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
Trial
judge erred in failing to hold a hearing on defendant's competency to
have stood trial, where, after conviction, trial counsel moved for a new
trial on the grounds that defendant had been hostile and uncooperative
during trial, the trial judge himself stated on the record that he
doubted defendant's competency, and psychological evaluation ordered by
the trial judge indicated that defendant was not competent to be
sentenced. Remanded for retrospective hearing if possible.
Boggs v. State,
575 So.2d
1274 (Fla. 1991)
Once
notified that a psychiatrist had found defendant incompetent, the trial
court should have ordered further evaluation and a hearing pursuant to
state law, rather than ruling that defendant was competent based solely
on a brief conversation with him.
Finkelstein v. State,
574 So.2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(interlocutory appeal)
Trial
court erred in removing public defender from case, contrary to wishes of
defendant, when the public defender declined to proceed with a
suppression hearing until after the court completed its findings with
respect to defendant's competency. Public defender was correct that
defendant must be competent during all critical stages of the trial.
State v. Phelps,
600
N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
Under
state law, defendant committed for restoration of competency to be
sentenced must receive a hearing within a time certain. Trial court's
failure to conduct a timely hearing deprived it of jurisdiction over
defendant.
Bell v. State,
814
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
Trial
court erred in allowing four of defendant's prior convictions to be used
for enhancement of sentence. The convictions were not valid in that they
were entered after defendant had been adjudicated incompetent in another
proceeding but were not accompanied by a specific finding that defendant
was fit to stand trial. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
People v. West,
171
A.D.2d 1026, 569 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
Under
state law, trial court did not have discretion to deny a one-week
adjournment that was necessary so that a defense expert, who had
recently undergone an operation, could examine defendant and report on
his competency.
People v. Superior Court,
820 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1991)
Trial
court's failure to conduct competency hearing after expressing doubts
about defendant's competency was reversible error but did not deprive
the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus defendant's conviction of
second-degree murder was not fundamentally void and double-jeopardy
prohibited his retrial on a charge of first-degree murder.
Lambert v. State,
808
P.2d 72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)
Where
defendant, who was entitled to a jury trial on competency under state
law, presented evidence that he had attempted suicide on several
occasions, including after his arrest, that he had previously been
hospitalized for mental health problems and that he did not understand
the proceedings against him, the trial court erred in granting a
directed verdict of competency and dismissing the jury. Remanded for
retrospective hearing if feasible.
Nowitzke v. State,
572
So.2d 1346 (Fla. 1990)
Although the rejection of a favorable plea does not
necessarily indicate incompetence, trial court should have ordered a
second competency hearing when informed on the eve of trial by defense
counsel that defendant had rejected a plea agreement that would have
made him ineligible for the death penalty because defendant had a dream
in which a judge told him that he would be spiritually released on
Independence Day on account of the number of letters in defendant's
name.
Harringer v. State,
566 So.2d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990)
Where
defendant was a psychiatric patient at the time of the offense and where
experts reported that at best defendant was only marginally competent,
it was improper for the trial court to allow the state and defense
counsel to stipulate to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
without a hearing and a determination that defendant was competent to
consent to the plea.
Unruh v. State,
560
So.2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
Trial
court should have granted motion for psychiatric evaluation and
competency hearing, where defendant was incarcerated in a psychiatric
unit, had recently suffered a nervous breakdown and attempted suicide,
and had been diagnosed as suffering from mixed substance abuse disorder
and psychosis in remission.
People v. Harris,
460
N.W.2d 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
Although defendant had earlier been adjudicated as
restored to competency, the trial court should have re-evaluated
defendant's competency at the start of trial, when defendant told the
court she felt incoherent and incompetent, where defendant had been
hospitalized for schizophrenia at least 15 times, where the record was
replete with the bizarre statements and behavior of defendant, and where
a psychologist who testified on an earlier remand stated that
defendant's delusions persisted even when she was on medication and that
she was unlikely to have been competent at trial.
People v.
Torres,
556 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990)
Once
the trial court made a threshold finding that a defendant's conduct
warranted a psychiatric evaluation, the trial court's failure to comply
with statutory procedures deprived defendant of the right to a full and
fair determination of competency. A retrospective hearing would not be
feasible.
Porter v. State,
795
P.2d 105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990)
Given
that two years had passed since the reviewing court had ordered the
trial court to conduct a retrospective competency hearing, during which
time the trial court took no action, and given that almost six years had
passed since trial, a retrospective hearing was no longer possible and
defendant was entitled to a new trial.
Hill v. State,
788
S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
In
determining whether a competency hearing is merited, a trial court
should put aside the evidence in favor of competence (in this case, a
finding of competence by Dr. Grigson) and examine whether there is more
than a scintilla of the remaining evidence that might lead to a finding
of incompetency. There was more than a scintilla of evidence in the
report of a second expert that defendant suffered from organic brain
syndrome with psychosis, was functionally illiterate, and was presently
incompetent. Remanded for a competency hearing.
State v. Sadler,
549
So.2d 1236 (La. 1989)
Trial
court should have ordered a sanity commission when informed by defense
counsel that defendant had once been diagnosed as schizophrenic and that
defendant's brother had noticed strange behavior on defendant's part and
tried to have him admitted to a hospital. Since defense counsel related
the brother's statements solely for the purpose of establishing that
there was a reasonable basis for ordering a competency hearing, it was
error for the trial court to disregard them as hearsay.
White v. State,
548
So.2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
Under
state law, trial court that found defendant competent after a hearing
should have entered a written order to that effect. Remanded for nunc pro tunc order.
Shaw v. State,
546
So.2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
Trial
court erred in accepting nolo contendere
plea without holding competency hearing, where defendant informed the
court prior to sentencing that he did not understand what was going on,
where defendant's mother testified to his history of mental illness,
where defendant asked to withdraw his plea when given prison time and
then, when that request was denied, tried to flee the courtroom, became
unconscious and experienced a seizure, and where, immediately after
sentencing, trial court ordered that defendant be evaluated for
treatment.
Robertson v. State,
765 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. 1989)
Trial
court erred in denying trial counsel's motion for a ruling on
defendant's competency, where testimony about defendant's history of
mental illness and defendant's own courtroom behavior should have raised
doubts in the court's mind. The court's decision to proceed with trial
could not be taken to be an implicit finding of competency, since the
trial court was under the mistaken impression that fitness to stand
trial is a jury question.
Warren v. State,
543
So.2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
Where
defense counsel's motion for competency hearing cited defendant's
erratic behavior and statements to counsel, it was error for the trial
court to dismiss the motion based on his own personal observation of
defendant.
Thomas v. State,
777
P.2d 399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)
Once
the trial court determined that there was doubt as to defendant's
competency, it was error not to hold a hearing on the issue even if
defendant failed to request one. As the trial court had determined on a
remand that a retrospective hearing was not feasible, the defendant is
entitled to a new trial.
People v. Marks,
756
P.2d 260 (Cal. 1988)
Where
trial court stated that it had a doubt as to defendant's competency and
ordered a hearing, it was error to proceed to trial without conducting
the hearing, even though defense counsel agreed to waive the hearing.
Burks v. State,
748
P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)
A
remand was necessary to determine defendant's competence to proceed pro se, where pre-trial judge concluded that
defendant was not competent to represent himself and where trial judge's
finding of competency was somewhat ambiguous and may have reflected the
erroneous view that defendant had an absolute right to represent himself
even if incompetent.
Jacobs v. State,
744
S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1988)
Testimony of psychiatrist that defendant's
competence was highly questionable should have caused trial court to
order a full-scale psychiatric evaluation and competency hearing, even
though a physician found defendant competent after a brief
examination.
Tingle v. State,
536
So.2d 202 (Fla. 1988)
There
was reasonable ground to believe defendant was incompetent and therefore
to order a competency hearing, where defense counsel notified the court
that defendant had stabbed himself with a pen, was hallucinating, and
had been tentatively diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. The trial
court's reliance upon a review of hospital records did not sufficiently
protect defendant's due process rights.
Pridgen v. State,
531
So.2d 951 (Fla. 1988)
Trial
court should have suspended penalty phase of capital trial and ordered
competency hearing, where defense counsel moved for a hearing because
defendant refused to allow the presentation of mitigating evidence,
where defendant asked the judge to kill him
several times during a colloquy, where defendant protested his
innocence but asked the jury to sentence him to death, where a
psychiatrist who examined defendant during recess found him to be
incompetent, and where trial court later ordered a psychiatric
evaluation before final entry of defendant's sentence. Remanded for a
new sentencing hearing.
