UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Hernandez v. Nelson,
298 F.Supp. 682 (N.D.Cal. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.
1969)
Habeas granted where defendant denied culpability in illegal sale of heroin,
informer was material witness on issue of defendant's guilt, and prosecution knowingly
engaged in conduct which permitted informer to be unavailable at time of trial.
Imbler v. Craven,
298 F.Supp. 795 (C.D.Cal. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S 865
(1970)
Defendant was denied due process where prosecution
permitted witness to give material testimony which prosecution knew or should have
known was false, suppressed an exculpatory fingerprint, and failed to disclose negative
evidence indicating that coat, which prosecution claimed was worn by defendant, was not
defendant's.
Clements v. Coiner,
299 F.Supp. 752 (S.D.W.Va.
1969)
Police polygraph report and
psychiatrist's letter to prosecutor raising possibility of defendant's defective mental
condition were material to issue of limitation of criminal responsibility and failure of
prosecutor to produce documents, even though not requested, rendered conviction on
guilty plea violative of constitutional due process.
Bowen v. Eyman,
324 F.Supp. 339 (D.Ariz.
1970)
Habeas granted where trial court's
refusal to appoint expert to test seminal fluid removed from vaginal tract of rape victim and
to test petitioner's blood type, which could have negated guilt, denied petitioner
fundamental fairness and was tantamount to a suppression of evidence in violation of
Brady.
Simms v. Cupp,
354 F.Supp. 698 (D.Ore. 1972)
Conviction vacated where state
suppressed original description of witness' assailant, which differed substantially with her
trial testimony, in order to corroborate inculpatory story of children who had been riding
with defendant.
Simos v. Gray,
356 F.Supp. 265 (E.D.Wisc. 1973)
Where witnesses identified
defendant from police photos six weeks after offense and never wavered from their
identifications, the state had a duty to disclose police reports which indicated that, of the
night of the offense, witnesses declined to view photos because they were sure they could
not identify the couple they saw, that five days later a witness made a mistaken
identification, and the witnesses gave inaccurate physical descriptions.
Hawkins v. Robinson,
367 F.Supp. 1025 (D.Conn.
1973)
Where government informant
was the only witness who was not a law enforcement officer, and his testimony would
have been highly relevant to identification and alibi defense, defendant was deprived of
a fair trial when the trial court refused at his request to require the government to identify
informant and furnish information as to his location.
Ray v. Rose,
371 F.Supp. 277 (E.D.Tenn.
1974)
Conviction set aside due to failure of
prosecution to reveal that it had made a standing plea bargain with codefendant, who
pleaded guilty only after he gave testimony during trial which implicated defendant, which
resulted in defendant's being deprived of due process of law.
Emmett v. Ricketts,
397 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.Ga. 1975)
No privilege existed between
chief prosecution witness and psychologist in connection with "age regression" sessions,
and since psychologist was an investigative arm of the prosecution, both he and the DA
were required to produce files for in camera inspection. Habeas granted for failure to
disclose.
Moynahan v. Manson,
419 F.Supp. 1139 (D.Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1204 (2nd
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939
(1977)
Habeas granted where prosecution's
failure to disclose that its key witness was a target of police investigation for the same
criminal scheme for which defendant stood accused, was threatened with prosecution, but
was never charged, deprived defendant of due process because it raised reasonable
doubt as to guilt.
Kircheis v. Williams,
425 F.Supp. 505 (S.D.Ala. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 414 (5th Cir.
1977)
Habeas granted where state, despite a court order, failed to produce motel records
tending to exonerate defendant, and failed to inform the defense of an oral agreement
with a key prosecution witness which could have affected the witness' credibility.
United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson,
425
F.Supp. 1272 (D.Conn. 1977)
Habeas granted where trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of key prosecution
witness as to pending criminal charges to show bias and motive violated right of
confrontation, particularly in light of prosecution's nondisclosure of impeachment
information concerning extensive immunity and aid offers to the witness.
Jones v. Jago,
428 F.Supp. 405 (N.D.Ohio 1977), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883
(1978)
Habeas granted where state, despite a specific
request from defense counsel, suppressed statement of coindictee which, though
somewhat ambiguous, appeared on its face to be favorable to the defense and was
sufficiently material to compel disclosure.
United States v. Turner,
490 F.Supp. 583 (E.D.Mich. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 219 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981)
New trial granted where DEA agent, who
had entered into a leniency agreement with the defense counsel for a prosecution witness,
not only failed to correct the witness' testimony disclaiming any such arrangement but
took the stand and buttressed the witness' false testimony through an affirmative material
misrepresentation that no agreement existed, and such conduct was an affront to the
court's dignity and honor and to the nation.
United States ex rel. Merritt v. Hicks,
492 F.Supp.
99 (D.N.J. 1980)
Habeas granted
where failure, despite specific request, to disclose police report which cast substantial
doubt on credibility of witness whom New York state court twice characterized as being
"in many respects unreliable," and upon whom the state's entire case rested, deprived
defendant of due process and fair trial.
Cagle v. Davis,
520 F.Supp. 297 (E.D.Tenn. 1980), aff'd, 663 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir.
1981)
Habeas granted where, despite lack of request by petitioner for exculpatory material,
fundamental fairness required prosecutor to disclose the availability of a witness, who
was "planted" in petitioner's jail cell soon after his arrest to interview him in violation of his
constitutional rights and who could have testified that, prior to petitioner's alleged
confession to witness, petitioner had continually denied his involvement in victim's murder.
