Incompetency To Stand Trial

Summaries of Successful Cases

Updated October 2004

 

 

SUCCESSFUL CASES

 

 

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

 

 

Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348 (1996)

Oklahoma's statute requiring criminal defendants to prove their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence imposes a significant risk that defendants who have already demonstrated that they are more-likely-than-not incompetent will be erroneously found competent and thus violates due process.

Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975)

The trial court violated Drope's due process rights when it failed to suspend his trial for a competency hearing in the face of accumulating evidence of incompetency, including an attack on his wife and a suicide attempt. A nunc pro tunc, or retrospective, determination of competence, which is difficult under the best of circumstances, would not be adequate in this case inasmuch as Drope was absent during a critical stage of his trial and thus was not observed by the court or counsel.

Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375 (1966)

The trial court's failure to grant a competency hearing deprived Robinson of his right to a fair trial, where there was uncontradicted testimony of his history of irrational behavior, defense experts testified that he was insane and the only evidence supporting his competency was Robinson's demeanor at trial and the stipulated testimony of a state expert who did not make a determination as to Robinson's sanity. A retrospective determination of competency would be too difficult because (1) the jury would not be able to observe the subject of their inquiry, (2) the testimony of experts would have to be based solely on information in the printed record and (3) six years had passed since the trial.

Westbrook v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam)

Although defendant received hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial, he was entitled to hearing or inquiry into issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel and to proceed to conduct his own defense. Remand to Arizona Supreme Court to determine if the trial court fulfilled its "protecting duty" to the defendant. But see Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993), which denies that there are separate standards of competency to stand trial and to waive counsel, and interprets Westbrook as holding that the trial court failed to determine if defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.

Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960)

The information on the record was insufficient to support a finding of competency. The District Court erred in limiting its inquiry to whether the defendant is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of events. The proper "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." A retrospective hearing would have been difficult because of the "doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance of the psychiatric testimony."

 

 

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

 

 

United States v. Howard
381 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2004)

Where it was undisputed that at the time of his guilty plea petitioner was taking powerful narcotic drugs that could have dulled his mental faculties, and petitioner had alleged specific, credible facts in support of claim that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing him while incompetent to acquiesce in a plea agreement he had seen for the first time just before he agreed to plead guilty, petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim.

Lounsbury v. Thompson
374 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2004)

Petitioner’s substantive incompetency claim was properly exhausted even though his petition for review to the Oregon Supreme Court raised a procedural argument that the lower court applied an incorrect burden of proof. "Lounsbury worded his petition for review as a procedural challenge, but the clear implication of his claim was that by following a constitutionally defective procedure, the state court erred in finding him competent. Where the substantive and procedural claims are as intertwined as they are here, we hold that Lounsbury made a fair presentation to the state courts of his claim that he was not competent to stand trial." The case is remanded to the district court for merits consideration of the substantive incompetency claim.

United States v. Jones
336 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003)

In case involving unlawful weapons possession and witness tampering charges, the case is remanded to determine whether defendant was competent at the time of sentencing. At the initial sentencing hearing defendant became upset, struck his counsel, and requested to withdraw his plea. The court appointed substitute counsel and denied the motion to withdraw the plea. At a subsequent hearing on pro se pleadings the Government informed the court that defendant was being administered psychiatric medications and requested a competency hearing prior to sentencing. The court requested an evaluation of defendant which was referenced during sentencing, but there was never a competency hearing. In remanding for further proceedings, the appeals court references several indicators of incompetency, including defendant’s violent courtroom behavior and noncompliance with medication.

Brown v. Sternes
304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002)

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate non-capital defendant's mental illness and in permitting the court appointed experts to evaluate defendant with inadequate data. Prejudice is shown, in part, because the medical records counsel neglected to obtain showed defendant suffered from chronic schizophrenia and raised a "bona fide doubt" regarding his competence.

Matheny v. Anderson
253 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2001)

Indiana death row inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on (1) whether he was competent to stand trial, (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an initial request for a competency hearing, and (3) whether the state court was obligated to hold a competency hearing sua sponte; since the failure to develop the facts in state court was not attributable to petitioner, the court evaluated the request for an evidentiary hearing under pre-AEDPA standards.

Appel v. Horn
250 F.3d 203 (3rd Cir. 2001)

Capital defendant was constructively denied counsel where appointed counsel failed to take any steps to investigate their client's competency prior to the competency hearing ordered by the trial court at which time defendant's waiver of counsel was accepted.

Johnson v. Norton,
249 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2001)

In a non-capital case, the court analyzed a Pate claim under AEDPA standards; the trial judge should have held a competency hearing sua sponte where Petitioner was hit on the head shortly before trial and became unconscious a few hours after trial began, raising a question of his competency during jury selection.

McGregor v. Gibson,
248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

In capital 2254 proceeding, the court addressed the question "when may a defendant found competent to stand trial under an unconstitutional 'clear and convincing evidence' burden of proof and then convicted succeed in habeas on a procedural competency claim?"; since Petitioner's competency at trial was assessed under the standard found unconstitutional in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), the court reviews the trial as if no competency hearing was held at all; a procedural competency claim such as that raised by Petitioner is held to a lower burden of proof than a substantive competency claim; the court holds that in order to succeed on a procedural competency claim after a trial in which a petitioner was found competent under an unconstitutional burden of proof, the petitioner must establish that a reasonable judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence at the time of trial; a petitioner establishes a bona fide doubt by showing a reasonable judge should have doubted whether the petitioner met the Dusky standard; the claim is assessed under a totality of the circumstances approach; in this case, the trial court should have had such a doubt; the court also concluded that a retrospective competency determination could not be made and therefore ordered Petitioner's conviction vacated.

Odle v. Woodford,
238 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2001)

In capital 2254 proceeding, court held that state trial court should have conducted a competency hearing because the information before the judge about Petitioner's extensive mental impairments, including the fact that he was missing a piece of his brain the size of a grapefruit, raised a bona fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; the court also found the record sufficient for the state court to conduct a retrospective competency determination; case remanded to district court with directions to grant the writ unless the state trial court conducts a hearing within 60 days to determine Petitioner's competency at the time of trial.

United States v. Giron-Reyes,
234 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000)

In non-capital case, court found district court's failure to hold competency hearing violated due process as well as the competency procedure set out in 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241; district court initially found Appellant incompetent and ordered him hospitalized; the hospital later certified his competency; with no motion for a second competency hearing, Appellant pled guilty; the court held that section 4241 required a second competency hearing when there had been an initial finding of incompetence, even when Appellant had not requested the hearing; the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a determination of Appellant's competency to plead guilty; if retrospective determination cannot be made, district court should assess Appellant's present competency and if it finds him competent, allow him to replead.

Torres v. Prunty,
223 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000)

In non-capital 2254 proceeding, the state appealed the district court's finding of a Pate violation; the court analyzed the claim under AEDPA standards, finding the state courts' rejection of the claim was an "unreasonable determination of the facts" under 2254(d)(2); the court equated the "unreasonable determination" provision to the "clearly erroneous" standard; the information before the trial court raised a bona fide doubt about Petitioner's competency; writ granted.

Barnett v. Hargett,
174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999)

Pro se federal habeas petitioner's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising on rehearing a claim that the record was insufficient to support a finding that a competency hearing had occurred prior to sentencing, was construed by the federal courts as a claim that the state had violated petitioner's right to procedural due process by not conducting a competency hearing in accordance with the proper, post-Cooper v. Oklahoma, legal standard. Federal courts would not afford presumption of correctness to state-court determinations of competency where the state court applied the wrong, pre-Cooper, legal standard. The court treated petitioner's Cooper claim as analogous to a case where no competency hearing had occurred at all. Thus, petitioner was entitled to relief because his history of psychiatric problems, including being found incompetent to stand trial twice in this case, raised a bona fide doubt about his competency.

United States v. Klat,
156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998)

Once the district court had found reasonable cause to believe defendant was incompetent to stand trial, it could not allow defendant to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se at a hearing to determine her competency. Relying on Pate, court held that a defendant whose competency was reasonably in question could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived right to counsel. Remedy was remand for hearing to determine whether competency hearing "could have come out differently" if defendant had been represented by counsel. If so, reversal was required because error would have contaminated the entire criminal proceeding.

Trotter v. Bunnell,
163 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 1998)(unreported opinion)

Federal habeas corpus petitioner was arguably entitled to evidentiary hearing on claim that he was incompetent at time of guilty plea. Petitioner presented report of mental health expert indicating he had low IQ and an inability to apply information, and that his use of language could lead someone to erroneous impression that petitioner has greater understanding than he actually possessed. District court was correct that the latter finding by petitioner's expert defeated petitioner's procedural due process claim because it indicated the trial court would not have had grounds for doubting petitioner's competency at time of the plea. But district court erred in concluding that the expert's evidence was not relevant to petitioner's substantive due process claim that petitioner was in fact incompetent to enter plea.