People v. Mayes,
202
Cal. App.3d 908, 248 Cal.Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)
Trial
court violated defendant's due process rights by prohibiting defendant
from calling his own expert witnesses after defendant refused to
cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist. The trial court's action
would have been appropriate if the court concluded that defendant was
merely unwilling, rather than unable, to cooperate, but here the trial
court still entertained some doubts about defendant's competency.
Newman v. State,
369
S.E.2d 902 (Ga. 1988)
During a jury trial on defendant's competency, trial
court erred in excluding evidence that defendant had been found to be
incompetent to manage his own affairs by a probate court and had
previously been found to be incompetent to stand trial at an earlier
stage of the instant proceedings. Remanded for a new trial on the issue
of competency.
People v. Bey,
144
A.D.2d 972, 534 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
If
one of the experts appointed by the trial court did not meet the
statutory guidelines for a "qualified psychiatrist," then defendant is
entitled to a new hearing on competency. Remanded for determination
whether the expert was qualified.
People v. Hale,
749
P.2d 769 (Cal. 1988)
Failure to conduct competency hearing was a due
process violation, where two psychiatrists concluded that defendant was
incompetent, where two other psychiatrists believed that defendant
should be committed to state hospital, and where trial court stated that
it had a doubt about defendant's competency and ordered, but never
conducted, a hearing.
Kelly v. State,
735
P.2d 566 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
Under
state law, once trial court made a finding that there was doubt as to
defendant's competence to stand trial, it should have held a hearing on
that issue.
Holloway v. State,
361
S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 1987)
Trial
court should have conducted hearing on defendant's competency to stand
trial, where one mental health expert reported that defendant had an IQ
of 49, another expert reported that defendant was competent though his
understanding of the proceedings was marginal, and the trial court
refused to accept defendant's guilty plea on the grounds that defendant
did not understand what he was doing. Trial court also erred in failing
to appoint an independent mental health expert to assist the defense
with respect to the competency determination.
Gammage v. State,
510
So.2d 802 (Miss. 1987)
Trial
court's denial of a competency hearing was error inasmuch as its finding
of no probability of incompetency was manifestly against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Defendant was reported to have an
IQ of 48 to 52, two psychologists testified the defendant could not
assist in his defense, and both defense counsel and the district
attorney urged that defendant be committed to a mental institution.
State v. Haskins,
407
N.W.2d 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
Trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing,
where counsel knew that defendant had been adjudicated incompetent in
connection with previous offenses, where counsel conceded that defendant
was unable to assist in his defense, and where trial counsel's strategy
was "to roll the dice and take a chance with the jury" in the hope that
defendant would not face any confinement at all, either in prison or in
a hospital for restoration of competency. Although this is an
ineffectiveness-of-counsel case, the remedy seems more appropriate to a
competency case: the reviewing court held that defendant's conviction
could stand if he were found competent at a nunc
pro tunc hearing.
Barber v. State,
737
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
There
was more than a scintilla of evidence of incompetence and, consequently,
court should have ordered a jury trial on the issue of competency, where
one expert found that defendant's delusions rendered him incompetent,
even though many of defendant's statements that the expert interpreted
as delusional were in fact true and even though another expert opined
that defendant was competent. Remanded for jury trial on competency.
Manning v. State,
730
S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
Under
state law, once a person has been adjudicated incompetent, the burden
shifts to the state in any subsequent proceeding to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person is competent. Testimony of mental
health expert was sufficient to prove that defendant had previously been
adjudicated incompetent, and therefore, defendant was entitled to a new
competency hearing at which the burden of proof is properly
allocated.
People v. Colon,
128
A.D.2d 422, 512 N.Y.S.2d 809 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
Trial
court erred in denying motion for a hearing on defendant's competence to
be sentenced, where in the intervening months since defendant's
conviction he had been adjudicated incompetent in an unrelated
proceeding. Remanded for resentencing.
People v. Murphy,
513
N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
Under
state law, once the trial court determines that there is a bona fide doubt as to competency, a presumption
of competency no longer attaches and the state then has the burden of
production and persuasion. Thus, it was error for the trial court to
base its finding of competency on the presumption, on defense counsel's
failure to bring to the court's attention any problems in dealing with
defendant, and on the court's own observations of defendant.
Scott v. State,
730
P.2d 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)
As a
matter of state law, once the trial court found that there was doubt as
to defendant's competence, it was error not to hold a hearing on the
issue, notwithstanding that defendant did not request a hearing.
People v. Clark,
499
N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
Trial
court erred in failing to hold competency hearing where evaluation
requested by the defense indicated that defendant functioned at a
"borderline" level, gave odd responses to questions, had a severe speech
impediment, and was generally incompetent. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
Byrd v. State,
719
S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
It
was error for trial court not to make a formal adjudication of
defendant's competency, where defendant had been committed for
restoration of competency following a jury verdict of incompetency.
Remanded for retrospective hearing.
State v. Johnson,
395
N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986)
Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to bring to the court's attention the reports
of two experts who questioned defendant's competency. Remanded for a
retrospective competency hearing, if feasible.
People v. Maddicks,
118 A.D.2d 437, 499 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986)
Under
state law, once the trial court orders a competency evaluation, the
defendant is entitled to a hearing upon request, and therefore it was
error in this case for the trial court to deny a hearing merely because
defense counsel waited for a third opinion before requesting a hearing.
Remanded for retroactive hearing.
People v. Weech,
116
A.D.2d 975, 498 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
Retrospective hearing was inadequate where the only
witnesses called by the state were two experts who had no specific
recollection of defendant and who could only relate their conclusory
opinions that defendant was competent, but not the factual basis for
those opinions. Remanded for new retrospective hearing.
Meraz v. State,
714
S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
Jury's finding of competency was against the weight
of the evidence, where two psychiatrists testified that defendant was
incompetent, where defendant had long history of hospitalizations for
paranoid schizophrenia and where the only evidence pointing to
competence was the psychiatrists' testimony, brought out on
cross-examination, that defendant had served successfully in the Marine
Corps, that defendant had not been tested for malingering, that
defendant had a basic understanding of the courtroom situation, and that
one of the psychiatrists had previously thought that defendant was
competent.
Holmes v. State,
494
So.2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
Where
expert opinion had been divided at defendant's first competency hearing,
it was error for the trial court to
fail to conduct a second competency hearing when it became clear that
defendant, a seventeen-year-old deaf-mute, was unable to answer
questions on the stand that were crucial to his defense.
People v. O'Reilly,
125 A.D.2d 979, 510 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986)
Under
state law, trial court should have conducted a competency hearing once
it received conflicting psychiatric reports.
People v. Powell,
180
Cal.App.3d 469, 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)
When
presented with expert testimony that pro se
defendant's recent psychotic break rendered him incapable of assisting
in his defense, trail court should have appointed defendant an attorney
to aid in determining whether a competency hearing was necessary.
State v. Haun,
695
S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)
Trial
court should have held competency hearing sua
sponte, where trial counsel informed the court that they were
unable to communicate with defendant and where trial court was aware of
defendant's long history of mental illness and recent diagnosis as a
suicide risk.
People v. Christopher,
482 N.E.2d 45 (N.Y. 1985)
It
was a violation of state statute for the trial court to limit testimony
at a competency hearing to that of the state mental health evaluator who
reported that defendant's competency had been restored and to refuse to
hear expert testimony offered by the defense. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
People v. Brown,
476
N.E.2d 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
There
were sufficient indicia of defendant's incompetence that trial court
should have made a formal finding as to whether there was a bona fide doubt about defendant's competency,
where trial counsel alerted the court that defendant was uncooperative
and irrational and where defendant was recently ruled incompetent in an
unrelated proceeding. Remanded for finding as to whether there existed a
bona fide doubt.
W.S.L. v. State,
470
So.2d 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
Trial
court improperly denied motion for competency hearing, where defendant
was nine-years-old and where psychologist reported that because of his
age and intellect defendant could not understand the proceedings or
assist in his defense. Remanded for determination whether retrospective
hearing is feasible. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that a
retrospective hearing would not protect the defendant's due process
rights and reversed the conviction. State v.
W.S.L., 485 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1986).
People v. Arnold,
113
A.D.2d 101, 495 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
It
was an abuse of discretion to deny competency hearing, where trial court
was aware that defendant was epileptic and alcoholic, had suffered a
severe head injury, exhibited symptoms of psychosis, had a long history
of psychiatric hospitalizations, had experienced trance-like spells, and
was visibly shaking in the courtroom. Remanded for determination whether
there exist psychiatric reports contemporaneous with defendant's trial,
thus making a retrospective hearing possible.