Blanton v. Blackburn,
494 F.Supp. 895 (M.D.La. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1981)
New trial ordered where state failed to fully disclose all of agreements and
understandings it had with key government witnesses and failed to correct testimony
which it knew or should have known was false, even though witnesses' answers to
questions concerning agreements were technically direct, and even though no formal plea
agreements had been entered into.
United States v. Tariq,
521 F.Supp. 773 (D.Md.
1981)
Government violates defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process
when it acts unilaterally in a manner which interferes with defendant's ability to discover,
to prepare, or to offer exculpatory or relevant evidence, by deporting a witness who is an
illegal alien, if the Government knows or has reason to know that the witness' testimony
could conceivably benefit defendant and if deportation occurs before defense counsel has
had notice and a reasonable opportunity to interview and/or depose the illegal alien.
Anderson v. State of South Carolina,
542 F.Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 887 (4th Cir.
1983)
Habeas granted where right to fair trial was denied by prosecution's
failure to make autopsy report and investigative notes available to trial counsel, because
the withheld materials might well have created reasonable doubt in minds of jurors, who
deliberated 32 hours before returning a guilty verdict.
Sims v. Wyrick,
552 F.Supp. 748 (W.D.Miss.
1982)
Where promises were made to key
prosecution witnesses in habeas petitioner's firebombing case, and those promises were
unlawfully concealed from petitioner and his counsel, so that petitioner suffered obvious
prejudice of being deprived of his right to cross-examine those witnesses, petitioner was
deprived of due process and fair trial.
Raines v. Smith,
1983 WL 3310 (N.D.Ala. 1983)
Habeas granted where the police failed
to tell prosecution that, while three witnesses identified one suspect, only one---an elderly
man whose ability to accurately identify was highly suspect---identified defendant. There
was no other evidence linking defendant to the crime.
Jackson v. Calderon,
1994 WL 661061 (N.D.Cal.
1994)
Habeas granted where
defendant was denied the opportunity to elicit exculpatory testimony from an anonymous
informant whose identity the government failed, in violation of Brady, to disclose.
Defendant demonstrated a "reasonable possibility that the anonymous informant . . . could
give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in [his] exoneration."
Kennedy v. Thigpen,
NO CITE AVAILABLE
(N.D.Ala. 1994)
Conviction and death
sentence reversed where prosecution withheld statement of a co-defendant which could
have been useful to negate defendant's intent to kill and suggest that co-defendant was
really the killer.
United States v. Stifel,
594 F.Supp. 1525 (N.D.Ohio
1984)
Conviction for willfully and
knowingly mailing infernal machine with intent to kill another vacated where prosecution
failed to disclose evidence implicating another suspect, statement by defendant's girlfriend
attesting to his innocence in contradiction to her trial testimony, and results of investigation
tending to show that defendant did not buy the switch used in the bomb.
Scott v. Foltz,
612 F.Supp. 50 (E.D.Mich.
1985)
Habeas granted where a witness
testified falsely that she had not entered into a plea bargain with the prosecution before
testifying, and that witness' credibility was a key issue in the case.
Carter v. Rafferty,
621 F.Supp. 533 (D.C.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1299 (3rd Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011
(1988)
Convictions reversed where prosecution
failed to comply with a specific request for a polygraph report which substantially
undermined witness's testimony which was the "cracked and shaky pillar" supporting the
state's case.
Troedel v. Wainwright,
667 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.Fla. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.
1987).
Bagley and Napue violated when prosecution pushed expert to say that, in his expert
opinion, Troedel fired the gun, despite the fact that his reports and his habeas testimony
indicated that he could not tell who really fired it. Prosecutor was found to have misled the
jury in his questioning of the expert, and the evidence was material because it was the
only thing linking Troedel to the crime.
Silk-Nauni v. Fields,
676 F.Supp. 1076 (W.D.Okla.
1987)
Exculpatory evidence was
unconstitutionally withheld when state failed to disclose a statement which would have
revealed inconsistencies as to sequence of events leading up to shootings, and directly
related to insanity defense by showing that defendant held and acted upon certain beliefs
which lacked a foundation in reality.
Orndorff v. Lockhart,
707 F.Supp. 1062 (E.D.Ark. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
906 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
Due process and right to confrontation violated where prosecution failed to disclose that
witness's memory was hypnotically refreshed during pretrial investigation. Violation was
compounded by prosecutor's statement during opening that the jury would be "amazed
at the recollections" of the witness.
Hughes v. Bowers,
711 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 558 (11th Cir.
1990)
Habeas granted where evidence was suppressed that the state's sole eyewitness
to the murder stood to benefit from the life insurance policy of the victim if the defendant
were shown to be the aggressor. Court evaluated this under the standard for knowing use
of perjured testimony, i.e. whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the jury's verdict.
Ouimette v. Moran,
762 F.Supp. 468 (D.R.I. 1991), aff'd, 942 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1991)
Habeas relief granted where failure of prosecutor to disclose to defendant that state's
chief witness had 24 more criminal convictions than the four disclosed by the state, or to
disclose the inducements, promises, and rewards offered to the witness for his testimony,
violated defendant's due process rights.
Bragan v. Morgan,
791 F.Supp. 704 (M.D.Tenn.
1992)
Nondisclosure of plea
agreement between prosecution and witness, whether or not it was quid pro quo, required
new trial for defendant where witness's testimony that he faced life in prison, and
prosecutor's claim in closing argument that witness faced habitual criminal count were
false, regardless of a quid pro quo arrangement and the witness was the key prosecution
witness.
United States v. Burnside,
824 F.Supp. 1215 (N.D.
Ill. 1993)
Brady requires disclosure of impeachment
information of which government personnel, but not prosecutors
personally, are aware. Knowledge of warden and others at facility
housing witnesses could be imputed to prosecution.
