Incompetency To Stand Trial
Summaries of
Successful Cases
Updated October 2004
SUCCESSFUL
CASES
UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348 (1996)
Oklahoma's statute requiring criminal defendants to prove
their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence imposes a significant risk
that defendants who have already demonstrated that they are more-likely-than-not
incompetent will be erroneously found competent and thus violates due process.
Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975)
The trial court violated Drope's due process rights when
it failed to suspend his trial for a competency hearing in the face of
accumulating evidence of incompetency, including an attack on his wife and a
suicide attempt. A nunc pro tunc, or retrospective, determination of
competence, which is difficult under the best of circumstances, would not be
adequate in this case inasmuch as Drope was absent during a critical stage of
his trial and thus was not observed by the court or counsel.
Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966)
The trial court's failure to grant a competency hearing
deprived Robinson of his right to a fair trial, where there was uncontradicted
testimony of his history of irrational behavior, defense experts testified that
he was insane and the only evidence supporting his competency was Robinson's
demeanor at trial and the stipulated testimony of a state expert who did not
make a determination as to Robinson's sanity. A retrospective determination of
competency would be too difficult because (1) the jury would not be able to
observe the subject of their inquiry, (2) the testimony of experts would have to
be based solely on information in the printed record and (3) six years had
passed since the trial.
Westbrook v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam)
Although defendant received hearing on the issue of his
competence to stand trial, he was entitled to hearing or inquiry into issue of
his competence to waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel and to
proceed to conduct his own defense. Remand to Arizona Supreme Court to determine
if the trial court fulfilled its "protecting duty" to the defendant. But
see Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993), which denies that
there are separate standards of competency to stand trial and to waive counsel,
and interprets Westbrook as holding that the trial court failed to
determine if defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.
Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960)
The information on the record was insufficient to support
a finding of competency. The District Court erred in limiting its inquiry to
whether the defendant is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of
events. The proper "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding --
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." A retrospective hearing would have been difficult
because of the "doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance of
the psychiatric testimony."
UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
United States v. Howard
381 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2004)
Where it was undisputed that at the time of his guilty plea
petitioner was taking powerful narcotic drugs that could have dulled his
mental faculties, and petitioner had alleged specific, credible facts in
support of claim that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing him
while incompetent to acquiesce in a plea agreement he had seen for the
first time just before he agreed to plead guilty, petitioner was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim.
Lounsbury v. Thompson
374 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2004)
Petitioner’s substantive incompetency claim was properly exhausted
even though his petition for review to the Oregon Supreme Court raised a
procedural argument that the lower court applied an incorrect burden of
proof. "Lounsbury worded his petition for review as a procedural
challenge, but the clear implication of his claim was that by following
a constitutionally defective procedure, the state court erred in finding
him competent. Where the substantive and procedural claims are as
intertwined as they are here, we hold that Lounsbury made a fair
presentation to the state courts of his claim that he was not competent
to stand trial." The case is remanded to the district court for merits
consideration of the substantive incompetency claim.
United States v. Jones
336 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003)
In case involving unlawful weapons possession and witness tampering
charges, the case is remanded to determine whether defendant was
competent at the time of sentencing. At the initial sentencing hearing
defendant became upset, struck his counsel, and requested to withdraw
his plea. The court appointed substitute counsel and denied the motion
to withdraw the plea. At a subsequent hearing on pro se pleadings the
Government informed the court that defendant was being administered
psychiatric medications and requested a competency hearing prior to
sentencing. The court requested an evaluation of defendant which was
referenced during sentencing, but there was never a competency hearing.
In remanding for further proceedings, the appeals court references
several indicators of incompetency, including defendant’s violent
courtroom behavior and noncompliance with medication.
Brown v. Sternes
304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002)
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate non-capital defendant's mental illness and in permitting the court appointed experts to evaluate defendant with inadequate data. Prejudice is shown, in part, because the medical records counsel neglected to obtain showed defendant suffered from chronic schizophrenia and raised a "bona fide doubt" regarding his competence.
Matheny v. Anderson
253 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2001)
Indiana death row inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on (1) whether he was competent to stand trial, (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an initial request for a competency hearing, and (3) whether the state court was obligated to hold a competency hearing sua sponte; since the failure to develop the facts in state court was not attributable to petitioner, the court evaluated the request for an evidentiary hearing under pre-AEDPA standards.
Appel v. Horn
250 F.3d 203 (3rd
Cir. 2001)
Capital defendant was constructively denied counsel where appointed counsel failed to take any steps to investigate their client's competency prior to the competency hearing ordered by the trial court at which time defendant's waiver of counsel was accepted.
Johnson v. Norton,
249 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2001)
In a non-capital case, the court analyzed a Pate
claim under AEDPA standards; the trial judge should have held a competency
hearing sua sponte where Petitioner was hit on the head shortly before
trial and became unconscious a few hours after trial began, raising a question
of his competency during jury selection.
McGregor v. Gibson,
248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
In capital 2254 proceeding, the court addressed the
question "when may a defendant found competent to stand trial under an
unconstitutional 'clear and convincing evidence' burden of proof and then
convicted succeed in habeas on a procedural competency claim?"; since
Petitioner's competency at trial was assessed under the standard found
unconstitutional in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), the court
reviews the trial as if no competency hearing was held at all; a procedural
competency claim such as that raised by Petitioner is held to a lower burden of
proof than a substantive competency claim; the court holds that in order to
succeed on a procedural competency claim after a trial in which a petitioner was
found competent under an unconstitutional burden of proof, the petitioner must
establish that a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his
competence at the time of trial; a petitioner establishes a bona fide doubt by
showing a reasonable judge should have doubted whether the petitioner met the Dusky
standard; the claim is assessed under a totality of the circumstances approach;
in this case, the trial court should have had such a doubt; the court also
concluded that a retrospective competency determination could not be made and
therefore ordered Petitioner's conviction vacated.
Odle v. Woodford,
238 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2001)
In capital 2254 proceeding, court held that state trial
court should have conducted a competency hearing because the information before
the judge about Petitioner's extensive mental impairments, including the fact
that he was missing a piece of his brain the size of a grapefruit, raised a bona
fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; the court also found the record
sufficient for the state court to conduct a retrospective competency
determination; case remanded to district court with directions to grant the writ
unless the state trial court conducts a hearing within 60 days to determine
Petitioner's competency at the time of trial.
United States v. Giron-Reyes,
234 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000)
In non-capital case, court found district court's failure
to hold competency hearing violated due process as well as the competency
procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241; district court initially found
Appellant incompetent and ordered him hospitalized; the hospital later certified
his competency; with no motion for a second competency hearing, Appellant pled
guilty; the court held that section 4241 required a second competency hearing
when there had been an initial finding of incompetence, even when Appellant had
not requested the hearing; the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a
determination of Appellant's competency to plead guilty; if retrospective
determination cannot be made, district court should assess Appellant's present
competency and if it finds him competent, allow him to replead.
Torres v. Prunty,
223 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000)
In non-capital 2254 proceeding, the state appealed the
district court's finding of a Pate violation; the court analyzed the
claim under AEDPA standards, finding the state courts' rejection of the claim
was an "unreasonable determination of the facts" under 2254(d)(2); the
court equated the "unreasonable determination" provision to the
"clearly erroneous" standard; the information before the trial court
raised a bona fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; writ granted.
Barnett v. Hargett,
174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999)
Pro se federal habeas petitioner's claim that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on rehearing a claim that the
record was insufficient to support a finding that a competency hearing had
occurred prior to sentencing, was construed by the federal courts as a claim
that the state had violated petitioner's right to procedural due process by not
conducting a competency hearing in accordance with the proper, post-Cooper
v. Oklahoma, legal standard. Federal courts would not afford presumption of
correctness to state-court determinations of competency where the state court
applied the wrong, pre-Cooper, legal standard. The court treated
petitioner's Cooper claim as analogous to a case where no competency
hearing had occurred at all. Thus, petitioner was entitled to relief because his
history of psychiatric problems, including being found incompetent to stand
trial twice in this case, raised a bona fide doubt about his competency.
United States v. Klat,
156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998)
Once the district court had found reasonable cause to
believe defendant was incompetent to stand trial, it could not allow defendant
to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se at a hearing to determine her
competency. Relying on Pate, court held that a defendant whose
competency was reasonably in question could not have knowingly and voluntarily
waived right to counsel. Remedy was remand for hearing to determine whether
competency hearing "could have come out differently" if defendant had
been represented by counsel. If so, reversal was required because error would
have contaminated the entire criminal proceeding.
Trotter v. Bunnell,
163 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 1998)(unreported opinion)
Federal habeas corpus petitioner was arguably entitled to
evidentiary hearing on claim that he was incompetent at time of guilty plea.
Petitioner presented report of mental health expert indicating he had low IQ and
an inability to apply information, and that his use of language could lead
someone to erroneous impression that petitioner has greater understanding than
he actually possessed. District court was correct that the latter finding by
petitioner's expert defeated petitioner's procedural due process claim because
it indicated the trial court would not have had grounds for doubting
petitioner's competency at time of the plea. But district court erred in
concluding that the expert's evidence was not relevant to petitioner's
substantive due process claim that petitioner was in fact incompetent to enter
plea.