Gibson v. State,
474
So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam)
Given
that defendant had previously been adjudicated incompetent, the trial
court erred in making a finding of competency on the basis of past
medical reports and personal observations rather than taking testimony
at a hearing.
Hill v. State,
473
So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1985)
Failure to conduct a competency hearing deprived
defendant of his due process rights, where evidence indicated that
defendant suffered from grand mal epileptic seizures, was mentally
retarded, had speech and communication problems, took blame for things
he did not do, was referred for psychiatric evaluation by the jail, had
severe memory deficits, and exhibited inappropriate courtroom behavior.
Furthermore, in denying motion for a competency hearing, trial court
erred in refusing to consider the testimony of anyone other than defense
counsel based on the court's erroneous view that competence is a
judgment call for the lawyer.
People v. Lowe,
109
A.D.2d 300, 491 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
Defendant was denied a full and fair determination
of his competency, where, contrary to statute, only one psychiatrist was
appointed to examine defendant, where psychiatrist's report was a
conclusory finding of competency without the supporting information
required by statute, and where the psychiatrist may not have met the statutory guidelines
for an expert. A retrospective
hearing would not be possible because of the passage of time and because
defendant was absent during much of the trial.
People v. Johnson,
460
N.E.2d 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
Trial
court should have held competency hearing, where trial counsel alerted
court that defendant refused to cooperate in his defense and that
defendant had been found incompetent by a mental health expert, where
defendant exhibited paranoid and often disruptive behavior in the
courtroom and tried to commit suicide while awaiting trial, and where
trial court ordered evaluation of defendant's fitness to be sentenced.
Passage of time made retrospective hearing unfeasible.
Commonwealth v. Crowley,
471 N.E.2d 353 (Mass. 1984)
Defendant was prejudiced when trial court placed on
defendant the burden of proving his incompetency, where two experts
agreed that defendant was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, one of the
experts testified that defendant was competent but could assist counsel
only with great difficulty, the other expert testified that defendant
was incompetent, and defense counsel testified that defendant was
uncommunicative. Remanded for a retrospective hearing at which the state
must prove competence by a preponderance of the evidence. Note: this
holding may not survive the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2573 (1992)
that it is not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the
defendant in a competency proceeding.
Williams v. State,
663
S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Resolving a point of confusion in state law, the
court determined that one standard -- "there is evidence to support a
finding of incompetency" -- should trigger a competency hearing no
matter what the stage of the trial proceedings. Remanded to lower court
for reinstatement of relief. In Williams v.
State, 628 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982), the appellate court ruled
that defendant presented more than a scintilla of evidence of
incompetency and therefore was entitled to a post-verdict competency
hearing, where testimony indicated that defendant suffered from brain
damage and scored low on several tests of mental ability. Remanded for
retrospective hearing.
Lindsey v. State,
314
S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1984)
Trial
court erred in granting state's motion for a directed verdict on the
issue of competency. It cannot be said that the evidence demanded a
finding of competency where the sheriff testified that defendant was
competent but other evidence
established that he had been committed on several occasions
with diagnoses of paranoia, paranoid schizophrenia and psychosis, that
he refused to cooperate with his attorneys or court-appointed mental
health evaluators and that he appeared to have no reaction to important
news about the trial at which his life was at stake. Remanded for a
new jury trial on competency if the
state proves that a retrospective hearing is feasible.
Pipken v. State,
671
S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
Trial
court erred in failing to hold competency hearing, where court-appointed
psychologist had twice found defendant incompetent and where probation
officer informed court that defendant was incompetent to abide by the
terms of his probation. Remanded for retrospective hearing if
feasible.
State v. Howard,
668
S.W.2d 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
Trial
court erred in not holding a competency hearing, where trial counsel
(later stand-by counsel) reported that defendant refused to cooperate in
his defense unless counsel took FBI polygraph exam, where court was
aware that defendant thought that court and counsel were part of a
conspiracy against him, and where court on several occasions let
stand-by counsel present evidence over defendant's objections because
the court doubted that defendant was acting rationally.
Poynter v. State,
443
So.2d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
Trial
court's finding of competency was against the weight of the evidence,
where sole evidence was the transcript of a prior hearing, admitted into
evidence by stipulation, at which all three experts had agreed that
defendant was incompetent and where there was no evidence of competency
on the record.
People v. Arcadie,
692
P.2d 1145 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
Once
trial counsel voiced his misgivings about defendant's competency, trial
court violated state law in failing to make a preliminary finding as to
competency.
Rowell v. State,
676
P.2d 268 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)
Once
the trial court made a finding that there was doubt about defendant's
competency and ordered an evaluation, it was error under state law to
deny defendant's motion for a hearing. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
People v. Matthews,
662 P.2d 1108 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983)
Defendant's due process rights were violated when
the trial court failed to follow statutory procedures designed to give
the defense notice of a preliminary finding of competency and the
opportunity to rebut the preliminary finding.
State v. Davis,
466
N.E.2d 572 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)
It
was error for trial court to allow defendant who had been committed as
unrestorably incompetent to be reindicted based on the hearsay testimony
of the prosecutor that the hospital had informed him that defendant
would soon be given voluntary status and thus might be able to release
himself.
People v. Harris,
447
N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
Trial
court erred in failing to conduct hearing on defendant's competency to
have stood trial upon learning, prior to sentencing, that defendant had
history of psychiatric hospitalizations, had recently attempted suicide
and had failed to obtain treatment that was the condition of his release
on an earlier conviction. Trial judge's death made a meaningful
retrospective hearing impossible.
Smith v. State,
443
N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1983)
It
was a violation of state law for court to rule on defendant's competency
without having appointed two psychiatrists to examine him and without
hearing their testimony. Remanded for retrospective hearing.
State v. Lee,
660
S.W.2d 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
Ordering a competency evaluation does not
necessarily indicate that a trial court has a bona fide doubt as to competency. Under state
law, however, defendant may trigger a hearing if he challenges an
unfavorable evaluation and requests the appointment of an independent
expert. The record below does not indicate whether defendant knowingly
waived his right to such an expert. Remanded for competency hearing
unless defendant waives his right to an independent expert.
Kothman v. State,
442
So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Trial
court should have granted motion for competency hearing in light of
testimony by defendant's physician that defendant was not in command of
his faculties, had memory deficits, suffered blackouts from alcoholism,
and was in need of detoxification.
Ex parte LaFlore,
445
So.2d 932 (Ala. 1983) (interlocutory appeal)
The
intermediate appellate court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus
preventing the trial court from holding a jury trial on the issue of
competency. State statute denying such a trial to a person not presently
in custody (defendant was out on bond) does not comport with due process
requirements.
Trucci v. State,
438
So.2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Trial
court's finding of competency was against the weight of the evidence,
where defendant had been treated for chronic schizophrenia for many
years, was on military disability, acted in a bizarre manner during the
instant offense, and had a bizarre recollection of the offense, and
where psychologist reported that defendant had disoriented thinking,
memory impairment, delusions, depressive mood and was incompetent. Trial
court erred in disregarding this uncontroverted evidence and basing its
finding solely on another psychologist's fill-in-the-blanks intake form
that was never properly admitted into evidence.
State v. Bertrand,
465
A.2d 912 (N.H. 1983)
Trial
court should have sua sponte suspended
proceedings and ordered a competency hearing after defendant took the
stand and testified first that he had set a fire by accident and then
stated that he had set it deliberately. Defendant had been hospitalized
on 12 occasions for mental illness, and although two psychiatrists had
found him to be competent, one of the psychiatrists had warned that
defendant had a history of claiming responsibility for offenses that he
did not commit. Trial court's sentencing recommendation that defendant
be hospitalized indicates that the court did in fact entertain a bona fide doubt as to competency.
People
v. Grisset,
118 Misc.2d 450, 460 N.Y.S.2d 987
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)
State
failed to prove defendant's competency by a preponderance of the
evidence, where expert opinion was divided and where trial court's voir dire of defendant revealed that he was
disoriented as to time, did not know how long he had been confined,
could not remember his attorney's name, and did not know what an
Assistant District Attorney was.
People v. Stankewitz,
648 P.2d 578 (Cal. 1982)
Trial
court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing, where defense
counsel voiced doubts about defendant's competency, where a psychiatrist
testified that defendant's delusional and paranoid thoughts prevented
him from cooperating in the conduct of his defense, and where
defendant's colloquy with the court tended to contradict the court's
view that defendant merely had a conflict with the particular attorney
he was assigned. Reversal was required, since the trial court had no
power to proceed once there arose a doubt as to competency.