Xiao v. Reno,
837 F.Supp. 1506 (N.D.Cal.
1993), aff’d 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996)
Due process was denied to alien when
United States official had alien paroled into United States to be used as witness in heroin
conspiracy trial, even though official was aware that prosecutors in Hong Kong declined
to prosecute him because he may have been mistreated during interrogations; failure to
produce memorandum concerning Hong Kong officials' concerns was flagrant Brady
violation. District court permanently enjoined government from returning him to foreign
country.
Rickman v. Dutton,
864 F.Supp. 686 (M.D.Tenn.
1994), aff’d on other grounds, 131 F.3d
1150 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1133 (1998)
Habeas granted where
prosecution permitted witness to falsely testify that he had not been promised favorable
treatment including immunity for incriminating statements and preferential treatment
during his incarceration.
Williamson v.
Reynolds
904 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997),
and abrogated on other grounds,
Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir.
1997)
The prosecution’s withholding of a videotaped interview of petitioner
following a polygraph examination, in which petitioner denied
involvement in the murder, tainted his conviction and death sentence.
The crux of the prosecution case was alleged admissions by petitioner.
"If the 1983 videotape had been accessible during trial, defense counsel
could have countered the prosecution's testimony regarding alleged
oral admissions with the powerful tool of visual evidence
of Petitioner's denials." Further, the videotape would have allowed
defense counsel to conduct a more thorough cross-examination of a police
witness who failed to tape some of the alleged admissions. Statements on
the tape, which were consistent with petitioner’s trial testimony, also
would have assisted the case in mitigation, including by allowing
defense counsel to suggest that the codefendant played the primary role
in the capital murder.
United States v. Ramming,
915 F.Supp. 854 (S.D.Tex. 1996)
Motion to Dismiss for,
inter alia, prosecutorial misconduct granted where, in multi-count bank fraud indictment,
government failed to disclose, despite court order to the contrary, numerous items of
evidence tending to support defendants' claims of innocence and refute government's
theory of the case.
Banks v. United States,
920 F.Supp. 688 (E.D.Va.
1996)
Guilty plea successfully
challenged where government failed to disclose information regarding conjugal visits
government allowed informant to receive; information was useful to attack credibility of
informant and government agents and would probably have convinced defendant to
proceed to trial since defendant's actions were only criminal when viewed in context
supplied by the agents and the informant.
United States v. Fenech,
943 F.Supp. 480 (E.D.Pa.
1996)
New trial ordered where
government's undisclosed file on informant indicated that his motivation for cooperating
was monetary, yet prosecution elicited testimony from him at trial that he did not
cooperate for the money, but rather because he felt that he was "doing something real
good for the world."
Chamberlain v. Mantello,
954 F. Supp. 499
(N.D.N.Y. 1997)
Relief granted where
police officers gave perjured testimony, even though the prosecuter was unaware of the
misconduct.
Ely v. Matesanz,
983 F.Supp. 21
(1997)
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that a plea agreement between the state and its witness had not been disclosed to
the defense. Additionally, the state failed to correct false testimony presented by the
witness that no deal existed. Writ of habeas corpus conditionally granted.
United States v. Patrick,
985 F.Supp. 543 (E.D.Pa.
1997), aff’d 156 F.3d 1226 (3rd
Cir. 1998)
Motion for a new trial granted
when government failed to disclose evidence which would have impeached one of its
main witnesses. This evidence could not have been obtained by the defendant through
the exercise of due diligence as the government never idientified the information that was
contained in the withheld documents. Thus, the defendant could not have known of the
essential facts that would have permitted him to make use of the evidence.
United States v. Colima-Monge,
978 F.Supp. 941
(1997)
Defendant's due process
rights would be violated if the INS withheld information concerning the co-defendant which
may be relevant to defendant's motion to dismiss. Motion for protective order denied.
United States v. Dollar,
25 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1332 (N.D.Ala. 1998)
The district court
dismissed charges of conspiracy and concealing the identity of firearms purchasers as a
result of the government's repeated, egregious violations of its disclosure obligations
under Brady. These violations centered on nondisclosure of materially inconsistent pre-trial statements of several of the government's key witnesses. The court explained that,
"[f]rom the outset of this case, defense counsel have been unrelenting in their effort to
obtain Brady materials. The United States' general response has been to disclose as little
as possible, and as late as possible--even to the point of a post-trial Brady disclosure. *
* * [A]fter having assured the court that it had produced all Brady materials, the United
States continued to withhold materials which clearly and directly contradicted the direct
testimony of several of its most important witnesses."
Spicer v. Warden, Roxbury Correctional Institute,
31
F.Supp.2d 509, 522 (D.Md. 1998), rev’d in
part on other grounds, 194 F.3d 547 (4th Cir.
1999)
The prosecution violated Brady by failing to reveal that counsel for one of three
eyewitnesses upon whom its case rested had told the prosecutor that the witness would
say he had seen petitioner in the days before and after the crime, but not on the actual
day of the crime. At trial, however, this witness testified that he had actually seen
petitioner running from the scene of the crime. The district court concluded that this
development in the incriminating quality of the witness' testimony was sufficiently
inconsistent with how his counsel had previously described what he knew as to render
nondisclosure of counsel's description to the prosecutor a violation of Brady.
Cheung v. Maddock,
32 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1159
(N.D.Cal. 1998)
The state violated
Brady in this attempted manslaughter case by failing to disclose medical records
indicating that the victim of the shooting of which petitioner was convicted had a blood
alcohol content substantially higher than the victim's testimony acknowledged. This blood
alcohol evidence was favorable to petitioner in several ways: it drew into question the
victim's identification of petitioner, rather than one of petitioner's two companions, as the
shooter; it undermined the victim's credibility, since his claim that he only consumed one
drink on the night of the shooting could not possibly have been true in light of his blood
alcohol content; and it undermined the credibility of the victim's companions, who testified
in corroboration of his claim that he only consumed one drink on the night of the shooting.