United States v. Heywood,
155 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1998)
Defendant's procedural due process rights were violated
when district court failed to conduct a hearing on defendant's competency after
receiving report that defendant, who had been found incompetent, had been
rendered competent through "substantial doses of antipsychotic
medication" that had to be continued. Due process requires a
"record-based judicial determination of competence in every case in which
there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to stand trial."
Remanded for hearing to determine whether a (disfavored) retrospective
competency determination was possible. If no such determination was possible, or
a retrospective determination indicated defendant was not competent, defendant
would be entitled to a new trial.
United States v. Loyola-Dominguez,
125 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997)
Defendant's due process rights violated by failure of
district court to grant a competency hearing following defendant's attempted
suicide in a jail cell on the eve of trial. The timing of the suicide attempt,
and defendant's desire to "get out of here" as his sole objective,
raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competence that required a hearing.
United States v. Williams,
113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997)
Williams' courtroom behavior and other evidence created a bona
fide doubt about Williams' competency to stand trial and should have moved
the trial court to order a competency hearing. Williams often interrupted the
proceedings, speaking rapidly and "hysterically," urged one of her
several attorneys (having fired or caused many to withdraw) to behave improperly
(such as to ask cross-examination questions while the prosecutor was still
conducting direct examination), testified nonresponsively, cried in front of the
jury and informed the court on the second day of trial that she had not taken
the medication she required for depression. The trial court's error was not
cured when he ordered a post-verdict psychological evaluation at the urging of
Williams' fourth attorney. The evaluator's finding that she was competent to
participate in sentencing does not inspire confidence that she was actually
competent during her trial. The Circuit Court vacates the conviction and directs
the District Court to conduct a hearing into Williams' competency to stand
trial.
Sena v. New Mexico State Prison,
109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997)
Applying pre-AEDPA standards, the Circuit Court concludes
that the District Court improperly afforded the state court's competency finding
a presumption of correctness. The state court's initial judgment that Sena was
incompetent gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetence.
That presumption was not overcome when the state court later ruled Sena
competent without a hearing, relying solely on a hospital report claiming he had
improved but also warning that he required continued treatment. The District
Court also erred in holding that Sena's claim was procedurally barred when he
failed to appeal the trial court's competency determination to the state's
highest court. Procedural bars apply to competency claims that implicate
procedural due process, as when an defendant complains that he did not receive a
competency hearing to which he is entitled. Such bars do not apply to the type
of substantive due process claim raised by Sena, who complains that he was
allowed to enter a guilty plea while incompetent in fact. Remanded for a
competency hearing by the District Court.
Webb v. Evans,
1997 WL 207514 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished)
Webb's
failure to raise on direct appeal the claim that he was incompetent at the time
he entered his guilty plea does not bar him from raising the issue in federal
habeas since he is claiming a violation of substantive due process. Since the
state court's docket does not clearly indicate what proceedings took place, the
federal district court's first order of business on remand will be to determine
if the state court ever made a formal finding of incompetency, as claimed by the
state, giving rise to a presumption of continued incompetency. If so, then
Webb's guilty plea should not have been accepted without a full-blown competency
hearing.
Williamson v. Ward,
110 F.3d 1508
(10th Cir. 1997)
The
evidence of which Williamson's counsel was aware triggered a duty to investigate
Williamson's competency to stand trial and to move for a competency hearing.
Counsel knew that Williamson had a long history of mental problems (including
diagnoses of severe bipolar disorder and paranoid and borderline personality
disorders), that Williamson was being medicated, and perhaps overmedicated, for
mental disorders, that Williamson behaved bizarrely in jail and in the courtroom
(such as by tipping over counsel table), that Williamson had been found
incompetent in connection with an earlier criminal charge, and that he was
awarded disability benefits on the basis of his mental condition. Had counsel
conducted an investigation he would have uncovered a wealth of additional
information casting doubt on Williamson's competence. For instance, he would
have learned that the psychiatrist who opined that Williamson was competent was
himself severely mentally disordered. There is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's ineffectiveness, Williamson would have been found incompetent.
Miles v. Stainer,
108 F.3d 1109
(8th Cir. 1997)
Miles was
found incompetent to stand trial shortly after his arrest. The trial court
eventually ruled him competent after a year-and-a-half of conflicting
psychiatric findings. After entering a not guilty plea, Miles was again examined
by three psychiatrists who eventually found him competent after initial doubt,
but who warned that Miles' competency fluctuated since he did not consistently
take his antipsychotic medication. Before allowing Miles to change his plea to
guilty, the trial court held a second hearing. This hearing was not adequate
because the trial court failed to inquire whether Miles was still taking his
medication (in fact, he had stopped taking it some two weeks before). The
Circuit Court instructs the District Court to grant the writ unless the state
trial court conducts a retrospective competency hearing within 60 days.
Reynolds v. Norris,
86 F.3d 796
(8th Cir. 1996)
Although
defendant had been found competent during two pretrial hearings, the trial court
should have conducted a third hearing, knowing that: (1) expert opinion had been
closely divided at the second hearing, (2) defendant's trial testimony was
meandering and irrational, (3) defendant had not been taking his medication, (4)
defense expert testified that defendant was significantly impaired and (5)
expert who testified at trial that defendant was competent had not examined
defendant in some time. It was premature of the federal district court, however,
to grant the writ of habeas corpus without first conducting a nunc pro tunc hearing.
United States v. Mason,
52 F.3d
1286 (4th Cir. 1995)
The
District Court should have granted a retrospective competency hearing after the
defendant attempted to commit suicide following his conviction on federal drug
charges. It was an error under federal law to require Mason to show more than
"reasonable cause" for a competency hearing.
United States v. Soldevila-Lopez,
17 F.3d 480 (1st Cir. 1994)
District
Court abused its discretion by denying motion for continuance of competency
hearing to allow defendant to prepare response to new and unexpected diagnosis
of malingering. Remanded for a full competency hearing.
Blazak v. Ricketts,
1 F.3d 891 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1866 (1994)
Due process
was violated when the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing where
the defendant was found incompetent on three separate occasions in unrelated
matters and engaged in bizarre conduct in pretrial hearings. (The grant of
relief by the District Court was allowed to stand because two members of the
panel disagreed on the merits and the third declined to reach the merits.)
Spitzweiser-Wittgenstein v. Newton,
978 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1992)
The
District Court erred in giving the state court finding of competency a
presumption of correctness because the state court failed to adequately develop
the facts. The trial court failed to address the defendant's pro se motion to withdraw her plea, to which was
attached an expert's affidavit reinstating his earlier opinion that the
defendant was incompetent.
James v. Singletary,
957 F.2d 1562
(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 262 (1993)
Defendant
who presented clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial and
legitimate doubt as to his competence at the time of his trial was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. No state court had ever made a determination of
competency, and defendant presented the conclusion of an expert that defendant
would have been found lacking in several areas of competency. A defendant
alleging a substantive due process violation (incompetence in fact), rather than
a procedural due process violation (failure of the state court to hold a
required competency hearing) is not barred by his failure to raise his claim at
trial or on direct appeal.
Nicks v. United States,
955 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1992)
Determination that the trial court improperly denied a
competency hearing must be based solely on the evidence available to the trial
court at the time of the denial. Remand for clarification whether the District
Court's grant of relief relied on evidence not available to the trial court.
United States v. Hoskie,
950 F.2d
1388 (9th Cir. 1991)
Government
did not meet burden of demonstrating competence by a preponderance of the
evidence where defendant had verbal IQ of approximately 62, where defense expert
testified that defendant was incompetent, where government's expert focused too
narrowly on competency in basic skills of daily life, and where the court itself
expressed frequent doubts about defendant's competence and appeared motivated to
find competency out of a fear that the defendant would be a danger to the
community if released.
United States v. Day,
949 F.2d 973
(8th Cir. 1991)
District
Court erred in holding that defendant could not preclude the use of prior guilty
pleas as sentence enhancers unless he could prove that he was incompetent when
he made the pleas; defendant need only show that the courts that accepted the
pleas were aware of evidence warranting competency hearings but failed to
conduct them.
Lafferty v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992)
State trial
court erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial; although defendant
had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him, there was
substantial testimony that he lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings
because of his paranoid delusional system. The passage of six years made a
retrospective hearing impractical.
Griffin v. Lockhart,
935 F.2d 926
(8th Cir. 1991)
The state
trial court did not conduct a full, fair and adequate hearing as to defendant's
competency when there were no witnesses, questioning of the defendant was
limited and the only evidence was a one-paragraph letter from a state mental
health facility stating that further evaluation was needed. The passage of three
years made a meaningful retrospective hearing impossible.
Hull v. Freeman,
932 F.2d 159 (3d
Cir. 1991)
State trial
counsel exhibited deficient performance at a competency hearing when he failed
to bring to the factfinder's attention the fact that two colleagues of the
state's expert disagreed with his conclusion that the defendant was fit to stand
trial. Remand for clarification of the District Court's findings as to
prejudice.
Cowley v. Stricklin,
929 F.2d 640
(11th Cir. 1991)
Where trial
court was aware of defendant's extensive history of psychiatric commitments and
where the state's expert made only a cursory examination before declaring
defendant competent, it was a due process violation for the trial court to
refuse to appoint a defense mental health expert to assist in establishing
defendant's incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense.