Futch v. State,
632
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
In
overruling defense motion for competency hearing, trial court improperly
weighed evidence both for and against a finding of incompetency. Under
state law, a hearing is mandatory when the evidence of incompetence,
considered by itself, is greater than a scintilla. That standard was met
where defendant had been declared insane on four occasions, had
previously been adjudicated incompetent and had been diagnosed as a
severely psychotic chronic schizophrenic. Remanded for a retrospective
hearing if feasible.
Hollis v. State,
633
S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
Defendant was denied a fair trial on the issue of
competency when trial court allowed prosecution to introduce evidence as
to defendant's guilt of the charge. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
Baker v. State,
297
S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1982)
Even
if defense counsel had failed to follow local rules as to the filing of
an incompetency motion, trial court still had a constitutional duty to
hold a competency hearing when defense counsel brought to the court's
attention a psychiatrist's finding that defendant was incompetent.
Remanded for a competency hearing if the state proves that a meaningful
retrospective hearing is possible.
People v. McCabe,
87
A.D.2d 852, 449 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
Trial
court should not have permitted defendant to plead guilty without first
conducting a competency hearing, where two psychiatrists had reported
that defendant was schizophrenic and incompetent, notwithstanding that
defense counsel agreed not to dispute the finding of a third
psychiatrist that defendant was malingering. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
Ex parte Turner,
626
S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
Petitioner's conviction was fundamentally defective
in that trial court submitted question of competency to the same jury
that ruled on guilt.
People v. T.D.W.,
441
N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
Where
trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation and a fitness hearing, thus
indicating the existence of a bona fide
doubt as to competency, it was error to rule on competency without
holding the hearing. Defendant was given no opportunity to cross examine
the experts upon whose reports the court based its finding of
competency.
People v. Stribling,
433 N.E.2d 967 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982)
Trial
court should have ordered competency hearing, where court was aware that
defendant had been adjudicated incompetent (though later restored) in an
unrelated proceeding, where defendant claimed his attorney was part of a
conspiracy against him, and where defendant's pro se representation at trial and on appeal
gave indications, including paranoid ramblings, that he was unable to
assist in his defense.
State v. McGee,
289
S.E.2d 616 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
Trial
court erred in relying on its earlier adjudication of competency in
dismissing a defense motion for a competency hearing where the trial
court itself had re-opened the issue by committing defendant for further
evaluation following the earlier adjudication.
State v. Rogers,
419
So.2d 840 (La. 1982) (interlocutory appeal)
Trial
court's finding of competency was clearly erroneous, where two
psychiatrists determined after extensive testing that defendant was
severely mentally retarded and unable to understand the proceedings
against him and where a third psychiatrist based his finding of
competency on defendant's ability to recall certain basic facts such as his street number,
conducted no psychological testing, and hedged his opinion by stating he
had reached no conclusion about competency, only about defendant's
ability to assist his attorney.
People v. Jackson,
88
A.D.2d 604, 449 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
Where
defendant's first trial had ended in a mistrial because he couldn't hear
the proceedings, trial court should have suspended second trial for
further inquiry when it became clear that defendant was having
difficulty hearing.
People v. Samuel,
629
P.2d 485 (Cal. 1981) (en banc)
There
was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of competency,
where each of the several experts agreed that defendant was severely
disturbed and incompetent and where the state presented only two lay
witnesses who testified as to defendant's ability to perform such basic
functions as walking and talking.
People v. Greene,
430
N.E.2d 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
Inasmuch as the trial court had previously
adjudicated defendant incompetent, it was error to proceed to trial
based on the stipulation of the parties that defendant had been restored
to competency. Remanded for formal hearing and adjudication.
State v. Blair,
273
S.E.2d 536 (S.C. 1981)
Trial
court was required by state statute and the federal Constitution to hold
a competency hearing once the court ordered a psychiatric evaluation on
the issue of competency, even though the evaluator reported that
defendant was competent to stand trial. Failure to make a request does
not waive the defendant's right to such a hearing. Remanded for
retrospective competency hearing.
Bayramoglu v. Superior Court,
124 Cal.App.3d 718, 176 Cal.Rptr. 487 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981)
Even
though a jury had recently found defendant competent to stand trial, it
was error for the trial court to deny a hearing on defendant's claim
that he had been incompetent at his preliminary hearing some five months
earlier. At preliminary hearing, defendant's behavior was aberrant and
disruptive, and defendant stated that he did not want to live;
furthermore, there was expert testimony that defendant was psychotic
following the offense and that his competence might be intermittent.
Remanded for a hearing.
State v. Green,
395
So.2d 532 (Fla. 1981)
Trial
court should have granted hearing on defendant's motion to exclude
electronic media from the courtroom, where trial counsel notified court
that defendant's personal psychiatrist and a court-appointed
psychiatrist who had earlier certified defendant as restored to
competency both warned that the presence of electronic media would
heighten defendant's anxiety and depression and interfere with her
ability to assist counsel.
People v. Sundberg,
124 Cal.App.3d 944, 177 Cal.Rptr. 734 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981)
Although five experts reported prior to trial that
defendant was competent, trial court should have held a hearing when it
became evident during the course of the trial that defendant might not
be competent. Defendant had been adjudicated incompetent at an earlier
stage of the proceedings, was diagnosed as schizophrenic by the experts
who examined him, claimed that there was a conspiracy to deny him his
rights as the heir to J. Paul Getty, laughed and otherwise acted
inappropriately in the courtroom, gave signs of delusional thinking on
the stand and in his colloquies with the court and, near the end of
trial, was diagnosed as incompetent by one of the experts who had
previously found him competent.
Jones v. District Court,
617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (interlocutory
appeal)
Where
defense counsel notified trial court that he perceived a deterioration
in defendant's condition, it was error for the trial court to fail to
suspend a hearing on pretrial motions, order a psychiatric evaluation
and a hearing, and give the defense an opportunity to rebut the court's
preliminary finding of competence.
People v. Davenport,
416 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980)
Trial
court should have ordered competency hearing, where defendant had
undergone a long psychiatric hospitalization since he was last found
competent, where defendant had previously been diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenic, where trial counsel alerted the court that defendant was
unable to communicate with him, and where defendant's own efforts at
self-representation indicate that he was not in touch with reality.
Remanded for retrospective hearing.
Garcia v. State,
595
S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
Trial
court erred in relying on a psychiatric report that was never admitted
into evidence in denying a motion for a jury trial on competency.
Putting aside that report, there was sufficient evidence of incompetency
to merit a jury trial, where defendant's mother and wife testified that
defendant was behaving much as he had when previously hospitalized for a
nervous breakdown, where trial counsel and a clergyman testified that
defendant believed he could open jailhouse doors with magic knots, where
several witnesses testified as to their difficulties communicating with
defendant, and where the only properly admitted evidence of competency
was the testimony of a jailer who had never conversed with defendant.
Remanded for retrospective hearing.
People v. James,
404
N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
Trial
court should have held a competency hearing when the court itself noted
that defendant did not appear to understand what he would be giving up
by pleading guilty at a hearing on revocation of probation. Because
defendant's confusion may have been the cause of his failure to enter a
valid plea, the reviewing court remanded to give the defendant the
opportunity to uphold his end of the plea bargain he had struck with the
prosecution; a competency hearing would not be necessary unless the
court presiding over the new plea conference had a bona fide doubt about defendant's
competence.
Callaway v. State,
594
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
Defendant was denied a fair jury trial on
competence, where prosecution and prosecution experts repeatedly drew
attention to the criminal charges against defendant as well as
extraneous offenses and suggested he would go free if found incompetent
or would escape from a mental health facility. Remanded for
retrospective hearing.
Sisco v. State,
599
S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
Trial
court should not have weighed the evidence for and against competency
when ruling on whether on whether a jury trial on competency is merited.
Proper procedure is to ignore all evidence of competency and examine
whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence that rationally could
lead to a finding of competency. Remand for determination whether
defendant met that standard.
People v. Turner,
410
N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
When
trial court ruled, at the close of the state's evidence, that defendant
had become incompetent to proceed further, it was a denial of due
process not to inquire whether defendant had been competent during the
prior course of the trial.
People v. Williams,
409 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980)
Trial
court's finding of fitness was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, where two court-appointed experts testified that defendant's
memory defects and psychotic symptoms rendered him unable to assist in
his defense and where the only evidence of competence was the court's
brief exchanges of casual conversation with defendant.
People v. Teague,
404
N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
Petitioner was denied due process when trial court,
having entertained a bona fide doubt about
petitioner's competence based on defense counsel's representations,
vacated its order for a competency hearing. The passage of time made a
meaningful retrospective hearing impossible.