United States v. Locke,
1999 WL 558130 (N.D.Ill. July 27, 1999)
The government
violated Brady in connection with defendant's federal trial for conspiracy to import heroin
by suppressing a statement made by a co-defendant at his change-of-plea hearing, in
which the co-defendant indicated that neither he nor defendant had knowledge that their
travel abroad with another co-defendant was for the purpose of importing heroin. Noting
the weakness of the government's case against defendant at trial, the court found this
statement material and granted defendant's motion for new trial. In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected the government's contention that it did not "suppress" the
statement since defendant's attorney was free to have attended the co-defendant's
change-of-plea hearing, at which he would have heard the statement first hand. The court
reasoned that a defendant's counsel had not failed to act with reasonable diligence in not
attending the hearing, since such hearings do not ordinarily produce exculpatory evidence
for co-defendants.
Reasonover v. Washington,
60 F.Supp.2d 937
(E.D.Mo. 1999)
After finding that
petitioner had satisfied the "miscarriage of justice" standard and permitting her to pass
through the Schlup actual-innocence gateway in order to obtain merits review of her
procedurally defaulted claims, the court granted relief in this Missouri murder case in
which the state sought, but did not obtain, the death penalty, on the ground that the
prosecution committed numerous Brady violations, including: failure to disclose two
audiotapes, one containing petitioner's conversation with an ex-boyfriend in which she
credibly asserted her innocence, and another containing petitioner's conversation with a
snitch which is consistent with petitioner's claims of innocence and inconsistent with the
snitch's subsequent trial testimony; failure to disclose the existence of an extremely
favorable deal between the prosecution and its main snitch, whose testimony was the
"linchpin" of the state's case; and failure to disclose a prior deal between the state and its
secondary snitch, who testified falsely that she had never before made a deal with the
state.
United States v. McLaughlin,
89 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D.Pa. 2000)
The court granted
defendant's motion for a new trial in this federal tax evasion case, finding that the
government's nondisclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony contradicting the trial
testimony of defendant's accountant on the critical point of whether the accountant had
knowledge of defendant's bank account, and nondisclosure of documents supporting
defendant's claim that certain income was legitimately entitled to tax deferred status,
violated Brady.
Watkins v. Miller,
92 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D.Ind. 2000)
After finding that petitioner's DNA
evidence conclusively refuting the prosecution's theory that he alone raped and murdered
the victim established a miscarriage of justice sufficient to entitle him to merits review of
his procedurally barred Brady claims, the court granted relief on those claims. The court
found that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence indicating that a witness saw
the victim being abducted at a time for which petitioner had a firm alibi, and that another
potential suspect had taken and failed a polygraph examination about the victim's murder.
Jamison v. Collins,
100 F.Supp.2d 647 (S.D.Ohio
2000), aff’d 291 F.3d 380 (6th
Cir. 2002)
The court held that the
cumulative effect of undisclosed exculpatory evidence in this Ohio capital case raised a
reasonable probability that, had it been revealed, petitioner would not have been
convicted of capital murder or sentenced to death. The evidence included: statements
by a cooperating codefendant that were significantly inconsistent with his testimony at
petitioner's trial; statements of eyewitnesses suggesting the perpetrator did not match
petitioner's description; and statements of eyewitnesses to robberies admitted as other
acts evidence against petitioner. This evidence was material in that it could have been
used to direct suspicion to others, including the codefendant, to impeach the
codefendant's testimony, and to discredit eyewitness identifications of petitioner in
connection with robberies admitted as other bad acts. Although petitioner's Brady claims
were procedurally defaulted, the court found the fact that the state continued to withhold
the evidence during petitioner's state court proceedings constituted "cause," and
concluded further that the materiality of the undisclosed evidence under Brady and its
progeny constituted "prejudice" sufficient to overcome the default.
Mendez v. Artuz,
2000 WL 1154320 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 303 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1353 (2003)
The court granted
habeas corpus relief in this New York murder and attempted murder case on the ground
that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose five documents containing
significant evidence that a third party had ordered a hit on one of the victims in retaliation
for a theft he believed the victim to have committed.
Benn v. Wood,
2000 WL 1031361 (W.D. Wash. 2000), aff’d 283 F.3d 1040 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 341 (2002)
The district court
granted relief from petitioner's conviction and death sentence, finding that although the
state had been ordered to search for and disclose evidence of its confidential informant's
prior dealings with law enforcement, it failed to conduct the search, and therefore failed
to locate and disclose a wealth of impeaching material. The undisclosed information
included: evidence that the informant had been a police snitch for fifteen years; "significant
evidence of unreliability and dishonesty in [the snitch's] dealings with police; perjury by the
snitch in another case; protection by the prosecution from charges for other crimes; use
and sale of drugs by the snitch while staying in a hotel at government expense during
petitioner's trial. The undisclosed information was material because the snitch, who
claimed petitioner had confided in him in jail, provided the only evidence to support the
prosecution's theory that petitioner's killing of the victims was premeditated, and was the
result of an insurance fraud scheme gone bad. With regard to the insurance fraud
scheme, the prosecution also withheld evidence of an official determination that a fire in
petitioner's trailer, which the prosecution alleged to be a component of the insurance
scheme, had actually started accidently.