United States v. Heywood,
155 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1998)

Defendant's procedural due process rights were violated when district court failed to conduct a hearing on defendant's competency after receiving report that defendant, who had been found incompetent, had been rendered competent through "substantial doses of antipsychotic medication" that had to be continued. Due process requires a "record-based judicial determination of competence in every case in which there is reason to doubt the defendant's competence to stand trial." Remanded for hearing to determine whether a (disfavored) retrospective competency determination was possible. If no such determination was possible, or a retrospective determination indicated defendant was not competent, defendant would be entitled to a new trial.

United States v. Loyola-Dominguez,
125 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997)

Defendant's due process rights violated by failure of district court to grant a competency hearing following defendant's attempted suicide in a jail cell on the eve of trial. The timing of the suicide attempt, and defendant's desire to "get out of here" as his sole objective, raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competence that required a hearing.

United States v. Williams,
113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997)

Williams' courtroom behavior and other evidence created a bona fide doubt about Williams' competency to stand trial and should have moved the trial court to order a competency hearing. Williams often interrupted the proceedings, speaking rapidly and "hysterically," urged one of her several attorneys (having fired or caused many to withdraw) to behave improperly (such as to ask cross-examination questions while the prosecutor was still conducting direct examination), testified nonresponsively, cried in front of the jury and informed the court on the second day of trial that she had not taken the medication she required for depression. The trial court's error was not cured when he ordered a post-verdict psychological evaluation at the urging of Williams' fourth attorney. The evaluator's finding that she was competent to participate in sentencing does not inspire confidence that she was actually competent during her trial. The Circuit Court vacates the conviction and directs the District Court to conduct a hearing into Williams' competency to stand trial.

Sena v. New Mexico State Prison,
109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997)

Applying pre-AEDPA standards, the Circuit Court concludes that the District Court improperly afforded the state court's competency finding a presumption of correctness. The state court's initial judgment that Sena was incompetent gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetence. That presumption was not overcome when the state court later ruled Sena competent without a hearing, relying solely on a hospital report claiming he had improved but also warning that he required continued treatment. The District Court also erred in holding that Sena's claim was procedurally barred when he failed to appeal the trial court's competency determination to the state's highest court. Procedural bars apply to competency claims that implicate procedural due process, as when an defendant complains that he did not receive a competency hearing to which he is entitled. Such bars do not apply to the type of substantive due process claim raised by Sena, who complains that he was allowed to enter a guilty plea while incompetent in fact. Remanded for a competency hearing by the District Court.

Webb v. Evans,
1997 WL 207514 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished)

Webb's failure to raise on direct appeal the claim that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea does not bar him from raising the issue in federal habeas since he is claiming a violation of substantive due process. Since the state court's docket does not clearly indicate what proceedings took place, the federal district court's first order of business on remand will be to determine if the state court ever made a formal finding of incompetency, as claimed by the state, giving rise to a presumption of continued incompetency. If so, then Webb's guilty plea should not have been accepted without a full-blown competency hearing.

Williamson v. Ward,
110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997)

The evidence of which Williamson's counsel was aware triggered a duty to investigate Williamson's competency to stand trial and to move for a competency hearing. Counsel knew that Williamson had a long history of mental problems (including diagnoses of severe bipolar disorder and paranoid and borderline personality disorders), that Williamson was being medicated, and perhaps overmedicated, for mental disorders, that Williamson behaved bizarrely in jail and in the courtroom (such as by tipping over counsel table), that Williamson had been found incompetent in connection with an earlier criminal charge, and that he was awarded disability benefits on the basis of his mental condition. Had counsel conducted an investigation he would have uncovered a wealth of additional information casting doubt on Williamson's competence. For instance, he would have learned that the psychiatrist who opined that Williamson was competent was himself severely mentally disordered. There is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's ineffectiveness, Williamson would have been found incompetent.

Miles v. Stainer,
108 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1997)

Miles was found incompetent to stand trial shortly after his arrest. The trial court eventually ruled him competent after a year-and-a-half of conflicting psychiatric findings. After entering a not guilty plea, Miles was again examined by three psychiatrists who eventually found him competent after initial doubt, but who warned that Miles' competency fluctuated since he did not consistently take his antipsychotic medication. Before allowing Miles to change his plea to guilty, the trial court held a second hearing. This hearing was not adequate because the trial court failed to inquire whether Miles was still taking his medication (in fact, he had stopped taking it some two weeks before). The Circuit Court instructs the District Court to grant the writ unless the state trial court conducts a retrospective competency hearing within 60 days.

Reynolds v. Norris,
86 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996)

Although defendant had been found competent during two pretrial hearings, the trial court should have conducted a third hearing, knowing that: (1) expert opinion had been closely divided at the second hearing, (2) defendant's trial testimony was meandering and irrational, (3) defendant had not been taking his medication, (4) defense expert testified that defendant was significantly impaired and (5) expert who testified at trial that defendant was competent had not examined defendant in some time. It was premature of the federal district court, however, to grant the writ of habeas corpus without first conducting a nunc pro tunc hearing.

United States v. Mason,
52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995)

The District Court should have granted a retrospective competency hearing after the defendant attempted to commit suicide following his conviction on federal drug charges. It was an error under federal law to require Mason to show more than "reasonable cause" for a competency hearing.

United States v. Soldevila-Lopez,
17 F.3d 480 (1st Cir. 1994)

District Court abused its discretion by denying motion for continuance of competency hearing to allow defendant to prepare response to new and unexpected diagnosis of malingering. Remanded for a full competency hearing.

Blazak v. Ricketts,
1 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1866 (1994)

Due process was violated when the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing where the defendant was found incompetent on three separate occasions in unrelated matters and engaged in bizarre conduct in pretrial hearings. (The grant of relief by the District Court was allowed to stand because two members of the panel disagreed on the merits and the third declined to reach the merits.)

Spitzweiser-Wittgenstein v. Newton,
978 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1992)

The District Court erred in giving the state court finding of competency a presumption of correctness because the state court failed to adequately develop the facts. The trial court failed to address the defendant's pro se motion to withdraw her plea, to which was attached an expert's affidavit reinstating his earlier opinion that the defendant was incompetent.

James v. Singletary,
957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 262 (1993)

Defendant who presented clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to his competence at the time of his trial was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. No state court had ever made a determination of competency, and defendant presented the conclusion of an expert that defendant would have been found lacking in several areas of competency. A defendant alleging a substantive due process violation (incompetence in fact), rather than a procedural due process violation (failure of the state court to hold a required competency hearing) is not barred by his failure to raise his claim at trial or on direct appeal.

Nicks v. United States,
955 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1992)

Determination that the trial court improperly denied a competency hearing must be based solely on the evidence available to the trial court at the time of the denial. Remand for clarification whether the District Court's grant of relief relied on evidence not available to the trial court.

United States v. Hoskie,
950 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991)

Government did not meet burden of demonstrating competence by a preponderance of the evidence where defendant had verbal IQ of approximately 62, where defense expert testified that defendant was incompetent, where government's expert focused too narrowly on competency in basic skills of daily life, and where the court itself expressed frequent doubts about defendant's competence and appeared motivated to find competency out of a fear that the defendant would be a danger to the community if released.

United States v. Day,
949 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1991)

District Court erred in holding that defendant could not preclude the use of prior guilty pleas as sentence enhancers unless he could prove that he was incompetent when he made the pleas; defendant need only show that the courts that accepted the pleas were aware of evidence warranting competency hearings but failed to conduct them.

Lafferty v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992)

State trial court erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial; although defendant had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him, there was substantial testimony that he lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings because of his paranoid delusional system. The passage of six years made a retrospective hearing impractical.

Griffin v. Lockhart,
935 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1991)

The state trial court did not conduct a full, fair and adequate hearing as to defendant's competency when there were no witnesses, questioning of the defendant was limited and the only evidence was a one-paragraph letter from a state mental health facility stating that further evaluation was needed. The passage of three years made a meaningful retrospective hearing impossible.

Hull v. Freeman,
932 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1991)

State trial counsel exhibited deficient performance at a competency hearing when he failed to bring to the factfinder's attention the fact that two colleagues of the state's expert disagreed with his conclusion that the defendant was fit to stand trial. Remand for clarification of the District Court's findings as to prejudice.