State v. Moon,
602
S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
Trial
court erred in not ordering competency hearing sua sponte, where defendant entered plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, court was aware of defendant's prior
commitments to mental institutions, defendant gave inappropriate
responses on the witness stand, and defendant's behavior during the
instant offense, as well as earlier crimes, was bizarre.
Williams v. State,
386
So.2d 506 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)
Although hospital had discharged defendant as
restored to competency, the trial court should have held a second
competency hearing in light of evidence that defendant was behaving in a
bizarre manner following his discharge. Trial court was aware that
defendant had run out of medication prescribed by the hospital, had been
observed to eat off the floor, drink out of a commode, and set fire to
his cell and that the sheriff and defendant's guardian saw defendant's
condition deteriorate.
Alexander v. State,
380 So.2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980)
Although not aware that defendant had previously
been adjudicated incompetent and thus was under a continuing presumption
of incompetence, trial court nonetheless had reasonable doubt as to
defendant's competency, as evidenced by its appointment of two
psychiatrists, and should have held a hearing and made a formal
determination, even though trial counsel waived the hearing after the
psychiatrists reported that defendant was competent. Trial counsel's
waiver would not bar defendant's appeal, inasmuch as one who is presumed
incompetent cannot waive his right to a hearing.
State v. Williams,
381
So.2d 439 (La. 1980)
Trial
court's finding of competency was against the weight of the evidence,
where both court-appointed psychiatrists agreed that defendant was
mentally retarded, had a low tolerance for stress, a speech impediment,
and an impaired ability to concentrate and communicate.
State v. Khan,
417
A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (interlocutory
appeal)
Although the trial court's finding of competency was
not without support in the record, the reviewing court remanded for a
new hearing, apparently out of an abundance of caution. Doubts about
defendant's competency were raised by his diagnosis of schizophrenia, by
the conflicting competency holding of different judges within a short
span of time, by the fact that two-years had elapsed since the last
medical testimony, by testimony indicating that defendant might not have
been taking necessary medication, and by defendant's refusal to allow
his attorney to present an insanity defense, notwithstanding that his
claim of self-defense rested on the delusional belief that the victim
was part of a conspiracy against him.
People v. Charette,
78
A.D.2d 567, 431 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
Where
trial court held statutorily mandated hearing after receiving
conflicting reports from two experts, but then ordered further
evaluation by a third expert, it was error to make a determination of
competency based on the third expert's report without re-opening the
hearing so that defendant could conduct cross-examination.
State v. Sena,
594
P.2d 336 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979)
A
doubt as to defendant's competency at the time of his trial and
sentencing was raised by a pre-sentencing psychiatric evaluation that
found defendant to be schizophrenic, overtly psychotic, delusional and
possibly organically impaired, and that recommended that defendant be
committed to a hospital for treatment; trial court should have ordered a
hearing sua sponte.
People v. Arias,
71
A.D.2d 551, 418 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
Trial
court should have conducted hearing on defendant's fitness at the time
he stood trial and on his present
fitness to be sentenced, where prior to sentencing defendant was
committed to a psychiatric hospital as a dangerous incapacitated person
and where two experts subsequently found defendant incompetent to stand
trial. Remanded for retrospective hearing.
State v. Coco,
371
So.2d 803 (La. 1979) (interlocutory appeal)
Trial
court decided the issue of mental competency prematurely, where experts
had not yet had time to assess whether defendant was rendered
incompetent by his mental retardation and epileptic seizures or whether
defendant's seizures and the attendant memory lapses could be brought
under control by medication. Remanded for new hearing.
Commonwealth v. Rise,
386 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979)
Where
psychiatrist testified a week before trial that defendant's continued
drug use rendered him unfit to stand trial and predicted that defendant
might be competent after a week of detoxification, it was error for the
court to proceed to trial without holding a competency hearing. Since
the record contained no information about defendant's condition on the
day of trial, a retrospective hearing would not be possible.
Ex parte Johnston,
587
S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc)
Trial
court erred in submitting the question of petitioner's present sanity to
the same jury that ruled on guilt. That the trial court had a bona fide doubt as to petitioner's competency
is demonstrated by the court's submission to the jury of an instruction
to acquit if they found petitioner incompetent, by the trial court's own
findings of fact on habeas review, and by the extensive trial testimony
as to petitioner's diagnosis of schizophrenia and long history of mental
difficulties. Trial court also erred in instructing jury to apply the
M'Naghten standard to assess competency.
Ex parte Locklin,
583
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc)
Trial
court's submission of the question of petitioner's competence to the
guilt/innocence jury indicated that the court had a bona fide doubt as to competence. Petitioner's
due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to convene
a separate jury on the issue of competency and when it instructed the
jury to apply the M'Naghten standard to assess competency. These
violations are not waivable. A retrospective hearing would not be
adequate inasmuch as the jury's consideration of the competency issue
may have infected its guilt/innocence deliberations.
State v. Hamilton,
373
So.2d 179 (La. 1979) (interlocutory appeal)
Trial
court's finding of competency was an abuse of discretion, where
competency hearing was focused almost exclusively on defendant's ability
to distinguish right from wrong, where the finding of one psychiatrist
that defendant was competent and only mildly mentally retarded was
supported by only a 20-minute interview, and where the conclusion of
another psychiatrist that defendant was moderately to severely mentally
retarded, possibly brain damaged, unable to understand the meaning of
words such as "rape," and unable to assist counsel was supported by an
interview of over an hour and by the written reports of psychiatrists
who had examined defendant in the past.
State v. Morris,
590
P.2d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
Trial
court should have had doubt about defendant's competency to plead guilty
and therefore should have ordered competency hearing when the court
learned through a pre-sentencing evaluation that defendant had suffered
brain damage resulting in post-traumatic brain syndrome, with a
resultant impulsivity and loss of inhibition. Remanded for retrospective
hearing.
Commonwealth v. Hill,
375 N.E.2d 1168 (Mass. 1978)
Trial
court should have held competency hearing, where two psychiatrists who
testified in support of insanity defense stated that defendant was
paranoid schizophrenic and one of the psychiatrists testified that
defendant was incompetent to stand trial, where records of defendant's
hospitalizations indicated that his problems were of long standing,
where evaluator who found defendant competent prior to trial nonetheless
recommended that he receive continued treatment for schizophrenia, and
where defendant was later found incompetent to be sentenced.
People v. Hancock,
375
N.E.2d 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
Defendant was prejudiced when the trial court
unconstitutionally placed on him the burden of proving his incompetence;
the evidence for and against competency was close, with one psychiatrist
on each side of the question. Remanded for retrospective hearing. Note:
This holding relies on the view, later repudiated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct.
2572 (1992), that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proving
incompetence on the defendant.
People v. Jackson,
373
N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
Trial
court erred in pronouncing sentence without holding a hearing on
defendant's competence to be sentenced. After defendant's conviction,
the trial court itself expressed doubts about defendant's competence to
be sentenced and ordered a psychiatric evaluation that was never
completed. Furthermore, the court was aware that at the time of
sentencing defendant was not receiving medications that a psychiatrist
had previously testified were necessary if defendant was to remain
competent. Remanded for resentencing.
Ex parte Long,
564
S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc)
Trial
court should have sua sponte ordered a
separate competency hearing where several lay people testified as to
petitioner's history of mental illness, his childhood head injury and
his odd behavior and where hospital records indicated that he was
severely disturbed though not insane, even though two mental health
experts testified that petitioner was competent. That trial court
entertained bona fide doubt as to
petitioner's competency is strongly suggested by his submission of the
competency issue to the convicting jury. Trial court also erred in
instructing jury to follow the M'Naghten standard to determine
competency.
State v. Santillanes,
580 P.2d 489 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978)
Given
that defendant had been previously adjudicated incompetent, the burden
then shifted on the state to overcome defendant's presumption of
incompetence; hence, it was fundamentally unfair for the trial court to
instruct the competency jury that defendant bore the burden of proof.
State v. Wright,
575
P.2d 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
A
remand for a retrospective hearing was appropriate where new information
that was not available to the trial court, including evidence that
defendant suffered a psychotic break, indicated that defendant might
have been incompetent at the time of his sentencing. Though seven years
had passed, the existence of contemporaneous psychiatric records made a
retrospective hearing feasible.
Hayden v. Commonwealth,
563 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1978)
Trial
court should have held competency hearing, where trial counsel notified
court of his doubts regarding defendant's competency, psychologist
reported that defendant suffered from schizophrenia, and psychiatrist
reported that defendant would be able to assist at trial only if ideas
were presented to him in a very simple and concrete form. Reviewing
court would have preferred to remand for a retrospective hearing, but
felt that a new trial was dictated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Robinson and Drope.