United States v. Peterson,
116 F.Supp.2d 366
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)
The district court
granted a new trial in this federal prosecution, finding that the prosecution violated the
Jencks Act by inadvertently suppressing investigators' notes which, if disclosed, would
have revealed discrepancies with the government's trial testimony relating to petitioner's
statement. These discrepancies created a significant possibility that the jury would have
had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
Bragg v. Norris,
128 F.Supp.2d 587 (E.D.Ark. 2000)
The district court granted relief and
ordered petitioner's immediate release in this "delivery of a controlled substance" case,
in which petitioner established "actual innocence" to permit merits review of his Napue and
Brady claims, and further established his entitlement to relief on the merits of those
claims. Both claims arose out of "highly reliable" evidence that a police drug agent
falsified notes and back-dated reports in order to build an otherwise nonexistent case
against petitioner for selling crack. The officer's identification of petitioner as the person
who sold him crack was the only evidence supporting the conviction. Petitioner proved,
however, that: the officer's claim that he identified petitioner by running his license plate
through a state records check could not be true, because the plate number in question
was not issued to petitioner by the state until several weeks after the officer claimed to
have run his check; the officer's claim that he confirmed his identification by viewing a
police photograph of petitioner could not have been true because the police had no
photographs of him until months after the identification allegedly occurred; and, although
the officer testified at petitioner's trial that he had excluded another suspect who shared
a first name with petitioner by looking at photographs of that suspect, an undisclosed set
of notes written by the officer indicate the officer's belief that the other suspect and
petitioner were, in fact, the same person.
In granting relief on petitioner's Napue claim, the court acknowledged that the
prosecuting attorneys may not have intentionally elicited false testimony from the officer,
but found that knowledge of the contents of the officer's notes should be imputed to the
prosecutor, thereby establishing a violation of Napue. Additionally, citing the testimony
of two other prosecutors that "the case would have been over" if the defense had been
given access to the information about the officer's activities, the court concluded that this
evidence was "material" for purposes of petitioner's Brady claim, such that relief was
required. Finally, the court ordered petitioner's immediate release, and allowed petitioner
to be accompanied back to the jail by his counsel "to ensure he is out-processed as
rapidly as possible" in order to satisfy the court's desire that he "be released from custody
. . . this day."
Faulkner v. Cain,
133 F.Supp.2d 449 (E.D.La.
2001)
The district court granted habeas
corpus relief in this murder case on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady by
suppressing the names of police officers who were first on the murder scene, and
evidence that homosexual pornography and rubber gloves were found at the scene. This
information was favorable and material because petitioner's defense was that his
codefendant became belligerent and struck the victim in response to an unwanted
homosexual sexual advance, not pursuant to a plan with which petitioner had been
involved. The victim's sexual orientation and the codefendant's claim of self defense were
key issues at trial with regard to, inter alia, petitioner's mens rea with respect to first
degree murder as a principal.
Beintema v. Everett,
2001 WL 630512 (D.Wyo. April 23, 2001)
The district court
granted habeas corpus relief in this "delivering marijuana" case on the ground that the
prosecution's failure to disclose that a police officer had threatened the state's primary
witness that his family would be prosecuted if he refused to cooperate violated Brady.
Disagreeing with the Wyoming Supreme Court's conclusion that the evidence was not
"material," the district court observed that petitioner's "trial was dependent almost entirely
upon the testimony of a single witness, . . . and as such, impeachment evidence
[petitioner]'s counsel could have used to attempt to discredit that witness or question the
veracity of that witness would be material." In concluding that 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) did
not bar relief on petitioner's claim, the district court explained that "[t]he Wyoming
Supreme Court's opinion includes repeated references stating that certain evidence was
not material. This suggests that 'cumulative materiality' was not the touchstone of the
[state] court's opinion and that it was rather a series of independent materiality
evaluations, contrary to the requirements of Bagley. This is . . . and unreasonable
application of clearly established law . . ."
Mathis v. Berghuis
202 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D. Mich.
2002)
State’s failure to disclose prior police
reports suggesting rape complainant had made false accusations of rape
and armed robbery in the past mandated habeas relief.
United States v. Gurrola
2002 WL 31941469 (D. Kansas Dec. 16,
2002)
New trial granted
based on Brady violation where FBI agent testified that the defendant’s
daughter had informed him that defendant was distributing
methamphetamine, which defendant’s daughter denied, and the prosecution
failed to disclose the agent’s reports of his interviews with the
defendant’s daughter which contained no mention of defendant. Fact that
prosecution had revealed to defense counsel prior to trial that it was
not producing unrelated reports that pertained to persons other than
defendant did not "adequately put defense counsel on notice that the
government possessed reports favorable to the defendant." The suppressed
evidence was material given that a key issue at trial was whether the
defendant "knowingly" possessed the methamphetamine found in her
home.
Norton v. Spencer
253 F.Supp.2d 65 (D. Mass. 2003), aff'd, 351 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003)
In sexual assault
and battery case, petitioner is to be granted habeas relief on his
allegations of Brady error unless respondent requests an evidentiary
hearing. (Relief is ultimately ordered in 256 F.Supp.2d 120 (D. Mass. 2003), after respondent failed to request an
evidentiary hearing.) Because the state court failed to address the
federal claim, de novo review is applied irrespective of Early v.
Packer, 123 S.Ct. 362 (2002). The court also finds that petitioner is
entitled to relief even if AEDPA is applied. Assuming the truth of
petitioner’s affidavits, the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to
reveal that the alleged victim’s cousin informed the prosecutor that he
made up allegations against petitioner at the insistence of the alleged
victim, and that the alleged victim had admitted to his cousin that his
accusations against petitioner were fabricated. (The cousin had refused
to answer some questions at a pretrial hearing, resulting in the
dismissal of charges against petitioner related to the alleged sexual
assault on the cousin.)