Cowley v. Stricklin,
929 F.2d 640 (11th Cir. 1991)

Where trial court was aware of defendant's extensive history of psychiatric commitments and where the state's expert made only a cursory examination before declaring defendant competent, it was a due process violation for the trial court to refuse to appoint a defense mental health expert to assist in establishing defendant's incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense.

Tiller v. Esposito,
911 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1990)

Trial court violated due process when it accepted defendant's guilty plea without conducting a competency hearing, where trial court was aware of the history of mental illness of defendant and his family, uncontroverted psychiatric reports indicated that defendant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was incompetent, defendant inquired whether he would receive psychiatric treatment if he pled guilty, and judge wrote letter to Department of Corrections expressing concern regarding defendant's competency. Remand for a determination whether a meaningful nunc pro tunc hearing could be held.

Card v. Dugger,
911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990)

Petitioner claimed that both his procedural due process right to a competency hearing and his substantive due process right not to be tried while incompetent in fact were violated. In ruling on these claims, the district court alluded only to the facts regarding defendant's competency that were available to the state trial court. While this is appropriate for a procedural due process claim, disposition of the substantive due process claim requires examination of all the evidence regarding competence, whether it was available to the state trial court or not. In order to ensure that the district did in fact consider this additional evidence, the reviewing court remanded to allow the district court to set forth its reasons for failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Bouchillon v. Collins,
907 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1990)

It was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that petitioner met his burden of proving his incompetence in fact by a preponderance of the evidence, where petitioner was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, his periods of diminished capacity would not necessarily be obvious to the layman, and psychiatrist testified in habeas proceedings that petitioner was probably incompetent at the time of his guilty plea.

United States v. Hemsi,
901 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1990)

Trial court properly found defendant incompetent (over defendant's objection), based on expert testimony that while defendant had an intellectual understanding of the proceedings, his mental illness prevented him from rationally acting on that understanding and based on defendant's courtroom behavior, including frequent outbursts and the blowing of kisses at the prosecuting attorney. Note: strictly speaking this is not a successful case, since the defendant sought to have the finding of incompetency overturned.

United States v. Auen,
846 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1988)

District Court erred in not making findings as to defendant's competency to stand trial, were defendant exhibited bizarre behavior and beliefs, including claim that compliance with tax laws was voluntary and claim that his detention was an outlaw act. On remand, District Court is to determine if a meaningful nunc pro tunc competency hearing is possible and to hold such a hearing, if possible.

Estock v. Lane,
842 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)

The state habeas court's finding of competency, although ordinarily entitled to a presumption of correctness, was not fairly supported by the record, where petitioner's pleadings created a bona fide doubt as to competency and where the state habeas court (1) failed to conduct a hearing, (2) was not the same judge that accepted petitioner's plea and thus had no opportunity to observe petitioner, and (3) falsely assumed that petitioner's trial attorney was aware of all evidence relevant to competency. At a retrospective hearing, the federal district court properly concluded that petitioner had not been competent at his plea hearing, in that petitioner had been diagnosed as "paranoid personality, borderline on psychotic," petitioner's answers during his plea colloquy did not indicate understanding, and petitioner had attempted suicide six days prior to his guilty plea.

Agan v. Dugger,
835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987)

State trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to hold a competency hearing, where a bona fide doubt as to competency was raised by the facts presented to the trail court, including petitioner's long history of mental illness and commitments and his bizarre and self-defeating testimony before the grand jury and during the sentencing hearing. Remand for retrospective competency hearing.

United States v. Renfroe,
825 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1987)

District Court erred in not granting hearing on question of defendant's competency to stand trial and to be sentenced when, during the course of the sentencing hearing, evidence was presented that defendant suffered a 16-year addiction to cocaine that, in the opinion of experts, interfered with his ability to cooperate with his attorney and defendant's attorney testified that defendant forbade him from using drug abuse as a defense during trial. Remanded for District Court to determine if a meaningful nunc pro tunc hearing was still possible. (For disposition on remand, see United States v. Renfroe, 745 F.Supp. 203 (D.Del. 1990)).

United States v. Hutson,
821 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1987)

Second competency hearing should have been held after treating psychiatrist reported that defendant, who was earlier adjudged incompetent and committed for evaluation, was competent to stand trial, but failure to do so only required remand for determination as to whether meaningful retrospective competency hearing could be held, rather than reversal; defendant's substantive rights were affected only if she was actually incompetent at time of trial. A retrospective determination is meaningful if the quantity and quality of available evidence is such that a competency hearing can be labeled as more than mere speculation.

Bundy v. Dugger,
816 F.2d 564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987)

District Court's finding that petitioner was not entitled to an competency hearing was clearly erroneous where the District Court (1) relied on a finding of competency in a separate state proceeding without reviewing the record of that proceeding for adequacy, (2) placed undue emphasis on trial counsel's failure to request a competency hearing, (3) erred in finding that petitioner had waived his claim by failing to present it earlier, and (4) ignored strong indicia of incompetence, including petitioner's rejection of a plea agreement, the uncontroverted testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings, and petitioner's decision to perform a mock wedding ceremony in lieu of presenting mitigating evidence. Remanded for a competency hearing by the District Court. (For disposition on remand, see 675 F.Supp. 622 (M.D. Fla. 1987)).

United States v. Cole,
813 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1987)

It was error for the District Court not to inquire into defendant's competency when it learned during the course of a plea colloquy that defendant had taken illegal drugs the night before. The District Court's failure to develop the record made a retrospective hearing impossible.

Sturgis v. Goldsmith,
796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1986)

Petitioner had a constitutional right to be present at his competency hearing, a critical stage of his trial. Remanded to federal district court for harmless error analysis.

Felde v. Blackburn,
795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986)

After the jury rejected his insanity defense, petitioner instructed his attorney to seek the death penalty. The state habeas court and the federal district court rejected petitioner's claim that his attorney was ineffective for carrying out his wishes. The circuit court recast the issue as one of whether petitioner was competent to instruct his attorney in this manner, effectively waiving his right to counsel. Remanded to district court for determination whether the trial court's finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial was adequately supported by the record and whether petitioner was still competent at the time he waived counsel.

United States ex rel. SEC v. Billingsley,
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985)

District Court improperly placed the burden on the defendant to prove his incompetence. Since lay and expert testimony on defendant's competence was closely divided, there is a reasonable possibility that defendant would have been found unfit under a proper allocation of the burden of proof. Remanded for the District Court to determine if a meaningful retrospective hearing is possible and, if so, to hold such a hearing. Note: the Court appears to base its holding on the view, later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992), that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant.

Silverstein v. Henderson,
706 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1983)

In view of undisputed facts that petitioner had IQ of 74 and mental age of seven-year-old, had long institutional history and that two court-appointed psychiatrists found petitioner incompetent, failure to order competency hearing sua sponte violated right to fair trial, even though third psychiatrist found petitioner competent based on a brief evaluation. When a trial court neglects its duty to conduct a hearing on competence, the defendant's failure to object or take appeal on the issue will not bar collateral attack. A retrospective hearing would be inadequate given the passage of almost six years.

Speedy v. Wyrick,
702 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1983)

The federal district court erred in rejecting, without a hearing, petitioner's claim that he was incompetent during trial. Before trial, two experts opined that petitioner was competent, but a third expert gave trial testimony indicating he had some doubt about defendant's competency. Nonetheless the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing. The rejection of petitioner's claim by state courts was not entitled to a presumption of correctness, inasmuch as the state courts did not conduct a complete review of the record on direct appeal and did not supplement the record with relevant evidence in post-conviction proceedings. Remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.

United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen,
686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986)

State statute placing the burden on the defendant to prove incompetence is unconstitutional. The misallocation of the burden was not harmless error since competency was a close question: two experts found defendant unfit to stand trial, one found defendant fit but would present "difficulties for defense lawyer," and another found him fit. Remand for determination whether a retrospective hearing would be meaningful. Note: In Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant in a competency proceeding.

Acosta v. Turner,
666 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1980)

State trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to make a competency determination, where petitioner had history of serious mental illness, where there is no evidence that petitioner received necessary treatment during the four months between his hospital discharge and trial, where trial court entertained doubts about competency, and where psychiatrists appointed after trial found petitioner incompetent to be sentenced. In the alternative, where trial court agreed that he would vacate the guilty plea if a specified expert made a finding that petitioner was incompetent, petitioner was entitled to have this bargain enforced. Remanded for a determination of whether the specified expert ever made a finding. If petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his bargain with the court, then District Court is to determine whether a retrospective competency hearing is possible.