Barr v. State,
359
So.2d 334 (Miss. 1978)
Under
state law, when there is a reasonable probability that defendant is
unfit to stand trial the court must hold a jury trial on the issue.
There was a reasonable probability, where one court-appointed
psychiatrist diagnosed defendant as schizophrenic and presently insane
and where the staff of a psychiatric hospital that found defendant
competent nonetheless variously diagnosed defendant as schizophrenic or
as having a paranoid personality. That the trial court in fact
entertained some doubt is indicated by the court's decision to hold a
bench hearing.
Miller v. Superior Court,
81 Cal.App.3d 132, 146 Cal.Rptr. 253 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978)
Because defendant was found unfit to stand trial
shortly after his preliminary hearing, it could be inferred that
defendant was incompetent during the hearing, and therefore the
information against him should have been dismissed.
People v. Belanger,
252 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977)
Though trial court had recently adjudicated
defendant competent in connection with two charges arising out of the
same transaction, it was error not to hold a hearing on defendant's
competency with respect to the instant offense but rather to base its
decision on a telephone conversation with the examining psychiatrist.
Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can prove, on a motion for
a new trial, that he was incompetent in fact at the time of his guilty
plea.
Ex parte Hagans,
558
S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
Trial
court should have impaneled separate competency jury when several lay
and expert witnesses testified that petitioner suffered from brain
damage, had a history of psychiatric problems and blackouts, and often
had difficulty communicating with others and distinguishing right from
wrong. It was error for the trial court to submit the question of
competence to the convicting jury and to instruct the jury to apply the
M'Naghten standard to assess competency.
People v. Burnside,
367 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977)
Defendant was denied a fair trial because the trial
court failed to halt the proceedings and order a competency hearing as
soon as it became evident that
defendant might be incompetent. Trial court should have been
alerted by defense counsel's pre-trial motion for a competency hearing
(notwithstanding that defendant insisted that it be withdrawn), by the
expert testimony offered in support of an insanity defense and by the
same odd courtroom behavior that led the trial court to order a hearing
into defendant's competence to be sentenced.
Scott v. Commonwealth,
555 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977)
Trial
court had doubt as to defendant's competency and therefore should have
held a competency hearing inasmuch as in its sentencing order the court
recommended that the Department of Corrections conduct a psychiatric
evaluation of defendant. The reviewing court appears to have granted a
new trial, rather than a retrospective hearing, because of the
cumulative effect of this and other errors.
People v. Boose,
362
N.E.2d 303 (Ill. 1977)
Defendant was denied a fair jury trial on the issue
of his competency when the trial court ordered that defendant remain
shackled in the presence of the jury. It was error to order shackling
based solely on the seriousness of the charges.
Crawford v. State,
240
S.E.2d 824 (Ga. 1977)
During special trial on the issue of competency,
trial court erred in allowing the state to cross-examine defense
witnesses as to defendant's guilt or innocence of the charges against
her; guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the question whether one is fit
to stand trial.
Jones v. State,
372
A.2d 1064 (Md. Ct. App. 1977)
Trial
court committed state-law error in basing its finding of competency on
psychological reports that were not made part of the record. A remand to
permit the trial court to supplement the record would not suffice, in
that the failure to properly determine defendant's competency rendered
his conviction a nullity.
State v. Evans,
259
N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1977)
Where
court appointed expert, though finding defendant competent, reported
that he was paranoid schizophrenic with depressive features, where
testimony established that defendant was often irrational or
uncommunicative and where defendant was civilly committed as mentally
ill, trial court should have had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's
competency and therefore should have held a
jury trial on that issue before accepting defendant's guilty plea.
People v. McCullum,
362 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. 1977)
Defendant was denied due process when the trial
court placed on him the burden of proving his incompetency. Note: this
holding rests on the view, later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572
(1992), that it is unconstitutional to place the burden on defendant to
prove his incompetence.
State v. Pierce,
569
P.2d 865 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
Trial
court's finding that defendant was competent to plead guilty was not
supported by the evidence, where a psychologist's report questioned
defendant's reasoning ability, a psychiatrist's report was ambiguous,
and where both experts cast doubt on defendant's grasp of reality.
Remanded for a retrospective hearing.
Hayes v. State,
343
So.2d 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
Having granted a hearing on defendant's fitness to
stand trial on new charges, the trial court should not have gone forward
with a probation revocation proceeding without conducting a hearing to
determine defendant's competency to participate in that proceeding.
Hill v. State,
369
A.2d 98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)
Under
state law, a defendant who alleges that he is incompetent is entitled to
a hearing on the issue as a matter of right. Thus, it was error for the
trial court to refuse to suspend the trial when defendant alleged his
incompetency at the close of the state's evidence.
People v. Salvaggio,
348 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976)
Trial
court erred in concluding that sentencing did not require the same level
of competency as conviction. Trial court should have ordered a
competency hearing, where defense counsel notified the court at the
start of the sentencing hearing that defendant was under medication and
might not be able to understand the proceedings and where defendant
understood only that he was there to go to court and could not remember
what sentence was called for by his plea agreement. Remanded for
resentencing.
People v. Chambers,
345 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976)
Trial
court should have sua sponte ordered
competency hearing, where court was aware that psychiatric reports made
in connection with civil commitment proceedings diagnosed defendant as
paranoid schizophrenic and recommended that he be committed, where
defendant's discharge from civil commitment was not an indication that
he met the standards for fitness to stand trial, where defendant's
mother testified to defendant's history of mental illness, where
defendant's courtroom outbursts and testimony reflected an inability to
understand the proceedings or assist counsel and where the trial court
ordered that defendant receive psychiatric treatment as part of his
sentence.
Williams v. State,
543
S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
Under
then-existing state law, trial court did not have discretion to deny a
timely motion for a separate jury trial on the issue of competency.
State v. Bauer,
245
N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1976)
It
was error for trial court to deny motion to suspend trial and hold a
competency hearing, where public defender notified the court several
times that he believed defendant to
be competent, where an experienced psychiatrist found defendant
incompetent and where an expert who had earlier found defendant
competent had also warned that he might regress.
State v.
Milam,
226 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va.
1976)
Trial
court should have granted
competency hearing, where one expert reported that defendant was
competent but substantially impaired in his ability to recall and
discuss both recent and past events and where a second psychiatrist
reported that defendant's rational processes were impaired and that he
could not assist counsel.
State v. Rodriquez,
558 P.2d 717 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976)
There
was insufficient evidence to support trial court's finding of
competency, where medical reports voiced substantial doubts about
defendant's competency and where trial court appeared to base its
finding not on record evidence but on its own observations of defendant
at a previous trial.
State v. Carroll,
543
S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
Under
state law, defendant was entitled to a competency hearing once he
challenged the results of a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation.
People v. Matheson,
245 N.W.2d 551 (Mich. 1976)
Although having earlier ruled, on the basis of a
psychiatric report, that defendant was competent, the trial judge should
have inquired further before accepting defendant's guilty plea, where
defendant's colloquy responses betrayed confusion, where the
circumstances of the offense were bizarre, and where the judge himself
expressed doubts about defendant's mental state and recommended that he
receive psychiatric treatment in prison.
COMPETENCY TO PROCEED IN
POST-CONVICTION
Laws v. Lamarque
351
F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003)
In a non-capital case, defendant was entitled to
further factual development or evidentiary hearing as to whether his
mental illness prevented him from timely filing petition for writ of
habeas corpus, warranting equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations
period.
Rohan v. Woodford
334
F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003)
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) incorporates a statutory
right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. "[W]here an
incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises claims [in a first federal
habeas petition] that could potentially benefit from his ability to
communicate rationally, refusing to stay proceedings pending restoration
of competence denies him his statutory right to assistance of counsel,
whether or not counsel can identify with precision the information
sought." Further proceedings are stayed pending restoration of
competence. Not addressed are the following issues: (1) what showing a
petitioner must make to warrant a competency determination; (2) what
weight to attach to a prior state competency determination; (3) whether
a petitioner must first "exhaust" by arguing incompetence to pursue
state collateral relief in the state courts; and (4) whether the
rational communication requirement in federal habeas proceedings is the
same as the standard for competence to stand trial.
Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the
Central District of California,
163 F.3d 530
(9th Cir. 1998)
Habeas petitioner's mental incompetence warranted
equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations (28 U.S.C.
2244(d)).
United States v. Avery
328 F.Supp.2d 1269 (M.D. Ala.
2004)
Defendant has a due process right to a hearing
before the conditions of his supervised release can be modified, as well
as the right to be competent for such a hearing. The Insanity Defense
Reform Act does not set out the procedure when a defendant's competency
is questioned regarding a supervised-release modification hearing, so
the court applies the pre-trial detainee procedures in determining that
the defendant is incompetent and setting out a hospitalization schedule.