United States v.
Washington
263 F.Supp.2d 413 (D. Conn. 2003), on reconsideration, new trial again granted based on Brady violation, 294 F.Supp.2d 246 (D. Conn. 2003)
In case involving a
charge that defendant was a felon in possession of a gun where the key
evidence was a taped 911 call by a person who was deceased by the time
of trial, the prosecution violated Brady by its belated
disclosure of the caller’s prior conviction for falsely reporting a
crime to law enforcement. Although the conviction was revealed at the
close of evidence on the first day of the short trial, the late
disclosure denied the defense the opportunity to weave the conviction
into its overall trial
strategy.
United States v. Rodriguez
2003 WL 22290957 (E.D.Pa. 2003)
In federal drug case, the prosecution violated Brady by
failing to disclose numerous statements made by the co-defendant at two
proffer sessions that were favorable to the defense. First, while the
government's theory was that the defendant, who was the co-defendant’s
uncle, was involved in a conspiracy with the co-defendant in which the
defendant was the source of the heroin and brought the co-defendant and
the drugs to some of the transactions, the information from the proffer
sessions called that theory into question. Notably, the co-defendant had
provided detailed information about a drug distribution network that did
not involve the defendant. Second, contrary to the prosecution’s
representation at trial, the co-defendant had implicated other family
members while denying that defendant was involved in drug dealing.
Because the prosecution had falsely claimed that the co-defendant
protected all family members in his statements, the defense had declined
to admit into evidence the co-defendant’s statement that defendant was
not involved. (This statement from the proffer session had been
disclosed to defendant.) Finally, had defense counsel been given the
complete information from the proffer sessions, he would have been able
to conduct a further investigation about the sources of the
co-defendant's drugs that may have resulted in additional exculpatory evidence.
Richardson v. Briley
2004 WL 419902 (N.D.Ill. 2004)
Capital defendant’s due process rights were violated where the
prosecutor made an affirmative misrepresentation about the availability
of a rebuttal witness which led defense counsel to forgo calling an
eyewitness to state that defendant was not the person observed fleeing
from the robbery-murder scene. In rejecting a Teague defense, the
court notes, among other things, that Brady
"made clear that [prosecutors] cannot
make material misrepresentations to opposing counsel . . .."
St. Germain v. United States
2004 WL 1171403 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
Defendant was entitled to a new trial where the government failed,
whether deliberately or inadvertently, to disclose material exculpatory
evidence in sufficient time for the defense to make use of it. In
finding that the evidence was "suppressed," the court notes, among other
things, that the evidence was not disclosed until the eve of trial and
it was in the misleading guise of Jencks Act material. The court rejects
the government’s argument that the suppressed evidence was not material
because defendant could be found guilty under an alternative theory that was
consistent with the new evidence. Materiality is evaluated based on
the prosecution theory that was actually presented at trial.
Willis v. Cockrell
2004 WL 1812698 (W.D.Tex. Aug. 2004)
Brady violation found in Texas capital case where prosecution
failed to disclose that its mental health expert had evaluated
petitioner regarding future dangerousness and had written a report with
two hypothetical scenarios, one of which was favorable, one of which was
not, and the favorable scenario fit with petitioner’s absence of a
history of violence. State appellate court’s finding that no
Brady error occurred by the prosecution’s failure to disclose the
report was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law because the state court applied a
sufficiency of the evidence test for materiality, erroneously stated
that the brief nature of the evidence presented at the penalty phase
undermined, rather than supported, a finding of materiality,
and failed to consider that disclosure of the report would
have led to the favorable testimony of the expert.
Government of Virgin Islands v. Fahie
304 F.Supp.2d 669 (D.V.I. 2004)
In case involving a charge of possession of an unlicensed firearm,
the prosecution violated Brady by failing to reveal prior to
trial a gun trace report that showed the weapon belonged to someone
else. The prosecution’s case was one of constructive possession in that
the gun was found in a car that defendant had been driving. The gun
trace report was consistent with defendant’s claim that the gun was not
his. Had the prosecution timely revealed the report, defense counsel may
have been able to link the true owner of the gun to one of the
passengers that had been in the vehicle before the gun was found by
police. Because information about the report only came out during
cross-examination of a witness, defendant "had no meaningful opportunity
to utilize the evidence that someone else owned the weapon to his
advantage." The trial court abused its discretion, however, in
dismissing the case with prejudice as a sanction for the constitutional
violation.
United States v. Park
319 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D. Guam 2004)
In case where the government conceded that information
obtained from an interview was material to guilt, the prosecutor could
not satisfy its Brady obligation by providing a summary of the
interview. "[W]here a prosecutor obtains exculpatory information from an
interview with a government witness and where the prosecutor takes notes
during the interview, the government is obligated under Brady to produce such notes."
Turner v. Schriver
327 F.Supp.2d 174 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
In robbery case where the alleged victim was the sole witness, the
prosecutor's representation that the victim had no criminal record, both
to defense counsel and to the jury, when in fact he did, violated
petitioner’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland. In addition, there was also a
violation of due process based upon the admission of perjured
testimony which the prosecutor should have known was false.
Conley v. United States
332 F.Supp.2d 302 (D.Mass. 2004), aff'd, 415 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2005)
Petitioner was entitled to habeas relief based on the prosecution’s
failure to disclose an FBI memorandum which contained significant data
bearing on a key prosecution witness’s inability to recall crucial events. The court rejects
the government’s argument that the memorandum wasn’t material because defense
counsel at trial embraced aspects of the witness’s testimony.