Pride v. Estelle,
649 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1981)

Petitioner was entitled to a federal hearing on his claim that he was incompetent during his trial, where (1) one expert testified at his competency hearing that he was mentally retarded, paranoid schizophrenic and incompetent, (2) a second expert's finding of competency was based on a brief examination done for another purpose some three years previous to trial, (3) petitioner was transferred from prison to a mental hospital following his trial, and (4) petitioner's claim was rejected without a hearing or a written opinion by the state courts. Remanded to district court.

Pate v. Smith,
637 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1981)

Petitioner was entitled to a competency hearing once the state trial court entertained doubts about his competency. In resolving his doubts by consulting a report that was not part of the record and by reflecting on his own experience with petitioner in previous proceedings, the trial judge deprived petitioner of the opportunity to introduce evidence, conduct cross-examination, and create a record. Remanded to state court for a determination whether a retrospective hearing would be feasible.

Lokos v. Capps,
625 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980)

Petitioner's procedural due process rights were violated when the state trial court failed to inquire into his competency, where the only evidence of competency was the testimony of peace officers and a medical doctor who considered petitioner sane and where the trial court improperly refused to consider (as hearsay) the substantial evidence of incompetency contained in the records of one of petitioner's hospitalizations. Petitioner's substantive due process rights were violated when the federal habeas court ruled that petitioner was in fact competent at the time of his trial, where the expert with the greatest knowledge of petitioner was confident he had been incompetent, a second expert opined that petitioner was in a state of severe psychosis during his trial, and a third expert stated that he lacked sufficient evidence to make a determination.

Osborne v. Thompson,
610 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1979)

State trial court should have granted a competency hearing or allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas, where an expert found defendant to be only marginally competent prior to the plea colloquy and where the trial court found defendant to be incompetent to be sentenced a few months later.

Van Poyck v. Wainwright,
595 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1979)

District Court erred in holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust his substantive due process claim that he was convicted while incompetent in fact. Petitioner presented sufficient facts to raise a real, legitimate and substantial issue as to his mental capacity, inasmuch as during the period of his guilty pleas he tried to hang himself and set fire to his mattress and psychiatric tests showed him to be incompetent. (Petitioner's procedural due process claim that he was improperly denied a competency hearing was rejected because the trial court was not aware of these facts.) Remanded for a competency hearing.

Zapata v. Estelle,
588 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1979)

Petitioner presented sufficient facts to create a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to her competency in fact, where her personal physician testified at trial that she suffered from severe emotional problems and a mental health expert who examined her a few days after trial found her to be legally insane. Remanded for competency hearing.

Martin v. Estelle,
583 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978)

District Court's finding, following a retrospective hearing, that it could not make a determination of petitioner's competency at the time of his trial could not be relied upon inasmuch as the District Court failed to make an initial determination as to whether a retrospective hearing would be meaningful and improperly placed the burden of proof on the state. The test of meaningfulness is whether the evidence is adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labeled as more than mere speculation; contemporaneous expert and lay testimony, as well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, can provide sound material for a reconstruction of mental state. Remanded for a finding as to meaningfulness and, if warranted, a competency hearing at which the burden of proof is put upon the petitioner.

United States v. Ives,
574 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978)

Petitioner's due process rights were violated when trial court refused to consider evidence proffered by the defense (the testimony of two psychiatrists and a U.S. Marshall) indicating a change in petitioner's competence, where previously there had been four alternating determinations of competency and incompetency within the space of a year, petitioner's first trial had ended in a mistrial upon a finding of incompetency, and five months had elapsed since he was last found competent by government experts. A retrospective hearing would not be possible because of the passage of six years, because the judges in both previous trials were dead, and because there were no psychiatric reports on petitioner's competence at the time of his second trial.

Suggs v. LaVallee,
570 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)

A state trial judge ordered a competency evaluation when petitioner made unusual remarks immediately following the court's acceptance of his guilty plea. After petitioner had been restored to competency, a second trial judge sentenced petitioner without considering whether he had been competent to enter a guilty plea, even though petitioner told the court that he had not understood the earlier proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court properly concluded that petitioner had been incompetent at the time of his guilty plea, based on the finding of incompetency immediately after the plea, evidence of bizarre behavior on petitioner's part around the time of the plea, and the exhaustive investigation by an expert who testified that petitioner was probably psychotic. The district court was justified in rejecting the finding of a state postconviction court because several facts were not adequately developed at the state hearing.

United States v. Hollis,
569 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1977)

The federal habeas court's error in placing the burden on petitioner to prove his incompetence at the time of his trial was not harmless in that the evidence as to competency was closely divided. The fundamental nature of the right not to be tried while incompetent makes it inappropriate to place the burden on the petitioner, even in post-conviction proceedings. Remanded for a competency hearing at which the burden will be properly allocated. Note: this holding might not survive the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medina v. California 112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992) that it is not unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant in a competency proceeding.

United States v. Nichelson,
550 F.2d 502 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 998 (1977)

District Court must grant an 18 U.S.C. § 4244 motion for a psychiatric examination unless the motion is frivolous or made in bad faith. Defense counsel satisfied that standard by citing his own observations of defendant's difficulties in discussing the facts of the case, the history of mental disturbance in defendant's family, and the head injury that defendant had sustained some six years before. Remanded for competency hearing.

Martin v. Estelle,
546 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1977)

Petitioner was not given a full and fair competency hearing (before a jury), where the prosecutor continually introduced highly inflammatory material relevant only to guilt and warned that petitioner would go free if found incompetent and where the distinction between incompetence and insanity at the time of the offense was not observed during the competency hearing.

United States v. Masthers,
539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976)

District court erred in failing to hold a hearing on federal defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where the prosecutor agreed with defense counsel that defendant may not have given his confession knowingly and intelligently and where the presentence report stressed defendant's extremely low intelligence and lack of any concept of time. Remanded for a hearing.

Bruce v. Estelle,
536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976)

It was clearly erroneous for the federal district court, at a nunc pro tunc hearing, to credit the testimony of a psychiatrist (Dr. Grigson) who diagnosed petitioner as a sociopath and a malingerer, where the diagnosis made by the other psychiatrist at the hearing -- chronic schizophrenia so severe as to have rendered petitioner incompetent -- was supported by the great weight of the evidence, including petitioner's medical discharge from the Marines and his commitments to psychiatric facilities for treatment of schizophrenia.

Saddler v. United States,
531 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)

When evidence of defendant's extensive history of mental illness, including a hospitalization following a suicide attempt, became known to the trial court prior to sentencing, it was error for the trial court not to have ordered an evaluation of defendant's competency to be sentenced and a retrospective evaluation of his competence to have pled guilty.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

 

United States v. Mooney,
123 F.Supp.2d 442 (N.D. Ill. 2000)

In a non-capital case, the court found the defendant incompetent; the defendant's personality disorder, which was a systemic, enduring and severe condition, qualified as "a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 4241(a).

United States v. Sanchez,
38 F.Supp.2d 355 (D. N.J. 1999)

Court held that same standard for determining competency during trial (Dusky) must be applied in case of defendant whose competency came into doubt after the conviction but before sentencing.

United States v. Rudisill,
43 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)

While in pretrial detention defendant received a beating from other inmates. The resulting brain damage left him with severe cognitive impairments, dementia, speech and motor impairments, and "absolutely no recollection of the facts underlying the charges against him." Relying on its own observations of defendant and his testimony at a competency hearing, the court rejected the testimony of a government psychiatrist that defendant was malingering his amnesia symptoms. The court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and, based on expert testimony that he would never fully recover, refused to commit him to the custody of the attorney general, and instead returned defendant to his mother's custody and care.

Johnson v. Keane,
974 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

The state trial court erred in failing to order a second competency hearing where the experts who declared Johnson competent at the first hearing also warned that he had a history of mental illness and could deteriorate at any time, where defense counsel notified the court several times that Johnson had in fact deteriorated, where the court refused to hear evidence that counsel was prepared to present, where the court dismissed a psychiatrist's finding that Johnson was delusional by remarking that "[w]e are all delusional," where the court ignored Johnson's irrational behavior, such as his insistence on wearing to court the clothes that his victims had described to police, and where the court conceded that Johnson should receive psychiatric treatment while incarcerated.

Short v. United States,
1997 WL 276229 (W.D.N.Y. May 1997) (unpublished)

Short, filing a habeas petition before the same district judge who presided over his plea proceeding, succeeded in getting an evidentiary hearing not strictly on a competency claim, but rather on the claim that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty without investigating his competency and for failing to move for withdrawal of the plea when evidence of Short's mental illness came to light. Trial counsel should have known early on that Short suffered from a severe mental illness that merited further investigation (for example, Short told the court during the plea colloquy that he was taking medication for schizophrenia). A probation officer's report prepared after the plea colloquy should have alerted counsel that Short suffered from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, behaved irrationally during his interview with the probation officer and was receiving federal assistance on account of mental disability. The district judge appears to be sympathetic to Short's claim that the judge was in error for failing to convene a competency hearing before accepting his plea, but finds that Short procedurally defaulted the claim by not raising it on direct appeal and by failing to plead cause and prejudice.