Tiller v. Esposito,
911 F.2d 575
(11th Cir. 1990)
Trial court
violated due process when it accepted defendant's guilty plea without conducting
a competency hearing, where trial court was aware of the history of mental
illness of defendant and his family, uncontroverted psychiatric reports
indicated that defendant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was
incompetent, defendant inquired whether he would receive psychiatric treatment
if he pled guilty, and judge wrote letter to Department of Corrections
expressing concern regarding defendant's competency. Remand for a determination
whether a meaningful nunc pro tunc hearing could
be held.
Card v. Dugger,
911 F.2d 1494 (11th
Cir. 1990)
Petitioner
claimed that both his procedural due process right to a competency hearing and
his substantive due process right not to be tried while incompetent in fact were
violated. In ruling on these claims, the district court alluded only to the
facts regarding defendant's competency that were available to the state trial
court. While this is appropriate for a procedural due process claim, disposition
of the substantive due process claim requires examination of all the evidence
regarding competence, whether it was available to the state trial court or not.
In order to ensure that the district did in fact consider this additional
evidence, the reviewing court remanded to allow the district court to set forth
its reasons for failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Bouchillon v. Collins,
907 F.2d 589
(5th Cir. 1990)
It was not
clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that petitioner met his
burden of proving his incompetence in fact by a preponderance of the evidence,
where petitioner was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, his periods
of diminished capacity would not necessarily be obvious to the layman, and
psychiatrist testified in habeas proceedings that petitioner was probably
incompetent at the time of his guilty plea.
United States v. Hemsi,
901 F.2d
293 (2d Cir. 1990)
Trial court
properly found defendant incompetent (over defendant's objection), based on
expert testimony that while defendant had an intellectual understanding of the
proceedings, his mental illness prevented him from rationally acting on that
understanding and based on defendant's courtroom behavior, including frequent
outbursts and the blowing of kisses at the prosecuting attorney. Note: strictly
speaking this is not a successful case, since the defendant sought to have the
finding of incompetency overturned.
United States v. Auen,
846 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1988)
District Court erred in not making findings as to
defendant's competency to stand trial, were defendant exhibited bizarre
behavior and beliefs, including claim that compliance with tax laws was
voluntary and claim that his detention was an outlaw act. On remand,
District Court is to determine if a meaningful nunc pro tunc competency hearing is possible
and to hold such a hearing, if possible.
Estock v. Lane,
842
F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
The
state habeas court's finding of competency, although ordinarily entitled
to a presumption of correctness, was not fairly supported by the record,
where petitioner's pleadings created a bona
fide doubt as to competency and where the state habeas court (1)
failed to conduct a hearing, (2) was not the same judge that accepted
petitioner's plea and thus had no opportunity to observe petitioner, and
(3) falsely assumed that petitioner's trial attorney was aware of all
evidence relevant to competency. At a retrospective hearing, the federal
district court properly concluded that petitioner had not been competent
at his plea hearing, in that petitioner had been diagnosed as "paranoid
personality, borderline on psychotic," petitioner's answers during his
plea colloquy did not indicate understanding, and petitioner had
attempted suicide six days prior to his guilty plea.
Agan v. Dugger,
835
F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987)
State
trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to hold
a competency hearing, where a bona fide
doubt as to competency was raised by the facts presented to the trail
court, including petitioner's long history of mental illness and
commitments and his bizarre and self-defeating testimony before the
grand jury and during the sentencing hearing. Remand for retrospective
competency hearing.
United States v. Renfroe,
825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987)
District Court erred in not granting hearing on
question of defendant's competency to stand trial and to be sentenced
when, during the course of the sentencing hearing, evidence was
presented that defendant suffered a 16-year addiction to cocaine that,
in the opinion of experts, interfered with his ability to cooperate with
his attorney and defendant's attorney testified that defendant forbade
him from using drug abuse as a defense during trial. Remanded for
District Court to determine if a meaningful nunc
pro tunc hearing was still possible. (For disposition on remand,
see United States v. Renfroe, 745 F.Supp.
203 (D.Del. 1990)).
United States v. Hutson,
821 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1987)
Second competency hearing should have been held
after treating psychiatrist reported that defendant, who was earlier
adjudged incompetent and committed for evaluation, was competent to
stand trial, but failure to do so only required remand for determination
as to whether meaningful retrospective competency hearing could be held,
rather than reversal; defendant's substantive rights were affected only
if she was actually incompetent at time of trial. A retrospective
determination is meaningful if the quantity and quality of available
evidence is such that a competency hearing can be labeled as more than
mere speculation.
Bundy v. Dugger,
816
F.2d 564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870
(1987)
District Court's finding that petitioner was not
entitled to an competency hearing was clearly erroneous where the
District Court (1) relied on a finding of competency in a separate state
proceeding without reviewing the record of that proceeding for adequacy,
(2) placed undue emphasis on trial counsel's failure to request a
competency hearing, (3) erred in finding that petitioner had waived his
claim by failing to present it earlier, and (4) ignored strong indicia
of incompetence, including petitioner's rejection of a plea agreement,
the uncontroverted testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner
lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings, and petitioner's
decision to perform a mock wedding ceremony in lieu of presenting
mitigating evidence. Remanded for a competency hearing by the District
Court. (For disposition on remand, see 675 F.Supp. 622 (M.D. Fla.
1987)).
United States v. Cole,
813 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1987)
It
was error for the District Court not to inquire into defendant's
competency when it learned during the course of a plea colloquy that
defendant had taken illegal drugs the night before. The District Court's
failure to develop the record made a retrospective hearing
impossible.
Sturgis v. Goldsmith,
796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1986)
Petitioner had a constitutional right to be present
at his competency hearing, a critical stage of his trial. Remanded to
federal district court for harmless error analysis.
Felde v. Blackburn,
795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986)
After
the jury rejected his insanity defense, petitioner instructed his
attorney to seek the death penalty. The state habeas court and the
federal district court rejected petitioner's claim that his attorney was
ineffective for carrying out his wishes. The circuit court recast the
issue as one of whether petitioner was competent to instruct his
attorney in this manner, effectively waiving his right to counsel.
Remanded to district court for determination whether the trial court's
finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial was adequately
supported by the record and whether petitioner was still competent at
the time he waived counsel.
United States ex rel. SEC v. Billingsley,
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985)
District Court improperly placed the burden on the
defendant to prove his incompetence. Since lay and expert testimony on
defendant's competence was closely divided, there is a reasonable
possibility that defendant would have been found unfit under a proper
allocation of the burden of proof. Remanded for the District Court to
determine if a meaningful retrospective hearing is possible and, if so,
to hold such a hearing. Note: the Court appears to base its holding on
the view, later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992),
that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the
defendant.
Silverstein v. Henderson,
706 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1983)
In
view of undisputed facts that petitioner had IQ of 74 and mental age of
seven-year-old, had long institutional history and that two
court-appointed psychiatrists found petitioner incompetent, failure to
order competency hearing sua sponte
violated right to fair trial, even though third psychiatrist found
petitioner competent based on a brief evaluation. When a trial court
neglects its duty to conduct a hearing on competence, the defendant's
failure to object or take appeal on the issue will not bar collateral
attack. A retrospective hearing would be inadequate given the passage of
almost six years.
Speedy v. Wyrick,
702
F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1983)
The
federal district court erred in rejecting, without a hearing,
petitioner's claim that he was incompetent during trial. Before trial,
two experts opined that petitioner was competent, but a third expert
gave trial testimony indicating he had some doubt about defendant's
competency. Nonetheless the trial court failed to conduct a competency
hearing. The rejection of petitioner's claim by state courts was not
entitled to a presumption of correctness, inasmuch as the state courts
did not conduct a complete review of the record on direct appeal and did
not supplement the record with relevant evidence in post-conviction
proceedings. Remanded to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing.
United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen,
686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 873 (1986)
State
statute placing the burden on the defendant to prove incompetence is
unconstitutional. The misallocation of the burden was not harmless error
since competency was a close question: two experts found defendant unfit
to stand trial, one found defendant fit but would present "difficulties
for defense lawyer," and another found him fit. Remand for determination
whether a retrospective hearing would be meaningful. Note: In Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional to place the
burden of proof on the defendant in a competency proceeding.
Acosta v. Turner,
666
F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1980)
State
trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to make
a competency determination, where petitioner had history of serious
mental illness, where there is no evidence that petitioner received
necessary treatment during the four months between his hospital
discharge and trial, where trial court entertained doubts about
competency, and where psychiatrists appointed after trial found
petitioner incompetent to be sentenced. In the alternative, where trial
court agreed that he would vacate the guilty plea if a specified expert
made a finding that petitioner was incompetent, petitioner was entitled
to have this bargain enforced. Remanded for a determination of whether
the specified expert ever made a finding. If petitioner is not entitled
to relief based on his bargain with the court, then District Court is to
determine whether a retrospective competency hearing is possible.