United States v. Koubriti
336 F.Supp.2d 676 (E.D.Mich. 2004)
Court grants government’s motion to dismiss terrorism-related charges
and grants defendants’ motion for a new trial on document fraud charges
where the government post-trial confessed that Brady violations
had occurred and an independent review of the suppressed documents by
the court confirmed that defendants’ constitutional rights were
violated.
United States v. Hernandez
347 F.Supp.2d 375 (S.D. Tex. 2004)
Defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with assaulting, interfering
with, and resisting a border control agent was granted where the government acted in bad
faith by allowing the defendant’s niece to plead to a superseding indictment without
notice to the defendant and then deporting her while knowing that she was the only
witness who would support the defendant’s claim of self defense. The Government’s
action violated due process and compulsory process by impeding the defense’s access to
exculpatory and material evidence.
United States v. Lyons
352 F.Supp.2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
Brady and Giglio violations admitted to by the government which related to a drug
conspiracy count also materially tainted the remaining counts because impeachable
testimony as to the drug conspiracy counts affected the jury’s ability to assess the
character and credibility of the defendant’s testimony about the other counts. Dismissal
with prejudice of remaining counts in the indictment was appropriate where the defendant
was prejudiced by the government’s numerous and flagrant Brady and Giglio violations,
and its later denials and delay.
Simmons v. Beard
356 F.Supp.2d 548 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (capital case)
There was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result at Simmons’s capital trial
had the prosecution not suppressed evidence that would have further impeached the two
main prosecution witnesses. Simmons was charged with raping and killing an elderly
woman. The primary evidence against him came from another elderly woman who
alleged that Simmons attacked her and said, “if you don’t shut your [expletive] mouth,
you’ll get the same thing [victim] got,” and Simmons’s girlfriend who testified about
Simmons’s behavior around the time of the crime. The prosecution suppressed evidence
that (1) the girlfriend had been threatened with charges if she did not cooperate in
wiretapping Simmons; (2) the elderly woman had purchased a gun following her assault,
in violation of felon in possession of gun law, and charges were dismissed by
investigators in Simmons’s case; (3) the elderly woman perjured herself on the gun
application forms; (4) lab reports found no blood or semen on the elderly woman’s
clothes, and found hair consistent only with the victim and inconsistent with Simmons;
and (5) the elderly woman had failed to identify Simmons in a mug book. (The State had
affirmatively denied that a mug book procedure had taken place.) Evidence regarding
intimidation of the girlfriend, and disposition of gun charges against the elderly woman
provided a motive for their having lied, which was missing in the impeachment at trial.
Lab reports further undermined the elderly woman’s story, even though they did not point
to another suspect. And had the defense known about the elderly woman’s inability to
identify Simmons in a mug book, it would not have pursued a strategy of in-person
identification. Cumulatively, this led to a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
The state court’s conclusion that no single piece of evidence would have changed the
outcome was an unreasonable application of Kyles.
Eastridge v. United States
372 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2005)
In case involving numerous gang members charged with killing a man, the prosecution
violated Brady by failing to disclose a grand jury transcript where two unindicted gang
members falsely denied being present at the club where the altercation began on the night
of the killing. A witness at trial had testified that he and the petitioner were not among
the group that chased and killed the victim, which was consistent with the petitioners’s
account. This witness’s version of events included the presence of the two unindicted
gang members. Had the false denials by the unindicted gang members been revealed, the
testimony of the supporting witness would have been more credible.
Bell v. Haley
437 F.Supp.2d 1278 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (capital case)
Habeas relief granted as to death sentence in robbery-murder case based on suppression
of evidence that could have impeached the key witnesses against Bell. The victim’s body
was never found, nor was a weapon or any forensic evidence recovered. The case against
Bell was largely based on the testimony of two witnesses, one who claimed to have been
present at the murder scene but not a participant, and another who said that Bell came to
his house following the murder and showed him the robbery proceeds. This witness also
corroborated some elements of the first witness’s story. The district court found three
Brady violations. First, the State suppressed a prior statement of the second witness that
was inconsistent with his trial testimony. Second, the State failed to disclose that the
prosecutor threatened the second witness with a habitual offender prosecution if he did
not testify. Third, the State suppressed a tacit agreement with the first witness not to
prosecute him for his involvement in the case. The court found that while evidence in the
case was sufficient to show that Bell was involved in some way in the crime, the Brady
evidence was enough to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome at
sentencing.
Ramsey v. Belleque
2005 WL 1502875 (D. Or. June 10, 2005)
In robbery and assault case, prosecution violated Brady by suppressing evidence of
unrelated drug sales by Ramsey’s alleged victim to a confidential informant which would
have impeached the victim’s testimony at Ramsey’s trial. The victim had claimed that he
and Ramsey were former drug dealing partners and that after their partnership ended,
Ramsey robbed him and shot him in the leg. The victim claimed he was no longer
dealing drugs at the time of the incident. The suppressed evidence, which was discovered
shortly after Ramsey’s conviction when drug dealing charges were brought against the
victim, could have supported Ramsey’s defense that the victim had fronted drugs to
Ramsey and that the victim was accidently shot after pulling a gun on Ramsey during a
dispute about payment for the drugs. Notably, the prosecutor had argued to the jurors
that to find for Ramsey, they would have to believe that the victim was still dealing drugs.
By refusing to grant Ramsey a new trial, the state court unreasonably applied clearly
established federal law.
United States v. Hammer
404 F.Supp.2d 676 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (capital case)
Petitioner was entitled to sentencing phase relief under § 2255 based on prosecution’s
suppression of evidence supporting petitioner’s version of how the murder of his cellmate
occurred. The cellmate was tied to his bed with braided sheets and strangled.