Nicks v. United States,
874 F.Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

Trial court denied petitioner's due process rights in failing to conduct a hearing into petitioner's competency to enter a guilty plea, where, prior to sentencing, petitioner's probation officer requested a psychiatric evaluation, mental health experts who examined him for purposes of sentencing found him to be paranoid schizophrenic, mentally retarded and delusional, and trial counsel expressed his misgivings about petitioner's competence to the trial judge in private and made a motion for withdrawal of the plea on the record. Conviction vacated.

United States v. Veatch,
842 F.Supp. 480 (W.D. Okl. 1993)

The government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is fit to stand trial or waive his right to counsel, where appointed counsel stated, over defendant's objections, that he did not believe defendant is competent, where defense expert gave credible testimony that defendant's unconditional belief in conspiracy theory rendered him incapable of participating in the proceedings in a rational manner, and where the testimony of the government expert that defendant's actions are calculated was inconsistent and less credible.

Lagway v. Dallman,
806 F.Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ohio 1992)

Competency hearing before state trial court did not comport with due process, where trial court relied on his own impressions based on a lengthy colloquy, discounted the uncontroverted testimony of a mental health expert that petitioner was incompetent, and failed to request additional evidence or argument from counsel. Furthermore, even if the hearing had comported with due process, the trial court's finding of competency is not entitled to a presumption of correctness in that the court placed undue emphasis on petitioner's factual understanding of the functions of judge, jury and prosecution and did not give adequate consideration to petitioner's ability to consult with counsel and to participate in the proceedings in a rational manner.

United States v. Perez Diaz,
797 F.Supp. 81 (D. Puerto Rico 1992)

Government failed to prove defendant's competence by a preponderance of the evidence, where there was uncontroverted expert testimony that defendant is incompetent, defendant exhibited nervous tremors throughout the competency hearing, and defendant's self-inflicted wounds were visible to the court.

United States v. Renfroe,
745 F.Supp. 203 (D. Del. 1990)

In retrospective competency hearing where evidence for and against a finding of competency was equally balanced, government failed to meet the burden of proving competence by a preponderance of the evidence. Government and defense experts agreed that defendant was using cocaine during trial, but disagreed as to his level of impairment. Trial counsel testified that defendant was able to focus on his case for only a few minutes at a time and that he exhibited bizarre behavior.

United States v. Nichols,
661 F.Supp. 507 (W.D. Mich. 1987)

Defendant established reasonable cause to believe that he may not be able to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense, where trial counsel attested that defendant failed to respond normally to discussions of the charges, defendant has been under treatment for severe depression, and government agreed that defendant's attitude is bizarre and that he may be incompetent. Under federal law, a showing of reasonable cause mandates a competency hearing and strongly counsels in favor of a psychiatric evaluation, although the latter remains in the District Court's discretion.

United States v. Blohm,
579 F.Supp. 495 (S.D. N.Y. 1983)

Defendant was incompetent to stand trial, though he had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him and though mental health experts deemed him competent, because the requirement that defendant have a rational understanding of the proceedings was not satisfied by the mental health experts' testimony that defendant was rational in the sense that his reasoning was logically consistent with his underlying delusions. Defendant could not be said to have a rational understanding (in the lay sense of that phrase) in that he believed that the charges against him grew out of a conspiracy among a judge, Richard Nixon, and Arnold Palmer.


Evans v. Raines,
534 F.Supp. 791 (D.Ariz. 1982)

Trial court violated petitioner's due process rights in failing to hold hearing on petitioner's competence to waive counsel. Although petitioner was able to understand the nature of the proceedings and to participate in them meaningfully, and thus was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to waive counsel in that he was unable to make reasoned choices among the alternatives presented to him. Trial court knew that petitioner had been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and that petitioner believed the public defender was part of a conspiracy against him. The Circuit Court endorsed the above findings of the district judge, but held that the state court might be able to cure the error through a retrospective competency hearing. Evans v. Raines, 705 F.2d 1479 (1983). Note: in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is one standard for both competency to stand trial and competency to waive counsel.

Meeks v. Smith,
512 F.Supp. 335 (W.D. N.C. 1981)

Petitioner's due process rights were violated when state trial court failed to hold competency hearing, where petitioner had recently been found incompetent in another proceeding, one mental health expert consistently found petitioner incompetent and another mental health expert, who diagnosed petitioner as paranoid schizophrenic, alternated between findings of competency and incompetency.

Osborne v. Thompson,
481 F.Supp. 162 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)

Trial court should have inquired further into petitioner's competency to enter guilty pleas, where pre-trial evaluator deemed petitioner only marginally competent, where petitioner gave unclear or nonresponsive answers to open-ended questions during the plea colloquy, and where trial court had petitioner committed for treatment of mental illness prior to sentencing. Passage of four years made retrospective hearing unfeasible.

 

 

Military Cases

 

United States v. Collins
60 M.J. 261 (U.S. Armed Forces 2004)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces finds that a military judge abused his discretion by not inquiring further into Appellant's mental responsibility when the sole member of the sanity board appeared to change his testimony and conclusion about the central issue.

 

STATE COURTS

 

 

State v. Leonard
855 A.2d 531 (N.H. 2004)

The trial court found that defendant was not competent to stand trial, but his competence could probably be restored "with appropriate services of legal counsel." Pursuant to court order, counsel attempted to educate defendant before the next competency hearing. On interlocutory appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist must be appointed to supervise a defendant’s treatment, and that "tutelage in the law" by his attorneys is not appropriate treatment. Case is reversed and remanded.

Commonwealth v. Santiago
855 A.2d 682 (Pa. 2004)

The issue of competence to stand trial is not waived where it was not raised at trial or on appeal and it may be raised initially in a PCRA (Post Conviction Relief Act) petition. Under certain circumstances, however, a PCRA court may hold a retrospective competency hearing in lieu of granting a new trial. Here, the findings of the PCRA court that petitioner was competent to stand trial are affirmed.

In Re Erick B.
777 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 2004)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the court commits the defendant to the custody of the Commissioner for the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for a period of 90 days. The court found that the defendant presented evidence that rebutted the application of the presumption of fitness and competence, after which the prosecution failed to prove he was not an incapacitated person.

Jackson v. State
880 So.2d 1241 (Fla.App. 2004)

The trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing where the defendant had been adjudicated incompetent on four separate occasions. A defendant cannot be adjudicated from incompetent to competent without a competency hearing that includes an opportunity to call witnesses, so the court's oral declaration that defendant was competent was invalid. Thus, the defendant remained incompetent when brought to trial and his right to due process was violated. Harmless error review is inappropriate with such fundamental error, so the case is reversed and remanded.

People v. Johnwell
18 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 (Cal.App. 2004)

Erroneous circumstantial evidence instructions at defendant’s competency trial placed a higher standard of proof on defendant and violated due process. The error was not harmless and the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

People v. Ary
13 Cal.Rptr.3d 482 (Cal.App. 2004)

Defendant was denied due process when the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing despite substantial evidence that defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings against him because of his mental retardation. On remand, the State has the burden of establishing that a retrospective competency hearing can be held.

State v. Kent
584 S.E.2d 169 (W.Va. 2003)

Defendant was found incompetent after his arrest and was treated for 9 months until he regained competency and was tried and convicted of murder. Because of his behavior during trial, counsel immediately requested an examination of defendant. It was subsequently determined that correctional authorities had failed to advise the court and the parties that defendant was no longer taking his medication. At a competency hearing, the treating physician testified that defendant had been incompetent, while another State doctor who examined defendant 23 days after resumption of medication opined that he had been competent at trial. The trial court agreed and sentenced defendant to life in prison. The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred and reversed and remanded for a new trial because the defendant had lacked the mental capacity to meaningfully participate in his defense.

Wilson v. State
875 So.2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)

A hearing was required on whether defendant was competent at time he pleaded guilty to theft and burglary, where the trial judge had ordered a mental evaluation of defendant, the forensic examiner expressed doubts as to defendant's intellectual functioning and knowledge comprehension, the examiner referred defendant for screening by the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and nothing in record indicated any action was taken on the examiner's recommendations, and no reference was made at guilty plea proceedings to defendant's mental evaluation.