The Court also strongly encourages the Bureau of Prisons to investigate
whether defendant's current mental state is the result of mistreatment
or neglect by prison officials.
People v. Dunkle
S014200 (Cal. July 24, 2002) (unpublished
order)
After
referee found death row inmate Jon Scott Dunkle presently incompetent,
the request by appellate/habeas counsel for appointment of a guardian ad
litem was granted by the state supreme court.
Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Watts
800 So.2d 225 (Fla.2001)
Defendant was found incompetent to proceed with his
post-conviction proceedings and judge ordered that he be confined at a
specific Department of Corrections (DOC) facility for treatment. DOC
filed an interlocutory appeal as to the specific confinement. The
Florida Supreme Court held that trial court acted properly in directing
that defendant remain at specified hospital, where he could continue to
receive the necessary treatment aimed at restoring him to competency to
allow the postconviction process to proceed.
Ferguson v. State,
789
So.2d 306 (Fla. 2001)
In a capital post-conviction
case, the court held that the rule of Carter v. State, 706 So.2d 873
(Fla. 1997), requiring a competency hearing in capital post-conviction
cases when there are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent, applies retroactively under state law retroactivity
analysis; although this was not the law at the time of Ferguson's first
post-conviction motion, trial court did hold a competency hearing at
that time and found Ferguson competent under the Dusky standard, so he
has received the benefit of Carter.
People v. Johnson,
730
N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. 2000)
In a
capital post-conviction case, the court held that when a bona fide doubt
about the defendant's fitness to proceed with post-conviction
proceedings is raised, the burden is on the state to prove defendant is
fit; a court may require a substantial threshhold showing of
incompetence to establish a bona fide doubt in post-conviction; a
post-conviction defendant is
incompetent when, because of a mental condition, defendant cannot communicate his allegations of
constitutional deprivations to counsel; vacated and remanded because
trial court misallocated burden of proof.
Ex parte Mines,
26
S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
No
right to be competent in state post-conviction.
Seals v. State,
1999
WL 2833 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 1999)(unpublished slip
opinion)
Due
process would not allow statute of limitations to bar consideration of
post-conviction petition of petitioner who was incompetent during
limitations period. Where petitioner alleged that he suffered from psychological and neurological
disorders that rendered him incompetent at the time of his conviction,
sentence, and throughout the limitations period, and petitioner
supported those allegations with "independent indicia of incompetence"
such as a history of treatment for the condition which he claimed
rendered him incompetent, he surpassed threshold for summary dismissal,
and was entitled to an opportunity to prove his claim of incompetence.
If he proved his incompetency, his petition would not be barred by
the statute of limitations.
Carter v. State,
706
So.2d 873 (Fla. 1997)
Petitioner is entitled to a competency determination
during post conviction proceedings. Until such time as the legislature
makes provisions for post conviction competency determinations,
courts should follow the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to raising and determining
competency at trial. The trial court must hold a competency hearing in a
post conviction proceeding where there is reasonable grounds to believe
that the capital defendant is incompetent and after the defendant shows
there are specific factual matters at issue that require the defendant
to competently consult with counsel.
FORCIBLE MEDICATION
UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
Sell v. United States
539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174
(2003)
A
pretrial order affirming a magistrate judge's order requiring a
defendant to receive medication involuntarily in order to render the
defendant competent to stand trial is immediately appealable as a
collateral order. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause permits the
Government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally
ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is (1)
medically appropriate; (2) substantially unlikely to have side effects
that may undermine the fairness of the trial; and (3) taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests. This standard permits
forced medication solely for trial competence purposes in certain rare
instances. If the defendant is not dangerous to himself or others, he
cannot be ordered to involuntarily take antipsychotic drugs solely to
render him competent to stand trial without consideration of other
factors.
Riggins v. Nevada
504 U.S. 127 (1992)
Capital conviction and death sentence reversed where
defendant was forced to take antipsychotic medication without the State
first establishing that the medication was necessary and medically
appropriate. Prejudice is found despite expert testimony presented at
trial that allowed jurors to assess defendant's demeanor fairly, since
there remained an unacceptable risk that forced medication compromised
his trial rights.
Washington v. Harper
494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028
(1990)
Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a seriously mentally ill
inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if he is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in his medical interest. Due
Process does not require a judicial hearing before such involuntary
treatment, and the state's administrative procedures, including
provision for review by administrative panel instead of a judicial
decision maker, comported with requirements of procedural due
process.
UNITED COURTS OF
APPEALS
United States v.
Rivera-Guerrero
377 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.
2004)
Where
the district court had upheld a magistrate's order authorizing
involuntary administration of medication to defendant for purpose of
making defendant competent to stand trial, the Ninth Circuit held that
such an order was not among the pretrial matters that could be fully
delegated to a magistrate judge, and that the district court's failure
to review the magistrate's order de novo required remand.
United States v.
Williams
356 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
2004)
Judge
required that the defendant take psychotropic medication as a condition
of his supervised release. The appeals court held that the judge erred
in failing to apply the "no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary" statutory standard in imposing the conditions of
supervised release, and that the judge abused its discretion in imposing
the mandatory medication condition without making findings on a
medically-informed record to support its decision.
United States v.
Weston
255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.
2001)
Defendant in federal death penalty prosecution who
suffers from paranoid schizophrenia could be forcibly medicated to
render him competent to stand trial, where: (1) the record supported the
district court's finding that treatment with antipsychotic medication
was medically appropriate (weighing benefits of drug against possible
side effects); (2) given the severity of the charges, the government had
an essential interest in adjudicating criminality; and (3) the
government established a sufficient likelihood that antipsychotic
medication would restore defendant's competence while preserving his
right to a fair trial, and that there were no less intrusive
alternatives.
United States v.
Brandon
158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir.
1998)
Non-violent pre-trial detainee was entitled to a
judicial hearing on the question of whether he could be forcibly
medicated in order to render him competent to stand trial. At the
hearing, the government must satisfy strict-scrutiny review and
demonstrate that its proposed approach is narrowly tailored to a
compelling interest.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS
Willis v. Cockrell
2004 WL 1812698 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2004)
(unpublished)
In Texas death penalty case, habeas relief
granted on several grounds, including claim of unconstitutional forcible
medication. The state court’s denial of relief where petitioner was
medicated with antipsychotic drugs without medical justification was
contrary to clearly established federal law. Further, the state court’s
determination that an objection is a necessary condition of
involuntariness is contrary to clearly established federal law regarding
waiver of constitutional rights, and there was no evidence that
petitioner or defense counsel knew of the existence or nature of the
medication.
United States v.
Barajas-Torres
2004 WL 1598914 (W.D. Tex. July
1, 2004) (unpublished)
In case involving a charge of illegal reentry
into the United States, a request that the schizophrenic defendant be
forcibly medicated to render him competent to stand trial was denied.
Although the other components of Sell were
satisfied, there was no important governmental interest at stake. Even
assuming arguendo illegal re-entry is a
"serious crime" for purposes of forcible medication, the length of
confinement indicates the government does not have an important interest
at stake.
Chapman v. Haney
2004 WL 936682 (D. Neb. Apr. 30, 2004)
(unpublished)
In a §1983 suit against prison officials with
several claims, including allegations of forced medication, the district
court held that under no circumstances may an inmate be involuntarily
medicated with psychotropic drugs unless the inmate has a serious mental
illness, is dangerous to himself or others, and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest. Although an inmate’s substantive interest in
avoiding involuntary medication under Harper
does not alter in an emergency situation, some of the procedural
protections of Harper may be overridden in
such a circumstance. In an emergency, an inmate is entitled to have the
decision to force medication upon him made by a qualified medical
professional who may order the medication only after concluding that the
inmate has a serious mental illness; the inmate is dangerous to himself
or others; the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest; the
inmate's mental illness has created an emergency; and less restrictive
alternatives to the forced administration of psychotropic drugs are
unavailable or would be ineffective. In this case, there was no
emergency and the inmate’s rights were violated. However, the prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of
their actions the emergency exception to Harper was not sufficiently clear for defendants
to know that they were violating the inmate’s rights.
United States v. Evans
293 F.Supp.2d 668 (W.D.Va.
2003)
In case involving a charge of forcibly
intimidating and interfering with an employee of United States while
engaged in performance of her official duties, a government motion to
have the defendant forcibly medicated to render him competent to stand
trial was denied. Although the crime with which defendant was charged
was a "serious offense" under Sell, there was
no important government interest at stake in pursuing the prosecution.