Prosecution theorized that the cellmate agreed to be tied up as part of a hostage ruse that
would get him transferred to a different prison. Petitioner pled guilty, but specifically
denied the hostage ruse scenario and that he had braided the sheets for this purpose.
Prosecution failed to disclose third party statements indicating that petitioner regularly
engaged in sexual activity with other inmates involving tying inmates down with braided
sheets. Guilt-phase relief was denied because petitioner specifically denied the
sheets/hostage ruse elements of the prosecution’s case at his plea, and yet pled guilty
anyway. Penalty phase relief was appropriate because the prosecution had relied
primarily on the fact of the braided sheet tie-down scenario to prove the substantial
planning and premeditation aggravator, one of only two found by the jury, among many
mitigating circumstances.
Powell v. Mullin
2006 WL 249632 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 31, 2006) (capital case)
Prosecution violated petitioner’s constitutional rights by suppressing evidence concerning
benefits provided to the sole identification witness and leaving uncorrected false
testimony about the absence of benefits. During habeas proceedings, petitioner offered
evidence that the prosecutor had written a letter to the parole board requesting leniency
following the witness’s testimony in petitioner’s co-defendant’s case, produced a letter
from the witness to his mother regarding deal negotiations, and introduced testimony
regarding a phone call between the witness’s mother and a member of the prosecution
team about benefits to the witness. The prosecutor’s testimony that he sought benefits for
the witness without being asked and without alerting the witness he had done so was
rejected. (Note that co-defendant, whose trial preceded the letter to the parole board, was
denied relief. Douglas v. Mullin, 2006 WL 249663 (W.D. Okla., Jan. 31, 2006).)
Wilson v. Beard
2006 WL 2346277 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9 2006) (capital case)
In barroom shooting case where the prosecution’s evidence centered on two eyewitnesses
and one long-time police informant, the prosecution violated Brady by withholding
impeachment evidence. It failed to disclose evidence that one eyewitness had a lengthy
criminal history, including impersonating a police officer, and an extensive psychiatric
history as a result of several head injuries. The prosecution further withheld evidence that
the other eyewitness had an extensive psychiatric history, including medication with
antipsychotic drugs. Also not disclosed to petitioner was that during his trial, this witness
was transported by a detective from the prosecutor’s office for emergency psychiatric care
whereupon he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Regarding the informant witness,
petitioner was not told that the officer who took his statement had been giving the witness
interest free loans for some time. This same officer at trial had denied providing anything
to the informant.
Perez v. United States
2006 WL 2355868 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 15, 2006)
In case involving prosecution for illegal reentry into the U.S., the prosecution violated
Brady because it had constructive knowledge that the defendant was a U.S. citizen at the
time he was originally deported and at the time of reentry but failed to disclose it. (The
defendant had been unaware that he automatically had become a naturalized U.S. citizen
derivatively through his mother's successful naturalization.)
Mark v. Burger
2006 WL 2556577 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 31, 2006)
Habeas relied granted to petitioner convicted through circumstantial evidence of
murdering his brother and his brother’s family based on consideration of 14 documents
that were not turned over to the defense or trial court, and 10 that were provided to the
trial court for review but not provided to the defense. The evidence fell into several
categories. First, expert testimony attempted to place petitioner at the crime scene based
on “O” secretor saliva on four cigarette butts. The prosecution suppressed evidence that
its expert said that in small samples “A” secretor saliva can test as “O.” Second, a
witness who placed petitioner in the area at the time of the crime said he knew he saw
petitioner on Friday because he went to the doctor on Saturday. The prosecution
suppressed evidence that the doctor’s appointment was actually on Friday. Third, the
prosecution suppressed evidence of a potential alibi witness. Fourth, several witnesses
placed petitioner at various gas stations on the route to the crime scene. The prosecution
suppressed numerous inconsistencies amongst their statements, and statements of other
witnesses contracting the inculpatory statements. Finally, the prosecution suppressed
evidence related to shoeprints, including evidence indicating that several types of shoes
could match the marks made at the scene. The evidence was cumulatively material, an
analysis which the state court failed to undertake.
Tassin v Cain
___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 942355 (E.D. La. 2007) (capital case)
Capital conviction and death sentence reversed where critical prosecution witness
provided misleading and uncorrected testimony about the sentence she was to receive as
part of her plea agreement. She testified that she could be sentenced up to 99 years, that
she did not know whether her testimony would affect her sentencing, and that she had
been made no promises concerning her testimony. In fact, as established in state post-
conviction proceedings, the witness had been informed by her attorney that the judge had
told him the witness should expect a 10 year sentence if she testified, based on the
consistency of her testimony. The state court had denied relief because Tassin had failed
to establish that an actual promise had been made to the witness. This decision was
contrary to Brady by applying “a more stringent standard than the one established by
Supreme Court precedent.” Materiality is found because the witness’s testimony was
crucial to the State’s case in that it provided the only evidence of a plan to commit armed
robbery.
Montgomery v. Bagley
___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 1038972 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (capital case)
In double murder case, capital convictions and death sentence reversed where prosecution
withheld a police report indicating that a witness, who knew victim Ogle, saw her alive
four days after the prosecution theorized she was murdered. The evidence was material
because it directly contradicted the testimony of the co-defendant who had a motive to lie
to exculpate himself due to circumstantial evidence pointing to both him and
Montgomery. That Ogle was seen four days after victim Tincher was found dead also
undermined the prosecution’s theory that Montgomery’s motive to kill Tincher was to
eliminate the only person who saw Montgomery with Ogle the day the prosecution
contended she was killed.