Tate v. State
864 So.2d 44 (Fla.App. 2003)

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to mandatory life in prison for an offense committed when he was 12 years old. Post-trial his appellate counsel sought a competency evaluation, as well as an evidentiary hearing on the adequacy of explanations to the defendant regarding pre-trial plea negotiations. The trial court denied the competency evaluation, explaining that defendant’s competency to stand trial had never before been questioned. The appellate court held that defendant's due process rights were violated by the trial court's failure to order, sua sponte, pretrial and post-trial competency evaluations. In light of defendant’s age, his lack of previous exposure to the criminal justice system, and further developmental evidence presented at trial, a competency evaluation was constitutionally mandated.

Baqleh v. Superior Court
100 Cal.App.4th 478, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2002)

The provisions of the Civil Discovery Act apply to competency hearings; the order directing defendant to submit to an examination by a prosecution expert is vacated because it fails to adequately specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination, as required by the Civil Discovery Act, and improperly allows unidentified examiners to videotape the examination; an accused person cannot on the basis of the Fifth Amendment refuse to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a competency hearing because a judicially declared rule of immunity provides the necessary assurance that an accused will not be convicted of a crime by use of any information obtained at a court-compelled mental examination or the use of information obtained from that examination, or that his sentencing may be affected by such information or the fruits thereof; there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a court-ordered mental examination because the judicially declared rule of immunity provides adequate protections; if a proper order is entered requiring defendant to submit to a competency examination by a prosecution expert, and defendant refuses to cooperate, the trial court may disclosure to the jury the fact of the defendant's refusal to comply with the order.

State v. Morales
2002 WL 1331757 (Conn. Super. April 5, 2002) (unpublished)

Connecticut statute governing procedures for when the court determines that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will obtain competency within the period of treatment allowed by the law was unconstitutionally vague. Although the statute clearly provided the available options -- release or civil commitment -- it provided no standards for the trial judge to use in selecting the choice or implementing the choice of remedy.

State v. Bevins
2002 WL 440753 (Ohio App. March 22, 2002) (unpublished)

Because the trial court raised the issue of defendant's competency, even though it may have been inadvertent, it was reversible error under state law for the trial court to fail to conduct a competency hearing. (The trial court ordered a sanity evaluation in response to defendant's NGRI plea but utilized a form that included a competency examination.)

In re Grimes
769 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 2002)

The right not to be tried while incompetent applies to juvenile proceedings just as it does in criminal trials of adults. Report in prior case finding that juvenile defendant was not competent to stand trial, of which the judge in the present case was familiar, raised "sufficient indicia of incompetence" that defendant should have been afforded a competency hearing.

Anderson v. State
2002 WL 432674 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio March 20, 2002) (unpublished)

While an informal dialogue may constitute a competency inquiry in some instances, it is insufficient when, as in this case, the competency issue is specifically raised by the defendant; trial court erred in failing to conduct a competency inquiry given the well-supported incompetency finding of an appointed expert; the appointed expert's later unexplained opinion that defendant was competent did not extinguish the bona fide doubt that had been raised about defendant's competence; the case is remanded to the trial court to determine whether there is "some evidence" of incompetence, and, if there is, to determine whether a retrospective competency determination by a jury is practicable.

State v. Were
761 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio 2002)

In case involving the murder of a prison guard, the capital conviction and death sentence are reversed due to the trial court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing after trial counsel repeatedly raised the issue of defendant's competency. The trial court's finding of competence based upon its review of the competency evaluation report violated the competency statute then in effect, as well as the United States Constitution. "[A]n evidentiary competency hearing is constitutionally required whenever there are sufficient indicia of incompetency to call into doubt defendant's competency to stand trial." Here, defense counsel documented defendant's paranoia and bizarre beliefs that interfered with his ability to cooperate with his attorneys. Defendant's pro se filings corroborated defense counsel's assertions. That defendant had refused to speak with the appointed mental health experts did not prevent the trial court from conducting the required hearing. Further, the record did not support the lower court's conclusion that defendant was engaged in a "calculated effort to avoid prosecution by delaying the progress of the trial."

In re Kerch
2002 WL 86831 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)

After state supreme court directed appellate court to vacate its summary denial of petitioner's habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings, the appellate court grants relief on claims that petitioner was incompetent at the time of trial and incompetent at the time she waived her right to counsel. Post-trial affidavits established that petitioner suffered from bipolar disorder and that she was delusional at the relevant times.

People v. Green
2002 WL 86987 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished)

Trial court abused its discretion by denying motion to continue sentencing to allow defendant to present a formal competency motion based on newly discovered information about defendant's narcolepsy.

In re Staten
2001 WL 1647286 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Dec. 21, 2001) (unpublished)

Trial court was required to conduct a competency hearing before accepting minor's plea of guilty, which resulted in an adjudication of delinquency, where the CAST-MR indicated that the minor was not competent to stand trial.

State ex rel. Reed v. Frawley
59 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. 2001)

Juvenile was entitled to hearing to determine whether he was competent to understand extradition proceeding and to assist counsel in defending against extradition.

State v. Marshall,
27 P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001)

In a capital case, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding a competency hearing mandated by state statute where there was ample evidence calling defendant's competency into question at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea.

Thompson v. Com.,
56 S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001)

In a capital case where the defendant pled guilty, the trial court erred in not holding a competency hearing mandated by state statute; the statute protects the due process right not to be tried while incompetent; a retrospective competency hearing is permissible depending on the facts of the case; remanded for trial court to determine if a retrospective hearing is possible and if so, to conduct it.

State v. Sanders,
549 S.E.2d 40 (W.Va. 2001)


In a non-capital case, the defendant was found incompetent and committed; later, court found defendant competent; during trial, defense moved for mistrial, saying the defendant was psychotic; conviction reversed because the information before the trial court raised sufficient doubt about the defendant's mental fitness to warrant an additional inquiry regarding his competency; the trial court has a duty to employ adequate procedures for determining competency, whether or not a formal motion is made; where there has been a competency hearing and the defendant has been found competent, the trial court need not suspend proceedings for another hearing unless it is presented with new evidence casting serious doubt on the validity of the earlier competency finding or with an intervening change of circumstances that renders prior determination unreliable; on remand, the trial court may attempt a nunc pro tunc determination of the defendant's competency at the time of trial.

Kelly v. State
797 So.2d 1278 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2001)


In non-capital case, trial court abused its discretion in not sua sponte holding a competency hearing before proceeding with trial. The court found on the record that Kelly was only borderline competent, a finding that was supported by defendant's disruptive behavior during trial, nonsensical ramblings about leaving the country, and rantings about Jesus. "Because all the parties involved, including defense counsel, worried about Kelly's ‘reduced capacity,' it was incumbent upon the court to speak up and order a hearing when no one else asked for it."

In re J.M.,
769 A.2d 656 (Vt. 2001)

In a non-capital case, an expert testified at the competency hearing that the mentally retarded juvenile defendant was "marginally competent," but would need special held before he could meet the competency standard; teachers and others from defendant's school testified about his limited abilities; the court's sole finding in ruling defendant competent was that the expert "should be believed"; although the evidence was sufficient to find defendant competent, the court's findings were inadequate to explain its reasoning and did not address defendant's need for special help; reversed.

State v. Haycock,
766 A.2d 720 (N.H. 2001)

In a non-capital case, the only witness at the competency hearing was defendant's expert, who testified defendant did not have rational understanding and lacked ability to consult with attorney; trial court found defendant competent, focusing on factual understanding; under state law, the state must prove competency by a preponderance of the evidence; the trial court erred in finding defendant had a rational understanding when no evidence supported that finding; on remand, court should consider if a retrospective determination of competency could be made.

In re Fleming,
16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2001)

Guilty plea vacated because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to apprise court that defendant's competence was in doubt.


State v. Sullivan,
739 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 2001)

In a non-capital case, experts testified that defendant was incompetent and that no form of treatment would be effective in restoring his competency in foreseeable future; trial court found defendant incompetent and committed him; relying upon Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), court found statute under which defendant was committed unconstitutional because it requires all defendants found incompetent to be committed for a fixed time up to one year regardless of whether treatment will be effective in restoring competency.

 

Roberts v. State,
761 S.2d 885 (Md. 2000)

In a non-capital case, court found under state law that trial court erred in denying, without a hearing, a motion for examination of defendant for competency, when attorney's motion was sufficient to overcome the presumption of competency.

Head v. Taylor,
538 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 2000)

In capital state post-conviction case, court affirmed lower court's order finding trial counsel ineffective in failing to assure defendant was medicated before trial so he could assist in his defense and in failing to obtain jail records which would have contradicted testimony of jail doctor and jailers about defendant's mental condition.

Permenter v. State,
796 So.2d 1147 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)

In non-capital case, court found that although defendant was initially found competent, court erred in denying second competency hearing where the defense presented evidence that defendant's mental condition had deteriorated since first competency hearing; remanded for trial court to conduct compentency hearing, at which state has burden of proving competency.