Pride v. Estelle,
649
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1981)
Petitioner was entitled to a federal hearing on his
claim that he was incompetent during his trial, where (1) one expert
testified at his competency hearing that he was mentally retarded,
paranoid schizophrenic and incompetent, (2) a second expert's finding of
competency was based on a brief examination done for another purpose
some three years previous to trial, (3) petitioner was transferred from
prison to a mental hospital following his trial, and (4) petitioner's
claim was rejected without a hearing or a written opinion by the state
courts. Remanded to district court.
Pate v. Smith,
637
F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1981)
Petitioner was entitled to a competency hearing once
the state trial court entertained doubts about his competency. In
resolving his doubts by consulting a report that was not part of the
record and by reflecting on his own experience with petitioner in
previous proceedings, the trial judge deprived petitioner of the
opportunity to introduce evidence, conduct cross-examination, and create
a record. Remanded to state court for a determination whether a
retrospective hearing would be feasible.
Lokos v. Capps,
625
F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980)
Petitioner's procedural due process rights were
violated when the state trial court failed to inquire into his
competency, where the only evidence of competency was the testimony of
peace officers and a medical doctor who considered petitioner sane and
where the trial court improperly refused to consider (as hearsay) the
substantial evidence of incompetency contained in the records of one of
petitioner's hospitalizations. Petitioner's substantive due process
rights were violated when the federal habeas court ruled that petitioner
was in fact competent at the time of his trial, where the expert with
the greatest knowledge of petitioner was confident he had been
incompetent, a second expert opined that petitioner was in a state of
severe psychosis during his trial, and a third expert stated that he
lacked sufficient evidence to make a determination.
Osborne v. Thompson,
610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1979)
State
trial court should have granted a competency hearing or allowed
defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas, where an expert found defendant
to be only marginally competent prior to the plea colloquy and where the
trial court found defendant to be incompetent to be sentenced a few
months later.
Van Poyck v. Wainwright,
595 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1979)
District Court erred in holding that petitioner had
failed to exhaust his substantive due process claim that he was
convicted while incompetent in fact. Petitioner presented sufficient
facts to raise a real, legitimate and substantial issue as to his mental
capacity, inasmuch as during the period of his guilty pleas he tried to
hang himself and set fire to his mattress and psychiatric tests showed
him to be incompetent. (Petitioner's procedural due process claim that
he was improperly denied a competency hearing was rejected because the
trial court was not aware of these facts.) Remanded for a competency
hearing.
Zapata v. Estelle,
588
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1979)
Petitioner presented sufficient facts to create a
real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to her competency in fact,
where her personal physician testified at trial that she suffered from
severe emotional problems and a mental health expert who examined her a
few days after trial found her to be legally insane. Remanded for
competency hearing.
Martin v. Estelle,
583
F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978)
District Court's finding, following a retrospective
hearing, that it could not make a determination of petitioner's
competency at the time of his trial could not be relied upon inasmuch as
the District Court failed to make an initial determination as to whether
a retrospective hearing would be meaningful and improperly placed the
burden of proof on the state. The test of meaningfulness is whether the
evidence is adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labeled as
more than mere speculation; contemporaneous expert and lay testimony, as
well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, can provide sound
material for a reconstruction of mental state. Remanded for a finding as
to meaningfulness and, if warranted, a competency hearing at which the
burden of proof is put upon the petitioner.
United States v. Ives,
574 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978)
Petitioner's due process rights were violated when
trial court refused to consider evidence proffered by the defense (the
testimony of two psychiatrists and a U.S. Marshall) indicating a change
in petitioner's competence, where previously there had been four
alternating determinations of competency and incompetency within the
space of a year, petitioner's first trial had ended in a mistrial upon a
finding of incompetency, and five months had elapsed since he was last
found competent by government experts. A retrospective hearing would not
be possible because of the passage of six years, because the judges in
both previous trials were dead, and because there were no psychiatric
reports on petitioner's competence at the time of his second trial.
Suggs v. LaVallee,
570
F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)
A
state trial judge ordered a competency evaluation when petitioner made
unusual remarks immediately following the court's acceptance of his
guilty plea. After petitioner had been restored to competency, a second
trial judge sentenced petitioner without considering whether he had been
competent to enter a guilty plea, even though petitioner told the court
that he had not understood the earlier
proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court properly concluded
that petitioner had been incompetent at the time of his guilty plea,
based on the finding of incompetency immediately after the plea,
evidence of bizarre behavior on petitioner's part around the time of the
plea, and the exhaustive investigation by an expert who testified that
petitioner was probably psychotic. The district court was justified in
rejecting the finding of a state postconviction court because several
facts were not adequately developed at the state hearing.
United States v. Hollis,
569 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1977)
The
federal habeas court's error in placing the burden on petitioner to
prove his incompetence at the time of his trial was not harmless in that
the evidence as to competency was closely divided. The fundamental
nature of the right not to be tried while incompetent makes it
inappropriate to place the burden on the petitioner, even in
post-conviction proceedings. Remanded for a competency hearing at which
the burden will be properly allocated. Note: this holding might not
survive the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medina v. California 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992) that
it is not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant
in a competency proceeding.
United States v. Nichelson,
550 F.2d 502 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 998 (1977)
District Court must grant an 18 U.S.C. § 4244
motion for a psychiatric examination unless the motion is frivolous or
made in bad faith. Defense counsel satisfied that standard by citing his
own observations of defendant's difficulties in discussing the facts of
the case, the history of mental disturbance in defendant's family, and
the head injury that defendant had sustained some six years before.
Remanded for competency hearing.
Martin v. Estelle,
546 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1977)
Petitioner was not given a full and fair competency
hearing (before a jury), where the prosecutor continually introduced
highly inflammatory material relevant only to guilt and warned that
petitioner would go free if found incompetent and where the distinction
between incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense was not
observed during the competency hearing.
United States v. Masthers,
539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
District court erred in failing to hold a hearing
on federal defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where the
prosecutor agreed with defense counsel that defendant may not have given
his confession knowingly and intelligently and where the presentence
report stressed defendant's extremely low intelligence and lack of any
concept of time. Remanded for a
hearing.
Bruce v. Estelle,
536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976)
It
was clearly erroneous for the federal district court, at a nunc pro tunc hearing, to credit the testimony
of a psychiatrist (Dr. Grigson) who diagnosed petitioner as a sociopath
and a malingerer, where the diagnosis made by the other psychiatrist at
the hearing -- chronic schizophrenia so severe as to have rendered
petitioner incompetent -- was supported by the great weight of the
evidence, including petitioner's medical discharge from the Marines and
his commitments to psychiatric facilities for treatment of
schizophrenia.
Saddler v. United States,
531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam)
When evidence of defendant's extensive history of
mental illness, including a hospitalization following a suicide attempt,
became known to the trial court prior to sentencing, it was error for
the trial court not to have ordered an evaluation of defendant's
competency to be sentenced and a retrospective evaluation of his
competence to have pled guilty.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS
United States v. Mooney,
123 F.Supp.2d 442 (N.D. Ill.
2000)
In
a non-capital case, the court found the defendant incompetent; the
defendant's personality disorder, which was a systemic, enduring and
severe condition, qualified as "a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241(a).
United States v. Sanchez,
38 F.Supp.2d 355 (D. N.J. 1999)
Court held that same standard for determining
competency during trial (Dusky) must be
applied in case of defendant whose competency came into doubt after the
conviction but before sentencing.
United States v. Rudisill,
43 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)
While in pretrial detention defendant received a
beating from other inmates. The resulting brain damage left him with
severe cognitive impairments, dementia, speech and motor impairments,
and "absolutely no recollection of the facts underlying the charges
against him." Relying on its own observations of defendant and his
testimony at a competency hearing, the court rejected the testimony of a
government psychiatrist that defendant was malingering his amnesia
symptoms. The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and,
based on expert testimony that he would never fully recover, refused to
commit him to the custody of the attorney general, and instead returned
defendant to his mother's custody and care.
Johnson v. Keane,
974 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
The
state trial court erred in failing to order a second competency hearing
where the experts who declared Johnson competent at the first hearing
also warned that he had a history of mental illness and could
deteriorate at any time, where defense counsel notified the court
several times that Johnson had in fact deteriorated, where the court
refused to hear evidence that counsel was prepared to present, where the
court dismissed a psychiatrist's finding that Johnson was delusional by
remarking that "[w]e are all delusional," where the court ignored
Johnson's irrational behavior, such as his insistence on wearing to
court the clothes that his victims had described to police, and where
the court conceded that Johnson should receive psychiatric treatment
while incarcerated.
Short v. United States,
1997 WL 276229 (W.D.N.Y. May 1997)
(unpublished)
Short, filing a habeas petition before the same
district judge who presided over his plea proceeding, succeeded in
getting an evidentiary hearing not strictly on a competency claim, but
rather on the claim that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to
plead guilty without investigating his competency and for failing to
move for withdrawal of the plea when evidence of Short's mental illness
came to light. Trial counsel should have known early on that Short
suffered from a severe mental illness that merited further investigation
(for example, Short told the court during the plea colloquy that he was
taking medication for schizophrenia). A
probation officer's report prepared after the plea colloquy
should have alerted counsel that Short suffered from chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia, behaved irrationally during his
interview with the probation officer
and was receiving federal assistance on account of mental
disability. The district judge appears to be sympathetic to Short's
claim that the judge was in error for failing to convene a competency
hearing before accepting his plea, but finds that Short procedurally
defaulted the claim by not raising it on direct appeal and by failing to
plead cause and prejudice.