United States v. Miller
292 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.Maine
2003)
Where the government sought to involuntarily
medicate the defendant to render him competent to stand trial, the
district court held that the government did not show that the need to
involuntarily medicate the defendant was sufficiently important to
overcome defendant's due process-protected liberty interest in refusing
compelled medication. There was no showing that the treatment was
medically appropriate, no consideration of the risk of side effects to
this particular defendant, and no important governmental interest at
stake.
United States v. Kourey
276 F.Supp.2d 580 (S.D.W.Va.
2003)
Where the Bureau of Prisons requested
authorization to forcibly medicate a prisoner in light of Sell, the district court found that because the
prisoner was not being medicated to stand trial, Sell was inapplicable and the request was
instead governed by Harper. The Court denied
the Bureau’s request, finding that the Bureau’s decision had not been
made through the appropriate administrative due process procedures, and
the prisoner was not being held for the purpose of treatment but simply
to be evaluated.
United States v.
Santonio
2001 WL 670932 (D. Utah May 3, 2001)
(unpublished)
In a
non-capital case, the court denied the government's motion to forcibly
medicate Santonio in order to make him competent to stand trial; since
Santonio was not a danger to others nor "gravely disabled," the court
applied the strict scrutiny standard to the government's request.
United States v.
Sanchez-Hurtado
90 F.Supp.2d 1049 (S.D. Cal.
1999)
District Court sets out a three-prong test which the
Government must satisfy by clear and convincing evidence before
defendant may be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs: (1) the
government must demonstrate that administration of antipsychotic
medication is necessary to accomplish an essential state policy; (2) the
government must show that there is a sound medical basis for treatment
with antipsychotic medication; and (3) the government must establish
that there is no significant risk that the medication will impair or
alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to
react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel. In determining
whether the Government has established these three elements, the
District Court will: (1) consider defendant's interests at stake in this
decision; (2) weigh the interests of the Government in forcibly
medicating defendant with antipsychotic drugs; and (3) consider (a)
whether defendant is dangerous to himself or others, (b) the seriousness
of the crime, and (c) whether defendant will be released from
confinement if not made to stand trial. In addition, the District Court
may consider whether there are any less intrusive alternatives available
to enable defendant to attain the capacity for the trial to proceed.
Rickman v. Dutton
864 F.Supp. 686 (M.D.Tenn. 1994), aff'd on other
grounds 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997)
The
court vacates Rickman's capital conviction, in part because he "was
unconstitutionally administered medication which affected his demeanor
and ability to assist with his defense at trial." Id. at 717.
Notwithstanding the above statement, the court does not appear to take
issue with the finding of the state habeas court that Rickman was
competent despite having been administered the maximum allowable dosages
of soporific medications. Rather, the district court finds that the
state violated Rickman's procedural due process rights by involuntarily
administering medication without a showing that it was necessary to
accomplish an essential state policy. Id. at 713 (citing Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)).
STATE
COURTS
In re Mark W.
811 N.E.2d 767 (Ill.App.
2004)
Although the provision of the state Mental Health Code allowing
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to pretrial
detainees was not unconstitutional, the trial court here improperly
granted the State's request to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication to a pretrial detainee since it failed to address the factors
set forth in Sell.
In re Walker
856 A.2d 579 (D.C. 2004)
The involuntary administration of medication to a patient violated
the Commission on Mental Health Services (CMHS) policies and was not
authorized by law.
State v. Jacobs
802 A.2d 857 (Conn. App. 2002)
Where
incompetent defendant was appointed a health care guardian for purposes
of determining what was in his best medical interests, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying his appointed attorney's request
for a guardian ad litem to assist counsel in defending his legal
interests. Appellate court upholds trial court's decision to
involuntarily medicate defendant charged with the serious crimes of
assault on a police officer, interfering with a police officer and
carrying a dangerous weapon.
State v. Garcia
669 A.2d 573 (Conn. 1996)
Appellate review of a decision ordering forcible
medication uses clearly erroneous standard, at least as to factual
findings.
State v. Garcia
658 A.2d 947 (Conn. 1995)
In
order to forcibly medicate a defendant to render him competent to stand
trial, the government must prove by "clear and convincing" evidence
that: (1) to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, involuntary
medication of the defendant will render him competent to stand trial;
(2) an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be had using less
intrusive means; (3) the proposed treatment plan is narrowly tailored to
minimize intrusion on the defendant's liberty and privacy interest; (4)
the proposed drug regimen will not cause an unreasonable risk to the
defendant's health; and (5) the seriousness of the alleged crime is such
that the state's criminal law enforcement interest in fairly and
accurately determining the defendant's guilt or innocence overrides the
defendant's interest in self-determination.
UNSUCCESSFUL BUT INSTRUCTIVE
CASES
UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
Godinez v. Moran,
509
U.S. 389 (1993)
The
standard of competency for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel
is the same as the competency standard for standing trial.
Medina v. California,
505 U.S. 437 (1992)
A
state may constitutionally place the burden of proof upon the defendant
in a competency hearing.
Demosthenes v. Baal,
495 U.S. 731 (1990)
Federal habeas court may not overturn a state
court's determination that a prisoner is competent to waive his right to
pursue postconviction relief unless the determination is not fairly
supported by the record.
Maggio
v. Fulford,
462 U.S. 111
(1983)
A
state court's determination of competency is a factual matter and may
not be overturned by a federal habeas court unless the determination is
not fairly supported by the record.
UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS
Rogers
v. Gibson,
173 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir.
1999)
Claim
that state violated due process by requiring petitioner to prove his
incompetency by clear and convincing evidence (i.e., Cooper claim) was
construed as a procedural due process claim. Standard for reviewing a
claim that state court imposed an unconstitutional burden on a defendant
at a competency hearing is the same as standard applied to claim where
no competency hearing was conducted at all, i.e., whether there was a
bona fide doubt about competency. See also Walker v. Attorney General
for the State of Okl., 167 F.3d 1339 (10th Cir. 1999); West v. Gibson, 1999 WL 339702
(10th Cir, 1999)(slip op.)(same); Barnett
v. Hargett, 1999 WL 221513 (10th
Cir.)(same).
Harper
v. Parker,
177 F.3d 567 (6th Cir.
1999)
District court took the correct approach to
determination of habeas petitioner's competence to fire his
post-conviction counsel and dismiss his federal habeas corpus petition.
State-provided collateral counsel properly represented the petitioner
because, relying on Pate, once petitioner's competency was put in
question, he could not waive his right to have his competence
determined, and state-provided counsel were necessary to complete
judicial review of issue; district court properly held a preliminary
hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of
incompetency to require a full evidentiary hearing.
O'Rourke
v. Endell,
153 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998)
State
court's determination that habeas corpus petitioner was competent to
waive collateral review of conviction and death sentence (making it
impossible for him to exhaust his federal habeas claims) violated due
process and therefore was not entitled to presumption of correctness in
federal court. At state-court hearing on waiver the court appointed
counsel for petitioner but ordered counsel to argue that petitioner was
competent. "The [state] court's failure to appoint [counsel to argue
that petitioner was not competent] resulted in an evidentiary hearing on
O'Rourke's competence that failed to develop adequately all material
facts, that was neither full nor fair, and that did not afford O'Rourke
the process he was due."
Medina
v. Singletary,
59 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir.
1995)
Medina's claim that he had a procedural due process
right to a competency hearing was defaulted when he failed to raise it
on direct appeal. His substantive due process claim that he was in fact
incompetent while tried is not subject to procedural default, but Medina
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding of competency was
not fairly supported by the record.
Moran v.
Godinez,
57 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.
1995)
Violation of due process not to hold competency
hearing in connection with a change of plea, where court was aware that
defendant was on medication, had attempted suicide three months earlier,
and wanted to fire his attorneys, plead guilty to three counts of
capital murder, and die. The violation was cured by a state
postconviction hearing conducted three years after the entry of the
plea.
Weekley v. Jones,
56 F.3d 889
(8th Cir. 1995) (dictum)
In
dictum, the author of the opinion argues that the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception will have to be broadened beyond
"actual innocence" in the context of competency claims: "[T]he author
... envisions a case where failure to review a competency claim will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, even though the
petitioner in fact committed the crime." Id. at 895 n.4.
Bolius
v. Wainwright,
597 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1979)
In a
retrospective competency hearing, the testimony of trial counsel and the
prosecutor should be discounted. They would place themselves in an
ethical dilemma if they admitted that they allowed defendant to plead
guilty though they doubted his competency. Consequently, their testimony
that they believed defendant to be competent should not be given much
weight.