 

State v. Paul,
2000 WL 1239728 (Minn. App. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished)

In non-capital state post-conviction proceeding, court found that trial court violated defendant's procedural due process rights in not holding competency hearing where there was reason to doubt defendant's competency.

State v. McRae,
533 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. App. 2000)

In non-capital case, trial court's failure to conduct competency hearing violated federal due process; evidence before the court raised bona fide doubt sufficient to require court to conduct hearing sua sponte; remanded for retrospective competency determination, if that is possible; if retrospective determination is not possible, conviction must be reversed.

People v. Castro
78 Cal.App.4th 1402 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 2000)

In non-capital case, trial court committed reversible error in denying defense counsel's request to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to evaluate defendant pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code, § 1369 (trial of issue of mental competence) in light of substantial evidence that raised a suspicion that defendant was developmentally disabled.


Woods v. State,
994 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)

Defendant's due process rights were violated when trial court failed to order a competency evaluation and hearing after defendant, who had a history of psychiatric problems, attempted suicide the day before the sentencing hearing.

State v. Snyder,
750 So.2d 832 (La. 1999)

Trial court's refusal to grant a "continuance to allow [defendant's] antidepressant medication time to remedy his unfocused, tangential and circumstantial ideation [which] rendered him unable to effectively communicate with his attorney"violated due process because the trial court failed to conduct adequate inquiry into defendant's competency. Defendant had been diagnosed with severe depression while in jail awaiting trial. Experts testified that the anti-depressant medication defendant received further clouded his thinking, and trial counsel informed the court that defendant was unable effectively to communicate with her. Remanded for retrospective competency determination, and if necessary a new trial, due to trial court's failure adequately to investigate defendant's competency further before denying continuance.

State v. Tilden,
1999 WL 136944 (Mo. App. March 16, 1999)(unpublished slip opinion)

The failure of the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor (who all shared in the responsibility) to raise the issue of defendant's competency despite their knowledge of his brain damage, "partial lobotomy, self-mutilating behavior, alcohol abuse, extensive criminal activity, extensive mental health treatment and observation dating back to childhood" violated due process. After being found guilty but before sentencing, defendant was sent to state hospital. At the sentencing hearing the court asked defendant and the prosecutor if defendant had been evaluated and found competent to stand trial. Both answered yes, although no competency evaluation had been performed. Trial court had an obligation to order competency evaluation and a post-examination hearing once he was "presented with sufficient facts to form reasonable cause to believe the accused lack[ed] the mental fitness to proceed," and the failure to do so will require a new trial, if defendant is competent to stand trial. Neither the erroneous belief that defendant had been found competent, the fact that the evidence supported the conviction, nor the fact that defendant exhibited no bizarre behavior during the trial could change this result.


Garcia Estrada v. State,
1999 WL 12749 (Tex. App. Jan. 14, 1999)(unpublished opinion)

Defendant's bizarre behavior raised a bona fide doubt about his competency, which required the trial court to conduct a competency hearing although not requested by either the defense or prosecution. Defendant had filed "numerous incomprehensible pro se motions," could not explain his objection that "something was 'missing from his defense,'" fired three lawyers, and made several ranting outbursts during the trial.

Commonwealth v. Simpson,
704 N.E.2d 1131 (Mass. 1999)

Defendant had been allowed to represent himself. Although he was coherent and rational in early stages of proceedings, his opening statement asserting that he was victim of conspiracies and scams by the police, and his subsequent trial conduct raised sufficient doubt about his competency to require a hearing. Court would not address the issue on appeal, but held that defendant's new counsel would be required to raise issue in a motion for new trial. Addressing defendant's earlier resistance to efforts by previous defense counsel to challenge his competency, the court held that if defendant were first found competent, the trial court could permit him to withdraw the motion for new trial "on a finding an appropriate waiver, equivalent in quality to a plea of guilty."

People v. Hill,
697 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1st Dist. App. June 17, 1998).

Court held, per statute, that defendant was entitled to a retrospective fitness hearing due to defendant's use of psychotropic medication. If at the hearing the trial court determines that the case is one of those "exceptional cases" in which the defendant's sanity at the time of trial may fairly and accurately be determined despite the time intervening, his conviction may be affirmed. If the evidence is inconclusive or suggests that defendant was impaired, his conviction and sentence must be vacated and he must be granted a new trial.

People v. Kinkead,
695 N.E.2d 1255 (Ill. 1998)

Defendant was entitled to a new trial having established that there was a bona fide doubt as to fitness at time of plea and sentencing due to his use of psychotropic medication during trial, and, where five years had passed since the original proceeding, a retrospective competency hearing was inappropriate.

Hatten v. State,
978 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. March 12, 1998)

Case remanded to trial court to determine whether defendant's competency at the time of trial can be ascertained after the passage of two years and, if so, to hold a hearing on the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial where the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing and "some evidence (at least more than a scintilla)" of the defendant's incompetence had been brought to the attention of the trial court.

Ex Parte Janezic,
723 So.2d 725 (Ala. Nov. 14, 1997)

During trial expert changed his opinion from "the defendant is competent" to "the defendant is not competent." Although the evidence in the record does not conclusively prove that the defendant had become incompetent during the course of the trial, the shift in opinion when considered in the context of other evidence related to the defendant's mental health created a reasonable and bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency during the guilt-determination phase of the trial.

People v. Smith,
694 N.E. 2d 681 (Ill.App. 4th Dist. 1998)

Failure of defense counsel to request, and trial court to order, hearing as to the fitness of defendant required remand for fitness hearing where the defendant's presentence investigation report contained information from medical doctors, a clinical psychologist, and defendant concerning use of the drugs Effexor and Xanax and treatment for symptoms of depression and anxiety and where the state did not contest the possibility that defendant might have taken these psychotropic medications prior to, around the time of, and subsequent to trial.

Commonwealth v. Simpson,
689 N.E.2d 824 (Mass.App. 1998)

Failure of trial judge to raise the issue of competency and to hold a competency hearing required reversal of judgment where the defendant, proceeding pro se, though initially determined competent to conduct own defense in prosecution for mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon, manifested paranoid delusions and an underlying defense position that he was entitled to hammer a sleeping woman in the head, as well as knife her, because of a pervasive conspiracy against him. Though the defendant, at a certain level, understood the offenses for which he was charged and the punishment the court might impose, the defense position was irrational.

People v. Abraham,
689 N.E.2d 278 (Ill.App. 2nd Dist. 1998)

Defendant's conviction vacated where the State failed to show within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the psychotropic medication that the defendant had been taking did not impair his ability to participate in and understand his defense prior to pleading guilty and sentencing. Though the defendant was afforded the type of supplemental hearing required on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the only medical expert to testify in the case testified that he could not give an opinion as to the defendant's fitness at the time of the guilty plea and the trial court made no specific ruling with respect to the effect of the psychotropic drugs on the defendant.

People v. Carlson,
691 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1997)

Limited remand to determine whether the defendant was entitled to a fitness hearing where both the trial court and defense counsel knew that defendant was taking psychotropic drugs (lithium) and was diagnosed manic depressive. The court and defense counsel were made aware that drugs were taken proximate to the pretrial continuance, defendant's appeal bond hearing, in defendant's physician's letter attached to the pre-sentencing investigation report, and in defendant's statement during the sentencing hearing, all of which put the court on notice of the issue of defendant's mental incapacity to stand trial. An Illinois statute entitles a defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs to a fitness hearing while under medication.

People v. Johns,
687 N.E.2d 138 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1997)

Limited remand to determine whether defendant was taking psychotropic drugs at any critical stage of the proceeding where the presentence investigative report indicated that he was prescribed the drugs Thorozine and Haldol while incarcerated awaiting trial, but which report did not specify the dates the drugs were taken.

People v. Nitz,
670 N.E.2d 672 (Ill. 1996)

The order of dismissal of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the conviction and to grant a new trial for failure of trial court to grant a fitness hearing. The State withheld information that it was administering psychotropic medication (Tranxene) to defendant throughout trial and sentencing. Had the trial court known, it would have been required, pursuant to Illinois statute, to hold a fitness hearing. Prior Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the statute to mean that the administration of psychotropic drugs during trial raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial, thus a fitness determination, through a fitness hearing, is constitutionally required.

Williams v. State,
685 N.E. 2d 730 (Ind.App. 1997)

The trial court abused its discretion by allowing previously recorded deposition testimony into evidence where defendant was present at the time the testimony was recorded, but was incompetent. Because defendant was deemed incompetent, defendant did not have "the opportunity" to cross exam the witness.