Nicks v. United States,
874 F.Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Trial court denied petitioner's due process rights
in failing to conduct a hearing into petitioner's competency to enter a
guilty plea, where, prior to sentencing, petitioner's probation officer
requested a psychiatric evaluation, mental health experts who examined
him for purposes of sentencing found him to be paranoid schizophrenic,
mentally retarded and delusional, and trial counsel expressed his
misgivings about petitioner's competence to the trial judge in private
and made a motion for withdrawal of the plea on the record. Conviction
vacated.
United States v. Veatch,
842 F.Supp. 480 (W.D. Okl.
1993)
The
government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant is fit to stand trial or waive his right to counsel, where
appointed counsel stated, over defendant's objections, that he did not
believe defendant is competent, where defense expert gave credible
testimony that defendant's unconditional belief in conspiracy theory
rendered him incapable of participating in the proceedings in a rational
manner, and where the testimony of the government expert that
defendant's actions are calculated was inconsistent and less
credible.
Lagway v. Dallman,
806 F.Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ohio
1992)
Competency hearing before state trial court did not
comport with due process, where trial court relied on his own
impressions based on a lengthy colloquy, discounted the uncontroverted
testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner was incompetent, and
failed to request additional evidence or argument from counsel.
Furthermore, even if the hearing had comported with due process, the
trial court's finding of competency is not entitled to a presumption of
correctness in that the court placed undue emphasis on petitioner's
factual understanding of the functions of judge, jury and prosecution
and did not give adequate consideration to petitioner's ability to
consult with counsel and to participate in the proceedings in a rational
manner.
United States v. Perez Diaz,
797 F.Supp. 81 (D. Puerto Rico
1992)
Government failed to prove defendant's competence
by a preponderance of the evidence, where there was uncontroverted
expert testimony that defendant is incompetent, defendant exhibited
nervous tremors throughout the competency hearing, and defendant's
self-inflicted wounds were visible to the court.
United States v. Renfroe,
745 F.Supp. 203 (D. Del. 1990)
In
retrospective competency hearing where evidence for and against a
finding of competency was equally balanced, government failed to meet
the burden of proving competence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Government and defense experts agreed that defendant was using cocaine
during trial, but disagreed as to his level of impairment. Trial counsel
testified that defendant was able to focus on his case for only a few
minutes at a time and that he exhibited bizarre behavior.
United States v. Nichols,
661 F.Supp. 507 (W.D. Mich.
1987)
Defendant established reasonable cause to believe
that he may not be able to understand the proceedings against him and
assist in his defense, where trial counsel attested that defendant
failed to respond normally to discussions of the charges, defendant has
been under treatment for severe depression, and government agreed that
defendant's attitude is bizarre and that he may be incompetent. Under
federal law, a showing of reasonable cause mandates a competency hearing
and strongly counsels in favor of a psychiatric evaluation, although the
latter remains in the District Court's discretion.
United States v. Blohm,
579 F.Supp. 495 (S.D. N.Y.
1983)
Defendant was incompetent to stand trial, though he
had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him and though
mental health experts deemed him competent, because the requirement that
defendant have a rational understanding of the proceedings was not
satisfied by the mental health experts' testimony that defendant was
rational in the sense that his reasoning was logically consistent with
his underlying delusions. Defendant could not be said to have a rational
understanding (in the lay sense of that phrase) in that he believed that
the charges against him grew out of a conspiracy among a judge, Richard
Nixon, and Arnold Palmer.
Evans v. Raines,
534
F.Supp. 791 (D.Ariz. 1982)
Trial court violated petitioner's due process
rights in failing to hold hearing on petitioner's competence to waive
counsel. Although petitioner was able to understand the nature of the
proceedings and to participate in them meaningfully, and thus was
competent to stand trial, he was not competent to waive counsel in that
he was unable to make reasoned choices among the alternatives presented
to him. Trial court knew that petitioner had been diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenic and that petitioner believed the public defender was part
of a conspiracy against him. The Circuit Court endorsed the above
findings of the district judge, but held that the state court might be
able to cure the error through a retrospective competency hearing. Evans v. Raines, 705 F.2d 1479 (1983). Note:
in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680
(1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is one standard for both
competency to stand trial and competency to waive counsel.
Meeks v. Smith,
512
F.Supp. 335 (W.D. N.C. 1981)
Petitioner's due process rights were violated when
state trial court failed to hold competency hearing, where petitioner
had recently been found incompetent in another proceeding, one mental
health expert consistently found petitioner incompetent and another
mental health expert, who diagnosed petitioner as paranoid
schizophrenic, alternated between findings of competency and
incompetency.
Osborne v. Thompson,
481 F.Supp. 162 (M.D. Tenn.
1979)
Trial
court should have inquired further into petitioner's competency to enter
guilty pleas, where pre-trial evaluator deemed petitioner only
marginally competent, where petitioner gave unclear or nonresponsive
answers to open-ended questions during the plea colloquy, and where
trial court had petitioner committed for treatment of mental illness
prior to sentencing. Passage of four years made retrospective hearing
unfeasible.
Military Cases
United States v. Collins
60 M.J. 261 (U.S. Armed Forces
2004)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
finds that a military judge abused his discretion by not inquiring
further into Appellant's mental responsibility when the sole member of
the sanity board appeared to change his testimony and conclusion about
the central issue.
STATE COURTS
State v. Leonard
855
A.2d 531 (N.H. 2004)
The trial court found that defendant was not competent to stand
trial, but his competence could probably be restored "with appropriate
services of legal counsel." Pursuant to court order, counsel attempted
to educate defendant before the next competency hearing. On
interlocutory appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a
psychiatrist must be appointed to supervise a defendant’s treatment, and
that "tutelage in the law" by his attorneys is not appropriate
treatment. Case is reversed and remanded.
Commonwealth v. Santiago
855 A.2d 682 (Pa. 2004)
The issue of competence to stand trial is not waived where it was not
raised at trial or on appeal and it may be raised initially in a PCRA
(Post Conviction Relief Act) petition. Under certain circumstances,
however, a PCRA court may hold a retrospective competency hearing in
lieu of granting a new trial. Here, the findings of the PCRA court that
petitioner was competent to stand trial are affirmed.
In Re Erick B.
777
N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 2004)
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the court
commits the defendant to the custody of the Commissioner for the Office
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for a period of 90
days. The court found that the defendant presented evidence that
rebutted the application of the presumption of fitness and competence,
after which the prosecution failed to prove he was not an incapacitated
person.
Jackson v. State
880
So.2d 1241 (Fla.App. 2004)
The trial court erred in failing to hold a
competency hearing where the defendant had been adjudicated incompetent
on four separate occasions. A defendant cannot be adjudicated from
incompetent to competent without a competency hearing that includes an
opportunity to call witnesses, so the court's oral declaration that
defendant was competent was invalid. Thus, the defendant remained
incompetent when brought to trial and his right to due process was
violated. Harmless error review is
inappropriate with such fundamental error, so the case is reversed and
remanded.
People v. Johnwell
18
Cal.Rptr.3d 826 (Cal.App. 2004)
Erroneous circumstantial evidence instructions at
defendant’s competency trial placed a higher standard of proof on
defendant and violated due process. The error was not harmless and the
case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
People v. Ary
13
Cal.Rptr.3d 482 (Cal.App. 2004)
Defendant was denied due process when the trial
court failed to hold a competency hearing despite substantial evidence
that defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings against
him because of his mental retardation. On remand, the State has the
burden of establishing that a retrospective competency hearing can be
held.
State v. Kent
584
S.E.2d 169 (W.Va. 2003)
Defendant was found incompetent after his arrest
and was treated for 9 months until he regained competency and was tried
and convicted of murder. Because of his behavior during trial, counsel
immediately requested an examination of defendant. It was subsequently
determined that correctional authorities had failed to advise the court
and the parties that defendant was no longer taking his medication. At a
competency hearing, the treating physician testified that defendant had
been incompetent, while another State doctor who examined defendant 23
days after resumption of medication opined that he had been competent at
trial. The trial court agreed and sentenced defendant to life in prison.
The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred and
reversed and remanded for a new trial because the defendant had lacked
the mental capacity to meaningfully participate in his defense.
Wilson v. State
875
So.2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)
A hearing was required on whether defendant was
competent at time he pleaded guilty to theft and burglary, where the
trial judge had ordered a mental evaluation of defendant, the forensic
examiner expressed doubts as to defendant's intellectual functioning and
knowledge comprehension, the examiner referred defendant for screening
by the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and nothing
in record indicated any action was taken on the examiner's
recommendations, and no reference was made at guilty plea proceedings to
defendant's mental evaluation.
Tate v. State
864
So.2d 44 (Fla.App. 2003)
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to mandatory life in prison for an offense committed when
he was 12 years old. Post-trial his appellate counsel sought a
competency evaluation, as well as an evidentiary hearing on the adequacy
of explanations to the defendant regarding pre-trial plea negotiations.
The trial court denied the competency evaluation, explaining that
defendant’s competency to stand trial had never before been questioned.