Nunez v. State,

942 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.App. 1997)

Jury verdict that defendant was competent to stand trial for murder was held to have been against the great weight and preponderance of evidence as to be manifestly unjust where the defense called two doctors at the competency hearing who testified that defendant was not fit to stand trial, where defendant's mother and sister testified to defendant's strange behavior for years prior to the crime, and where the state presented little evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the defense.

Artiles v. State,
691 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)

An indigent defendant has the right to be examined by a confidential expert even if two other experts appointed by the court agree that defendant is competent to proceed. The trial court's refusal to continue the competency hearing to allow examination by the confidential expert was an abuse of discretion, depriving the defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the competency hearing in terms of presenting evidence and challenging the opinions of the other experts.

State v. Levy,
700 So.2d 1283 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1997)

The State of Louisiana appealed the trial court's finding that defendant lacked necessary mental capacity by a "clear preponderance of the evidence" as opposed to "by clear and convincing evidence," which was required by statute. The Court held that the lower standard was not erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Oklahoma.

Howard v. State,
701 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1997)

The trial court's failure to order a competency hearing before allowing the defendant to represent himself constituted reversible error in a murder prosecution where the trial judge did not have a complete evaluation of defendant's mental capacity, defendant's court-appointed attorney repeatedly expressed concerns about defendant's competency to assist or conduct his own defense, and where defendant exhibited paranoid behavior at trial, asked irrational questions of witnesses, and engaged in rambling commentary. Where facts appear on the record which, when objectively considered, reasonably raise questions of defendant's competence to stand trial or to represent himself, the trial court is obliged to order a competency hearing.

Howard v. State,
697 So.2d 415, withdrawn, republished as corrected at, 701 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1997)

The court reverses Howard's capital conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing before allowing Howard to proceed to trial and certainly before allowing him to represent himself. The court should not have relied on a state psychiatrist's written finding of competency since the same psychiatrist said that he could not venture even a provisional diagnosis in light of Howard's refusal to cooperate. The court was warned by all four of Howard's attorneys that he was unable to assist them, let alone to represent himself. Finally, the trial court should have been alerted to the need for a hearing by Howard's irrational behavior, such as insisting on the seating of jurors likely to be biased against, asking witnesses questions that were irrational or relevant only to his elaborate conspiracy theories, and accusing one of the jurors of having committed the murder.

In re Williams,
687 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1997)

The magistrate's finding of competency is not reliable since both experts who gave written reports and testified at the competency hearing appear to have based their opinions on inappropriate considerations, the state's expert focusing on Williams' moral culpability and dangerousness if released and the defense expert focusing on the excessiveness of charging a mentally impaired juvenile with rape. After subtracting these inappropriate considerations, the evidence of incompetency predominates. According to the defense expert, Williams has an I.Q. of 40 and the mind of a six-year-old. Even the state's expert admitted that Williams would have difficulty understanding the roles of judge and jury and would be afraid to confide in his attorney. The court remands Williams' case for a new competency hearing. A concurring judge takes the magistrate to task for allowing himself to be swayed by the cost of the treatment that would be required if Williams were found incompetent.

In re Hinnant,
678 N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. 1997)

The evidence raised a substantial doubt about Hinnant's competence to understand the extradition proceedings against him, where a court in the state seeking his extradition had earlier found him unfit to stand trial because of a head injury, where Hinnant's attorney stated that Hinnant was unable to communicate with him and where Hinnant had been found incompetent by a physician. The court remands the case to the lower court for a formal competency determination and the issuance of a stay for the duration of Hinnant's incompetency.

State v. Garfoot,
558 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1997)

The intermediate appellate court incorrectly subjected the trial court's finding of incompetence to de novo review. Under the proper "clearly erroneous" standard, the trial court's finding was entitled to stand, since a defense expert testified at the competency hearing that Garfoot would never be able to meaningfully participate in a criminal trial because of a developmental disability and where the state's expert testified that he had an IQ of 64 and was only marginally competent.

State v. Gowan,
666 So.2d 1325 (La.App. 1996)

Once defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of a sanity commission, the trial court erred in accepting petitioner's guilty plea before resolving the issue of his mental capacity. The reviewing court declined to bar the habeas petition as untimely, because petitioner had unsuccessfully raised the same issue in earlier proceedings and because it would be unfair to enforce the deadline against someone who may not have understood the proceedings against him.

State v. Johnson,
551 N.W. 2d 741 (Neb.App. 1996)

Trial court committed plain error for failing to hold a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the issue of defendant's competency when the court was faced with a reasonable doubt regarding defendant's competency twice: at the plea hearing and at sentencing. The trial court had conducted a competency hearing of sorts: the court admitted into evidence a psychiatrists report (offered by defense counsel), questioned the defendant, allowed questioning of counsel, and observed defendant in the context of a hearing to enter a plea. This "hearing" was not sufficient to provide adequate procedural due process to protect defendant's substantive due process right not to be tried while incompetent. The issue of competency was determined principally on the basis of the trial court's colloquy with Petitioner at the plea hearing; the colloquy, however went only to defendant's ability to understand the procedures, not his capability for rational decision making, which is what the psychiatrist's report said was lacking.

Casey v. State,
924 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)

Trial court incorrectly concluded that defendant need not be competent during the course of a probation revocation hearing. Trial court should have held a competency hearing after a psychiatrist testified that defendant was experiencing psychogenic amnesia.

State v. Soares,
916 P.2d 1233 (Haw. 1996)

Trial court should have suspended trial for a competency hearing where (1) several experts who had earlier found defendant competent warned that he required medication to remain competent, (2) the court was aware that defendant had missed his weekly dose of medication, and (3) trial counsel notified the court that defendant's demeanor had changed, that defendant wanted to change trial strategy and that defendant refused to cooperate with him.

Brogdon v. State,
467 S.E.2d 598 (Ga.App. 1996)

Trial court should have interrupted trial for a competency hearing, where (1) an evaluator who had earlier found defendant competent also noted that he suffered from paranoid delusions, needed medications, and was severely mentally ill, (2) defendant's trial testimony was confused and not grounded in reality, and (3) defendant had to be restrained after an outburst. It was not sufficient to inquire of the defendant whether he was competent.

State v. Carney,
663 So.2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1995)

Where trial counsel filed pre-trial motion for sanity commission, pointing to defendant's hallucinations and inability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel, it was error for the trial court to proceed to trial without a competency ruling merely because trial counsel withdrew his motion at a hearing at which defendant was not present.

Calloway v. State,
651 So.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

Trial court should have ordered psychiatric evaluation and hearing on competency to be sentenced, where defense counsel notified the court that defendant was so heavily medicated that he could not discuss the presentence report, where defendant's allocution was rambling and incoherent, where those who testified to defendant's competency were neither experts nor able to describe his medications, and where the record indicated that defendant had brain damage, memory problems, and a history of seizure disorders. Remanded for competency hearing and resentencing.

People v. Kinkead,
660 N.E.2d 852 (Ill. 1995)

Trial court should have ordered competency hearing sua sponte upon learning that the jail administered thorazine to defendant. Trail counsel's failure to make a motion did not waive defendant's state-law right to a competency hearing upon a showing that he was receiving psychotropic medication. Remanded for clarification whether defendant's doses of thorazine coincided with his entry of a guilty plea.

People v. Johnson,
659 N.E.2d 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)

Under state law, defendant is entitled to competency hearing if receiving psychotropic drugs under medical supervision during the pendency of her prosecution or sentencing. Remand for determination whether defendant was in fact on psychotropic medication and whether it may have had an effect on her competency.

People v. Gevas,
655 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 1995)

Under state law, defendant who is taking psychotropic medications during the course of his trial is entitled to a competency hearing. It was error for trial court to deny motion for competency hearing, where defense counsel presented evidence that defendant was administered antipsychotics and antidepressants during the month prior to his entry of a guilty plea. Passage of two years made a meaningful retrospective hearing impossible.

People v. Guttierez,
648 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)

Under state law, trial court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing upon learning that defendant was administered psychotropic medication. Furthermore, trial counsel, who was aware that defendant was receiving antidepressants, was ineffective for failing to request such a hearing.

Aragon v. State,
910 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)

Jury's finding of competency is against the weight and preponderance of the evidence, where the defense presented several witnesses to defendant's bizarre thoughts and behavior, where the only mental health expert to testify found defendant incompetent, and where the prosecutor presented no evidence and, indeed, initially conceded defendant's incompetence, only changing his mind during cross-examination of defendant.

State v. Bartlett,
898 P.2d 98 (Mont. 1995)

Under state law, trial court must order psychiatric evaluation upon written motion by stand-by counsel, even if defendant had