The appellate court held that defendant's due process rights were
violated by the trial court's failure to order, sua sponte, pretrial and
post-trial competency evaluations. In light of defendant’s age, his lack
of previous exposure to the criminal justice system, and further
developmental evidence presented at trial, a competency evaluation was
constitutionally mandated.
Baqleh v. Superior Court
100 Cal.App.4th 478, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 (Cal.App. 1
Dist. 2002)
The
provisions of the Civil Discovery Act apply to competency hearings; the
order directing defendant to submit to an examination by a prosecution
expert is vacated because it fails to adequately specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as
required by the Civil Discovery Act, and improperly allows unidentified
examiners to videotape the examination; an accused person cannot on the
basis of the Fifth Amendment refuse to submit to a mental examination by
a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a
competency hearing because a judicially declared rule of immunity
provides the necessary assurance that an accused will not be convicted
of a crime by use of any information obtained at a court-compelled
mental examination or the use of information obtained from that
examination, or that his sentencing may be affected by such information
or the fruits thereof; there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a
court-ordered mental examination because the judicially declared rule of
immunity provides adequate protections; if a proper order is entered
requiring defendant to submit to a competency examination by a
prosecution expert, and defendant refuses to cooperate, the trial court
may disclosure to the jury the fact of the defendant's refusal to comply
with the order.
State v. Morales
2002
WL 1331757 (Conn. Super. April 5, 2002) (unpublished)
Connecticut statute governing procedures for when
the court determines that there is not a substantial probability that
the defendant will obtain competency within the period of treatment
allowed by the law was unconstitutionally vague. Although the statute
clearly provided the available options -- release or civil commitment --
it provided no standards for the trial judge to use in selecting the
choice or implementing the choice of remedy.
State v. Bevins
2002
WL 440753 (Ohio App. March 22, 2002) (unpublished)
Because the trial court raised the issue of
defendant's competency, even though it may have been inadvertent, it was
reversible error under state law for the trial court to fail to conduct
a competency hearing. (The trial court ordered a sanity evaluation in
response to defendant's NGRI plea but utilized a form that included a
competency examination.)
In re Grimes
769
N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 2002)
The
right not to be tried while incompetent applies to juvenile proceedings
just as it does in criminal trials of adults. Report in prior case
finding that juvenile defendant was not competent to stand trial, of
which the judge in the present case was familiar, raised "sufficient
indicia of incompetence" that defendant should have been afforded a
competency hearing.
Anderson v. State
2002
WL 432674 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio March 20, 2002) (unpublished)
While
an informal dialogue may constitute a competency inquiry in some
instances, it is insufficient when, as in this case, the competency
issue is specifically raised by the defendant; trial court erred in
failing to conduct a competency inquiry given the well-supported
incompetency finding of an appointed expert; the appointed expert's
later unexplained opinion that defendant was competent did not
extinguish the bona fide doubt that had been raised about defendant's
competence; the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether
there is "some evidence" of incompetence, and, if there is, to determine
whether a retrospective competency determination by a jury is
practicable.
State v. Were
761
N.E.2d 591 (Ohio 2002)
In
case involving the murder of a prison guard, the capital conviction and
death sentence are reversed due to the trial court's failure to conduct
an evidentiary hearing after trial counsel repeatedly raised the issue
of defendant's competency. The trial court's finding of competence based
upon its review of the competency evaluation report violated the
competency statute then in effect, as well as the United States
Constitution. "[A]n evidentiary competency hearing is constitutionally
required whenever there are sufficient indicia of incompetency to call
into doubt defendant's competency to stand trial." Here, defense counsel
documented defendant's paranoia and bizarre beliefs that interfered with
his ability to cooperate with his attorneys. Defendant's pro se filings
corroborated defense counsel's assertions. That defendant had refused to
speak with the appointed mental health experts did not prevent the trial
court from conducting the required hearing. Further, the record did not
support the lower court's conclusion that defendant was engaged in a
"calculated effort to avoid prosecution by delaying the progress of the
trial."
In re Kerch
2002 WL
86831 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)
After
state supreme court directed appellate court to vacate its summary
denial of petitioner's habeas petition and remanded for further
proceedings, the appellate court grants relief on claims that petitioner
was incompetent at the time of trial and incompetent at the time she
waived her right to counsel. Post-trial affidavits established that
petitioner suffered from bipolar disorder and that she was delusional at
the relevant times.
People v. Green
2002
WL 86987 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)
Trial
court abused its discretion by denying motion to continue sentencing to
allow defendant to present a formal competency motion based on newly
discovered information about defendant's narcolepsy.
In re Staten
2001 WL
1647286 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Dec. 21, 2001) (unpublished)
Trial
court was required to conduct a competency hearing before accepting
minor's plea of guilty, which resulted in an adjudication of
delinquency, where the CAST-MR indicated that the minor was not
competent to stand trial.
State ex rel. Reed v. Frawley
59 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. 2001)
Juvenile was entitled to hearing to determine
whether he was competent to understand extradition proceeding and to
assist counsel in defending against extradition.
State v. Marshall,
27
P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001)
In a
capital case, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea without holding a competency hearing mandated
by state statute where there was ample evidence calling defendant's
competency into question at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea.
Thompson v. Com.,
56
S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001)
In a
capital case where the defendant pled guilty, the trial court erred in
not holding a competency hearing mandated by state statute; the statute
protects the due process right not to be tried while incompetent; a
retrospective competency hearing is permissible depending on the facts
of the case; remanded for trial court to determine if a retrospective
hearing is possible and if so, to conduct it.
State v. Sanders,
549
S.E.2d 40 (W.Va. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, the defendant was found incompetent and committed;
later, court found defendant competent; during trial, defense moved for
mistrial, saying the defendant was psychotic; conviction reversed
because the information before the trial court raised sufficient doubt
about the defendant's mental fitness to warrant an additional inquiry
regarding his competency; the trial court has a duty to employ adequate
procedures for determining competency, whether or not a formal motion is
made; where there has been a competency hearing and the defendant has
been found competent, the trial court need not suspend proceedings for
another hearing unless it is presented with new evidence casting serious
doubt on the validity of the earlier competency finding or with an
intervening change of circumstances that renders prior determination
unreliable; on remand, the trial court may attempt a nunc pro tunc
determination of the defendant's competency at the time of trial.
Kelly v. State
797
So.2d 1278 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2001)
In
non-capital case, trial court abused its discretion in not sua sponte
holding a competency hearing before proceeding with trial. The court
found on the record that Kelly was only borderline competent, a finding
that was supported by defendant's disruptive behavior during trial,
nonsensical ramblings about leaving the country, and rantings about
Jesus. "Because all the parties involved, including defense counsel,
worried about Kelly's ‘reduced capacity,' it was incumbent upon the
court to speak up and order a hearing when no one else asked for it."
In re J.M.,
769 A.2d
656 (Vt. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, an expert testified at the competency hearing that the
mentally retarded juvenile defendant was "marginally competent," but
would need special held before he could meet the competency standard;
teachers and others from defendant's
school testified about his limited abilities; the court's sole
finding in ruling defendant competent was that the expert "should be
believed"; although the evidence was sufficient to find defendant
competent, the court's findings were inadequate to explain its reasoning
and did not address defendant's need for special help; reversed.
State v. Haycock,
766
A.2d 720 (N.H. 2001)
In a
non-capital case, the only witness at the competency hearing was
defendant's expert, who testified defendant did not have rational
understanding and lacked ability to consult with attorney; trial court
found defendant competent, focusing on factual understanding; under
state law, the state must prove competency by a preponderance of the
evidence; the trial court erred in finding defendant had a rational
understanding when no evidence supported that finding; on remand, court
should consider if a retrospective determination of competency could be
made.
In re Fleming,
16 P.3d
610 (Wash. 2001)
Guilty plea vacated because trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to apprise court that defendant's competence was
in doubt.
State v. Sullivan,
739 N.E.2d
788 (Ohio 2001)
In a
non-capital case, experts testified that defendant was incompetent and
that no form of treatment would be effective in restoring his competency
in foreseeable future; trial court found defendant incompetent and
committed him; relying upon Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), court found statute under which
defendant was committed unconstitutional because it requires all
defendants found incompetent to be committed for a fixed time up to one
year regardless of whether treatment will be effective in restoring
competency.
Roberts v. State,
761
S.2d 885 (Md. 2000)
In a
non-capital case, court found under state law that trial court erred in
denying, without a hearing, a motion for examination of defendant for
competency, when attorney's motion was sufficient to overcome the
presumption of competency.
Head v. Taylor,
538
S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 2000)
In
capital state post-conviction case, court affirmed lower court's order
finding trial counsel ineffective in failing to assure defendant was
medicated before trial so he could assist in his defense and in failing
to obtain jail records which would have contradicted testimony of jail
doctor and jailers about defendant's mental condition.
Permenter v. State,
796 So.2d 1147 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000)
In
non-capital case, court found that although defendant was initially
found competent, court erred in denying second competency hearing where
the defense presented evidence that defendant's mental condition had
deteriorated since first competency hearing; remanded for trial court to
conduct compentency hearing, at which state has burden of proving
competency.
State v. Paul,
2000 WL
1239728 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished)
In
non-capital state post-conviction proceeding, court found that trial
court violated defendant's procedural due process rights in not holding
competency hearing where there was reason to doubt defendant's
competency.
State v. McRae,
533
S.E.2d 557 (N.C. App. 2000)
In
non-capital case, trial court's failure to conduct competency hearing
violated federal due process; evidence before the court raised bona fide
doubt sufficient to require court to conduct hearing sua sponte;
remanded for retrospective competency determination, if that is
possible; if retrospective determination is not possible, conviction
must be reversed.
People v. Castro
78
Cal.App.4th 1402 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 2000)
In
non-capital case, trial court committed reversible error in denying
defense counsel's request to appoint the director of the regional center
for the developmentally disabled to evaluate defendant pursuant to Cal.
Pen. Code, § 1369 (trial of issue of mental competence) in light of
substantial evidence that raised a suspicion that defendant was
developmentally disabled.
Woods v. State,
994 S.W.2d 32
(Mo. App. W.D. 1999)
Defendant's due process rights were violated when
trial court failed to order a competency evaluation and hearing after
defendant, who had a history of psychiatric problems, attempted suicide
the day before the sentencing hearing.
State v. Snyder,
750
So.2d 832 (La. 1999)
Trial
court's refusal to grant a "continuance to allow [defendant's]
antidepressant medication time to remedy his unfocused, tangential and
circumstantial ideation [which] rendered him unable to effectively
communicate with his attorney"violated due process because the trial
court failed to conduct adequate inquiry into defendant's competency.
Defendant had been diagnosed with severe depression while in jail
awaiting trial. Experts testified that the anti-depressant medication
defendant received further clouded his thinking, and trial counsel
informed the court that defendant was unable effectively to communicate
with her. Remanded for retrospective competency determination, and if
necessary a new trial, due to trial court's failure adequately to
investigate defendant's competency further before denying
continuance.
State v. Tilden,
1999
WL 136944 (Mo. App. March 16, 1999)(unpublished slip
opinion)
The
failure of the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor (who all
shared in the responsibility) to raise the issue of defendant's
competency despite their knowledge of his brain damage, "partial
lobotomy, self-mutilating behavior, alcohol abuse, extensive criminal
activity, extensive mental health treatment and observation dating back
to childhood" violated due process. After being found guilty but before
sentencing, defendant was sent to state hospital. At the sentencing
hearing the court asked defendant and the prosecutor if defendant had
been evaluated and found competent to stand trial. Both answered yes,
although no competency evaluation had been performed. Trial court had an
obligation to order competency evaluation and a post-examination hearing
once he was "presented with sufficient facts to form reasonable cause to
believe the accused lack[ed] the mental fitness to proceed," and the
failure to do so will require a new trial, if defendant is competent to
stand trial. Neither the erroneous belief that defendant had been found
competent, the fact that the evidence supported the conviction, nor the
fact that defendant exhibited no bizarre behavior during the trial could
change this result.
Garcia
Estrada v. State,
1999 WL 12749 (Tex. App. Jan.
14, 1999)(unpublished opinion)
Defendant's bizarre behavior raised a bona fide
doubt about his competency, which required the trial court to conduct a
competency hearing although not requested by either the defense or
prosecution. Defendant had filed "numerous incomprehensible pro se
motions," could not explain his objection that "something was 'missing
from his defense,'" fired three lawyers, and made several ranting
outbursts during the trial.
Commonwealth v. Simpson,
704 N.E.2d 1131 (Mass. 1999)
Defendant had been allowed to represent himself.
Although he was coherent and rational in early stages of proceedings,
his opening statement asserting that he was victim of conspiracies and
scams by the police, and his subsequent trial conduct raised
sufficient doubt about his
competency to require a hearing. Court would not address the issue on
appeal, but held that defendant's new counsel would be required to raise
issue in a motion for new trial. Addressing defendant's earlier
resistance to efforts by previous defense counsel to challenge his
competency, the court held that if defendant were first found competent,
the trial court could permit him to withdraw the motion for new trial
"on a finding an appropriate waiver, equivalent in quality to a plea of
guilty."
People v. Hill,
697
N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1st Dist. App. June 17,
1998).
Court
held, per statute, that defendant was entitled to a retrospective
fitness hearing due to defendant's use of psychotropic medication. If at
the hearing the trial court determines that the case is one of those
"exceptional cases" in which the defendant's sanity at the time of trial
may fairly and accurately be determined despite the time intervening,
his conviction may be affirmed. If the evidence is inconclusive or
suggests that defendant was impaired, his conviction and sentence must
be vacated and he must be granted a new trial.
People v. Kinkead,
695
N.E.2d 1255 (Ill. 1998)
Defendant was entitled to a new trial having
established that there was a bona fide doubt as to fitness at time of
plea and sentencing due to his use of psychotropic medication during
trial, and, where five years had passed since the original proceeding, a
retrospective competency hearing was inappropriate.
Hatten v. State,
978
S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. March 12, 1998)
Case
remanded to trial court to determine whether defendant's competency at
the time of trial can be ascertained after the passage of two years and,
if so, to hold a hearing on the issue of defendant's competency to stand
trial where the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing and
"some evidence (at least more than a scintilla)" of the defendant's
incompetence had been brought to the attention of the trial court.
Ex Parte Janezic,
723
So.2d 725 (Ala. Nov. 14, 1997)
During trial expert changed his opinion from "the
defendant is competent" to "the defendant is not competent." Although
the evidence in the record does not conclusively prove that the
defendant had become incompetent during the course of the trial, the shift in opinion when
considered in the context of other evidence related to the defendant's
mental health created a reasonable and bona fide doubt as to the
defendant's competency during the guilt-determination phase of the
trial.
People v. Smith,
694
N.E. 2d 681 (Ill.App. 4th Dist.
1998)
Failure of defense counsel to request, and trial
court to order, hearing as to the fitness of defendant required remand
for fitness hearing where the defendant's presentence investigation
report contained information from medical doctors, a clinical
psychologist, and defendant concerning use of the drugs Effexor and
Xanax and treatment for symptoms of depression and anxiety and where the
state did not contest the possibility that defendant might have taken
these psychotropic medications prior to, around the time of, and
subsequent to trial.
Commonwealth v. Simpson,
689 N.E.2d 824 (Mass.App. 1998)
Failure of trial judge to raise the issue of
competency and to hold a competency hearing required reversal of
judgment where the defendant, proceeding pro se, though initially
determined competent to conduct own defense in prosecution for mayhem
and assault with a deadly weapon, manifested paranoid delusions and an
underlying defense position that he was entitled to hammer a sleeping
woman in the head, as well as knife her, because of a pervasive
conspiracy against him. Though the defendant, at a certain level,
understood the offenses for which he was charged and the punishment the
court might impose, the defense position was irrational.
People v. Abraham,
689
N.E.2d 278 (Ill.App. 2nd Dist.
1998)
Defendant's conviction vacated where the State
failed to show within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
psychotropic medication that the defendant had been taking did not
impair his ability to participate in and understand his defense prior to
pleading guilty and sentencing. Though the defendant was afforded the
type of supplemental hearing required on his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, the only medical expert to testify in the case testified
that he could not give an opinion as to the defendant's fitness at the
time of the guilty plea and the trial court made no specific ruling with
respect to the effect of the psychotropic drugs on the defendant.
People v. Carlson,
691
N.E.2d 1156 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
1997)
Limited remand to determine whether the defendant
was entitled to a fitness hearing where both the trial court and defense
counsel knew that defendant was taking psychotropic drugs (lithium) and
was diagnosed manic depressive. The court and defense counsel were made
aware that drugs were taken proximate to the pretrial continuance,
defendant's appeal bond hearing, in defendant's physician's letter
attached to the pre-sentencing investigation report, and in defendant's
statement during the sentencing hearing, all of which put the court on
notice of the issue of defendant's mental incapacity to stand trial. An
Illinois statute entitles a defendant who is receiving psychotropic
drugs to a fitness hearing while under medication.
People v. Johns,
687
N.E.2d 138 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.
1997)
Limited remand to determine whether defendant was
taking psychotropic drugs at any critical stage of the proceeding where
the presentence investigative report indicated that he was prescribed
the drugs Thorozine and Haldol while incarcerated awaiting trial, but
which report did not specify the dates the drugs were taken.
People v. Nitz,
670
N.E.2d 672 (Ill. 1996)
The
order of dismissal of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is
reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the
conviction and to grant a new trial for failure of trial court to grant
a fitness hearing. The State withheld information that it was
administering psychotropic medication (Tranxene) to defendant throughout
trial and sentencing. Had the trial court known, it would have been
required, pursuant to Illinois statute, to hold a fitness hearing. Prior
Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the statute to mean that the
administration of psychotropic drugs during trial raises a bona fide
doubt as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial, thus a fitness
determination, through a fitness hearing, is constitutionally
required.
Williams v. State,
685
N.E. 2d 730 (Ind.App. 1997)
The
trial court abused its discretion by allowing previously recorded
deposition testimony into evidence where defendant was present at the
time the testimony was recorded, but
was incompetent. Because defendant was deemed incompetent,
defendant did not have "the opportunity" to cross exam the witness.
Nunez v. State,
942 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.App.
1997)
Jury
verdict that defendant was competent to stand trial for murder was held
to have been against the great weight and preponderance of evidence as
to be manifestly unjust where the defense called two doctors at the
competency hearing who testified that defendant was not fit to stand
trial, where defendant's mother and sister testified to defendant's
strange behavior for years prior to the crime, and where the state
presented little evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the
defense.
Artiles v. State,
691
So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997)
An
indigent defendant has the right to be examined by a confidential expert
even if two other experts appointed by the court agree that defendant is
competent to proceed. The trial court's refusal to continue the
competency hearing to allow examination by the confidential expert was
an abuse of discretion, depriving the defendant a reasonable opportunity
to prepare for the competency hearing in terms of presenting evidence
and challenging the opinions of the other experts.
State v. Levy,
700
So.2d 1283 (La.App. 1st Cir.
1997)
The
State of Louisiana appealed the trial court's finding that defendant
lacked necessary mental capacity by a "clear preponderance of the
evidence" as opposed to "by clear and convincing evidence," which was
required by statute. The Court held that the lower standard was not
erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v.
Oklahoma.
Howard v. State,
701
So.2d 274 (Miss. 1997)
The
trial court's failure to order a competency hearing before allowing the
defendant to represent himself constituted reversible error in a murder
prosecution where the trial judge did not have a complete evaluation of
defendant's mental capacity, defendant's court-appointed attorney
repeatedly expressed concerns about defendant's competency to assist or
conduct his own defense, and where defendant exhibited paranoid behavior
at trial, asked irrational questions of witnesses, and engaged in
rambling commentary. Where facts appear on the record which, when
objectively considered, reasonably raise questions of defendant's
competence to stand trial or to represent himself, the trial court is
obliged to order a competency hearing.
Howard v. State,
697
So.2d 415, withdrawn, republished as corrected at, 701 So.2d 274 (Miss.
1997)
The
court reverses Howard's capital conviction and death sentence on the
grounds that the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing
before allowing Howard to proceed to trial and certainly before allowing
him to represent himself. The court should not have relied on a state
psychiatrist's written finding of competency since the same psychiatrist
said that he could not venture even a provisional diagnosis in light of
Howard's refusal to cooperate. The court was warned by all four of
Howard's attorneys that he was unable to assist them, let alone to
represent himself. Finally, the trial court should have been alerted to
the need for a hearing by Howard's irrational behavior, such as
insisting on the seating of jurors likely to be biased against, asking
witnesses questions that were irrational or relevant only to his
elaborate conspiracy theories, and accusing one of the jurors of having
committed the murder.
In re Williams,
687
N.E.2d 507 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1997)
The
magistrate's finding of competency is not reliable since both experts
who gave written reports and testified at the competency hearing appear
to have based their opinions on inappropriate considerations, the
state's expert focusing on Williams' moral culpability and dangerousness
if released and the defense expert focusing on the excessiveness of
charging a mentally impaired juvenile with rape. After subtracting these
inappropriate considerations, the evidence of incompetency predominates.
According to the defense expert, Williams has an I.Q. of 40 and the mind
of a six-year-old. Even the state's expert admitted that Williams would
have difficulty understanding the roles of judge and jury and would be
afraid to confide in his attorney. The court remands Williams' case for
a new competency hearing. A concurring judge takes the magistrate to
task for allowing himself to be swayed by the cost of the treatment that
would be required if Williams were found incompetent.
In re Hinnant,
678
N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. 1997)
The
evidence raised a substantial doubt about Hinnant's competence to
understand the extradition proceedings against him, where a court in the
state seeking his extradition had earlier found him unfit to stand trial
because of a head injury, where Hinnant's attorney stated that Hinnant
was unable to communicate with him and where Hinnant had been found
incompetent by a physician. The court remands the case to the lower
court for a formal competency determination and the issuance of a stay
for the duration of Hinnant's incompetency.
State v. Garfoot,
558
N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1997)
The
intermediate appellate court incorrectly subjected the trial court's
finding of incompetence to de novo review.
Under the proper "clearly erroneous" standard, the trial court's finding
was entitled to stand, since a defense expert testified at the
competency hearing that Garfoot would never be able to meaningfully
participate in a criminal trial because of a developmental disability
and where the state's expert testified that he had an IQ of 64 and was
only marginally competent.
State v. Gowan,
666
So.2d 1325 (La.App. 1996)
Once
defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of a sanity
commission, the trial court erred in accepting petitioner's guilty plea
before resolving the issue of his mental capacity. The reviewing court
declined to bar the habeas petition as untimely, because petitioner had
unsuccessfully raised the same issue in earlier proceedings and because
it would be unfair to enforce the deadline against someone who may not
have understood the proceedings against him.
State v. Johnson,
551
N.W. 2d 741 (Neb.App. 1996)
Trial
court committed plain error for failing to hold a full, fair, and
adequate hearing on the issue of defendant's competency when the court
was faced with a reasonable doubt regarding defendant's competency
twice: at the plea hearing and at sentencing. The trial court had
conducted a competency hearing of sorts: the court admitted into
evidence a psychiatrists report (offered by defense counsel), questioned
the defendant, allowed questioning of counsel, and observed defendant in
the context of a hearing to enter a plea. This "hearing" was not
sufficient to provide adequate procedural due process to protect
defendant's substantive due process right not to be tried while
incompetent. The issue of competency was determined principally on the
basis of the trial court's colloquy with Petitioner at the plea hearing;
the colloquy, however went only to defendant's ability to understand the
procedures, not his capability for rational decision making, which is
what the psychiatrist's report said was lacking.
Casey v. State,
924
S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)
Trial
court incorrectly concluded that defendant need not be competent during
the course of a probation revocation hearing. Trial court should have
held a competency hearing after a psychiatrist testified that defendant
was experiencing psychogenic amnesia.
State v. Soares,
916
P.2d 1233 (Haw. 1996)
Trial
court should have suspended trial for a competency hearing where (1)
several experts who had earlier found defendant competent warned that he
required medication to remain competent, (2) the court was aware that
defendant had missed his weekly dose of medication, and (3) trial counsel notified the court that
defendant's demeanor had changed, that defendant wanted to change trial
strategy and that defendant refused to cooperate with him.
Brogdon v. State,
467
S.E.2d 598 (Ga.App. 1996)
Trial
court should have interrupted trial for a competency hearing, where (1)
an evaluator who had earlier found defendant competent also noted that
he suffered from paranoid delusions, needed medications, and was
severely mentally ill, (2) defendant's trial testimony was confused and
not grounded in reality, and (3) defendant had to be restrained after an
outburst. It was not sufficient to inquire of the defendant whether he
was competent.
State v. Carney,
663
So.2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
Where
trial counsel filed pre-trial motion for sanity commission, pointing to
defendant's hallucinations and inability to understand the proceedings
or assist counsel, it was error for the trial court to proceed to trial
without a competency ruling merely because trial counsel withdrew his
motion at a hearing at which defendant was not present.
Calloway v. State,
651
So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
Trial
court should have ordered psychiatric evaluation and hearing on
competency to be sentenced, where defense counsel notified the court
that defendant was so heavily medicated that he could not discuss the
presentence report, where defendant's allocution was rambling and
incoherent, where those who testified to defendant's competency were
neither experts nor able to describe his medications, and where the
record indicated that defendant had brain damage, memory problems, and a
history of seizure disorders. Remanded for competency hearing and
resentencing.
People v. Kinkead,
660
N.E.2d 852 (Ill. 1995)
Trial
court should have ordered competency hearing sua
sponte upon learning that the jail administered thorazine to
defendant. Trail counsel's failure to make a motion did not waive
defendant's state-law right to a competency hearing upon a showing that
he was receiving psychotropic medication. Remanded for clarification
whether defendant's doses of thorazine coincided with his entry of a
guilty plea.
People v. Johnson,
659
N.E.2d 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
Under
state law, defendant is entitled to competency hearing if receiving
psychotropic drugs under medical supervision during the pendency of her
prosecution or sentencing. Remand for determination whether defendant
was in fact on psychotropic medication and whether it may have had an
effect on her competency.
People v. Gevas,
655
N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1995)
Under
state law, defendant who is taking psychotropic medications during the
course of his trial is entitled to a competency hearing. It was error
for trial court to deny motion for competency hearing, where defense
counsel presented evidence that defendant was administered
antipsychotics and antidepressants during the month prior to his entry
of a guilty plea. Passage of two years made a meaningful retrospective
hearing impossible.
People v. Guttierez,
648 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995)
Under
state law, trial court should have sua
sponte ordered a competency hearing upon learning that defendant
was administered psychotropic medication. Furthermore, trial counsel,
who was aware that defendant was receiving antidepressants, was
ineffective for failing to request such a hearing.
Aragon v. State,
910
S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
Jury's finding of competency is against the weight
and preponderance of the evidence, where the defense presented several
witnesses to defendant's bizarre thoughts and behavior, where the only
mental health expert to testify found defendant incompetent, and where
the prosecutor presented no evidence and, indeed, initially conceded
defendant's incompetence, only changing his mind during
cross-examination of defendant.
State v. Bartlett,
898
P.2d 98 (Mont. 1995)
Under
state law, trial court must order psychiatric evaluation upon written
motion by stand-by counsel, even if defendant had